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This thesis uses South Africa as a case study to examine the gendered effects of tariff 
liberalisation on labour market outcomes at the local level. Specifically, the thesis focuses on 
the effect of tariff liberalisation on regional employment growth, labour adjustment in the 
manufacturing sector and services sector, and internal migration over a period (1996 to 2011) 
in which South Africa substantially reduced tariff protection. This was also a period 
corresponding with low employment growth and declines in the manufacturing share of 
employment that vary by gender and race as well as across regions. The experience of South 
Africa, therefore, presents a useful context to empirically identify the association between tariff 
liberalisation and gendered outcomes in local labour markets.   
 
To analyse the relationship between tariff liberalisation and local labour market outcomes, the 
structure of the thesis chapters is configured around four research questions:  
1. How is regional employment growth distributed in South Africa? 
2. What is the effect of tariff liberalisation on gendered employment and wages in 
manufacturing? 
3. How does tariff liberalisation in manufacturing affect wages and employment by gender 
in the services sector?  
4. Does tariff liberalisation drive internal migration?  
 
The thesis draws on a regional level database of employment, wages and migration constructed 
using South African Population Census data for 1996, 2001 and 2011, that is combined with 
product-level import tariff data over the period.  
 
Chapter 2 sets the context for the thesis by assessing key sources of regional employment 
growth across the 234 local municipalities in South Africa. The chapter adopts a dynamic 
industry shift-share analysis method that decomposes the growth in national employment into 
three sources: (i) national growth effects, (ii) industry-mix effects and (iii) regional competitive 
effects. The results reveal substantial variation in employment growth across regions that is 
closely associated with the regions’ industry composition and competitiveness. Our findings 
also reveal that industry-mix effects are negatively correlated with the initial employment ratio 




the regions’ initial income level, initial share of female workers, initial share of Black female 
workers, initial share of Black male workers, and initial share of White female workers. This 
descriptive review and data analysis demonstrates the importance of industry composition in 
driving regional patterns of employment growth and reveals how these changes are associated 
with the gender and racial composition of workers in the region. The remainder of the thesis 
analyses how tariff liberalisation may have contributed towards these outcomes.  
 
Chapter 3 investigates the gendered effects of tariff liberalisation on manufacturing 
employment in South Africa. The chapter adopts the Bartik (1991) approach and exploits 
variations in the regional composition of industries to identify how tariffs affect manufacturing 
employment at the local level. To examine the effect of tariff reductions on manufacturing 
employment, a first-difference instrumental variable estimation strategy is employed. First, the 
results indicate that tariff reductions had no effect on manufacturing wages, with its impact 
falling entirely on employment. Municipalities that were more exposed to tariff reductions 
experienced slower growth in manufacturing employment of both men and women. The effect 
was significantly stronger for women, particularly Black women, thus widening the gender 
employment gap. The results of testing for the various channels that may have given rise to 
these gendered effects reveal the dominant sources to be industry segregation combined with 
the comparatively large reductions in tariffs in female-intensive industries such as textiles, 
clothing, and footwear.  
 
Chapter 4 investigates whether tariff liberalisation is associated with structural shifts in 
employment from manufacturing to services by employing a similar empirical approach to that 
used in Chapter 3. Consistent with theoretical expectations, the chapter illustrates that tariff 
liberalisation was associated with strong increases in the services to manufacturing 
employment ratio, but this shift was not driven by the absorption of employment in the services 
sector. In fact, employment in the services sector also fell in regions experiencing relatively 
large tariff reductions. Further analysis demonstrates that the decline in services employment 
was driven by lower derived demand, income, and manufacturing infrastructure investment 
that are linked to the decline in manufacturing from tariff reductions. The results also show that 
tariff effects differed by gender and race. The implication of the results is that spillover effects 
from the decline in manufacturing diminished the absorption of labour by the services sector, 





The final chapter, Chapter 5, provides a descriptive analysis on how tariff liberalisation affects 
internal migration in South Africa. Tariff liberalisation alters relative wages and relative 
employment opportunities across regions, thus giving rise to internal migration. The extent to 
which labour responds to these changes by migrating affects the local market outcomes of 
liberalisation. The analysis utilises a gravity-style model and instrumental variable estimation 
strategy to estimate the effect of tariff liberalisation on internal bilateral migration flows. The 
main finding is that there was higher out-migration and lower in-migration in regions that 
experienced relatively large tariff reductions, as is predicted by theory. The chapter reveals that 
tariff-induced internal migration differed across gender in both locations with women 
appearing to be more spatially mobile than men. The chapter also teases out gender implication 
by race and family structure. The core finding is that tariff-induced gendered internal migration 
varied according to individual characteristics. 
 
Overall, the thesis provides new evidence regarding the impact of tariff liberalisation on local 
labour market outcomes in South Africa. Liberalisation had no effect on regional wages, but 
lowered employment and induced internal migration. The research also reveals substantial 
changes in the gender and industry composition of regional employment associated with tariff 
liberalisation. The thesis contributes to international trade theory by highlighting that the 
gendered effects of tariff liberalisation are country-specific, largely dependent on the intensity 
of tariff reductions and the gender intensities across industries. The study also demonstrates 
that internal migration is a mechanism for mitigating the undesirable effects of liberalisation. 
Accordingly, the thesis emphasises that tariff liberalisation effects are not homogenous across 
gender, and thus gender-specific policies may be required to ameliorate the unequal adjustment 
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1.1 Background and Motivation 
 
The impact of tariff liberalisation on employment is an interesting economic issue because the 
world has become more integrated through multilateral and preferential tariff reductions. The 
influence of tariff liberalisation on the labour market has preoccupied trade negotiators, trade 
economist and policymakers across the globe for the past 40 years. Debates have largely been 
centred around determining the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of international trade among developed 
and developing countries. Existing research illustrates that in developed countries tariff 
reductions have reduced employment and increased wage inequality, particularly in the 
manufacturing sector (Autor et al., 2015; Pierce & Schott, 2016) while in developing countries 
outcomes has been more positive. For example, tariff liberalisation has reduced poverty and 
improved welfare in China (Huang et al., 2003) and India (Pavcnik, 2017), and expanded the 
manufacturing export sectors in Vietnam (Nguyen, 2016). 
 
The effect of tariff liberalisation on labour market outcomes within countries is relevant from 
a theoretical and empirical perspective. In general, analysis of the impact of tariff liberalisation 
on factor markets has drawn on traditional trade theories such the Heckscher-Ohlin model and 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem. However, two pivotal considerations need to be noted about these 
models. 
 
Firstly, these models focus on the long-run and assume that labour is fully mobile across sectors 
and regions. The consideration of costs associated with adjustment in the production structure 
across industries and regions of the economy in the short to medium-run is necessary in order 
to estimate the entire adjustment effects of tariff liberalisation in the labour market. These 
considerations may be particularly important in emerging economies given pronounced 
frictions to the mobility of workers across industries and regions in these economies.  
 
Secondly, the adjustment and welfare effects are commonly assumed in the application of these 




towards understanding the potential gendered effects of tariff liberalisation. This is because the 
participation of women in the labour market has increased over the years in the context of 
global integration and tariff liberalisation. Historically, global labour markets have been 
dominated by male workers, but this trend has been changing as the gender employment gap 
has narrowed. Even though global labour force participation has declined for men and women, 
men face stronger reductions. The International Labour Organization (2018) shows that labour 
force participation of women has decreased from 51.2% in 1998 to 48.5% in 2018 while that 
of men declined from 78.8% to 75.1% over the same period. Moreover, empirical evidence 
shows that tariff policies have heterogeneous effects on industries. For example, in some 
emerging economies such as Brazil (Gaddis & Pieters, 2017) and Indonesia (Kis-Katos et al., 
2018), liberalisation promoted the growth of female-intensive industries, especially the 
clothing and textile industries, and this led to distinctive impacts on the gender composition of 
employment.  
 
Other theories, such as the Specific-Factors model, that allow for labour market rigidities 
provide alternative perspectives of labour market adjustments to tariff liberalisation. In this 
model, when factors are specific to an industry or a region, tariff shocks result in industry-
specific or region-specific changes in wages and labour market outcomes. Gendered labour 
market outcomes will arise if there are differences in industry or regional specificities in 
employment of men and women.  
 
Feminist economics provides additional explanations for the industry specificities and 
rigidities. This theoretical literature focuses on the labour force participation of women by 
touching on several aspects such labour market participation (Tejani & Milberg, 2016), 
working conditions (Benería, 2003) and household responsibilities (Braunstein & Folbre, 
2001).  
 
Seguino and Braunstein (2018) explain that gender inequality in the labour market is driven by 
persistent stratification ingrained in institutions which favour men at the expense of women. 
One of the main mechanisms through which stratification occurs is the exclusion of women in 
the workforce where men monopolise jobs (Braunstein & Seguino, 2018) through collective 
bargaining (Braunstein & Folbre, 2001) and thereby maintain their economic status which may 
be socially costly (Berik et al., 2009). This collective bargaining and strong social network 




excluding women in the labour market is facilitated by societal norms and stereotypes. Norms 
and stereotypes are societal perceptions of suitability of work for men and women that are 
based on gender roles (Braunstein & Seguino, 2018) and bolster gender inequality in the labour 
market (Berik et al., 2009). For example, society has a perception that men are more suited for 
formal employment while women are expected to be in unpaid work in the household (Berik 
et al., 2009; Braunstein & Folbre, 2001; Braunstein & Seguino, 2018).  
 
Individuals face societal pressures to follow these norms and this creates boundaries to women 
from entering formal employment and certain industries which may be deemed more suitable 
for men. These norms and stereotypes also affect the demand side of the labour market. Seguino 
and Braunstein (2018) highlight that firms may be resistant to hiring women in skill-intensive 
or capital-intensive industries to avoid increasing costs associated with investing in training 
women. This is a form of a stereotype that assumes that women require more training than men. 
Firms also discriminate against women by employing them in low-paying jobs that often lack 
job security. Elson and Pearson (1981) state that women are perceived as having ‘nimble 
fingers’, docility, submissiveness and are non-union members. These stereotypes make women 
more vulnerable to exploitation and exclusion.  
 
Nonetheless, Braunstein and Folbre (2001) acknowledge that technological progress 
(associated with tariff liberalisation) and the resultant shift in relative prices between formal 
employment and household work can improve the employment of women primarily in the 
formal labour market. This will lead to a narrow gender employment gap.   
 
The implication is that liberalisation of tariffs accompanied by technological progress and 
coupled with societal norms, which restrict women to certain industries such as the clothing 
and textile industry, are likely to benefit women in countries that have a comparative advantage 
in the labour-intensive and female-intensive industries. Furthermore, the interaction of tariff 
liberalisation in countries with rigidities that affect employment opportunities and industry 
composition of employment can give rise to differential impacts across gender. 
 
The thesis is motivated by the observation that few studies have examined Sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries. International studies that employ the Specific-Factors model show that 
liberalisation has unanticipated differential labour market effects on men and women (Autor et 




(Artuç et al., 2010; Pavcnik, 2017). These findings demonstrate that the dynamics to 
adjustments vary and the distribution of gains and losses are dependent on rigidities. Failure to 
account for rigidities leads to an underestimation of the full effect of tariffs on labour market 
outcomes.  
 
This thesis aims to fill the gap in the existing literature by providing new evidence of tariff 
liberalisation effects on labour market outcomes in a middle-income country. The thesis is 
structured to expand the existing literature by focusing on five key dimensions of labour market 
outcomes, namely: Regional employment dynamics, gender, sectoral employment and wages 
(specifically manufacturing and services) as well as migration. The thesis focuses on the 
manufacturing and services sectors and not in other tradable (primary) sectors specifically 
agriculture and mining for the following reasons. First, there were minimal tariff reductions in 
mining. As a result, the tariff data on mining does not have provided sufficient variation across 
the mining industries. Second, census data on employment in agriculture is noisy. There are a 
number of inconsistencies regarding the collection of this data in all three censuses, 1996, 2001 
and 2011. Third, a similar study by Erten et al. (2019) found the effect of tariff reductions in 
agriculture and mining are statistically insignificant.  
 
1.2 Relevance and Contribution of the Thesis  
 
Evidence in developed countries on the tariff liberalisation effects in the labour market are well 
documented. The existing body of international literature has highlighted the importance of 
regional economies and regional variation in labour market outcomes. These studies provide 
empirical evidence of large and persistent within-country regional employment variation and 
the sources of regional employment change (Brox & Carvalho, 2008; Cochrane & Poot, 2008; 
Matlaba et al., 2014; Mitchell & Carlson, 2003). This literature highlights that national 
employment growth is driven by regional employment growth, which in turn is predominantly 
underpinned by differential industry composition. 
 
The thesis also draws on two strands of emerging theoretical and empirical international 
literature to address the scarcity of research on the effects of tariff liberalisation on the labour 
market in the SSA region. The first strand highlights spatially differentiated labour market 
outcomes (employment, wages, and poverty) arising from international trade (Autor et al., 




the literature shows that tariff liberalisation can increase the wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers (Dix-Carneiro & Kovak, 2015), decrease employment in manufacturing 
(Autor et al., 2015; Gaddis & Pieters, 2017), lower poverty levels (Topalova, 2010) and 
stimulate internal migration (Dix-Carneiro & Kovak, 2017; Kovak, 2013).  
 
Differences in regional industry composition, factor endowment and region-specific 
competitiveness give rise to differentiated local labour market responses to the liberalisation of 
tariffs. Focussing on regions within a country allows for sector-specific, region-specific and 
other local labour market frictions that influence outcomes in the economy.  
 
There is a widespread view of local labour market view of the effects of tariffs in emerging 
economies such as Brazil, India and Indonesia. However, evidence for SSA countries is 
minimal. This is an important gap in the literature because countries in the SSA region are 
characterised by far more frictions than countries in other regions. Specifically, South Africa 
differs from both advanced and emerging economies because it does not have a comparative 
advantage in female-intensive manufacturing industries (Alleyne & Subramanian, 2001; Bell 
& Cattaneo, 1997). Despite being a middle-income country with an abundance of labour, South 
Africa’s trade is found to be relatively capital abundant and the country has low exports 
volumes in labour-intensive goods (Alleyne & Subramanian, 2001) such as clothing and 
textiles. Furthermore, South Africa has a unique history, having experienced the negative 
effects of colonisation and apartheid, unlike other African countries. This history has created a 
complex set of challenges for the country. One of the legacies of apartheid is high and persistent 
unemployment, which varies by gender and population group (Casale, 2004; Casale & Posel, 
2002). Historically women have been discriminated against in the labour market, and this 
discrimination is fuelled by cultural and legal constraints. Initiatives have been implemented 
to increase the economic activity of women, however, South Africa is still lagging behind other 
countries in terms of gender convergence (Leibbrandt et al., 2010). It is for these reasons we 
anticipate that the effects of tariff liberalisation may play out differently for SSA than for 
advanced and emerging economies. 
 
The second strand of international literature proposes that the labour market effects of tariff 
liberalisation are gendered. Wage and manufacturing employment effects of tariff liberalisation 
are likely to be gendered given that men and women may differ in terms of skills levels, 




manufacturing and services. The evidence from the emerging literature is inconclusive, 
suggesting that gendered employment effects differ according to the level of development of a 
country. Studies from a developed country point to an increase in the gender employment gap, 
while those from developing countries suggest that international trade reduces the gap. Autor 
et al. (2015) reveal that increased Chinese competition in the US led to a decline in employment 
of both men and women, but the negative trade effects were sturdier on female workers. In 
contrast, Gaddis and Pieters (2017) find that the negative employment effects of tariff 
liberalisation in Brazil were larger on male employment. In Indonesia, the reduction of input 
tariffs benefitted female-intensive industries, increasing work participation of women (Kis-
Katos et al., 2018). 
 
Based on the literature, empirical evidence on the effects of tariff liberalisation on gendered 
labour market outcomes at the local level remains limited, particularly in SSA countries. This 
thesis aims to fill this research gap by empirically examining the gendered effects of tariff 
liberalisation on manufacturing employment, services and internal migration in South Africa 
using new and regionally consistent population census data between 1996 and 2011.  
 
The thesis contributes to the existing literature in several ways: Firstly, Chapter 1 sets the scene 
for the rest of the thesis by utilising an industry shift-share decomposition approach to assess 
regional dynamics. The analysis is extended by exploring contributing factors to the regional 
industry-mix. This analysis is underexplored in existing literature in South Africa. The 
descriptive analysis shows huge variations in regional employment growth in South Africa 
underpinned by heterogeneity in region-specific factors namely the industry-mix and regional 
competitiveness. We also find that the industry-mix to be positively associated with high initial 
share of employment in nontradable sectors. These outcomes are consistent with the expected 
effects of tariff liberalisation since the employment effects of tariffs through changes in the 
industry composition.   
 
Secondly, in Chapter 3, we investigate the gendered tariff effects on manufacturing 
employment using the Bartik (1991) approach. This chapter also investigates the channels 
through which tariff reductions have an effect on manufacturing employment. The results show 
that tariff liberalisation in South Africa had an unfavourable effect on manufacturing 
employment and the adverse effect was stronger on women compared to men. Our results differ 




(Kis-Katos et al., 2018) where tariff liberalisation benefitted women. The disproportionate 
effects on women in South Africa were driven mainly by industry-bias tariff reductions which 
disadvantaged female-intensive industries and industry-segregation. 
 
Thirdly, literature that explores the gendered effects in services is also scarce. Moreover, the 
few studies that do examine services employment do not probe the channels through which 
tariffs in manufacturing affect employment in services. Chapter 4 explores the transmission 
channels namely: derived demand from manufacturing, income, and manufacturing 
infrastructure investment. The findings highlight a modest tariff-induced structural change. 
Additionally, we also find evidence that tariff liberalisation also slowed services employment 
growth through the transmission channels from manufacturing. Taken together, our results 
show that the structural change was due to much stronger reductions in manufacturing 
employment, rather than an increase in services employment. The effects of tariff liberalisation 
on services employment are heterogeneous across gender and race. The services sector employs 
more women relative to men. Tariff liberalisation slowed services employment of Black men 
and White women more than their counterparts.     
 
Fourthly, the literature on internal migration in South Africa explores the various push and pull 
factors. Chapter 5 deepens this literature by including tariff reduction as a determinant of 
internal migration. This descriptive analysis provides insight into the response mechanism of 
internal migration in developing countries to tariff liberalisation. The results indicate that 
workers responded to the negative effects of tariff reductions by migrating out of regions. We 
also find a stronger movement of women compared to men. This suggests that women 
responded to the negative tariff effects in manufacturing by migrating to less-affected regions. 
We also find that tariff liberalisation had unequal effects on internal migration of women when 
taking into consideration the family structure, mainly marital status and fertility. 
 
1.3 Why South Africa? 
 
South Africa represents an important case study for several reasons. Firstly, South Africa has 
experienced significant reductions in tariffs from the early 1990s. The process started with the 
entry of South African into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Moreover, the government 
signed several preferential trade agreements, including bilateral and regional trade agreements, 




South Africa-European Union Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA). 
Edwards and Abdi (2002) report that average nominal protection for the whole economy was 
reduced to 15.1% in 1997 from 29% in 1990, while, for manufacturing goods, average nominal 
protection was reduced to 15.6% from 30% over the same period. Unlike in other emerging 
economies, tariffs fell disproportionately on the textile, clothing and footwear industry (Erten 
et al., 2019) which is dominated by women. The experience in South Africa may, therefore 
differ substantially from that of other emerging economies such as Indonesia, where growth in 
this industry post-liberalisation provided a major boost to female employment. An overview of 
tariff liberalisation in South Africa is provided in Table 1.1A in the appendix section.  
 
Secondly, there is a massive disparity in terms of economic activity, growth, and employment 
across space and population groups in South Africa. Historically, this is largely due to apartheid 
policies that reinforced spatial imbalances by developing major cities at the expense of the 
homelands and other remote rural areas. According to Bosker and Krugell (2006), the apartheid 
system encouraged the development of inefficient industries, inefficient land use, and excessive 
transport costs, together with under-investment in transport infrastructure, 
telecommunications, and electric power in the homelands. Therefore, given the apartheid 
spatial legacy, we may anticipate distinctive local level effects arising from liberalisation.  
 
Thirdly, South Africa is also characterised by extremely high unemployment and low, albeit 
rising, labour force participation, particularly among women. Many academics argue that high 
unemployment reflects rigidities in the labour market with wages determined on a sectoral and 
regional basis for many manufacturing industries (Bhorat et al., 2009). The implication is that, 
in South Africa, the labour market outcomes of increased international competition may be 
revealed by changes in employment levels rather than wages.  
 
Fourthly, there are strong reasons to anticipate differences in the effects of tariff liberalisation 
on men and women may also differ from the experience of other emerging economies. Tariffs 
fell disproportionately on the female intensive clothing and textiles industries in South Africa 
(Erten et al., 2019). Countering this effect is that average skill levels of employed women are 
higher than those of men, in large part due to the lower labour force participation of women 
and the selection of more skilled into employment (Statistics South Africa, 2012). Females, on 
aggregate, may thus be better placed to have higher wages and employment in response to the 




Fifthly, the persisting effects of apartheid on the South African economy may give rise to 
distinctive heterogeneous effects of tariff liberalisation across race. South Africa is distinct 
from other middle-income countries because of its particular history of apartheid, which 
entrenched racial discrimination, and deepened gender discrimination. At the core of apartheid 
was racial segregation and discrimination against Blacks (Africans, Coloureds, and 
Indians/Asians) people in terms of access to land, education, location of settlement, mobility, 
employment opportunities across industries, and economic participation (Choe & Chrite, 2014; 
Von Fintel & Moses, 2017)1. Historically, it is difficult to separate gender discrimination from 
race in a country like South Africa. The education policies discriminated by race, resulting in 
substantive differences in education curricula, educational attainment, and education 
departments (Bhorat, 2005). Apartheid labour and employment policies also clearly 
discriminated by race. Black people were prevented from fully participating in the economy, 
being restricted to unskilled-intensive and low-wages industries. This legacy has resulted in 
huge gaps in terms of employment and skills levels between Blacks and Whites (Burger & 
Jafta, 2006). 
 
Furthermore, unemployment in South Africa is disproportionately high among Africans, 
particularly in the rural areas and former homelands. This historical legacy is also what makes 
the country distinct from other middle-income countries in terms of its economic outcomes. 
The knock-on effect of this is that tariff liberalisation is expected to give rise to labour market 
effects that will differ starkly by race and gender. The racial divide in the economy has 
implication on the taste for discrimination by firms. The Neoclassical trade theory predicts that 
increased import competition reduces discrimination because of the pro-competitive effects of 
trade (Becker, 2010).  
 
South Africa is also an interesting case study to look at tariff-induced gendered migration, 
given its apartheid history. The government initiated and implemented various laws which 
constrained the mobility and settlement of Africans (who constitute about 80% of the 
population) dating back from 1923 (Choe & Chrite, 2014; Von Fintel & Moses, 2017). 
 
1 The removal of African people from urban to rural areas, and to designated peri-urban areas, had an effect on their access to 
education and their choice and place of work. Access to education was skewed (Bhorat, 2005), with Whites getting a superior 
education in terms of tuition and resources, and one that allowed them to participate fully in the economy. African people, on 
the other hand, received “Bantu” education (Heugh, 1999; Thomas, 1996), an inferior and inadequately resourced education 
system. In the post-apartheid era, educational quality for, and attainment of, Africans is persistently lower than that of Whites 
(Burger & Jafta, 2006). There remain huge gaps in terms of employment and skills levels between Africans and Whites (Burger 
& Jafta 2006). Furthermore, unemployment in South Africa is disproportionately high among African people, particularly in 




Migration was also intrinsically gender-biased because it occurred within the labour migrant 
system which favoured men, in particular, African men, who worked in mines in the urban 
areas (Von Fintel & Moses, 2017; Posel, 2004). African women remained behind in the 
homelands (or rural areas). This historical fact indicates that tariff liberalisation may have 
unique gendered effects in South Africa.  
 
Lastly, the choice of South Africa is reinforced by gaps in the empirical literature. Studies on 
the effect of tariff liberalisation on the labour market in South Africa by Bhorat and Hodge 
(1999), Edwards (2001) and Rodrik (2008) demonstrate a structural shift in employment away 
from manufacturing towards services from the early 1990s. The role of tariff liberalisation in 
driving these changes has not been firmly established. In contrast, Dunne and Edwards (2006) 
reveal that employment lost in the manufacturing sector in South Africa due to import 
penetration from 1994 to 2003 was counteracted by employment gains in the services sector, 
in particular, employment growth in the retail and wholesale industries.   
 
Other national studies such as Bhorat (2000) and Thurlow (2006) find that tariff liberalisation 
decreased the employment share of male workers and increased the share of female workers in 
South Africa. In contrast, Cockburn et al. (2007) argue that liberalisation led to a decline in 
labour force participation and employment of women in South Africa, pointing to the fact that 
women are concentrated in the previously heavily protected textile, clothing, and footwear 
industry. None of these studies explores the gendered employment effects of tariff liberalisation 
at the local level.    
 
The first published study on the effects of tariff liberalisation on regional labour market 
outcomes in South Africa, by Erten et al. (2019) finds no wage effects but large reductions in 
manufacturing employment relative to other sectors in districts that experienced relatively high 
tariff reductions. Their study does not identify the gendered effects of these employment 
changes. 
 
Overall, the available literature on the tariff liberalisation effects on local labour market 
outcomes has several limitations. The bulk of the literature focuses on the national labour 
market, thus omits regional heterogeneity at the local labour market level. The literature also 
does not provide adequate evidence on the gendered effects of tariff liberalisation, more 




liberalisation on gendered employment have not been fully explored. Lastly, the South African 
literature fails to investigate the gendered tariff effects across race. This is a vital omission in 
a country that has a racially segmented labour market.   
 
This thesis augments the available literature by investigating the gendered effects of tariff 
liberalisation on local labour market outcomes in a middle-income country. In doing so, the 
thesis contributes to the South African literature in several ways. First, the thesis contributes to 
policy by providing insight into the gendered effects of trade on local labour markets. Second, 
it provides additional and more nuanced evidence than is currently available on middle-income 
countries. Third, it unpacks the channels that explain the gendered employment effects of tariff 
liberalisation, thus contributing to the ongoing global debate on gender inequality. Fourth, the 
research provides empirical evidence on the tariff liberalisation effects on labour market 
outcomes by gender and across racial groups. Fifth, the thesis offers a comprehensive analysis 
of the dynamics of labour adjustment to tariff liberalisation in the manufacturing and services 
sectors and changes in migration patterns.  
 
1.4 The South African Context 
 
Following the political transformation in 1994, South Africa experienced economic 
transformation including the abolishment of sanctions, the inclusion of Blacks in the formal 
banking sector and other sectors of the economy as well as accelerated trade and capital 
controls liberalisation (Jonsson, 2001). At the onset of democracy, the government introduced 
a number of macroeconomic policies in an effort to bring about increased and balanced 
economic growth, reduce unemployment and narrow the inequality gap. These policies include 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme (1995), Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) adopted in 1996 and Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for 
South Africa (AsgiSA) which was implemented in 2006. Essentially these policies were geared 
towards redressing the inherited social, economic and spatial ills from apartheid. 
 
There is a huge disparity in terms of economic activity, growth and employment across space. 
Apartheid reinforced the spatial imbalance by developing major cities at the expense of the 
homelands and other remote areas. Naudé & Krugell (2004) show that around 82% of Gross 




developed parts of the country. The spatial economy is also characterised by increased 
urbanisation. 
 
South Africa’s six largest cities include Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni metropolitan, Durban, Cape 
Town, Pretoria (currently known as Tshwane metropole) and Port Elizabeth which is now 
referred to as Nelson Mandela metropole (Naudé, 2010; Naudé & Krugell, 2004). These cities 
gained their prominence through trade, mining, favourable climate as well as Apartheid's 
policies which promoted the development of these areas (Feinstein, 2005). 
 
1.4.1. The labour market and feminisation  
 
The South African labour market is characterised by chronic unemployment and slow 
employment creation. Despite these efforts by the government, economic growth remains 
constrained. Bhorat & Cassim (2004) attribute the modest growth improvements to the decline 
in gross capital formation, slow growth in aggregate demand, poor international 
competitiveness and declining productivity growth.  
 
We will separate our discussion of the labour market into two time periods: 1970-1995 and 
1995-1999. The overview of the labour market post-2001 is presented in Section 2.5 of this 
paper. 
 
South Africa entered a recession in the early 1970s, which coincided with a structural shift in 
the economy away from the traditional tradable sector to the non-tradable sector, with 
increasing capital intensity in production  (Bhorat & McCord, 2003). According to Bhorat & 
McCord (2003), this had a major impact on the labour market. The change in the structure of 
the economy led to a change in the composition of labour demand, with increasing demand for 
skilled labour. Parallel to this, technological changes brought about by international trade 
increased the capital-to-labour ratio (Jenkins, 2008). Firms substituted labour for capital and 
the consequence was a further reduction in demand for unskilled labour. South Africa paid a 
heavy price for this because its labour force is largely unskilled. During this period, labour 
demand was skewed towards workers with matric and tertiary education, as opposed to workers 
with lower levels of education, making education an important determinant of employment 





This period in South Africa was also the beginning of feminisation of the labour force. Demand 
for female workers grew by 3%, while demand for male workers dropped marginally by 1.7% 
(Bhorat & McCord, 2003). The unequal effect across gender is underpinned by the contraction 
of the primary sector which was dominated by male workers, and the expansion of the services 
sector, which has a high share of female workers. 
 
The period 1995 – 1999 was marked by an increase in labour supply, which exceeded labour 
demand. The end of Apartheid allowed South Africans of all races to participate freely in the 
labour market. South Africa was not, however, able to absorb all the labour that was available. 
Bhorat and McCord (2003) show that in this period employment rose by 12% but labour supply 
increased by 33.4%, reflecting subdued job creation. In real terms, Bhorat and McCord (2003) 
record that 1.1 million jobs were created, while 3.1 million people entered the job market, a 
shortfall of 2 million jobs. Feminisation of the labour market increased and the female 
economically active population grew by 30%, almost double that of males (Bhorat & McCord, 
2003). Casale & Posel (2002) and Casale (2004) suggest that increased female labour force 
participation is spurred on by chronic female unemployment. Although the supply of female 
labour increased during this period, jobs created were insufficient to match the supply, resulting 
in female unemployment rising to 42.8%, compared to the male unemployment rate of 29.7% 
(Bhorat & McCord, 2003). 
 
Empirical research on the causes of poor employment creation in South Africa is extensive.    
Some studies have pointed to supply-side factors, such as poor education, a skills shortage, and 
the lack of experience among job-seekers as major factors contributing to the slow growth of 
employment (Leibbrandt et al., 2010). This research area has been covered relatively well in 
South African literature, using household data. 
 
Other studies have emphasised regulatory impediments to employment creation. Following the 
end of apartheid, South Africa implemented new labour policies and legislation, including the 
Labour Relations Act of 1995, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997, the 
Employment Equity Act of 1998, the Skills Development Act of 1998 and the Skills 
Development Levies Act of 1999 (Leibbrandt et al., 2010). In addition, wage bargaining 
councils were introduced, in which trade unions negotiate with employers on matters related 
to wages, working conditions, and employee benefits, on behalf of workers (Bhorat et al., 




Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs), causing firms to substitute labour with 
capital (Kingdon & Knight, 2003; Nattrass & Seekings, 2012). Nattrass & Seekings (2012). 
Nattrass & Seekings (2012) also argue that the extension of wage bargaining agreements to all 
firms in industry has prevented the emergence of low-wage, labour-intensive firms.   
 
Demand-side factors, such as technological change and international trade are also contributing 
factors to the observed structural change and declining employment levels (Bhorat et al., 2014; 
Rodrik, 2008). These factors may have reduced the labour content of output and possibly the 
share of skilled labour in production (Cassim et al., 2004). More relevant for this thesis is the 
relationship between tariff liberalisation and labour. 
 
1.4.2 South African Tariff Liberalisation  
 
South Africa has experienced major transitions in trade policies over the decades and the 
history of South Africa’s tariff liberalisation prior to the 1990s has been covered extensively 
in the literature. From 1925 until the 1970s South Africa’s tariff liberalisation was geared 
towards import substitution (Edwards & Behar, 2005). At the time, gold was a major source of 
export revenue, and this was a concern for policymakers. The Reynders Commission of 
Inquiry, established in 1972, recommended export promotion strategies focusing on non-gold 
exports (Edwards & Behar, 2005). During the 1980s, the South African government attempted 
to make their trade policies more export-orientated. Their efforts included the relaxation of 
quantitative restrictions (QRs), the introduction of tariffs and an export development assistance 
scheme. The debt crisis during the mid-1980s saw businesses lobbying for higher tariffs to 
protect local industries. According to the International Monetary Fund (2000), South Africa 
had the most tariff lines and highest tariffs among developing countries in the early 1980s, with 
about 77% of the country’s imports subject to tariffs (International Monetary Fund 2000).  
 
In the early 1990s, South Africa emerged from a period of isolation from the international 
community. With the ending of apartheid, financial and trade sanctions imposed on the 
economy from the mid-1980s were removed. The South African government then introduced 
the General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS) as a structural adjustment programme, 
particularly for motor vehicles, clothing and textiles (Rangasamy & Harmse, 2005). Through 





The extensive process of reducing import tariffs, agreed upon during the Uruguay Round of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO, commenced in 1994. In the 
agreement, the South African government made a commitment to reducing tariffs, binding 98% 
of the tariff lines, providing export incentives to local producers, reducing the number of tariff 
rates to six, rationalising tariff lines, and replacing quantitative restrictions (QRs) on 
agricultural products with tariffs (Edwards & Behar, 2005; Mabugu & Chitiga, 2009). The 
GEIS was discontinued in 1997 because the policy was incoherent with the GATT and WTO 
agreements (Mabugu & Chitiga, 2009) and by this period the QRs were also almost completely 
phased out. These tariff changes, particularly the multilateral tariff reductions offered by South 
Africa’s government during the Uruguay Round of the GATT/WTO, were largely driven by a 
formulaic process of reducing the dispersion of tariffs. The government also signed several 
bilateral and regional trade agreements from the mid-1990s to early 2000s, including the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Free Trade Protocol and the South 
Africa-European Union Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) (Edwards 
& Behar, 2005).  
 
The subsequent entry of China into the WTO in 2001 also had an impact on the country’s 
economy, as China quickly become one of South Africa’s main trading partners. The reduction 
of tariffs exposed local producers to strong competition from international producers, 
especially those from China.  
 
1.5 Thesis Objectives 
 
The primary objective of this thesis is to examine the effects of tariff liberalisation on gendered 
labour market outcomes in the local labour market. To achieve this objective, the thesis uses 
South Africa as a case study, drawing on detailed regional data obtained from the population 
census. The analysis on gender is carried out with data on two racial groups in South Africa, 
Blacks and Whites. In the thesis, we follow the definition of the Employment Equity Act, 55 
of 1998 of Blacks as Africans, Coloureds and Indian/Asian. The research is done to 
complement existing international empirical literature by providing insight into the local labour 
market adjustments to tariff liberalisation in a middle-income country. The thesis has four 








This analysis has two main objectives. The first objective is to analyse the sources of changes 
in regional employment patterns in South Africa. This is done by exploiting regional 
differences in industry mix to identify how these may have contributed towards changes in the 
regional composition of employment. Here, the thesis seeks to verify whether and to what 
extent the main determinants of regional employment growth are consistent with local labour 
market effects of tariff liberalisation, namely industry composition. This is achieved by 
applying the industry shift-share analysis method to analyse the evolving patterns of 
employment growth across regions in South Africa. Industry composition is isolated from the 
other two sources of regional employment growth, that is, the effects that are common to all 
regions in a country (national growth effects) and those that are specific to a region (regional 
competitive effects). The second objective is to examine region-factors that are associated with 
the industry-mix that may explain the contribution of the industry-mix effect and the variation 




The second key objective is to investigate the gendered effects of tariff liberalisation on 
regional employment in South Africa. This is achieved by undertaking two types of analysis. 
The first is to analyse the effect of tariff liberalisation on wages and the gender employment 
gap in the manufacturing sector. Second, the thesis examines the channels through which tariff 
liberalisation affects relative outcomes for women. The channels include technological 
progress, demand for skills, and industry segregation within manufacturing. The thesis utilises 
the South African population census data for 1996, 2001, and 2011 as well as annual average 
tariff data obtained from Edwards (2005). These datasets provide an opportunity to exploit 
regional variation in initial manufacturing employment as well as tariff reductions across 




The third main objective is to evaluate whether tariff liberalisation prompted the reallocation 
of labour from manufacturing to services. Theory predicts a restructuring of the economy away 




and the services sector (Edwards, 1988). This chapter tests for evidence of structural shifts 
towards services in the economy in response to tariff liberalisation. There are four aims to this 
part of the study. First, to assess the extent to which tariff liberalisation prompted structural 
shifts in the employment of labour from manufacturing to services. Second, the thesis studies 
the tariff liberalisation effect on wages and employment in the services sector. Third, it 
investigates the three transmission channels through which tariff liberalisation impacts 
employment in the services sector, specifically, derived demand for services by manufacturing 
firms, income effect, and infrastructure investment. These indirect effects have not been widely 
considered in the international literature or the South African literature. Third, the thesis 




The final core objective of the thesis is to determine whether tariff liberalisation induces 
internal migration. Jones (1975) argues that the benefits of tariff liberalisation depend on the 
extent to which labour is able to reallocate across sectors or regions. To complete the analysis 
of tariff liberalisation on gendered labour market outcomes, it is fitting to explore the extent to 
which labour is able to migrate across regions in response to tariff liberalisation. Tariff 
reductions are expected to have gendered effects because men and women face different 
rigidities and differences in gender intensities across industries. Women mainly dominate in 
the textile, clothing and footwear industry. They will be impacted more in regions that are 
dominated by this industry. Other rigidities include marital status and fertility. Married women 
and women with children experience stronger constraints to internal migration than married 
men and even single women, as well as counterpart women without children (Chort et al., 2017; 
Hoang, 2011; Jacobsen & Levin, 2000). Ignoring these rigidities to internal migration limits 
our understanding of tariff-induced migration and, ultimately, the labour market adjustment to 
tariff liberalisation. The central questions that the thesis aims to answer include: what is the 
effect of tariff liberalisation on internal migration? How do gender-associated rigidities 
influence the effect of tariff liberalisation on internal migration? 
 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides an analysis of regional 




gendered labour market outcomes, including wages and employment, in the manufacturing 
sector. Chapter 4 extends that analysis by investigating sector reallocation from manufacturing 
to services in response to tariff liberalisation. Chapter 5 assesses regional reallocation by 
examining the effect of tariff liberalisation on gendered internal migration. Chapter 6 
synthesises the main thesis findings and provides the conclusion. Policy implications and 





































The focus of this thesis is on tariff liberalisation and its gendered effects on employment at the 
local level in post-apartheid South Africa. Before embarking on an exploration of this 
relationship, it is useful to identify the extent to which regional employment dynamics have 
contributed to national employment growth over the post-apartheid period. This is of relevance 
to this study, but also to the international literature that shows rising interest in the contribution 
of regional employment to national labour markets. Globally, researchers and policymakers are 
concerned about the regional distribution of economic activity and labour market outcomes 
within countries because aggregate employment figures have been found to hide disparities in 
labour market status at the regional level.  
 
The primary objective of this chapter is to analyse the regional employment dynamics in South 
Africa over the period 1996-2011. The first objective is to assess whether there is variation in 
employment growth across regions. The second objective is to identify regional characteristics 
associated with region-specific contributors to employment growth. To meet these objectives, 
the chapter adopts an industry shift-share analysis method that decomposes the change in 
regional employment into three sources:  
(i) Effects that are common to all regions in a country (national growth effects).  
(ii) Industry-mix (industry composition) effects associated with differences in the 
composition of industries within the region.  
(iii) Effects that are specific to the region, such as location, climate, and infrastructure 
(regional competitive effects).  
 
The national growth effect measures the share of regional employment growth attributed to 
national employment growth. The industry-mix effect represents the share of local employment 
growth that is driven by industry composition in that region. The competitive effect measures 





The decomposition of regional employment changes into regional and national components 
sets the context for the subsequent analysis in the thesis. Tariff liberalisation affects industries 
differently, with some industries, such as textile, clothing and footwear, experiencing 
comparatively strong reductions in tariffs in South Africa, while others, for example mining 
face lower reductions in tariff protection. This may give rise to differential labour market 
effects across regions in the presence of frictions that impede workers moving across industries 
or regions (Pavcnik, 2017). This, however, requires differences in the industry composition of 
employment across regions because then industry-specific changes in tariffs will expose 
workers in each region to differential reductions in aggregate tariffs.  
 
The decomposition approach adopted in this chapter isolates the role of differences in industry-
mix across regions in driving aggregate employment and thus serves two purposes: Firstly, it 
provides insight into the extent to which industry-mix differs across regions in South Africa. 
Secondly, it allows us to calculate the contribution of differences in industry-mix across regions 
to regional and aggregate employment growth.   
 
To guide the empirical analysis, the chapter is structured around answering the following 
research questions: 
1. What are the sources of variations in employment growth across regions? 
2. What is the contribution of national-level and regional-level (industry-mix and regional 
competitive) effects to regional employment growth?  
3. How does industry structure contribute to employment growth and the variation in this 
growth across regions? 
 
The empirical analysis in the chapter contributes to the South African literature in several ways. 
A considerable body of international literature reveals the importance of regional dynamics, 
namely industry-mix effects and regional competitive effects, in driving aggregate employment 
growth in economies (Brox & Carvalho, 2008; Cochrane & Poot, 2008; Matlaba et al., 2014; 
Mitchell & Carlson, 2003). Similar studies have not been widely conducted in SSA countries, 
largely because of a lack of long-range spatial data2. Existing studies do not decompose how 
regional employment dynamics contribute towards aggregate employment changes. In South 
Africa, the only comparable literature, by Kleynhans and Classen (2012) and Kleynhans and 
 
2 Bosker and Krugell (2008), Krugell (2014) and Von Fintel (2018) use regional data for South Africa and observe enormous 




Sekhobela (2011), focuses on one province, the North West province. This chapter extends the 
literature on South Africa by looking across all regions in South Africa using a spatially 
consistent regional employment database constructed from the Population Censuses for 1996, 
2001 and 2011.  
 
Changes in the regional composition of employment is driven by many factors: productivity, 
labour supply shocks, demand factors. In this context, isolating exogenous sources from 
endogenous sources of growth is very difficult. However, the liberalisation of tariffs from the 
early 1990s in South Africa presents a useful lens to interpret some of the trends in regional 
employment growth that are attributed to differences in the industry-mix. South Africa is thus 
an important case study for such a decomposition analysis. 
 
While not its central focus, the decomposition analysis contributes to the South African 
literature on the effect of tariff liberalisation on the structure of the economy and employment.  
Other studies in the literature include that of Edwards (2001), Jenkins (2008) and Rodrik 
(2008), who present industry-based decompositions of aggregate employment growth using 
aggregated industry data for South Africa. The decomposition analysis adopted here explicitly 
allows for regionally driven sources of employment growth.  
 
A second reason for South Africa being an important case study is that there exist large 
disparities in economic activity, growth, and employment across space and population groups 
in the country. This is largely due to the historical legacy of apartheid policies of “separate 
development” which restricted the movement of labour and were – and continue to be - 
responsible for unequal development of areas. For example, Bosker and Krugell (2008), 
Krugell (2014) and Von Fintel (2018) observe that the enormous spatial inequalities in South 
Africa have persisted over time. The economy is also characterised by distinct frictions that 
impede the mobility of workers across regions and industries. The implication is that there may 
be substantial differences in the sources of employment growth for individuals according to 
their gender, race and location. The chapter therefore extends the existing shift-share literature 
by decomposing the sources of regional employment growth by gender and race. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 provides the conceptual 
framework for the chapter, and Section 2.3 discusses the related empirical literature. Section 




Section 2.5, the data used in the decomposition are described and discussed. Section 2.6 
provides a summary of the results, and Section 2.7 offers concluding remarks on the chapter. 
 
2.2 Conceptual Framework 
 
This section provides a conceptual framework that support the study on regional dynamics. 
National labour market outcomes are an aggregate of local labour market outcomes. In other 
words, national employment is a balance between employment growth in some regions and 
contracting employment in others. The level of employment differs across regions for several 
reasons including: (i) differences in the level and composition of industry output; (ii) the 
mobility of factors in the short to medium term; and (iii) unequal factor endowments.  
 
These features are, in turn, driven by a combination of factors. These include, factors such as 
climate, factor endowments, geography and natural resources, which the literature refers to as 
“first nature forces” (Cochrane, 2011). For example, the location of minerals such as gold in 
the Gauteng province, platinum in the North West province and diamonds in the Northern Cape 
province played a dominant role in determining the geographical location of production in 
South Africa.  
 
Secondly, there are the “second nature forces” which are factors that lead to the movement to 
and agglomeration of firms in certain regions. These may be termed “New Economic 
Geography (NEG)” factors. Unlike first nature forces, second nature forces are influenced by 
the interaction of economic agents. The main assumptions of the NEG theory include imperfect 
competition and increasing returns to scale (Krugman, 1991). The core idea of the theory is 
that geography, in terms of supply and market access, determines the level of economic 
activity. According to the NEG theory, physical geography or location matter for the 
agglomeration of economic activity mainly because of lower transport costs (Brakman et al., 
2001). Firms agglomerate in regions where there are large markets and supply access, such as 
ports and borders (Fujita et al., 2001). The agglomeration of firms in certain regions allows for 
inter-industry linkages which come in the form of economies of scale (Venables, 1999). These 
linkages foster a close relationship between industry stakeholders. Accompanying the 
relocation and agglomeration of firms is labour migration to the same regions where there is 
high demand for labour, higher wages and a wider variety of goods. Therefore, the disparity 




(including transport costs), increasing returns to scale, factor mobility, and factor endowments 
across regions.  
 
The third and final influencing factor is government policy. The first relevant type of policy is 
spatial industrial policy, such as the creation of spatial industrial zones or the promotion of 
industry in rural areas. For example, in the case of South Africa, the apartheid government 
provided firms with incentives to encourage them to locate around the homelands as part of the 
separate development plan. The second is trade policy, which is influential because, even 
though tariff liberalisation affects all industries in all regions, its impact can have varying 
effects on regional production and employment, given the industry composition. Finally, 
policies that control the movement of people are also relevant. For instance, the apartheid 
government in South Africa influenced regional employment by controlling where Black 
people especially Africans, work and reside. Africans people were clustered in former 
homelands and township areas. This policy consequently created regional labour supply 
heterogeneity.   
 
The implication of these factors is that employment dynamics may differ across regions. These 
dynamics are in turn influenced by (i) region-specific shocks (for example declining in 
availability of minerals, dramatic and long-term changes in climate), (ii) region-specific 
policies (for example, the ending of spatial industry incentives in South Africa in 1991) and 
(iii) industry-specific shocks (for example, changes in world prices and liberalisation of tariffs 
across industries). National employment growth is underpinned by region-specific and 
industry-specific shocks that have implications for regional employment dynamics, and 
national shocks (for example, labour market or changes in macroeconomic factors) that affect 
all regions equally. A conceptual framework explaining regional employment dynamics and 






























2.3 Review of the Empirical Literature  
 
There is extensive international literature on regional economies, including Breau and Saillant 
(2016), Brox and Carvalho (2008), Cochrane and Poot (2008), Crozet (2004), Head and Mayer 
(2006), Matlaba et al. (2014) and Mitchell and Carlson (2005). The core objective of this 
literature is to determine the distribution of economic activity and labour market outcomes, 
specifically wages and employment. A component of this literature, including Breau and 
Saillant (2016), Crozet (2004), Head and Mayer (2006), and Krugman (1991) draws on the 
NEG theory and applies spatial econometrics techniques in the study of regional economies. 
The evidence provided by these studies is overwhelmingly consistent, showing that economic 
activity, wages, and employment, continue to be concentrated in a few regions. 
Notwithstanding this, the NEG-influenced literature is not the focus of this chapter.  
 
More relevant to the chapter is the second growing cluster in international literature that uses 
industry shift-share analysis to decompose national employment changes into their regional 
components (Brox & Carvalho, 2008; Cochrane & Poot, 2008; Matlaba et al., 2014; Mitchell 
& Carlson, 2005). The shift-share analysis approach was pioneered by Daniel Creamer in the 
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1940s and formalised by Dunn (1960). Its advantage lies in the accessible data requirements3, 
which provide fairly easily interpretable results (Kleynhans & Sekhobela, 2011).  
 
The industry shift-share method is a descriptive method and therefore, does not provide a causal 
effect. It serves to decompose the change in employment into three main components: national 
growth effect, industry-mix effect, and competitive effect. In this method, regional growth is 
directly linked to national growth and any diversion of regional growth from national growth 
can be attributed to the composition and growth of the industries in the regions (Cochrane & 
Poot, 2008). Therefore, it is an appropriate method to use for an analysis of the role of industry 
composition in regional employment and the region’s contribution to national employment.  
 
Since the national growth effect is equal across all regions, differences in regional employment 
are underpinned by industry-mix and regional competitive effects. Regional industry-mix will 
be beneficial in regions that are richly endowed with industries that are growing nationally as 
these regions are likely to experience higher employment growth compared to regions that have 
few or declining industries. The region competitive effect is the residual in regional growth 
after accounting for national and industry-mix effects. It measures the degree of 
competitiveness or region-specific factors that provide the industries in regions with advantage 
(or disadvantage) compared to national industries.  
 
The main finding emerging from the literature that employs the industry shift-share 
decomposition technique is the existence of huge spatial inequality within countries that is 
underpinned by differentials in the industrial and regional composition of employment. There 
is also consensus among researchers that, while employment change across regions within a 
country is driven mainly by the industry composition and regional factors, a small number of 
regions have been found to have followed the national employment growth trend. These studies 
in the literature do not decompose employment growth within sectors, thus they do not include 
analyses of sectoral dynamics.  
 
Mitchell and Carlson (2005) analyse the regional employment growth rate in Australia for the 
period 1985 to 2003. They find that region-specific factors have played a significant role in 
employment growth for non-metropolitan areas, while metropolitan areas have benefited from 
 





a favourable industry structure (Mitchell & Carlson, 2005). They find that only two regions in 
Australia had a positive national growth effect, that is, employment growth in these regions 
was proportional to the national average (Mitchell & Carlson, 2005). In this study, regional 
employment growth was dominated by changes in region-specific factors rather than national 
effects.  
 
Brox and Carvalho (2008) extend this approach by analysing regional labour markets in Canada 
for various age-gender cohorts over the period 1986 to 1995. They find that the employment 
growth of younger workers exceeded that of adult workers in most regions when accounting 
for changes in the labour force (Brox & Carvalho, 2008). The study also finds differential 
effects of regional competitiveness across demographic groups. The competitive effect has a 
predominantly negative effect on the employment of younger workers (both male and female) 
in the Atlantic region but has a positive effect on adult female workers (Brox & Carvalho, 
2008). Moreover, they find the competitive share effect to be stronger on female workers than 
on male workers. 
 
Cochrane and Poot (2008) examine the spatial distribution of employment in New Zealand,  
and the contributing factors. The study is performed over a longer period than that of the 
Canadian study, from 1986 to 2001. It aims to determine the persistence of regional diversity. 
To explore and determine this, a multi-period shift-share analysis is utilised for 58 labour 
market areas (LMAs). The research highlights that regions follow the same trend as the national 
labour market. The national growth effect is found to be the main contributing factor, affecting 
all LMAs equally. The second major contributing factor is shown to be the region competitive 
effect.  
 
A study on employment change across states in Brazil was carried out by Matlaba et al. (2014). 
The study investigated 27 states between 1981 and 2006. The findings show that employment 
growth in the underdeveloped states can mostly be attributed to the states’ comparative 
advantage, a combination of the appropriate industry-mix and competitiveness (Matlaba et al., 
2014). The national growth effect is shown to contribute little to the change in total 
employment. Aggregate employment changes are primarily attributed to changes in region-





This literature highlights that aggregate employment changes are driven by substantial changes 
in employment levels across regions. Regional composition effects are therefore an important 
part of the aggregate employment change in some countries. Only focussing on aggregate 
employment change may obscure important regional dynamics behind regional employment 
changes.  
 
2.3.1 Related Empirical Literature in South Africa 
 
The empirical literature dealing with the factors which influence employment change at a sub-
national level in South Africa has covered a broad range of topics, including labour market 
outcomes, demographics, urbanisation, inequality, poverty, and migration. In South Africa, 
empirical evidence is provided by Bosker and Krugell (2008), Kleynhans and Classen (2012), 
Kleynhans and Sekhobela (2011) and Naudé and Krugell (2004). The evidence from these 
studies shows that South Africa has extreme regional inequality, and some regions remain 
marginalised as economic activity continues to be concentrated in a few regions. South Africa’s 
six largest cities are Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, Durban, Cape Town, Tshwane and the Nelson 
Mandela metropole4 (Naudé, 2010; Naudé & Krugell, 2004). These cities gained their 
prominence through trade, mining, and favourable climate, as well as apartheid policies which 
promoted their development (Feinstein, 2005). These regions also have the highest 
employment levels relative to more remote regions. Naudé and Krugell (2004) show that 
around 82% of GDP is produced by only 20% of areas (specifically towns and cities) in the 
country. Moreover, in 2000, the richest 20% of areas had an average per capita income of 
R25 277 compared to R5 452 in the poorest 20% of areas (Naudé & Krugell, 2004).  
 
In the reviewed literature, few studies have analysed changes in regional employment or have 
identified the key drivers of this change at a municipal level. Studies that use the industry shift-
share decomposition in the South African context to identify the forces of regional employment 
growth are those by Kleynhans and Classen (2012) and Kleynhans and Sekhobela (2011). 
Kleynhans and Sekhobela (2011) employ this method, using Rex data from Global Insight 
Southern Africa, to decompose changes in value-added manufacturing in the North West 
province between 1996 and 2006. The analysis is across four local municipalities within the 
Southern District municipality, namely Klerksdorp, Potchefstroom, Ventersdorp, Merafong 
 
4 The chapter will refer to the cities by their previous names because it is focusing on the period between 1996 and 2001. The 




City, and Wolmaransstad. Their main finding is that the industry-mix in the region has a 
negative effect on value-added manufacturing, while the national growth effect has an 
overwhelmingly positive effect (Kleynhans & Sekhobela, 2011).  
  
Kleynhans and Classen (2012) extend this approach to evaluate the job creation and economic 
growth potential of the manufacturing industry in the North West province from 1996 to 2006, 
associated with the Platinum Spatial Development Initiative (SDI). The Platinum SDI is a 
development corridor between the North West province and Botswana set up to promote 
economic activity in the area. The study compares employment changes in magisterial districts 
in the SDI with the rest of the magisterial districts in the North West province. The authors find 
evidence that the SDI corridor has higher economic growth than the rest of the province. They 
find employment growth in the SDI to be significantly different from growth in the rest of the 
province and that this employment growth is mainly driven by industry-mix and regional 
competitive effects.  
 
The main shortcoming of the literature that uses the industry shift-share decomposition 
approach to analyse regional employment in South Africa is that the studies are limited to the 
manufacturing sector and do not analyse South Africa as a whole. This chapter attempts to 
deepen the empirical analysis of regional employment growth in South Africa by employing 
the dynamic industry shift-share method across all the municipalities in the country. 
Furthermore, the study aims to expand and enhance the body of the literature by analysing the 
industry-mix component and its associations. 
 
2.4 Estimation Method: Dynamic Industry Shift-Share Analysis 
 
This section discusses the empirical methods employed in this chapter for exploring regional 
dynamics in South Africa. The chapter investigates the distribution and drivers of regional 
employment growth in South Africa by utilising a dynamic industry shift-share analysis to 
decompose employment growth in South Africa into national effects, industry-mix effects, and 
regional competitive effects, for the periods 1996-2001 and 2001-2011. In doing so, it 
replicates the regional growth analysis done by Cochrane and Poot (2008) in New Zealand and 
by Matlaba et al. (2014) in Brazil. Even though the shift-share decomposition is descriptive, it 
is an appropriate technique to use in this chapter. The causal determinants of regional 




The dynamic shift-share approach adopted decomposes the sources of change in employment 
(∆𝐸𝑖𝑚 
𝑡 ) within the ith industry in the mth municipality as follows: 
 
∆𝐸𝑖𝑚 
𝑡 ≡  𝐸𝑖𝑚
𝑡 − 𝐸𝑖𝑚
𝑡−1 ≡  𝑁𝐸𝑖𝑚
𝑡 + 𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑚
𝑡 + 𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑚
𝑡                              (2.1) 
 
where 𝐸𝑖𝑚
𝑡  denotes employment in the ith industry in the mth municipality at the end period (t). 
𝐸𝑖𝑚
𝑡−1 is employment in the ith industry in the mth municipality during the initial period (t-1). 
𝑁𝐸𝑖𝑚
𝑡  indicates national growth effect on industry i in the mth municipality between the initial 
period and the end period. 𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑚
𝑡  represents the industry-mix effect on industry i in the mth 
municipality between the initial period and end period. 𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑚
𝑡  denotes competitive effect on 
industry i in the mth municipality between the initial period and end period. 
 
The national growth effect shows the hypothetical employment change if a region grows at the 
national growth rate and is defined by the following two equations: 
 
𝑁𝐸𝑖𝑚
𝑡 =  𝐸𝑖𝑚
𝑡−1𝑔𝑡            (2.2) 
𝑔𝑡 = (𝐸𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1)/𝐸𝑡−1            (2.3) 
 
where 𝐸𝑡reflects national employment at the end period. 𝐸𝑡−1 denotes national employment at 
the initial period. 𝑔𝑡 is the growth rate in total national employment between the initial period 
and the end period.  Equation (2.2) defines the national growth effect for each municipality in 
each industry as a product of the initial employment in municipality m in industry i and the 
total national employment growth.  
 
The industry-mix effect represents the share of employment growth that is explained by the 
industry composition in that region. Regions differ in terms of their industry composition, and 
consequently, differential growth rates across industries will give rise to regional variation in 
employment change. For example, a region with a “favourable” mix of industries (industries 
that are growing fast nationally) is likely to experience relatively rapid growth in employment. 















𝑡 is national employment in industry i at the end period. 𝐸𝑖
𝑡−1 denotes national 
employment in industry i at the initial period. 𝑔𝑖
𝑡 represents the growth rate in national 
employment5 in industry i between the initial period and end period.  
 
Equation (2.4) calculates the industry-mix effect as the product of initial employment in 
municipality m in industry i and the difference between national industry employment growth 
and total national employment growth. Regions with large numbers of workers in industries 
facing high growth rates relative to the national growth rate will, therefore, experience a large 
industry-mix effect.  
 
The regional competitive effect measures the part of employment growth that is due to region-
specific factors that contribute to regional industries growing faster or slower than national 
industries. It reflects the difference between actual employment and hypothetical regional 
employment had the regional industries grown at the national industry growth rate. The 











𝑡−1                                   (2.7) 
 
𝑔𝑖𝑚 
𝑡  denotes actual employment growth on industry i in municipality m between the initial 
period and end period. Equation (2.6) defines the competitive effect as a product of initial 
employment in municipality m in industry i and the difference between regional industry 
employment growth and national industry employment growth.  
 
It follows from equations (2.1), (2.2), (2.4) and (2.6) that municipal employment growth is an 
aggregate of employment over industries i in each municipality m. Consequently, aggregate 
municipality-level employment growth rate can be decomposed into national growth rate (𝑔𝑚
𝑡 ), 
industry-mix growth rate (𝑛𝑚
𝑡 ), and competitive effect growth rate (𝑐𝑚
𝑡 ), as illustrated in 
equation (2.8):  
𝑔𝑚
𝑡 =  𝑔𝑡 + 𝑛𝑚
𝑡 + 𝑐𝑚
𝑡                (2.8) 
 
 




The growth rates of the industry-mix and the competitive effect that contribute to employment 
growth can, in turn, be expressed by equations (2.9) and (2.10), respectively:  
 
𝑛𝑚




𝑡)           (2.9) 
𝑐𝑚




𝑡)                                (2.10) 
 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑚
𝑡−1 is the share of municipality employment that is devoted to industry i at the initial 
period.  
 
The classic industry shift-share decomposition method has been criticised for being 
comparatively static, thus not providing insight into the evolution of regional employment. 
This weakness is addressed by analysing two periods: 1996 – 2001 and 2001 – 2011. Thus, the 
chapter provides a dynamic component. Another criticism of the classic method is that the 
analysis does not reveal causality and only provides an indication of the direction of influence 
of the various components on regional employment growth (Patterson, 1991; Ray & Harvey, 
1995). Proving causality is not a critical feature in this chapter because the aim is this study is 
to provide the context for the relative contribution of each component to total employment 
growth. Its objective is thus primarily descriptive. The subsequent chapters in the thesis focus 
on establishing a causal relationship between tariff liberalisation and the observed changes in 
regional employment. 
 
The most common criticism of the industry shift-share decomposition method regards the 
possible association between the industry-mix effect and the competitive effect. Critics argue 
that the industry shift-share method cannot isolate the source of regional employment growth. 
That is, the method cannot determine whether the growth is due to the composition of industries 
in the region that are growing nationally or to a buoyant industry in the region which is not 
found in other regions which increases its competitiveness. Furthermore, the classic industry 
shift-share decomposition technique fails to take into account the role of region size. Firms are 
likely to agglomerate to large regions because of labour supply, and thus, there is a probability 
that those regions will have favourable industry composition, and this will lead to higher 
regional employment growth.  Failure to account for region size in the analysis means that the 
industry-mix effect interacts with the competitive effect. This method therefore makes it 




Esteban-Marquillas (1972) proposes a solution by rearranging the shift-share equation to 
isolate the actual competitive effect. The alternative method he proposes includes an element 
called ‘homothetic employment’, which represents the employment that a region would have 
had in industry i if the share of industry i in regional employment was the same as the share of 
industry i in national employment.  
 
In this chapter we apply the modified methodology of Esteban-Marquillas (1972) using 
equation (2.11), where total employment growth rate is the sum of national growth rate, 




𝑡 =  𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑡
𝑡 + 𝑛𝑚,𝑎𝑙𝑡
𝑡 + 𝑐𝑚,𝑎𝑙𝑡
𝑡                                                    (2.11) 
𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑡
𝑡 ≡ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑚,𝑎𝑙𝑡
𝑡−1 (𝑖 𝑔𝑖
𝑡)                                                                                  (2.12) 
𝑛𝑚,𝑎𝑙𝑡
𝑡 ≡ ∑ (𝑤𝑖𝑚
𝑡−1 −  𝑤𝑖𝑚,𝑎𝑙𝑡
𝑡−1 ) ∗𝑖 𝑔𝑖
𝑡                                                                      (2.13) 
𝑐𝑚,𝑎𝑙𝑡








𝑡−1 )                                 (2.14) 
 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑚,𝑎𝑙𝑡
𝑡−1   is national industry employment as a share of total national employment.   
 
2.5 Data and Stylized Facts 
 
2.5.1 Data Sources 
 
The main data sources for the analysis are the population census conducted in 1996, 2001 and 
2011 released by Statistics South Africa. The advantages of the census datasets are that they 
contain many observations and they provide detailed data on age, gender, race, employment 
status, industries and regions.  
 
Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) disseminates the data in two formats: A full census database 
with data that is disaggregated to the sub-place level6, and a 10% sample of individual-level 
data, at a more aggregated regional level to protect respondent privacy. One of the 
disadvantages of the full census is that it reports industries at an insufficient level of 
 
6 Sub-place represents a “suburb, section or zone of an (apartheid) township, smallholdings, village, subvillage, ward or 




disaggregation. Industry data is reported only at the one-digit7 Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) level. This chapter therefore employs the 10% weighted samples of 1996, 
2001 and 2011 population censuses, which report industries at the two-digit SIC level. The 
10% sample is weighted using individual weights to correct for potential issues of 
undercounting. The analysis restricts data to the working-age population that is individuals 
aged between 15 and 65 years. The final dataset for this chapter comprises nine industries8 at 
the one-digit SIC level and ten manufacturing industries9 in 234 municipalities covering the 
three census years.  
 
The second disadvantage of the full census database is that the data does not include a common 
local level unit of analysis across censuses. The data is published at different geographical 
levels (province, local municipality, main-place, and sub-place). Since 1994, the government 
has been engaged in massive re-demarcation of the administrative boundaries to redress the 
regional imbalances of the past. This poses a challenge for the analysis of regional data as the 
geographic units are not comparable over time. For example, the local geographic unit of 
analysis in the 1996 census data is magisterial district, whereas the 2001 census contains 
variables for both magisterial district and municipality. New municipal demarcations also 
occurred between the 2001 and 2011 censuses. Additionally, the magisterial district variable 
was dropped in the 2011 census data. To allow comparison over time, some form of mapping 
is required to align the geographical units. For this chapter, we mapped the lowest available 
geographical units in 1996 (12 398 place-names) and 2001 (21 243 sub-places) to the 2011 






7 Industries at the one-digit SIC level are: (1) Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; (2) Mining and quarrying; (3) 
Manufacturing; (4) Electricity, gas and water supply; (5) Construction; (6) Wholesale and retail trade; (7) Transport, storage 
and communication; (8) Financial, insurance; real estate and business services; (9) Community, social and personal services; 
and (10) Private households. 
8 The nine industries include agriculture, mining, manufacturing, utilities, construction, wholesale and retail trade, logistics, 
finance, and other services (including public administration). The exclusion of public administration in “other services” is 
because employment in government is centralised and not influenced by changes in industry structure. 
9 Manufacturing comprises the following industries: (1) Food, beverages and tobacco products; (2) Textiles, clothing, footwear 
and leather goods; (3) Wood products; (4) Fuel, petroleum; chemical and rubber products; (5) Other non-metallic mineral 
products; (6) Metal products, machinery and household appliances; (7) Electrical machinery and apparatus; (8) Electronics, 
sound/vision, medical and other appliances; (9) Transport equipment and (10) Furniture and other items not elsewhere 




2.5.2 Stylized Facts: Employment trends 
 
In this section, we present and discuss the stylized facts that characterise the South African 
labour market, focusing on employment trends from 1996. Table 2.1 illustrates sector 
employment as a share of total national employment from 1996 to 2011. Employment in South 
Africa was approximately 7.5 million in 1996 and grew to about 8 million in 2001, and then 
12 million in 2011. A significant contributor to this growth is the services sector. The “Other 
services” industry has the largest share of national employment with a share of 29.2% in 2011. 
However, the fastest-growing sectors are finance and wholesale and trade. The share of 
employment in the finance sector rose by 7.3 percentage points while the employment share of 
the wholesale and trade sectors rose by 4.2 percentage points between 1996 and 2011.  
 
With these growth rates in services, a structural shift in employment away from tradable sectors 
to nontradable sectors (services) is observed, as is also found by Bhorat et al. (2014), Bhorat 
and Hodge (1999), Edwards (2001), Rodrik (2008), and Tregenna (2008). The tradable sectors, 
such as agriculture, mining, and manufacturing shrank by 5, 3.8, and 4.2 percentage points, 
respectively in the 1996-2011 period. It is therefore expected that municipalities with an 
industry-mix biased towards the nontradable sector are likely to have experienced faster 
employment growth during the period than regions dominated by the tradable sector.  
 
Table 2.1: National industry employment shares 
 Industry Shares 
 Percentage Point Change 
Industry 1996 2001 2011  1996-2001 2001-2011 1996-2011 
Agriculture 10.6% 12.0% 5.6%  1.3 -6.4 -5.0 
Mining 7.0% 4.7% 3.2%  -2.3 -1.5 -3.8 
Manufacturing 14.8% 15.0% 10.6%  0.2 -4.4 -4.2 
Utilities 1.4% 0.9% 0.9%  -0.5 0.0 -0.5 
Construction 7.3% 6.5% 8.8%  -0.8 2.3 1.5 
Wholesale & trade 14.5% 18.0% 18.7%  3.5 0.7 4.2 
Logistics 6.4% 5.5% 6.6%  -0.9 1.1 0.2 
Finance 9.0% 11.2% 16.4%  2.1 5.2 7.3 
Other services 29.1% 26.4% 29.2%  -2.6 2.8 0.1 
     
 
   
National employment 7 530 756 8 055 077 12 207 562     
Notes: Industry shares are aggregate industries normalised by national employment. 
Source: 10% weighted sample census data 
 
 
Table 2.2 shows employment changes in the manufacturing sector between 1996 and 2011. 




almost 1.3 million in 2011. However, manufacturing as a share of total employment contracted, 
as shown in Table 2.1. In 1996, the largest industry within manufacturing was the textiles, 
clothing, and footwear sector, with a share of 22.2%, followed by food, beverages and tobacco 
products with a share of 20%, and metal products with a 16% manufacturing employment 
share. By 2011, the industry composition of manufacturing employment had changed, and the 
share of the textile, clothing, and footwear industry fell to 8.4%. The major manufacturing 
industries in 2011 were food, beverages, and tobacco (21.7%), metal products (19.8%) and 
petroleum products (13.8%). In terms of percentage change, industries with the largest growth 
in employment were metal products (3.8), petroleum products (3.5), transport equipment (2.4) 
and non-metallic products (2). In comparison, the textile, clothing and footwear, electrical 
machinery and electronic appliance sectors were the major losers, with employment shares 
contracting by 13.9, 1.4 and 0.1 percentage points from 1996 to 2011, respectively. 
 
Table 2.2: National manufacturing employment shares 
 Industry Shares 
 Percentage Point Change 
Industry 1996 2001 2011  1996-2001 2001-2011 1996-2011 
Food products 19.9% 14.0% 21.7%  -6.0 7.8 1.8 
Textiles et. 22.2% 18.4% 8.4%  -3.9 -10.0 -13.9 
Wood products 13.1% 11.4% 14.6%  -1.7 3.2 1.5 
Petroleum products 10.2% 12.7% 13.8%  2.5 1.1 3.5 
Non-metallic products 4.1% 4.9% 6.1%  0.8 1.2 2.0 
Metal products  16.0% 21.7% 19.8%  5.7 -1.8 3.8 
Electrical machinery 2.2% 1.7% 0.8%  -0.6 -0.8 -1.4 
Electronic appliances 1.3% 1.1% 1.2%  -0.2 0.0 -0.1 
Transport equipment 6.1% 7.5% 8.5%  1.4 1.0 2.4 
Furniture  4.7% 6.7% 5.0%  2.0 -1.6 0.4 
    
 
   
National manufacturing  1 111 121 1 204 318 1 291 093     
Notes: Manufacturing industries are normalised by national manufacturing employment. 
Source: 10% weighted sample census data 
 
To provide a depiction of how employment levels vary across municipalities, Figure 2.2 
presents kernel density estimates of relative employment. Relative employment is calculated 
by dividing each municipality's employment level by the average across all municipalities. A 
value of one means that the level of employment in the municipality is equal to the average 
across the nation. The figure shows a wide and skewed distribution in employment across 
municipalities. Employment for a large number of municipalities is less than the national 
average reflecting an unequal distribution of employment across municipalities in South 




employment. Comparing 1996 and 2011, we see a rising proportion of municipalities with 
below average employment levels, suggesting widening regional inequality in employment. 
Bosker and Krugell (2008), Krugell (2014) and Von Fintel (2014) also reveal a high degree of 
persistence in the regional inequality of economic activity and employment in South Africa 
over the period. 
 
Figure 2.2: Relative employment from 1996 to 2011 
 
Notes: Relative employment is municipality employment divided by national average employment 
Source: 10% weighted sample census data 
 
Table 2.3 presents the summary statistics of employment shares by gender and race across 
municipalities in 1996, 2001, and 2011. The data shows that more men are employed than 
women, but the gender employment gap (the difference between male and female employment) 
has declined marginally over the years. For example, the average employment share of men 
dropped from 58.6% in 1996 to 56.2% in 2011, while for women, the average share rose 
slightly from 41.4% to 43.8% over the same period.  
 
The aggregate trends are therefore reflected in trends within race categories, although there are 
differences in levels. The gender employment gap is more distinct within racial groups. Women 
comprise a higher share of employment among Blacks (40.2%) than among Whites (38.3%). 
It is also observable that the share of women in employment rose for both Blacks and Whites, 
leading to a narrower gender employment gap for both racial groups. However, Whites 
experienced a larger reduction in the gender employment gap than Blacks. From 1996 to 2011, 
the gender employment gap decreased from 16.8 percentage points to 12.4 percentage points 




There is also evidence of wide variation in the gender composition of employment across 
municipalities. This is reflected in the standard deviation, but even more noticeable in the gap 
between the minimum and maximum shares. For instance, in 1996 the municipality with the 
lowest share of females in employment was Merafong City municipality in Gauteng Province 
with 16.1%, while the municipality, while the maximum share (56.9%) was Hlabisa 
municipality in KwaZulu-Natal Province. The variation is found in all years, although we see 
that in 2011 the minimum and maximum share of females in the workforce in these 
municipalities have risen compared to 1996. There is also substantial regional variation within 
races10.  
 
Table 2.3: Regional gendered average employment shares 
 Gender Mean SD Min Max 
1996 
All Female  0.414 0.415 0.161 0.569 
Male 0.586 0.585 0.431 0.839 
Black Female 0.402 0.414 0.045 0.575 
Male 0.598 0.586 0.425 0.955 
White Female 0.383 0.386 0.002 0.806 
Male 0.617 0.614 0.194 0.998 
2001 
All Female  0.422 0.424 0.234 0.585 
 Male 0.578 0.576 0.415 0.766 
Black Female 0.412 0.418 0.124 0.587 
 Male 0.588 0.582 0.413 0.876 
White Female 0.391 0.398 0.017 0.554 
 Male 0.609 0.602 0.446 0.983 
2011 
All Female  0.438 0.435 0.273 0.587 
 Male 0.562 0.565 0.413 0.727 
Black Female 0.429 0.429 0.000 0.656 
 Male 0.571 0.571 0.344 1.000 
White Female 0.418 0.427 0.000 1.000 
 Male 0.582 0.573 0.000 1.000 
Notes: Employment share represents employed fe(male) as a share of the total number of employed individuals of each gender. “Blacks” 
comprise Africans, Coloureds, Indians/Asians, “Other” have been excluded in the final sample. The gender mean differences are significant 
at the 1% level.   
Source: 10% weighted sample census data 
 
10 Some municipalities have no female workers, and this is evident in 2011 which shows zero for the “min” statistic. An 
explanation for the non-zero min value in 1996 and 2001 is because of the mapping process from magisterial districts to the 
2011 municipalities. The zero count for women may also reflect the use of the 10% sample, meaning that women were probably 
not selected in these regions. Nonetheless, the values in 1996 and 2001 are extremely low which is in line with the 
municipalities having no female workers. White women workers are not represented in the following municipalities: 
Umzimkhulu (Kwa-Zulu Natal), Ntambana (Kwa-Zulu Natal), Maphumulo (Kwa-Zulu Natal), Mbizana (Eastern Cape), 
Nongoma (Kwa-Zulu Natal), Makhuduthamaga (Limpopo), Ntabankulu (Eastern Cape), while Kareeberg (Northern Cape) and 




The important role of industry composition within municipalities can be estimated using the 
location quotients for the nine industries. The 𝐿𝑄𝑖𝑚 is an index that quantifies the concentration 
of industries within a region relative to the reference area (Cochrane & Poot, 2008), which in 








            (2.15) 
 
where 𝐸𝑖𝑚 is employment in industry i in municipality m, 𝐸𝑚 is the total municipality 
employment,  𝐸𝑖 is national employment in industry i, and E is total national employment. A 
LQim value of 1 indicates that the share of employment in industry i in municipality m is 
equivalent to that industry's share in national employment. A value greater (less) than one 
shows that the municipality has proportionally more (less) employment in industry i relative to 
the national labour market. Values that are greater than one also suggest that particular industry 
is dominant in that municipality (Cochrane & Poot, 2008).  
 
Table 2.7A in the appendix presents provincial location quotients in 2011. The values in the 
table reflect the share of municipalities within a province that have 𝐿𝑄𝑖𝑚 greater than or equal 
to one. The 𝐿𝑄𝑖𝑚 shows wide dispersion of industries across municipalities. The services sector 
is concentrated in Gauteng, the Western Cape and Eastern Cape provinces. Gauteng, the 
economic hub of South Africa, has the largest share of municipalities where the following 
sectors dominate: manufacturing (80%), wholesale and trade (90%), logistics (90%), and 
finance (80%). The second largest province in terms of economic activity, the Western Cape, 
has about 56% and 72% of its municipalities specialising in manufacturing and wholesale & 
trade, respectively. About 90% of the municipalities in the Eastern Cape dominate in other 
services. About 93% of municipalities in the Northern Cape have a comparatively large 
agricultural sector while Mpumalanga has most employment in mining and construction with 
61% and 94% of municipalities dominated by these industries, respectively.   
 
Table 2.4  shows the correlation between employment growth, population growth and growth 
in migration in regions. The correlation matrix illustrates that employment growth is perfectly 
positively correlated with the population growth and the growth in migration. The positive 
associations of these three variables indicate that as the population grows, more people migrate 




possibility that regional population dynamics, in particular changes in migration patterns, play 
a key role in regional employment dynamics. Thus, regions differ in terms of employment 
growth due to both industry composition (as shown by the location quotients) and changes in 
the population which is associated with changes in migration patterns. The data thus reveals 
the connection between employment, migration and population. This is a critical observation 
for the thesis which seeks to isolate the role of tariff changes in driving changes in employment 
and migration patterns. 
 
Table 2.4: Correlation between growth in employment, population and migration 
between 1996 and 2011 
 Employment growth Migration growth Population growth 
Employment growth 1   
Migration growth 0.9397* 1  
Population growth 0.9825* 0.9480* 1 
Note: The data employed is for the working-age population (individuals aged between 15-65 years). Regional growth rates in employment, 
migration and population are calculated as the difference between 1996 and 2011 normalised by 1996 figures. The correlations are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
Source: 10% weighted sample census data 
 
2.6 Industry Shift-Share Decomposition Results 
 
This section presents the results of the dynamic industry shift-share decomposition applied to 
the 234 municipalities across three time periods, 1996-2001, 2001-2011, and 1996-2001. The 
decomposition is based on nine broadly defined industries (at the one-digit SIC level), namely: 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, utilities, construction, wholesale & trade, logistics, finance 
and other services. 
 
2.6.1 Dynamic Industry Shift-Share Decomposition 
 
A summary of the dynamic industry shift-share employment decomposition is provided in 
Table 2.5. The table presents decomposition results for municipalities in the median, 10th and 
90th percentiles. The decomposition results disaggregated by municipalities are presented in 
Table 2.8A in the appendix, with municipalities ranked according to 1996-2011 employment 
growth.  
 
The disaggregated results show that, in the period 1996-2001, the municipality with the median 




summary results, employment in this municipality grew by 7.9%, in excess of the 7% national 
growth, suggesting that region-specific factors had an overall positive effect on the region’s 
employment growth. The industry-mix effect raised employment growth by 2.7% and this was 
sufficient to cover the 1.7% negative regional competitive effect.  
 
The decomposition results for the municipalities in the 10th and 90th percentiles show 
substantial variation in employment growth across regions. The municipality with employment 
growth in the 10th percentile is Umsobomvu, in the Northern Cape. This municipality 
experienced negative employment growth of about 16.4% while national employment growth 
was 7%. Regional factors, particularly the regional competitive effect, severely constrained 
growth in employment in this municipality. In contrast, employment growth in Polokwane in 
Limpopo Province was 32.7%, putting the region in the 90th percentile, and the growth was 
supported mainly by the regional competitive effect.   
 
During 2001-2011, median employment growth of in Msinga in Kwa-Zulu Natal and 
Matzikama in the Western Cape was approximately 30.6%. This employment growth was 
below the national average of 51.5% and this poor regional performance was driven 
predominately by region-specific factors. The industry-mix effect slowed regional employment 
growth by an average of 17.2% and regional competitive effects reduced regional employment 
growth by on average 3.7%. However, these shift-share components had varying effects in the 
two municipalities. Matzikama experienced a 33% negative industry-mix effect while Msinga 
faced a 1.4% negative effect. Regional competitive effects reduced employment growth in 
Msinga by 19.4% but increased employment growth in Matzikama by 12%. 
 
Employment growth in uMlalazi in Kwa-Zulu Natal contracted by 39.7%, putting the 
municipality in the 10th percentile. This negative employment growth was underpinned by the 
negative contribution of the industry-mix (16.6%) and regional competitiveness (74.6%). 
Interestingly, the municipality in the opposite end of the spectrum was Mtubatuba, also in Kwa-
Zulu Natal, which was in the 90th percentile. Employment growth in this province was 122.7%, 
driven largely by the regional competitive effect, which contributed 72.6% to the region’s 
employment growth. The industry-mix effect had a negative effect of 1.3%.  
 
Over the entire period 1996-2011, the municipality with the median employment growth was 




62%. The industry-mix effect was the sole contributor to this slow employment growth, 
reducing this growth by 27%. The region competitive effect increased employment growth in 
this municipality by 10.8%. Dannhauser and Umuziwabantu, both in in Kwa-Zulu Natal, had 
employment growth in the 10th and 90th percentiles respectively. Dannhauser experienced 
negative employment growth of 41.7% while Umuziwabantu’s employment growth was 137%, 
which exceeded the national growth effect of 62%. We find that the industry-mix effect was 
detrimental to employment growth in both regions, but the effect was more disadvantageous 
for Dannhauser. The regional competitive effect favoured Umuziwabantu by increasing 
employment growth by 88.3%, but reduced employment growth in Dannhauser by 84.3%.  
 
Looking across municipalities in Table 2.8A in the appendix, employment growth from 1996 
to 2011 was highest in Gamagara (877%) and lowest in Mier (-92%). Of the 234 municipalities, 
61 experienced negative growth over the period 1996-2011. These municipalities with slow 
employment growth are located in the Eastern Cape (8), Northern Cape (9), Free State (13), 
KwaZulu-Natal (16), North West (5), Gauteng (4), Mpumalanga (1) and Limpopo (5). All the 
municipalities in the Western Cape had positive employment growth. These findings reinforce 
the observation that there is enormous regional disparity in employment growth in South Africa 
over the period examined. 
 
With respect to the determinants, employment growth was, on average, driven mainly by the 
national growth effect. The dominance of the national growth effect in driving regional 
employment is in line with evidence for New Zealand and Australia (Cochrane & Poot, 2008; 
Mitchell & Carlson, 2005).  
 
More importantly, the results point to substantial heterogeneity in the industry-mix effects 
across municipalities. The municipal level data in the appendix Table 2.8A shows that 
employment growth in 183 out of 234 of the municipalities over the period 1996-2011was 
adversely affected by their industry-mix. The negative industry-mix effect is comparable with 
findings from the study conducted in Brazil by Matlaba et al. (2014), indicating that the 
industry-mix effect is a vital contributor to regional employment growth in both countries.  
 
The regional competitive effect was a positive contributor to employment growth. 
Decomposition results at the municipality level in the appendix in Table 2.8A reveal that in the 




Overall, the decomposition highlights large variation in employment growth across regions. 
Regions did not follow the national trend, 96 regions grew faster and 135 regions grew slower 
than the national average11. The finding that more than half of the municipalities faced negative 
industry-mix and regional competitive effects suggests that region-specific factors play a vital 
role in regional employment growth in South Africa. The effect of the industry-mix effect is 
particularly interesting for the thesis as it lends itself to a study on the contribution of sector-
biased shocks, such as tariff liberalisation.  
 
Table 2.5: Summary of the dynamic industry shift-share decomposition results 
Time period Components Median P10 P90 
1996 - 2001 ΔE 7.9 -16.4 32.7 
 NE 7.0 7.0 7.0 
 IM 2.7 3.6 0.1 
 CE -1.7 -27.0 25.7 
     
2001 - 2011 ΔE 30.6 -39.7 122.7 
 NE 51.5 51.5 51.5 
 IM -17.2 -16.6 -1.3 
 CE -3.7 -74.6 72.6 
     
1996 - 2011 ΔE 45.8 -41.7 137.5 
 NE 62.0 62.0 62.0 
 IM -27.0 -19.5 -12.8 
 CE 10.8 -84.3 88.3 
Notes: Results are for the 234 local municipalities. Figures are expressed as percentages. ΔE is change in regional employment growth, NE is 
national growth effect, IM is industry-mix effect and CE is regional competitive effect.  
 
The chapter further explores the contribution of the industry shift-share decomposition 
components to regional employment. Table 2.6 presents an overview of the distribution of 
decomposition components across provinces between 1996 and 2011. The Northern Cape, Free 
State and North West were adversely affected by region-specific factors particularly the effect 
of their industry-mix, and over 74% of municipalities in these provinces experienced 
employment growth that was in deficit to national growth. Gauteng was the least affected 
province, with 30% of municipalities facing negative industry-mix effects, but with a high 
share (over 64%) of municipalities in each province experiencing negative industry-mix 
effects. This reflects the dominance of Gauteng in terms of employment growth and suggests 
 
11 Beaufort West, Camdeboo and Karoo Hoogland have missing values for regional employment growth because these regions 
experienced zero growth in the mining industry. This resulted in missing values for the regional competitive effect, and 




that sectoral employment growth patterns are diverging between municipalities in Gauteng and 
those in other provinces. 
 
Table 2.6: Industry shift-share decomposition components distribution: 1996-2011   









Western Cape (25)  12 48%  20 80%  7 28% 
Eastern Cape (39)  19 49%  25 64%  16 41% 
Northern Cape (27)  20 74%  26 96%  18 67% 
Free State (20)  19 95%  17 85%  19 95% 
Kwa-Zulu Natal (51)  26 51%  43 84%  25 49% 
North West (19)  16 84%  16 84%  14 74% 
Gauteng (10)  4 40%  3 30%  4 40% 
Mpumalanga (18)  10 56%  15 83%  9 50% 
Limpopo (25)  9 36%  18 72%  8 32% 
Notes: The share reflects the share of municipalities with negative IM and CE in total municipalities in each province. ΔE is change in regional 
employment growth, NE is national growth effect, IM is industry-mix effect and CE is regional competitive effect. 
 
2.6.2 Gender Shift-Share Decomposition  
 
Gender differences have increasingly been at the forefront of research for the past couple of 
decades, with analysts investigating the persistence, or convergence, of gender gaps within 
countries. Table 2.3 shows that there are differences in gender employment shares, and this 
necessitates an investigation of gender employment growth using the shift-share 
decomposition. The summary of the decomposition results presented in Table 2.7, shows 
differential regional employment growth across gender. Regional employment growth of 
women in the median municipality has been consistently higher than that of men. In the period 
1996-2001, female employment in the median municipality grew by 9.6% compared to 
employment growth for men of 6% exceeding the national growth effect of 9.4% and 5.2% 
respectively. This reinforces the importance of region-specific factors. The sources of this 
employment growth also differ across gender with the industry-mix reducing growth in female 
employment by 1% but contributing positively to the growth of male employment by 2.7%. 
Even though the regional competitive effect contributed positively to the employment of both 
men and women, the contribution was marginally stronger for male employment (1%) 





The results for the municipalities in the 10th and 90th percentiles show substantial variation 
and the gap between male and female employment growth has been growing over the years. 
The municipality in the 10th percentile faced negative female (male) employment growth of -
12.1% (-17.9%) which was in deficit of the national growth effect. The regional competitive 
effect considerably lowering the employment growth by 21.2% (23.7%) compared to the 
negative industry-mix effect of 4.2% (7.7%). Contrary, municipalities in the 90th percentile 
experienced employment growth that exceeded that national growth effect. Female regional 
employment growth was 37.5% compared to male regional employment growth of about 35%. 
This suggests that these municipalities benefitted from region-specific factors, particularly as 
a result of regional competitiveness. The regional competitive effect component contributed 
28.9% to female employment and 28.5% to male employment while the industry-mix effect 
increased female and male employment by 3.9% and 7.9% respectively.  
 
We find converse results for the period 2001-2011 for both male and female employment, 
suggesting that the national growth effect in the median municipality was higher than the 
employment growth. Furthermore, both the industry-mix and regional competitive effects had 
a negative effect on regional employment growth. The industry-mix had a stronger adverse 
effect compared to the regional competitive effect for both men and women. Municipalities in 
the 10th percentile experienced a larger contraction while municipalities in the 90th percentile 
faced a significantly positive growth for female and male employment compared to the period 
1996-2001. The national growth effect had a positive contribution to male and female regional 
employment growth in the municipalities in the 10th and 90th percentiles. The regional 
competitive effect remains the most disadvantageous component for the municipalities in the 
10th percentile but a positive contributor for municipalities in the 90th percentile for both male 
and female employment growth. 
 
Looking at the entire period, 1996-2011, the results show that the national growth effect had a 
positive effect on regional employment growth for both male and female employment in the 
median municipality. The results also show that region-specific factors, particularly the 
industry-mix, had a strong negative effect on female employment. Our findings show that men 
benefitted from the 2.5% positive contribution from regional competitiveness. We find similar 
patterns as the period 2001-2011 for municipalities in the 10th and 90th percentiles where 
regional employment growth of both men and women was driven largely by regional-specific 




employment growth for both genders for municipalities in the 10th percentile but contributed 
positively to female (male) employment growth for municipalities in the 90th percentiles. 
These results further highlight the importance of both the industry composition and regional 
competitiveness to regional employment growth for men and women. 
 
Table 2.7: Summary of the gendered dynamic industry shift-share decomposition results 
   Female  Male 
Time period Components  Median P10 P90  Median P10 P90 
1996 - 2001 ΔE  9.6 -12.1 37.5  6.0 -17.9 35.0 
 NE  9.4 9.4 9.4  5.2 5.2 5.2 
 IM  -1.0 -4.2 3.9  2.7 -7.7 7.9 
 CE  0.8 -21.2 28.9  1.0 -23.7 28.5 
          
2001 - 2011 ΔE  39.4 -40.3 142.5  29.0 -41.4 117.7 
 NE  58.0 58.0 58.0  46.7 46.7 46.7 
 IM  -8.1 -23.9 5.6  -13.1 -39.6 18.4 
 CE  -5.9 -88.4 100.3  -2.4 -81.5 64.1 
          
1996 - 2011 ΔE  53.7 -31.8 184.8  40.0 -43.5 120.6 
 NE  72.8 72.8 72.8  54.4 54.4 54.4 
 IM  -13.0 -28.1 7.4  -13.5 -42.0 16.3 
 CE  -7.7 -101.7 118.1  2.5 -80.7 76.1 
Notes: Results are for the 234 local municipalities. Figures are expressed as percentages. ΔE is change in regional employment growth, NE is 
national growth effect, IM is industry-mix effect and CE is regional competitive effect. 
 
Next, we evaluated the regional employment dynamics by gender and race. We include race 
because, in the context of South Africa, gender and race are intertwined. The interaction of 
gender and race is underpinned by historic policies which discriminated against females and 
Blacks. Table 2.8 contains the gendered employment decomposition results that are 
disaggregated by race. We find similar gendered results within Black and Whites with the 
Black and White female employment growth in the median municipality exceeding that of their 
male counterparts in all the three time periods. Our findings point to increasing absorption of 
women into the labour market. This finding corresponds to those found by Brox and Carvalho 
(2008) for Canada who found evidence of increased employment growth of women exceeding 
that of men across regions. 
 
The contribution of the shift-share components also varies by gender and race. The national 
growth effect was larger than regional employment growth for all the population groups except 




women, White women and White men followed the national growth trajectory. 
Notwithstanding that the industry-mix effect reduced employment growth for both Black 
female and Black men, Black women faced a more robust industry-mix effect compared to 
Black men in the periods 1996-2001 and 1996-2011. The industry-mix slowed employed 
growth of Black women more than any other demographic across all the periods except for 
2001-2011 when the effect was slightly more pronounced on Black men. Interestingly, the 
industry-mix effect had a positive effect on White women in all three periods, suggesting that 
White women were employed in industries that grew faster than the national average 
employment, and that the effect was negative for the other demographics.  
 
The results for the municipalities in the 10th and 90th percentiles affirm that there is enormous 
variation in employment growth across regions for both Blacks and Whites. The regional 
competitive effect emerges as the predominant contributor to the gendered employment growth 
across race albeit the contribution differs for municipalities in the 10th and 90th percentiles. 
These findings imply that regional employment growth is driven by the industry-mix effect and 
the regional competitive effect reinforcing that region-specific factors play a crucial role in the 





















Table 2.8: Summary of the dynamic industry shift-share decomposition results 
disaggregated by gender and race 
  Black Female  Black Male 
Time period Components Median P10 P90  Median P10 P90 
1996 - 2001 ΔE 9.9 -12.0 39.3  8.6 -17.9 38.4 
 NE 11.6 11.6 11.6  7.0 7.0 7.0 
 IM -1.2 -4.9 3.6  3.4 -7.9 7.9 
 CE -0.2 -22.8 30.0  1.0 -25.3 32.1 
         
2001 - 2011 ΔE 38.7 -39.8 148.7  28.2 -40.1 120.5 
 NE 62.0 62.0 62.0  49.4 49.4 49.4 
 IM -8.5 -28.2 8.4  -13.0 -44.6 20.4 
 CE -8.1 -91.8 96.2  -3.5 -83.2 61.0 
         
1996 - 2011 ΔE 52.4 -31.2 189.0  45.2 -41.6 130.5 
 NE 80.8 80.8 80.8  59.8 59.8 59.8 
 IM -15.5 -36.2 10.2  -13.9 -47.7 20.8 
 CE -11.6 -100.1 105.4  -2.9 -85.0 73.9 
  White Female  White Male 
1996 - 2001 ΔE 5.9 -24.6 45.9  0.6 -26.7 42.1 
 NE 6.0 6.0 6.0  2.5 2.5 2.5 
 IM 1.5 -2.8 6.5  1.6 -8.2 6.8 
 CE -1.3 -32.6 36.1  -0.4 -29.0 36.8 
         
2001 - 2011 ΔE 26.0 -83.7 152.1  2.0 -78.9 97.6 
 NE 37.0 37.0 37.0  24.7 24.7 24.7 
 IM 0.5 -3.6 7.1  -9.4 -22.2 5.1 
 CE -14.8 -126.4 115.1  -11.8 -98.4 85.6 
         
1996 - 2011 ΔE 32.1 -74.7 153.8  6.0 -77.0 138.6 
 NE 45.3 45.3 45.3  27.9 27.9 27.9 
 IM 2.4 -2.6 7.7  -9.0 -25.6 7.6 
 CE -15.7 -124.9 100.8  -14.2 -98.8 109.3 
Notes: Results are for the 234 local municipalities. Figures are expressed as percentages. ΔE is change in regional employment growth, NE is 
national growth effect, IM is industry-mix effect and CE is regional competitive effect. 
 
2.6.3 An Analysis of the Industry-Mix Effects 
 
A main observation from prior analysis is that there is substantial variation in regional 
employment growth, with the industry-mix emerging as an important source of this variation. 
This finding is relevant for the thesis, as the impact of tariff liberalisation on labour market 
outcomes is through changes in industry composition. Tariff liberalisation alters the price of 




This section seeks to identify region-specific factors that are correlated with the industry mix 
effect.   
  
Table 2.9 depicts estimation results for the correlations between initial municipality 
characteristics and the industry-mix effects over the period 1996-2011. We investigate whether 
the initial industry structure, denoted by the tradable to nontradable sector employment ratio, 
income (used as a proxy for GDP), gender, as well as gender and race combinations, are 
correlated with the industry-mix effects. These characteristics are likely to play a key role in 
mediating the effects of tariff liberalisation on labour market outcomes. 
 
The results in Table 2.9 demonstrate that the industry-mix effect is negatively correlated with 
the initial tradable to nontradable sector employment ratio. This suggests that municipalities 
with a high ratio of tradable to nontradable sector employment are more adversely affected by 
the industry-mix decomposition component. This also means that any change in the industry 
structure from tradable to nontradable sectors, presumably due to tariff liberalisation, is 
beneficial to regional employment growth. 
 
The estimates also show that municipalities with higher initial income as well as a higher initial 
share of female, initial share of Black female, initial share of Black male and initial share of 
White female workers experienced positive growth in employment through the industry-mix 
effect. The coefficient is higher for initial share of White females than for initial share of Black 
females. This demonstrates the differences in industry-mix effects across race. It also supports 
the idea of industry and regional specificities in employment that cross race and gender lines. 
Black female workers appear to be identified more specifically with certain regions and 
industries than their White counterparts. The T-test confirms that the difference between initial 
share of employed Black females and White females (difference in the coefficients for pooled 
data 1996-2011) is statistically significant at the 1% level and a T-statistic of 77.9405. 
 
These findings imply that the initial share of tradable to nontradable sector is an important 
source of the industry-mix contribution to regional employment growth. This is consistent with 
the finding that the impact of tariff liberalisation altered the industry composition by growing 
the nontradable sector at the expense of the tradable sector, especially the manufacturing sector. 
Furthermore, the industry mix-effects are not gender and race-neutral, indicating that tariff 




Table 2.9: Factors correlated with the industry-mix 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
      
Initial tradable/nontradable ratio -0.257*** -0.258*** 
 (0.010) (0.018) 
Initial income 0.055*** 0.046*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Initial employed female share 0.621***  
 (0.086)  
Initial employed Black share 0.017  
 (0.070)  
Initial employed Black female share  1.522*** 
  (0.238) 
Initial employed Black male share  1.298*** 
  (0.254) 
Initial employed White female share  3.221*** 
  (0.598) 
Constant -0.680*** -1.694*** 
 (0.129) (0.264) 
   
Observations 234 234 
R-squared 0.860 0.862 
T-test   
T-statistic  77.9405 
Degrees of freedom   701 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All estimates are for the period 1996-2011, and the covariates are based on 1996 values. Initial employed female, Black, Black female 
and White female are shares in total employment. Omitted variables include initial employed male share, initial employed White share, and 
initial employed White male share. Income is averages income in each municipality.  
 
2.6.3.1 Structural Change 
 
In South Africa, economies of some regions experienced positive industry-mix effects and 
others negative industry-mix effects. From the above and the correlation of industry-mix effects 
with the initial industry structure, as shown in Figure 2.3, it is evident that much of this can be 
attributed to the general rise in the nontradable sector relative to the tradable sector. The scatter 
plot depicts a sharply negative correlation between the industry-mix effect and initial tradable 
to nontradable sector ratio, which suggests that the industry-mix effect fell disproportionately 
on those municipalities with a high initial ratio of tradable to nontradable sectors. The chapter 









Figure 2.3: Correlation between the industry-mix effect (1996-2011) and industry 
structure 
 
Notes: The industry-mix effect is for the period 1996 to 2011. Tradable industries included agriculture, mining and manufacturing in 1996. 
 
Following Cochrane & Poot (2008), we decompose the industry-mix according to equation 
(2.16). The decomposition provides insight into the degree to which we see active structural 
change across regions.  
 
𝑆𝑆𝑚 = ∑ (𝑤𝑖𝑚
𝑡 − 𝑤𝑖𝑚
𝑡−1)(𝑔𝑖
𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡)𝑖                                               (2.16) 
 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑚denotes structural change in municipality m and 𝑤𝑖𝑚
𝑡  is the end-period weights and 
reflects industry employment shares after the change in the economy's structure. The term of 
the right hand side therefore measures the effect of changing municipality industry 
composition. We refer to this term as the structural change effect. A positive value implies that 
the municipality followed the national trend of industry restructuring towards relatively fast 
growing industries. This is an example of structural shifts in line with national growth path. 
 
Table 2.10 presents a summary of the results on structural change across regions. The results 
also reveal that on average municipalities experienced a positive structural effect, suggesting 
that the industry composition of employment shifted away from slow-growing industries 
towards fast-growing industries. However, the adjustment of regional industry composition 
was initially moderate, but over time has become rapid. This is shown by the increase in the 




period 1996-2001 to 13.58% (an average for Ngwathe and Govan Mbeki) during the period 
2001-2011 and 18.35 (an average for Nkonkobe and Ntambanana) for the entire period 1996-
2011. The pace at which regions restructured industries varies considerably. The structural 
change value for the municipality in the 10th percentile (Big 5 False Bay) was 0.04%, while for 
the 90th percentile (Tsantsabane) the value was 4.14% in the period 1996-2001. The difference 
between the 10th and 90th percentiles also grew larger over time, from 4.1 percentage points 
(1996-2001) to 28.15 percentage points (2001-2011). For the period 1996-2011, the gap was 
34.75%.  
 
The disaggregated results shown in appendix Table 2.9A reveal that 221 of the 234 
municipalities have positive structural effects, with large positive effects (50%) found for 13 
of the municipalities. This suggests that the sector composition of employment for the vast 
majority of the municipalities followed that of the national trend. The 13 municipalities are 
located in the Western Cape (6), Gauteng (2), Kwa-Zulu Natal (2) and Free-State (3) provinces. 
The Western Cape, Gauteng, Kwa-Zulu Natal are relatively more urbanised and services-
oriented than other provinces. These provinces also house the largest finance sectors, wholesale 
& trade, logistics and tourism sectors. It is therefore not surprising that the decomposition 
analysis shows that municipalities in these provinces followed the national trend and 
experienced significant growth in the nontradable sector. In contrast, 13 of the municipalities 
the employment composition shifted towards sectors experiencing relatively slow growth. The 
municipalities based in Limpopo (4), North-West (3), Eastern Cape (2), Kwa-Zulu Natal (2), 
Northern Cape (1) and Free-State (1). These provinces are relatively more isolated, rural and 
have smaller services sectors. The implication is that should these national trends in 
employment continue, these municipalities will experience disproportionately large negative 
industry-mix effects in the future. 
 
The results are in line with those of Cochrane and Poot (2008), who find the structural change 
effect to be negative for all the states in New Zealand in their investigation. Matlaba et al. 
(2014) find a negative effect for 21 out of 27 states in Brazil. The distinct differences between 
the municipalities that experienced the highest and lowest positive structural change effects is 
largely underpinned by differences in comparative advantage in the services sector and the 
development of the provinces. It can be deduced that provinces that are more developed and 
urban are better able to change the regional industry composition towards expanding 




The positive structural change effect suggests that municipalities benefited from moving 
towards industries that were doing well nationally. The change towards a focus on the 
nontradable sector augmented growth in employment growth in these municipalities. These 
results emphasise the significant impact of structural change in the South African labour market 
during the period under study.   
 
Table 2.10: Summary of the structural change effect 
Period Median P10 P90 
1996 - 2001 2.14 0.04 4.14 
2001- 2011 13.58 3.84 31.99 
1996 - 2011 18.35 6.59 41.34 
Notes: Values reflect the regional average employment growth. Figures expressed as percentages 
 
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
The chapter set out to first explore the dynamics of regional employment growth by 
investigating the distribution and main drivers of employment growth across regions from 1996 
to 2011 using the industry shift-share decomposition method. Furthermore, the chapter 
analysed the role of region-specific factors, in particular the industry-mix in regional 
employment and variation in employment growth.  
 
The results of the industry shift-share decomposition reveal that there is employment growth 
variation across municipalities during this period. On average, the gap between rich and poor 
regions widened in the post-apartheid period, even though a few of the poorer regions managed 
to achieve impressive growth. We find that national employment growth had a positive effect 
on regional employment growth through economic growth and improvements in the national 
labour market. The results suggest that regional industry effects are more central. The industry-
mix is shown to have a domineering yet negative effect on regional employment growth, as it 
reduced employment growth and counteracted the positive growth from the national growth 
effect. The regional competitive effect also made a significant contribution to regional 
employment growth. The impact and importance of industry composition on regional 
employment growth are consistent with tariff liberalisation effects on employment, as the latter 
is driven by the former. Tariff liberalisation changes the structure of industries (Rodrik, 2008), 





We also find that the main source of the contraction of manufacturing employment is regional 
competitiveness showing that regional manufacturing industries grew slower than national 
manufacturing industries. This suggests that majority of regions have factors that cripple the 
growth of local manufacturing industries. However, regions managed, to some degree, to 
restructure their industries and mirror the change in the national industry structure from the 
manufacturing sector towards the services sector.  
 
The chapter also highlights that the industry-mix is negatively correlated with an industry 
employment divide, specifically the divide between the tradable and nontradable sectors. The 
chapter also demonstrates that the industry-mix effects are also positively correlated with other 
region-specific factors, namely: Initial income, initial share of female workers, initial share of 
Black female workers, initial share of Black male workers and initial share of White female 
workers. The chapter also finds that the positive influence of the industry-mix is greater in 
regions with a larger initial share of White females than Black females. These gender and race 
results poses that the gender employment disparities are more striking within a race. This shines 
the spotlight on the association of industry-effects with gender and race endowments that is 
consistent with the idea of industry and region specificity of employment. Additionally, the 
results imply that the structural change is not neutral in terms of gender and race.  
 
However, regions managed, to some degree, to restructure their industries and mirror the 
change in the national industry structure from the manufacturing sector towards the services 
sector. The chapter concludes by showing that structural change took place between 1996 and 
2011 and also that the adjustment of industry structure away from contracting tradable sectors 
towards the nontradable sector benefitted the economies of most regions. Tariff liberalisation 
may be the main driver of this observed structural change.  
 
The implication of these results is that tariff liberalisation will have differential effects across 
regions, gender, and race. In the following chapter, we broaden the discussion of regional 
dynamics by identifying the specific factors that are likely drive the unequal distribution of 
industries across municipalities in South Africa, focusing on the role of tariff liberalisation on 









3. Tariff Liberalisation Effects on Gendered Manufacturing Employment in South Africa   
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter finds evidence of substantial variation in regional employment growth in 
South Africa, with industry composition as a primary source of this heterogeneity in growth 
over the 1996-2011 period. This chapter expands on this evidence by analysing the role of tariff 
liberalisation in changes in regional employment patterns in South Africa. The analysis exploits 
regional differences in industry composition to identify how tariff liberalisation affects regions 
differently, and consequently, how it may contribute to changes in the regional composition of 
employment.  
 
The standard theoretical framework used to analyse how economies respond to tariff 
liberalisation is the Heckscher-Ohlin model and Stopler-Samuelson theorem. These 
Neoclassical trade theories suggest that tariff reductions increase the relative price of capital 
and skilled labour-intensive goods in developing countries because they trade on a comparative 
advantage basis. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, developing countries import 
capital-intensive or skilled labour-intensive manufactured goods and export unskilled labour-
intensive goods. This, according to the Stopler-Samuelson model, leads to a rise in the wages 
of unskilled workers, which is expected to reduce wage inequality. The predictions are based 
on the assumption of a national factor market with full mobility of factors across regions and 
industries. However, in the short term, factors of production are often immobile across regions 
and industries. Application of these models have also narrowly categorised factors of 
production into capital and labour or skilled and unskilled labour and thus ignore the potential 
gendered effects from trade.  
 
Gendered effects arise through several channels. Extensions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model to 
allow for gendered effects suggest that tariff liberalisation benefits women in developing 
countries as they are generally unskilled and are disproportionately employed in the labour-
intensive export-oriented sectors, such as the textile, clothing and footwear industry (Aguayo-
Téllez et al., 2014; Ederington et al., 2009; Fontana & Wood, 2000). Alternative theories and 




international competition benefits women by reducing the option of firms to discriminate. 
Further, tariff liberalisation that induces the use of less brawn-intensive technology12 may also 
contribute to narrow the gender employment gap (Galor & Weil, 1996; Juhn et al., 2014; 
Weinberg, 2000). Brawn-intensity is the share of workers in production occupations. 
Technological progress can also narrow the gender wage gap if women are more skilled than 
men (Arbache et al., 2004; Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2007; Robertson, 2000).  
 
The empirical evidence on the gendered effects of tariff liberalisation on employment at the 
local level is expanding. Evidence from this literature is that the effects of tariff liberalisation 
on employment differ for men and women. The gendered effect is driven by the liberalisation 
pattern and gender intensities in industries. However, this literature remains limited in 
emerging economies. The impact of tariff liberalisation on employment in South Africa, a 
middle-income economy, may not necessarily conform to these patterns. This chapter 
augments the available literature by investigating the gendered effects of tariff liberalisation on 
regional employment in a SSA country. We argue that this analysis could provide additional 
and more nuanced evidence than is currently available.  
 
The chapter focuses on South Africa for several reasons. Firstly, in Chapter 2, the thesis shows 
that in South Africa industry composition differs substantially across regions. The differences 
in the industry-mix across regions provide an important source of regional variation that can 
be used to identify the effect of tariff liberalisation on regional employment patterns.  
 
Secondly, the South African economy has experienced a structural shift away from 
manufacturing to the services sector over the past few years (Bhorat & Hodge, 1999; Bhorat et 
al., 2014; Edwards, 2001; Rodrik, 2008; Tregenna, 2008). In this chapter, we assess whether, 
within regions, the structural shifts in employment, specifically the contraction of 
manufacturing employment, and the adoption of labour-saving technology can be attributed to 
the effects of tariff liberalisation. 
 
Thirdly, South Africa may differ from other middle-income countries such as Vietnam, 
Indonesia and Brazil as it does not have a comparative advantage in labour-intensive 
 
12 Brawn is the term used to represent physical strength and brawn-intensive technology is technology that that require the use 




manufacturing. We argue that this characteristic may provide new evidence about structural 
adjustments to tariff liberalisation.  
 
Fourthly, it is expected that the effect of increased competition on the gender employment gap 
will be different in South Africa because the country is characterised by very high female 
unemployment and low labour force participation of women. The South African labour market 
is also rigid, with wages determined on a sectoral and regional basis for many manufacturing 
industries. Further, average skills levels of employed women are higher than those of men, 
possibly due to differential selection into employment (Statistics South Africa 2012). This 
suggests that tariff liberalisation could affect female and male labour differently through 
changes in demand for skilled relative to unskilled labour.  
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 presents theoretical insights that 
inform the chapter and Section 3.3 discusses the empirical evidence. The section provides 
propositions on the gendered effects of tariff liberalisation. Sections 3.4 and Section 3.5 outline 
the construction of the trade protection measures and the empirical approach employed in the 
analysis. Section 3.6 presents the data sources and an overview of tariff liberalisation and the 
labour market in South Africa. Section 3.7 discusses the estimation results and robustness 
checks. Lastly, the chapter presents concluding remarks. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Insights 
 
The Specific-Factors model provides a useful theoretical framework for analysing the effects 
of tariff liberalisation on wages and employment across regions because it allows for labour 
market rigidities that are prevalent in emerging economies. These include rigidities to mobility 
across sectors and regions. More importantly, this thesis focuses on gender and race and the 
Specific-Factors model is able to incorporate specificity of labour by gender and population 
group. If differences in industry specificities vary by gender and race, then we may expect 
differences in the effects of tariff reduction across gender and population groups.  
 
The Specific-factors model is a model for the national economy with n goods and n+1 factors 
of production. However, Kovak (2010) has extended the theoretical model by applying the 




wages and employment. This section presents the key elements of the Kovak (2010) model that 
leads to the Specific-Factors model being utilised in this chapter. 
 
We use a stylised country that has two regions (r = 1, 2) and each region is a separate economy 
with two industries (i = A, B). We adapt the Kovak (2010) model by assuming that industry A 
is clothing and textiles while industry B is other manufacturing. There are two main factors of 
production: labour (L) and other inputs (K). K includes factors such as mineral resources, land, 
geography, weather, factor endowments, and industry-specific capital. The model assumes that 
L is mobile across industries but not across regions and K is both industry and region-specific 
even in the long-run. Regions differ in terms of industry shares based on regional comparative 
advantage because of different relative endowments. Region 1 is more endowed with industry 
A specific-factors than region B. An additional assumption is that technology is industry-
specific but not region-specific, meaning that regions have access to the same technology for 
each industry (Kovak, 2010). Further assumptions include a constant returns to scale 
production function, a perfect competition market, and prices of goods, 𝑃𝑖, are the same across 
all regions. In the long-run labour is mobile across regions and industries and wages are 
therefore equalised across regions (Kovak, 2010). However, regional production composition 
differs based on initial endowments. 
 
Kovak (2010) shows that the relationship between regional wages of the mobile-factor and 
goods prices when regional labour supply is held constant is as follows:  
 
ẇ𝑟 = ∑ 𝛽𝑟𝑖Ṗ𝑖𝑖   ∀𝑟    (3.1) 
where Ṗ𝑖 =   𝑃𝑤𝑖  ∗ (1 + 𝑇𝑟𝑖) and                          (3.2) 








                 (3.3) 
 
r, 𝑃𝑤𝑖 and 𝑇𝑟𝑖 denote regions, world prices and tariff rates respectively. ẇ𝑟 and Ṗ𝑖  represent 




regional employment share, 𝛿𝑟𝑖 is the elasticity of substitution between K and L. 𝜃𝑟𝑖 is the cost 
share of the industry-specific factor K in the production of good i in region r. 𝛽𝑟𝑖 is positive 




industry mobile-factor wage is a weighted average of the proportional price change of both 
industries.  
  
The implication of this wage relationship is that price changes that differ across industries, but 
not regions, give rise to differences in mobile-factor wage changes across regions due to 
differences in the regional industry composition of employment. If a region's workers are 
highly concentrated in a given industry, then the region's mobile factor wage will be heavily 
influenced by price changes in that region's dominant industry (Kovak, 2010). For example, in 
our model, if there is a decrease in tariffs on the clothing and textile industry, the regions with 
the largest share of this industry in total regional employment will face a stronger reduction in 
wages of the mobile-factor.  
  
We employ Figure 3.1 (extracted from Kovak (2010) but adapting it to our stylized country 
with clothing and other manufacturing industries) to illustrate the effect of tariff liberalisation 
on wages, where the x-axis displays the total national labour supply to be allocated across the 
two regions, and the y-axis represents the wage in each region. Panel (a) shows the economy 
before tariff liberalisation. The marginal revenue product for labour13 (MRPL) of the two 
industries is given as XX (industry A - clothing) and YY (industry B - other manufacturing), and 
the intersection determines regional wages, which in the long-run with L mobile across regions 
equalises at w* in both regions. Employment in clothing in region 1 is given as 𝐿1𝐴 and in 
region 2 by 𝐿2𝐴 while 𝐿1𝐵  and 𝐿2𝐵 represent employment in other manufacturing in regions 1 
and 2, respectively.  
 
Panel (b) presents the outcome of tariff liberalisation where tariffs on industry A are reduced. 
The reduction in tariffs on industry A reduces the price of good A causing the MRPL curves of 
industry A to fall in both regions to 𝑋𝑋1 . However, given that region 1’s workers are 
concentrated in A that region’s wage will be more heavily influenced, as shown in panel (b). 
In the short-run, when labour is immobile across regions, this gives rise to new local 
equilibrium wages of 𝑤1* and 𝑤2* were 𝑤1* < 𝑤2*. The outcome of tariff reductions in the 
clothing industry leads to lower wages of the mobile factor in region 1 compared to region 2.  
 
 







We extend the Kovak (2010) model by considering the effect of tariff in a country where wages 
are rigid. In such a country, tariff reductions will not have a wage effect; instead, there will be 
an employment effect. In the case of downward wage rigidities, wages remain the same at 𝑤∗ 
and firms will respond by laying off workers because firms will be unable to compensate for 
the price drop. The level of unemployment is the distance between 𝑋𝑋1 and YY. In this scenario, 
unemployment will be higher in region 1 than in region 2. As mentioned earlier, the differential 
impact on the mobile and specific-factor will be determined by the substitutability and the 
extent of the income effects.  
 
The Specific-Factors model explains that if the specificity of labour is in clothing, then regions 
facing comparatively large reductions in tariffs, given their large clothing employment share 
in total manufacturing, will face a combination of (1) relatively large reductions in clothing 
real wages of the specific labour, and (2) relatively large contractions of clothing employment 
of both specific and mobile labour. However, if clothing wages are rigid downwards, the 
negative effect on employment will be intensified. It then follows those regions that have a 
relatively large share of the clothing industry face stronger exposure to tariffs and consequently 
a larger reduction in goods prices, wages, and employment.   
 
From the theory, we hypothesise that the effects of liberalisation in the South African economy 
may be: (1) differential regional wage and employment effects; (2) larger reductions in 
employment in import-competing manufacturing industries, particularly if wages are rigid; and 
(3) employment effects that differ by gender and race that will be more severe if labour within 















Figure 3.1: Graphic representation of labour market outcomes of tariff liberalisation 
 




(b) Response to tariff liberalisation  
 
 
3.2.1 Review of the Theoretical Literature: Gendered Effect of Tariff liberalisation 
 
This section provides a review of the literature on theories explaining how the effects of tariff 
liberalisation may differ for men and women. Supply and demand-side factors contribute to the 




liberalisation. The supply-side factor is skill while the demand-side factor is usually 
discrimination, which may also be influenced by substitutability. The effect of tariff 
liberalisation may be heterogeneous across genders if men and women are found to be 
imperfect substitutes in the production process (Do et al., 2016; Galor & Weil, 1996; Sauré & 
Zoabi, 2014; Wamboye & Seguino, 2015) and if liberalisation affects industries differently. 
Tariff liberalisation is expected to improve women’s employment if a country has is unskilled 
labour abundant and has a comparative advantage in female-intensive sectors (Fontana, 2004, 
2009). This applies to developing countries since women are generally unskilled. 
 
The trade literature has posited transmission channels which help explain the differential wage 
and employment gendered effects of tariff liberalisation. These explanations are founded in 
existing trade theory. The first transmission channel presented is less discrimination. 
Neoclassical trade theory predicts that increased import competition reduces discrimination 
against women because of the pro-competitiveness of trade (Becker, 2010).  
 
The second channel is technological progress. Liberalisation of tariffs may be associated with 
innovation and the adoption of new technologies that are more skill and less brawn-intensive 
(Galor & Weil, 1996; Juhn et al., 2014; Weinberg, 2000). If men and women have different 
skills or levels of educational attainment, this may have implications for gendered labour 
market outcomes (Acemoglu, 2003; Thoenig & Verdier, 2003; Wood, 1995). The gender group 
with the highest level of educational attainment, on average, will benefit from liberalisation. 
Technological change may also be gender-biased due to gender differences in endowments of 
intelligence versus physical strength - “brain versus brawn” (Galor & Weil, 1996; Juhn et al., 
2014; Weinberg, 2000). This is based on the assumption by Juhn et al. (2014) that women are, 
on average, less-endowed with physical strength than men and or are more skilled. Based on 
this assumption, the effect on female employment would depend on the skills endowment 
among women relative to men (Acemoglu, 2003; Thoenig & Verdier, 2003; Wood, 1995).  
 
Lastly, tariff liberalisation may have gendered effects through industrial segregation. Industrial 
segregation has been found to be persistent worldwide (Anker et al., 2003) and to be supported 
by societal norms. These societal norms range from discrimination, stigmatisation, 
stereotyping (Braunstein & Seguino, 2018; Elson & Pearson, 1981), and patriarchy, to 
differences in the production structure (Wamboye & Seguino, 2015) and technology across 




(Braunstein & Seguino, 2018) across industries, exposing those employed in sectors 
experiencing large tariff reductions to particularly severe employment changes. Women tend 
traditionally to be employed in certain industries, particularly textiles, clothing and footwear 
in the case of South Africa (Nattrass & Seekings, 2012). If the textiles, clothing and footwear 
industry faces a large reduction in tariffs, this will have a disproportionately negative effect on 
wages and employment of women relative to men in regions with a large share of the textiles, 
clothing and footwear manufacturing.  
 
3.3 Related Empirical Evidence 
 
This chapter relates to two strands of the international literature. The first strand employs a 
Bartik approach that involves interacting local industry shares with tariff rates to obtain a 
region’s exposure to tariff liberalisation (Autor et al., 2015; Dix-Carneiro & Kovak, 2015; 
Gaddis & Pieters, 2017; Kovak, 2013; Topalova, 2010). This literature covers a wide range of 
topics, including the effect of trade on employment, poverty, and wages. The literature argues 
that the effects at the local labour market level may differ from national labour market effects 
due to differences in regional industry composition, factor endowment, and region-specific 
competitiveness. The regional analysis allows for sector-specific, region-specific, and other 
local labour market frictions in the economy. In terms of trade effects on employment, Autor 
et al. (2015) and Gaddis & Pieters (2017) find that local labour markets that faced strong 
international competition experienced a decline in employment in the manufacturing sector, in 
the US and the tradable sector in Brazil, respectively. 
 
The second related strand of the international literature focuses on the trade effects on gendered 
manufacturing. Studies include those of Black and Brainerd (2004), Baliamoune-Lutz (2007), 
Bussmann (2009), Juhn et al. (2014). These studies are at a national level and cover a wide 
range of topics, including trade effects on employment, unemployment, labour force 
participation, wages, education, and life expectancy. They find that increased trade benefits 
women by reducing the ability of firms to discriminate against women, but increases wage 
inequality (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2007; Black & Brainerd, 2004; Juhn et al., 2014). 
 
Using the Current Population Survey (CPS) data from 1977 to 1994 for US manufacturing 




industries and competitive industries. They find that trade contributes to reducing 
discrimination against women by improving the employment and wages of women.  
 
Baliamoune-Lutz (2007) uses cross-sectional, 5-year averages data, and ordinary least-squared 
as well as three-stage least squares estimation, to examine the effect of globalisation on gender 
literacy inequality across developing countries. The study includes 30 SSA countries and 32 
non-SSA developing countries and uses data from the World Development Indicators for 1990 
– 1994 and 1995 - 1999. Baliamoune-Lutz (2007) find that globalisation does not have an 
impact on gender inequality in the non-SSA countries but widens gender inequality (the gap 
between men and women) in SSA countries.  
 
Juhn et al. (2014) investigate the effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
on the gender wage gap in Mexico, using establishment-level data from 1991 to 2000. The 
study extends the Melitz (2003) model by differentiating workers according to skills-level and 
gender-specific and occupation-specific skills. They find evidence of a reduction in gender 
wage and employment gaps among blue-collar occupations, and no effect on white-collar 
occupations. They conclude that growth in employment and wages in blue-collar occupations 
is driven by the adoption of computerised production processes, which lowers the demand for 
physical labour.  
 
More relevant to this thesis is the literature on gendered trade effects at the regional level using 
the Bartik approach. Autor et al. (2015) point to an increase in the gender employment gap in 
the US in response to Chinese competition. Gaddis and Pieters (2017) examine the gendered 
effects of tariff liberalisation in Brazil, using a fixed-effects model and census data from 1991 
and 2000. The study finds that tariff liberalisation reduces tradable employment and labour 
force participation of men and women, but the effect is larger for men. A study on gender-
specific effects of globalisation in Indonesia was undertaken by Kis-Katos et al. (2018). The 
study covers 259 districts in Indonesia using household survey data and tariff data from United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) - Trade Analysis Information 
System (TRAINS) for 1993, 1996, 1999, and 2002. Using first-difference estimation, the study 
shows that reduction of tariffs led to improved participation of women in the labour market, 
increased working hours, and a drop in domestic duties, particularly for women over 20 with 





3.3.1 South African Evidence 
 
The empirical literature on the effects of trade on the labour market in South Africa has 
accumulated over the years (Dunne & Edwards, 2006; Fedderke et al., 2012; Jenkins & 
Edwards, 2015; Rodrik, 2008). A recent factor content study by Jenkins & Edwards (2015), 
suggests that Chinese competition had a net negative effect on employment in the South 
African manufacturing sector since 2001. Dunne & Edwards (2006) find that employment lost 
due to import penetration in the manufacturing sector from 1994 to 2003 was counteracted by 
employment gains through exports, although the net gains in employment were biased towards 
skilled labour-intensive industries (Edwards, 2001). Notwithstanding, the studies show that 
trade had profound effects in South Africa, it is based on industry-level data and focuses on the 
national labour market while imposing long-run models that implicitly assume full factor 
mobility within the country. 
 
The first published study on the impact of tariff liberalisation on regional employment in South 
Africa was by Erten et al. (2019) who find large reductions in manufacturing employment 
compared to other sectors in districts that experienced relatively high tariff reductions. 
Although their study provides a gender dimension, it assesses the effect of tariff liberalisation 
on the percentage of the female population and finds the relationship to be insignificant. Our 
study differs from this literature by analysing the tariff liberalisation effects on gendered 
employment.  
 
The literature on gender-biased effect of trade on employment in South Africa is limited. 
Bhorat (2000) analyses the impact of trade on sectoral employment between 1970 and 1995, 
using the Katz & Murphy (1992) decomposition technique to decompose employment by race, 
gender, and class. The study shows that trade contributes to a decrease in the share of male 
workers while increasing the share of female workers. Bhorat (2000) suggests that the 
increased preference for women over men in the workplace is a reflection of the rise in the 
service sector. 
 
Using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, Cockburn et al. (2010) analyse the trade 
effects on poverty in South Africa by gender. The study finds gender-biased trade effects in 
terms of labour force participation and wages. They show that labour force participation and 




decreases. This suggests that in South Africa women are concentrated in previously heavily 
protected sectors, which contracted during tariff liberalisation.  
 
Thurlow (2006) examines the contribution of trade on female unemployment and poverty 
between 1993 and 2003, using a dynamic general equilibrium and microsimulation model. 
They find that trade reform is a contributing factor in the reduction of the gender wage gap, but 
this is driven mainly by rising employment of higher-skilled female workers. In contrast, 
Chitiga et al. (2010) argue that liberalisation led to a decline in labour force participation and 
employment of women in South Africa, pointing to the fact that women are concentrated in the 
previously heavily protected textile, clothing, and footwear industry. None of these South 
African studies explore the gendered employment effects of tariff liberalisation across regions.  
 
This South African empirical literature provides some insight into the gender-specific trade 
effects on various labour market outcomes but shows mixed findings. The inconsistent results 
could be due to the fact that the studies have focused on the national labour market, assuming 
full mobility of labour. Perhaps a more disaggregated analysis could provide nuanced evidence 
by accounting for regional and industry rigidities. This chapter aims to fill this research gap by 
investigating the gender-specific effects of tariffs on employment for local labour markets 
across South Africa.  
 
3.4 Empirical Framework 
 
To assess the effects of tariff liberalisation on local labour markets, we follow the Bartik (1991) 
empirical framework that has been widely used (Autor et al., 2015; Dix-Carneiro & Kovak, 
2015; Gaddis & Pieters, 2017; Kis-Katos et al., 2018; Kovak, 2013; Topalova, 2010) and 
construct a time-varying local labour market measure of trade protection. This is constructed 
as the average industry tariff weighted by regional manufacturing employment share in the 
initial period, 1996. We define local labour markets as municipalities, following Weir-Smith 










where 𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑚𝑡 represents the manufacturing trade protection measure at time t, 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑚,𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙  
is initial manufacturing employment in industry i, and municipality m, while 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑚,𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 is 
the initial total manufacturing employment in municipality m. 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑡 denotes simple average 
tariff rates in industry i at time t. Values of TPman will differ across regions according to a 
combination of their industry-mix and the tariffs associated with these industries. Regions with 
high initial shares of manufacturing employment in industries that face high tariffs will have 
comparatively high levels of TPman. 
  
3.5 Econometric Model 
 
To study the effects of tariff liberalisation on manufacturing employment at the regional level 
we employ a first-difference approach to estimate the change in manufacturing employment 




=  𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑋𝑚𝑡
′ + 𝛽3𝑍
′
𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑡 + ∆ 𝑚𝑡             (3.5) 
 
where the dependent variable, ∆𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑚𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑢𝑓
, is the change in log manufacturing employment. 
∆𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑚𝑡 represents a change in the municipality trade protection measure, which is 
estimated using equation (3.4). We control for period fixed effects (𝜆𝑡) to capture 
macroeconomic shocks or developments that affect all industries equally. In the first-difference 
model, time-invariant municipality effects are differenced out. The estimation thus uses the 
change in tariffs and employment across municipalities to identify the coefficient. Given 
differences in the initial industry composition and differences in tariff reductions across 
industries, we expect to obtain substantial variation in the change in tariffs across 
municipalities in the two periods 1996-2001 and 2001-2011.  
 
To deal with potential threats to our identification strategy, we include two sets of control 
variables that may be correlated with the trade protection measure. The first set of controls 
includes the change in log working-age population, change in migration rate, and change in 
union-intensity, denoted by ∆𝑋𝑚𝑡
′ 14. Changes in employment may reflect changes in migration 
rates, which in turn, may be influenced by tariff liberalisation. Workers may move out of 
 
14 Working-age population is transformed into a natural logarithm. Migration rate is calculated as individuals who moved 




regions that are highly exposed to tariff reductions to less exposed regions. An increase in 
employment will also be influenced by a growing working-age population (supply shock), 
which, as discussed, itself could be influenced by changes in protection as workers migrate 
across regions.  
 
Union-intensity may mediate the effect of tariff liberalisation on employment and the gender 
gap because there is a positive relationship between union-intensity and employment. In 
situations where there exists the possibility to negotiate either for higher wages or employment, 
trade unions opt for retention of jobs on behalf of their members (Freeman & Katz, 1991; 
Shendy, 2009), especially in a country like South Africa where there is extremely high 
unemployment. In this context, union members enjoy more job protection than non-union 
members.  
 
We also control for lagged municipality characteristics, including the share of skilled workers 
(number of skilled workers normalised by the skilled working-age population), number of 
unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population, share of the manufacturing 
sector in employment, and infrastructure (indicators include electricity, flush toilet, piped water 
and regular collection of refuse), represented by 𝑍′𝑚,𝑡−1.  
 
The main coefficient of interest in equation (3.5) is 𝛽1 which reflects the effect of tariffs on 
manufacturing employment. A positive coefficient of 𝛽1 suggests that higher tariffs are 
associated with higher manufacturing employment levels. Alternatively, tariff reductions will 
be associated with declining employment levels. We expect that the coefficient will be positive 
for aggregate manufacturing employment.  
 
We estimate the specification for aggregate manufacturing employment as well as 
manufacturing employment disaggregated according to gender. Further, we test for the effect 







=  𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑋𝑚𝑡










is the indicator of the gender employment gap measured as a change in the 
natural logarithm of the level of male employment (m) to female employment (f ). 
 
A positive 𝛽1 reflects the outcome that lower tariffs narrow the gender employment gap. This 
is expected if tariff liberalisation is associated with lower levels of discrimination, or if newly 
adopted technologies are less brawn-intensive, boosting the demand for female labour.  
 
3.5.1 Endogeneity of Tariffs 
 
A potential estimation issue is that tariffs themselves may be a function of employment. 
Endogeneity of tariff rates can arise from political interference and lobbying due to concerns 
about the employment effects arising from liberalisation. Unions and lobbyists demand 
protection from import competition, while politicians, motivated by their own self-interest, 
supply protection (Holden & Casale, 2002). Consequently, the change in tariffs may itself be 
influenced by the change in employment, particularly if unions or workers can lobby for 
increases (or slow-downs in the reduction) in tariffs in response to job losses.  
 
These pressures were prevalent in South Africa during the 1980s when the Board on Tariffs 
and Trade (BTT) weighted employment effects of tariff liberalisation more than capital 
investment when taking into account their considerations to grant protection (Holden & Casale, 
2002). Holden and Casale (2002), for example, find support for the Grossman and Helpman 
(1994) endogenous tariff model and argue that the extent of an industry's tariff reduction was 
actually dependent on lobbying. However, it takes time for labour to adjust to tariff reduction 
because of high reallocation costs (Artuç et al., 2010; Kambourov, 2009) associated with search 
costs, industry-specific skills, and firing costs (Kambourov, 2009).   
 
Nevertheless, during the 1990s, endogeneity concerns were less prevalent than in the 1980s as 
by then multi-lateral tariff reductions were guided by the phase down approach agreed upon 
during the Uruguay Round of the WTO in 1994. South Africa committed to reducing tariff 
categories from 100 to 6 groups in the five-year tariff reduction programme (Cassim et al., 
2004; Erten et al., 2019). Moreover, there were also bilateral tariff reductions from 2000 in 
accordance with the Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with the European Union (EU) and SADC 




Secondly, the primary concern of the democratically elected government was to demonstrate a 
commitment to a market-friendly economy to the rest of the world by lowering the levels of 
protection (Bella & Quintieri, 2000; Erten et al., 2019; Rangasamy & Harmse, 2005). This 
commitment was further demonstrated by the implementation of the GEAR strategy in 1996 
which, among other objectives, promoted the use of tariff liberalisation as an instrument for 
achieving gains from openness and economic growth (Erten et al., 2019; Republic of South 
Africa, 1996). Therefore, commitment by the democratic government to drastically reduce 
protection across all industries, coupled with the limited influence of lobbyists, strengthen the 
possibility of exogeneity of tariff reductions.  
 
Nevertheless, to deal with the potential endogeneity issue, we follow Ahsan (2013), Amiti and 
Konings (2007), Erten et al. (2019) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) who use an instrumental 
variable (IV) estimation strategy that involves the use of the initial tariff level as an instrument 
for subsequent change. The validity of our IV strategy depends on two key assumptions. First, 
we assume that initial tariffs are correlated with changes in tariffs. This is supported by the fact 
that the South African multilateral tariff liberalisation followed a rationalisation process that 
targeted the heavily protected industries (Edwards, 2005). Industries with the highest initial 
tariffs had the largest cuts in tariff rates. Supportive evidence for this is provided in Figure 3.2, 
where a negative association between initial tariff and the change in tariff is evident. Second, 
we assume that initial tariffs are uncorrelated with changes in the error term. This does not 
seem to be an unrealistic assumption because the 1996 tariffs are likely to be far removed from 
current changes in the error term. 
  
Figure 3.2: Correlation between initial tariff rates and change in tariff rates 
 




The first stage results (provided in the appendix Table 3.2A) also show that there is a strong 
negative relationship between initial tariffs and a change in tariffs. We also use the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test to assess whether the change in trade protection measure is exogenous. The 
results are also presented in Table 3.2A in the appendix. The p-values are small, and therefore 
we reject the null hypothesis that the trade protection measure is exogenous. The results in the 




3.6.1 Data Sources 
 
We utilise data from several sources. The first datasets are those of the South African 
population censuses for 1996, 2001, and 2011, released by the national statistics agency, 
Statistics South Africa. They include a database of the full census, and a 10% census sample 
dataset with individual-level and household-level data. The individual-level data includes 
variables for education level, gender, income, industry, migration, occupation, race, and 
unemployment for   the working-age population. Variables obtained from the full population 
census include gender, industry (at the one-digit SIC level), income, migration and 
unemployment, while education level, industry (at the two-digit SIC level), occupation and 
variables disaggregated by race (specifically education level, migration)  are acquired from the 
census 10% sample. Variables from the census 10% sample are weighted using individual 
weights. The household-level census data provides us with infrastructure variables. 
Infrastructure data is defined as variables on households’ access to electricity, piped water, a 
flush toilet, and at least weekly refuse removal by the local authority.  
 
The third dataset is comprised of industry-level annual nominal tariff data, obtained and 
updated from Edwards (2005). Edwards (2005) sourced the raw tariff data from UNCTAD – 
TRAINS.  
 
Finally, the study uses household survey data from Statistics South Africa. The fourth dataset 
is from year 1996 of the October Household Survey (OHS) series which was discontinued in 
1999.  A substitute survey, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) was introduced in 2000 and our last 
datasets are from the 2001 and 2011 years of the Labour Force Survey (LFS). A significant 




while the LFS was conducted biannually (in March and September) and then quarterly from 
2008 (the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS)). In an attempt to ensure the data is 
comparable, we utilise the September LFS for 2001 and the third Quarter QLFS for 2011. A 
drawback of these datasets is the lack of disaggregated geographical variables. The union 
membership variable is therefore only provided at the provincial level.  
 
3.6.2 Construction of Variables 
This section discusses how the variable utilised in the analyses are constructed. Since the 
census does not collect data on wages, we use the income of manufacturing workers as a proxy 
for wages, following Redding and Venables (2004). Although income includes basic salary, 
bonuses, allowances, income from grants, transfers, remittances and any other income source, 
we argue that it is a good proxy, especially in the case of South Africa where total income 
received is comprised largely of salaries or wages (Leibbrandt et al., 2010). A further challenge 
is that income in the censuses is reported in brackets and the top end bracket is open-ended. To 
overcome this challenge, we use the midpoints of each bracket and the highest bracket is set at 
twice the value of the lowest bound to construct an continuous income variable. Even though, 
this approach is reported to be provide noisy income date and exaggerate the income inequality 
(Wittenberg, 2017), it is found to presents similar findings to other techniques such as 
reweighting approach and mean imputation (Ardington et al., 2006; Von Fintel, 2007). This 
approach has commonly been used by Statistics South Africa (Mudiriza & Edwards, 2020; 
Statistics South Africa, 2000). We aggregate total income for manufacturing workers in each 
municipality and divide this total by the number of manufacturing workers in the respective 
municipality.  
The employment variable contains data for individuals employed full time and within the 
working age population (15-65 years old). Unemployment is constructed as individuals who 
are unemployed and are within the ages of 15 to 65 years, following the strict or official 
definition of unemployment15.  
 
 
15 The strict or official definition of unemployment includes individuals who did not work during the seven days prior to census 
night, individuals who wanted to work, and were available to start work within a week of census night, as well as individuals 




The migration variable indicates individuals who moved since the last census. In the case of 
the 1996 census, the focus is on migration between 1991 and 1996 whereas the 2001 and 2011 
censuses consider individuals who moved since 1996 and 2001 respectively.  
 
In the chapter, we use the production16/non-production employment gap in heavy17 
manufacturing industries. This data is obtained from the occupation variable in the census 10% 
sample, as a proxy for brawn-intensity. Brawn-intensity is the share of workers in production 
occupations, including craft and trades workers, and plant and machine operators. The skills 
gap is the ratio between skilled workers (individuals with a matric or Grade 12 qualification 
and higher) and unskilled workers obtained from the full census.  
 
With respect to other control variables, union-intensity is constructed at the provincial level as 
the share of trade union members out of total workers in a region. The infrastructure variable 
is derived as a principal component of households with access to electricity, regular refuse 
collection, a flush toilet, and piped water as a share of the total number of households. 
 
Constructing the local labour market trade protection measure requires that we map the tariff 
rates to initial employment shares in each municipality. However, the challenge with the full 
census is that industries are reported at the one-digit SIC level. To overcome this challenge, we 
use the 10% sample of 1996, which contains two-digit SIC level industries18. We first calculate 
the simple average of the 6-digit Harmonised System (HS) level tariff for each of the ten 
manufacturing industries19 in each year, using the concordance table. South Africa has a 
complex set of trade measures, including ad-valorem, specific, and mixed tariffs, all of which 
pose a challenge for the calculation of tariff measures. We consider only the ad valorem tariffs 
and the ad valorem component of the mixed tariffs, and exclude specific tariffs. Second, we 
use the 10% sample of the 1996 census to calculate weighted manufacturing employment levels 
(total and by gender) for each of the ten industries. We use the employment data and the tariff 
data to calculate regional average tariffs in accordance with equation (3.4). 
 
16 Production employment incorporates craft and trades workers, as well as plant and machine operators  
17 For the purposes of the thesis, heavy manufacturing industries include: Wood products; Fuel, petroleum and chemical 
products; Non-metallic products; Metal products and machinery; Electrical machinery; Transport equipment; and Furniture & 
recycling. 
18 The 10% sample is however reported at the magisterial district level. There are 354 magisterial districts in South Africa. We 
mapped the weighted magisterial district industry data to the 2011 municipalities to calculate the trade protection measure in 
each of the 234 municipalities. 
19 The two-digit SIC level manufacturing industries include: (1) Food, beverages and tobacco products; (2) Textiles; clothing 
and footwear; (3) Wood products; (4) Fuel, petroleum and chemical products; (5) Non-metallic products; (6) Metal products 




3.6.3 Tariff Liberalisation in South Africa in the Post-Apartheid Era 
 
This section of the chapter shows the reduction of tariffs in the post-apartheid period. The 
employment-weighted tariffs are presented in Figure 3.3, which provides an overview of the 
level of liberalisation that took place between 1993 and 2011 for the ten manufacturing 
industries, as defined by International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) revision 3. The 
figure shows three different employment-weighted20 tariff rates. The “Aggregate” measure 
uses total (male plus female) manufacturing employment to calculate employment shares. It 
thus reflects the average protection faced by all workers. The limitation of this aggregate 
measure is that the gender composition of employment differs across industries. Further, 
industry-specificity implies that male and female labour are not perfectly substitutable across 
industries. Consequently, with different levels of tariff reductions across industries, the 
aggregate measure may not reflect the change in protection faced by women relative to men. 
To account for this, a gender-specific tariff exposure measure is calculated where the 
employment share weights are derived using industry employment levels for men and women 
separately.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 3.3, average tariffs declined dramatically over these years. On average, 
aggregate employment-weighted tariffs fell by 12 percentage points, from 20% in 1993 to 8% 
in 2011. Female (male) employment weighted tariffs fell from an average of 29% (16%) to 
about 12% (7%), translating into a 17 (9) percentage point cut between 1993 and 2011. An 
interesting feature revealed in the figure is that women workers are more concentrated in high 




















Figure 3.3: Evolution of manufacturing employment-weighted tariff rates 
 
Notes: Employment weighted tariffs are constructed using the average of the regional tariff variable where regional tariffs are tariff rates 
weighted by 1996 regional manufacturing employment shares.  
Sources: 10% weighted sample census data and updated tariff data obtained from Edwards (2015) 
 
Industry-bias of tariff liberalisation is clearly reflected in Figure 3.4, where a negative 
relationship is found between the change in industry tariff and the share of women in total 
industry employment from 1996 and 201121.  The figure shows that the textile, clothing, and 
footwear industry experienced the largest tariff reduction. It is also the industry with the largest 
share of female workers. The textile and clothing industry faced drastic liberalisation over that 
period, which intensified trade exposure for women. The implication is that the tariff 
liberalisation process is expected to have a gendered impact based on industrial segregation, 















Figure 3.4: Gender-biased tariff reductions between 1996 and 2011 
 
Notes: Employment weighted tariffs are constructed using the average of the regional tariff variable where regional tariffs are tariff rates 
weighted by 1996 regional manufacturing employment shares.  
Sources: 10% weighted sample census data and updated tariff data obtained from Edwards (2015) 
 
3.6.4 The South African Labour Market 
 
The South African labour market is characterised by slow employment growth. This is a central 
economic challenge facing South African policymakers. Over the past two decades, the 
economy has not generated enough jobs to employ all individuals who could be participating 
in the labour market. Table 3.1 highlights employment trends in the post-apartheid period. The 
table shows how employment as a share of the working-age population (employment rate) rose 
by six percentage points from 32.9% in 1996 to 38.9% in 2011.  
 
Historically, the labour market has been dominated by men. Even though there has been a rise 
in female participation in the labour market in recent years, employment rates of men continue 
to exceed those of women. In 1996, employment rates of women and men were about 26% and 
41%, respectively, and by 2011 the rates stood at 33.2% and 44.9%, respectively. This indicates 
a narrowing of the gender employment gap from 15.5 percentage points in 1996 to 11.7 





Table 3.1: Total employment rates trend from 1996 to 2011 
 1996 2001 2011 
Employment rate: total employment/working-age population (%) 
Aggregate 32.9 30.8 38.9 
Female 25.5 24.6 33.2 
Male 41.0 37.7 44.9 
Notes: The data is for the national labour market. Employment rate reflects employment that is normalised by the working-age population 
(ages 15-64).  
Source: Full census data 
 
Of more relevance to the chapter is the employment trend in manufacturing, as exhibited in 
Table 3.2. The sector experienced sharp declines in employment growth compared to other 
sectors. Manufacturing employment as a share of total employment contracted by 4.2 
percentage points, from 14% in 1996 to 9.8% in 2011. There are also differences in 
manufacturing employment trends across gender. It is observed that a higher proportion of men 
work in manufacturing than women. In 2011, approximately 11.6% of employed men were in 
manufacturing compared to 7.5% of women. Men are thus more exposed to manufacturing than 
women, although the industries in which they dominate experienced less of a reduction in 
tariffs, as shown by Figure 3.3. Additionally, manufacturing employment shares declined more 
for females if measured in percentage change (4.2 percentage points) relative to 4 percentage 
points for men. The empirical analysis that follows later will attempt to isolate the role that 
tariffs play in driving these employment changes.  
 
Table 3.2: Manufacturing employment shares from 1996 to 2011 
 1996 2001 2011 
Manufacturing share/ total employment (%) 
Aggregate 14.0 13.8 9.8 
Female 11.7 11.0 7.5 
Male 15.6 15.8 11.6 
Notes: The data is for the national labour market. Manufacturing share is manufacturing employment as a share of total employment.  
Source: Full census data 
 
The census data also provides other relevant information on the employment composition. As 
shown in Table 3.3, the skill composition (measured as the share of skilled workers22) of 
workers in manufacturing has risen strongly over the period, rising from 27.8% in 1996 to 52% 
in 2011, with stronger increases for women than for men. We also characterise workers 
according to their occupational status. Production workers are defined as individuals working 
as craft and trades workers as well as plant and machine operators in heavy manufacturing 
 




industries. For the purposes of this chapter, the share of production workers reflects brawn-
intensity. The proportion of manufacturing workers engaged in production work in heavy 
manufacturing industries decreased to 42.3% in 2011 from 53.5% in 1996. Declines in shares 
were experienced by men in production occupations remains high compared to that of women. 
The data shows that there has been a marginal increase in the brawn-intensity among women. 
The slight rise in brawn-intensity among women may be due to changes in employment policies 
in South Africa which promote the employment of women. It may also indicate that women 
are exercising their agency and tyring to not conform to social norms and stereotypes.  
 
The sharp changes in the skill composition of employment in manufacturing points to the 
possible presence of technological change associated with tariff liberalisation. To the extent 
that production workers in heavy industries are a proxy for ‘brawn’, the trend is also consistent 
with a shift in the composition of workers away from brawn intensive tasks to non-brawn-
intensive tasks over the period. In the empirical analysis, we test whether these trends are 
associated with tariff liberalisation and whether they give rise to gendered effects on 
employment. 
 
Table 3.3: Skill and brawn employment shares in manufacturing from 1996 to 2011  
  1996 2001 2011 
Skill share Aggregate 27.8 38.9 52.0 
 Female 26.5 37.6 55.2 
 Male 28.4 39.6 50.4 
Production share Aggregate 53.5 47.9 42.3 
 Female 30.0 30.3 32.8 
 Male 59.7 53.1 46.1 
Notes: The figures are presented as a percentage. Skill share is calculated as the number of skilled workers divided by the sum of skilled and 
unskilled workers in all the manufacturing industries. Production share represents workers who are employed as craft and trade workers as a 
share of the sum of workers employed in all occupations (production/non-production occupations) in manufacturing industries excluding food 
& beverage, textile, clothing & footwear and electronics. We ran a t-test to determine whether the differences between men and women in 
terms of employment, manufacturing employment, skill share, and production share in manufacturing are statistically significant. The results 
are presented in Table 3.1A in the appendix. All the p-values are less than 0.05, indicating that the gender differences are significant. 
Source: Full census data and the 10% weighted sample census data. 
 
3.6.4.1 Spatial Variation in Manufacturing Employment Share 
 
A spatial map of 1996 manufacturing share (left side) and changes in manufacturing 
employment share from 1996-2011 (right side) across municipalities in South Africa is 
presented in Figure 3.5. The darker shade reflects higher shares or larger changes in shares. 
The map shows significant variation in the level and change in manufacturing employment 




Western Cape, and to a lesser extent Eastern Cape provinces had the highest employment share 
in manufacturing in 1996. This is not surprising as Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, and the Western 
Cape are the main economic hubs in South Africa. The municipalities in these provinces also 
experienced the largest declines in manufacturing employment share between 1996 and 2011. 
Not all municipalities experienced declining manufacturing employment shares, with several 
municipalities across the country experiencing marginal share increases over the period.  
 
Figure 3.5: Spatial distribution manufacturing employment share 
 
Notes: Manufacturing employment shares are calculated as manufacturing employment as a share of total employment in each municipality. 
Source: Full census data 
 
Summary statistics displayed in Table 3.4 show the change in the trade protection measure, 
wage (proxied by income) and employment across municipalities between 1996 and 2011. This 
table provides a more disaggregated lens through which to view regional dynamics. We 
observe substantial differences in exposure to international competition through tariff 
reductions. The average change in aggregate trade protection across municipalities is 8 
percentage points; the median is about 7 percentage points, while the standard deviation is 
about 3 percentage points. The municipality in the 25th percentile experienced close to a 3 
percentage point larger tariff reduction compared to a municipality in the 75th percentile.  
 
Municipality-level manufacturing wage rose by an average of 110 log points, with a median of 
101 log points and a standard deviation of 93 log points over the period, 1996-2011. In the 
same period, the data shows that South Africa experienced a reduction in the gender wage gap 
in the manufacturing sector, with the wage increase for women (129 log points) surpassing that 





On average, manufacturing employment rose by about 39 log points between 1996 and 2011. 
Female manufacturing employment increased by 38 log points, while the employment of men 
rose by 40 log points, resulting in a marginal increase in the gender employment gap of about 
1 percentage point. However, the standard deviation of female manufacturing employment is 
higher than that of males, revealing greater variation in the change in female manufacturing 
employment levels relative to that of men across municipalities.   
 
The number of Blacks (Africans, Coloureds and Indians/Asians) employed in the 
manufacturing sector increased by an average of 41 log points, while employment of Whites 
increased by 40 log points. The growth in manufacturing employment of Black women was an 
average of 42 log points compared to 43 log points for Black men, while for White women the 
average growth was 57 log points, compared to 38 log points for White men. Even though the 
gender gap declined for both Blacks and Whites, we see stronger convergence among Whites, 
highlighted by the 21 log point decline in the gender employment gap for this group compared 
to 6 log points for Blacks.  
 
Overall, the data point to fairly large changes in tariffs and employment levels or shares across 
municipalities over the period. These changes also differ vastly across municipalities. This 
variation in the data over time and across municipalities provides a good basis to estimate the 




















Table 3.4: Summary statistics of the change in tariffs and manufacturing employment 
between 1996 and 2011 
Variable Mean P50 SD P75-P25 
ΔTPman -0.08 -0.07 0.03 0.03 
Δln(Manufacturing wage) 1.10 1.01 0.93 0.87 
Female 1.29 1.15 1.07 0.95 
Male 0.99 0.95 1.01 0.97 
Δln(Manufacturing employment) 0.39 0.44 0.67 0.85 
Female 0.38 0.49 0.84 1.04 
Male 0.40 0.43 0.63 0.79 
Gender gap 0.01 -0.01 0.60 0.70 
Δln(Manufacturing employment: Black) 0.41 0.41 0.72 0.90 
Female 0.42 0.49 0.91 1.17 
Male 0.43 0.46 0.66 0.84 
Gender gap -0.06 -0.01 0.76 0.88 
Δln(Manufacturing employment: White) 0.40 0.31 1.04 0.85 
Female 0.57 0.55 0.82 0.96 
Male 0.38 0.31 1.07 0.85 
Gender gap -0.21 -0.23 0.70 0.86 
Notes: ΔTPman is the change in trade protection measure (tariff rates weighted by manufacturing employment shares). Manufacturing 
employment share is manufacturing as a share of total employment in each municipality. The gender gap is male manufacturing employment 
divided by female manufacturing employment. Black includes Africans, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. 
Source: Full census data 
 
3.7 Estimation Results 
 
3.7.1 The Effects of Tariff Liberalisation on Manufacturing Wages 
 
The focus of the empirical specification and background data analysis in this study has been 
on employment changes. However, as outlined in the theoretical review in Section 3.2, changes 
in wages in response to tariff liberalisation are a critical channel driving labour market 
outcomes, including changes in the employment composition of industries (Feenstra, 2015). 
As the first step in our analysis, we study the relationship between tariff reductions and wages. 
We use the bracketed income variable as proxy for wage. We then construct continuous income 
variable using the midpoint approach following Mudiriza and Edwards (2020) and Statistics 
South Africa (2000). A detailed discussion about the wage variable is provided in Section 3.6.2. 
Given the imputed variable, findings from this analysis do not conclusively point to the wage 
effect. Nonetheless, it is critical to determine whether wages adjust to tariff changes in South 
Africa. This analysis provides a comprehensive analysis of the tariff liberalisation effects on 





In Table 3.5, we present the estimation results for the analysis of tariff liberalisation on 
manufacturing wages. Columns (1) to (3) present estimates for aggregate wage, female wage 
and male wage, where we only control for the working-age population and period fixed effects. 
The models in columns (4) to (6) include other control variables such as the changes in the 
working-age population, migration rate, and change in trade union intensity. We also control 
for lagged variables, including skill rate, percent of unemployed individuals, infrastructure, and 
manufacturing share. The coefficient on the change in tariffs is insignificantly different from 
zero in all estimates. The interpretation is that there was no significant association between 
tariff reductions and average wages in municipalities over the period.  
 
Table 3.5: The effects of tariff liberalisation on manufacturing wages 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent variables: Change in log wages 
VARIABLES Aggregate Female Male  Aggregate Female Male 
               
ΔTariff 1.138 2.610 -4.936  -0.208 1.031 -6.583 
 (2.237) (2.325) (6.008)  (2.274) (2.309) (6.575) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.163 0.171 0.520*  0.128 0.091 0.438 
 (0.264) (0.334) (0.301)  (0.277) (0.336) (0.318) 
ΔMigration rate     0.455 0.454 0.163 
     (0.343) (0.454) (0.344) 
ΔUnion intensity     1.520** 2.049** 1.716** 
     (0.738) (0.901) (0.707) 
L.Skill rate     0.233 0.766 -0.166 
     (0.586) (0.743) (0.642) 
L.Unemployed rate     -1.257* -1.316 -1.460 
     (0.714) (0.849) (0.939) 
L.Infrastructure     -0.003 -0.008 0.016 
     (0.018) (0.022) (0.021) 
L.Manufacturing share     0.254 0.095 0.190 
     (0.421) (0.572) (0.545) 
Constant 0.630*** 0.924*** 0.385**  0.532 0.775* 0.598* 
 (0.082) (0.097) (0.155)  (0.332) (0.466) (0.315) 
        
Observations 467 464 466  467 464 466 
R-squared 0.011 0.054 0.023  0.036 0.074 0.046 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
IV No No No  No No No 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: Tariff variable is the manufacturing employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, change in tariffs comprises the difference in tariffs in 
the initial period and tariffs in the final period. The municipality wage variable is derived using the total income of manufactured workers 
calculated using the midpoints of the income brackets and dividing by the number of manufacturing workers in each municipality. Migration 
rate represents the number of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the 
share of trade union members. Skill rate denotes skilled workers as a share of workers within the working-age population, and unemployed 
rates are the number of unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents number households with 
access to electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, a flush toilet and piped water, as a share of total households. Manufacturing 





To deal with the issue of endogeneity, we follow Ahsan (2013), Amiti and Konings (2007) and 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) and use an IV estimation strategy. We instrument the change in 
trade protection with lagged trade protection. The estimation results of tariff effects on 
manufacturing wages using the IV strategy are presented in Table 3.6, and we find that the 
coefficients remain statistically insignificant for aggregate labour, as well as for gender. This 
evidence suggests that wages did not respond to tariff shocks. This result corroborates the 
findings by Erten et al. (2019) who find that tariff liberalisation had no effect on regional 
average wages in South Africa. However, they are inconsistent with findings in the US by 
Autor et al. (2013) and evidence from research in Brazil by Benguria and Ederington (2018) 
that regional exposure to an increase in Chinese imports reduced wages and the gender wage 
gap.  
 
Our results provide suggestive evidence of the presence of wage rigidities in the South African 
economy. An explanation for this is the wage-setting and the conditions of service processes 
determined by the Labour Relations Act and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) 
of 1997. Under these Acts, wages are set by centralised sector Bargaining Councils where 
unions and firms negotiate wages that can be extended to non-participants through ministerial 
agreements, or through Sectoral Determinations where the Ministry of Labour sets minimum 
wages for vulnerable sectors and occupations not covered by collective bargaining.  
 
Studies in South Africa show that the wage-setting processes are more binding for small firms 
(Magruder, 2012) and low skilled low wage workers (Bhorat et al., 2014; Dinkelman & 
Ranchhod, 2012). Murray and Van Walbeeck (2007) argue that the implementation of the 
minimum wage policy in South Africa reduced the average number of hours of farmworkers. 
Furthermore, minimum wages led to a substitution of labour for capital, this had an undesirable 
effect on employment in agriculture.  
 
The implications for our analysis are considerable. Our results indicate that adjustment to tariff 
liberalisation is likely to occur through employment changes. Since we find that manufacturing 
wages are unresponsive to tariff cuts, the thesis proceeds by studying the effect on 







Table 3.6: The effects of tariff liberalisation on gendered manufacturing wages  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent variables: Change in log wage 
VARIABLES Aggregate Female Male 
        
ΔTariff -0.006 1.232 -5.080 
 (2.605) (2.856) (6.736) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.126 0.089 0.426 
 (0.277) (0.336) (0.315) 
ΔMigration rate 0.455 0.454 0.163 
 (0.343) (0.454) (0.345) 
ΔUnion intensity 1.515** 2.044** 1.677** 
 (0.740) (0.903) (0.710) 
L.Skill rate 0.233 0.766 -0.165 
 (0.586) (0.742) (0.641) 
L.Unemployed rate -1.244* -1.304 -1.366 
 (0.719) (0.852) (0.943) 
L.Infrastructure -0.003 -0.008 0.017 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.021) 
L.Manufacturing share 0.260 0.101 0.234 
 (0.422) (0.577) (0.547) 
Constant 0.533 0.776* 0.605* 
 (0.331) (0.466) (0.314) 
    
Observations 467 464 466 
R-squared 0.036 0.074 0.046 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, change in tariffs 
comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. The municipality wage variable is derived using the total 
income of manufacturing workers calculated using the midpoints of the income brackets and dividing by the number of manufacturing workers 
in each municipality. Migration rate represents the number of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age 
population. Union-intensity is the share of trade union members. Skill rate denotes skilled workers as a share of the working-age population, 
and unemployed rates are the number of unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households 
with access to electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, a flush toilet, and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. 
Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing employment as a share of total employment, excluding employment in the primary sector.  
 
3.7.2 The Effects of Tariff Liberalisation on Aggregate Manufacturing Employment 
 
Table 3.7 presents the IV estimation results from the manufacturing employment regressions. 
A positive coefficient on the tariff variable means that tariff reductions are associated with 
manufacturing employment declines. We find that changes in tariffs are positively and 
significantly associated with changes in employment levels. The results imply that a 1 
percentage point reduction in the regional tariff indicator is associated with a 4.8% decline in 
manufacturing employment within that municipality, as shown in column (1). This finding is 





On average, tariffs declined by 8 percentage points, as shown in Table 3.4. When using the 
estimated coefficients, these tariff reductions translate into a 38% decrease in manufacturing 
employment. The raw data reveals that manufacturing employment declined by 39 log points 
between 1996 and 2011, implying that tariff cuts can explain the full decline in employment 
over the period. 
 
We are also interested in capturing the effect of both tariff reduction and imports on 
manufacturing employment to assess whether tariffs have additional effects over and above the 
import effect, because tariff liberalisation can affect employment through two channels. Firstly, 
it reduces the price of substitute products, leading to an increase in imports and a decline in 
domestically produced goods. Secondly, it reduces the price even of domestically produced 
substitutes. In much of the empirical literature, for example (Autor et al., 2015; Kis-Katos et 
al., 2018), consideration of the effect of international competition focuses solely on the import 
channel. To assess which of these channels drive the results, column (2) includes a measure of 
regional exposure to imports. Following Autor et al. (2015), the regional import exposure 
measure is constructed by weighing imports using regional employment shares.  
 
From this, we find that imports are negatively correlated with manufacturing employment, 
suggesting that higher import volumes reduce manufacturing employment, implying that rising 
imports are an important channel through which tariffs have induced job losses. However, 
while the coefficient on tariffs falls (as expected through the inclusion of the import channel), 
it remains significant. The implication is that the full effect of tariff liberalisation on 
employment is not captured by imports alone. The price effect presents an additional important 














Table 3.7: Effects of tariff liberalisation on aggregate manufacturing employment 
  (1) (2) 
 Dependent variables: Change in log employment 
VARIABLES Model 1  Model 2 
      
ΔTariff 4.750** 4.213** 
 (1.938) (1.920) 
ΔImports  -0.597** 
  (0.301) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.886*** 0.891*** 
 (0.142) (0.141) 
ΔMigration rate 0.386* 0.374* 
 (0.213) (0.211) 
ΔUnion intensity 0.249 0.373 
 (0.422) (0.416) 
L.Skill rate 0.527 0.443 
 (0.362) (0.364) 
L.Unemployed rate -0.984** -1.070*** 
 (0.399) (0.399) 
L.Infrastructure -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
L.Manufacturing share -2.393*** -2.397*** 
 (0.406) (0.405) 
Constant 0.511** 1.388*** 
 (0.217) (0.500) 
   
Observations 467 467 
R-squared 0.297 0.307 
Period FE Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, change in tariffs 
comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. Migration rate represents the number of individuals who 
migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of trade union members. Skill rate denotes 
skilled workers as a share of the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals as a share of the 
working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with access to electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, a flush 
toilet, and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing employment as a share of 
total employment, excluding employment in the primary sector.  
 
3.7.3 Tariff Liberalisation Effects on Gendered Employment in Manufacturing 
 
This section unpacks the aggregate employment effect of tariff liberalisation by gender using 
the IV estimation strategy. Table 3.8 presents estimation results for the employment of men 
and women as well as the gender employment gap, as measured by the manufacturing 
employment ratio of men to women.  
 
The results show that municipalities more exposed to tariff liberalisation experienced slower 
employment growth of both men and women compared to less exposed municipalities. 




point tariff cut is shown to be associated with a 7.3% decrease in female employment compared 
to a 3.0% decrease in male employment, revealing that the effect on women is double that on 
men. We utilised the Seemingly Unrelated Estimation (Suest) to test whether the difference of 
the two coefficients are statistically different using the lagged tariff protection measure23. The 
p-value (displayed in column (2)) is 0.003 which is less than 0.05 and this shows that the two 
coefficients are statistically different.   
 
To further test the significance of the difference in effects by gender further, column (3) shows 
that tariff liberalisation widened the gender employment gap in manufacturing in municipalities 
that are more exposed to tariff liberalisation. Municipalities that faced a one percentage point 
cut in tariffs experienced a 4.3% increase in the gender employment gap. Even though the 
estimate may appear to be large, it is may not be an unrealistic estimate. It is highly likely that 
it is in line with the South African labour market given the fact that the country  is characterised 
by huge gender inequalities particularly with regards to labour market outcomes. The gender 
employment gap is enormous and persistent over time, as shown in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2.  
 
These results of the effects of tariff reductions on gendered employment differ from experience 
in other emerging countries, such as Brazil and Indonesia (Gaddis & Pieters, 2017; Kis-Katos 
et al., 2018). These studies find that tariff liberalisation reduced the gender employment gap in 
both countries. The channel that may explain the difference in results is identified in Section 
3.7.5.2.  
 
From the coefficients on the control variables, it is evident that municipalities with a growing 
working-age population experienced an increase in manufacturing employment of both men 
and women. Furthermore, we find that an increase in migration increased male employment 
but had no effect on female employment. Municipalities with a higher unemployed rate 
(unemployment divided by the working-age population) experienced a larger decline in 
manufacturing employment of women, while men were more negatively affected in 




23 The Suest test is not ideal for IV estimations. To overcome this challenge, the estimation was performed using Ordinary 
Least squares (OLS) estimation and the lagged tariff protection measure as the main variable of interest. We also included all 
the control variables in equation (3.6). Nonetheless, performing this test of statistical difference does provide some insight to 
the differences that we observe in terms of gendered effects of tariff reductions. To this extent, we are not making conclusive 




Table 3.8: Tariff liberalisation effects on gendered employment in manufacturing 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Female Male  Gender employment gap 
        
ΔTariff 7.256*** 3.048* -4.280** 
 (2.525) (1.766) (1.778) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.712*** 0.898*** 0.207 
 (0.188) (0.141) (0.156) 
ΔMigration rate -0.266 0.562*** 0.847*** 
 (0.306) (0.211) (0.270) 
ΔUnion intensity 0.677 0.309 -0.370 
 (0.610) (0.402) (0.551) 
L.Skill rate 0.655 0.473 -0.158 
 (0.495) (0.338) (0.394) 
L.Unemployed rate -1.391** -1.065*** 0.412 
 (0.540) (0.406) (0.499) 
L.Infrastructure -0.009 -0.007 0.002 
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.015) 
L.Manufacturing share -1.905*** -2.456*** -0.547 
 (0.490) (0.387) (0.360) 
Constant 1.059*** 0.404* -0.699** 
 (0.310) (0.216) (0.281) 
    
Observations 465 466 464 
R-squared 0.183 0.312 0.039 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes 
Suest Test    
Chi(2)  8.929  
Prob > (Chi2)  0.003  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, change in tariffs 
comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. The dependent variables in the first two estimates are the 
change in log manufacturing employment, and in the third estimate, it is the change in log gender employment gap. Migration rate represents 
the number of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of union 
members. Skilled rate denotes skilled workers as a share of skilled working within the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the 
number of unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with electricity (including 
solar), weekly refuse collection, flush toilet and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. Manufacturing share reflects 
manufacturing employment as a share of total employment, excluding the primary sector.  
 
3.7.4 Tariff Liberalisation and Gendered Manufacturing Employment across Race 
 
The South African labour market is fragmented across race and gender. The effects of tariff 
liberalisation may, therefore, also differ across race and by race-gender combinations. To 
explore this further, we present estimates for manufacturing employment disaggregated by race 
and gender in Table 3.9.  
 
The estimates show that the negative effects of tariff liberalisation on manufacturing 
employment were disproportionately borne by Blacks, while employment of Whites was not 




cushioned from adverse tariff shocks. The effect on Black women was double that on Black 
men, resulting in a statistically significant widening of the gender employment gap. A one 
percentage point tariff cut widened the gender employment gap between Black men and Black 
women by about 4.6%. Among Whites, tariff liberalisation had no significant effect on 
manufacturing employment of males or females. Similarly to Section 3.7.3, we performed the 
Seemingly Unrelated Estimation (Suest) tests to test for the difference in the coefficients. The 
p-value from the test in columns (2) is 0.002 and is less than 0.05, indicating that the 
coefficients for Black women and Black men are statistically different. However, the p-value 
in column (5) of 0.950 shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients for 
White women and White men are the same.   
 
These findings are interesting because they reveal that in segmented labour markets, the effects 
of tariff liberalisation can fall disproportionately on some groups rather than others. In the 
South African context, the results point to a disproportionate impact of tariff liberalisation on 
Blacks, and Black women, more precisely. The liberalisation process thus exacerbated a 
structure of employment that arose out of South Africa’s racial and gender-biased policies that 




















Table 3.9: Tariff liberalisation gendered effects on manufacturing employment across 
race 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Black  White 
VARIABLES Female Male Gender gap  Female Male Gender gap 
               
ΔTariff 7.926*** 3.469* -4.559**  3.837 4.840 -0.072 
 (2.762) (1.822) (1.935)  (6.381) (7.292) (6.032) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.692*** 0.923*** 0.247  0.910** 0.734** -0.170 
 (0.215) (0.149) (0.177)  (0.419) (0.341) (0.332) 
ΔMigration rate -0.367 0.525** 0.926***  1.627** 2.289*** 0.565 
 (0.364) (0.224) (0.318)  (0.720) (0.805) (0.557) 
ΔUnion intensity 0.946 0.715* -0.310  2.995* -0.635 -2.499* 
 (0.698) (0.433) (0.627)  (1.613) (1.236) (1.405) 
L.Skill rate 0.666 0.545 -0.080  1.996 2.527* 0.315 
 (0.545) (0.354) (0.440)  (1.553) (1.461) (1.118) 
L.Unemployed rate -1.511** -1.023** 0.543  -1.408 -2.009 0.015 
 (0.653) (0.433) (0.594)  (1.272) (1.330) (1.272) 
L.Infrastructure -0.016 -0.008 0.007  0.028 -0.030 -0.043* 
 (0.018) (0.011) (0.015)  (0.025) (0.019) (0.024) 
L.Manufacturing share -1.898*** -2.414*** -0.489  -2.357* -4.432*** -1.736** 
 (0.516) (0.401) (0.392)  (1.272) (1.245) (0.827) 
Constant 1.186*** 0.438* -0.808**  -0.271 0.210 -0.492 
 (0.388) (0.225) (0.345)  (0.574) (0.473) (0.513) 
        
Observations 463 466 462  387 416 376 
R-squared 0.155 0.300 0.033  0.131 0.112 0.050 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Suest Test        
Chi2  9.897    0.004  
Prob > (Chi2)  0.002    0.950  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the manufacturing employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, 
change in tariffs comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. The dependent variables in columns (1), 
(2), (4) and (5) is the change in log manufacturing employment and the dependent variable in columns (3) and (6) it is the change in log gender 
employment gap.  Black includes Africans, Coloureds and Indians/Asians. Migration rate represents the number of individuals who migrated 
since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of union members. Skilled rate denotes skilled 
workers as a share of skilled working within the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals as a 
share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, flush 
toilet and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing employment as a share of 
total employment, excluding the primary sector. 
 
3.7.5 Determinants of Gendered Manufacturing Employment Effects  
 
The disproportionately negative effect of tariff liberalisation on women runs contrary to 
experience in Indonesia and Brazil. In this section, the chapter broadly analyses three different 
channels that may explain the gendered effects in South Africa. First, we will control for the 
potential effects via skills and “brawn” channels. Second, we will analyse the role of industry 
segmentation. This channel is relevant for South Africa, given the vast difference in the 




3.7.5.1 Transmission channels: Skills and Brawn 
 
Tariff liberalisation may be associated with innovation and the adoption of new technologies 
which may be (i) less brawn-intensive, boosting the relative demand for female labour (Galor 
and Weil, 1996; Juhn et al., 2014; Weinberg, 2000). This is under the assumption that women 
are less endowed with brawn, or (ii) more skill-intensive. The effect on female employment 
depends on the endowment of skills among women relative to men (Acemoglu, 2003; Thoenig 
& Verdier, 2003; Wood, 1995). The idea is that, if international competition induces firm to 
adopt less brawn-intensive technology, this will result in a decrease in employment of 
production workers relative to non-production workers who are seen to be complements to 
machines. Given that women are on average not as physically strong men (Juhn et al., 2014), 
the adoption of less brawn-intensive technology will reduce the relative demand for men, and 
narrow the gender employment gap.   
 
To isolate the influence of these channels on the estimated tariff effects, we follow a two-stage 
approach. We first analyse the relationship between tariff liberalisation and the two 
transmission channels by regressing the change in the brawn and skills gap measures on the 
change in tariffs, plus other controls at the municipal level. This provides insight into the direct 
relationship between tariffs and the transmission channels. We then re-estimate the gender gap 
regressions, including the brawn and skills gap measures as controls. If tariffs only affect the 
gender gap via the brawn and skills transmission channels, then tariffs should not affect the 
gender gap once we control for these transmission channels. The coefficient on tariffs in these 
regressions thus reflects the conditional effects of tariff liberalisation on the gender gap, after 
controlling for the indirect effects via the transmission channels. Should the transmission 
channels explain the gendered effect of tariffs as shown in Table 3.8 and Table 3.9, we would 
expect the coefficient on the change in tariffs to diminish in importance (absolute size) and 
significance.  
 
Table 3.10 presents the IV estimates where the change in the regional skills gap in the 
manufacturing-intensity of production (measured as skilled workers divided by unskilled 
workers) and the brawn-intensity of production (measured as a ratio of the number of workers 
in production24 divided by the number of workers in non-production occupations in heavy 
 




industries) is regressed on the change in regional exposure to tariffs plus several control 
variables25. The results show tariff increases are positively related to skills gaps and brawn-
intensity. However, only the effect statistically insignificant.  
 
Table 3.10: Tariff liberalisation effects on the skill gap and brawn-intensity  
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Skill gap Brawn-intensity 
      
ΔTariff -3.263 4.464 
 (3.673) (5.386) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.044 0.228 
 (0.248) (0.255) 
ΔMigration rate 0.153 0.153 
 (0.226) (0.270) 
ΔUnion intensity -0.843 -1.468** 
 (0.722) (0.702) 
L.Skill rate -0.268 -1.171* 
 (0.538) (0.698) 
L.Unemployed rate 0.002 0.099 
 (0.079) (0.072) 
L.Infrastructure -0.021 0.050** 
 (0.014) (0.023) 
L.Manufacturing share 0.120 0.824* 
 (0.377) (0.494) 
Constant 0.407*** -0.119 
 (0.141) (0.201) 
   
Observations 466 460 
R-squared 0.017 0.032 
Period FE Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the manufacturing employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, 
change in tariffs comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. The dependent variables are the change 
in log skill gap in column (1) is measured as skilled workers/unskilled workers in manufacturing. In column (2) the dependent variable is the 
change in log brawn-intensity measured as production workers (those employed in craft and trade)/non-production workers in manufacturing 
industries excluding food & beverage, textile, clothing & footwear and electronics. Migration rate represents the number of individuals who 
migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of union members. Skilled rate denotes 
skilled workers as a share of skilled working within the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals 
as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, 
flush toilet and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing employment as a share 
of total employment, excluding the primary sector. 
 
The next analyses assess whether the association with skills gap and brawn-intensity explain 
the relatively strong impact of tariff liberalisation on the employment of women compared to 
that of men found earlier. We expect that if tariffs reduce brawn-intensity, and brawn-intensive 
 






industries are male dominated, then the coefficient on the tariff will become even more 
negative. Table 3.11 presents results based on the IV estimation strategy where the 
manufacturing gender employment gap, measured as the change in the log ratio of male to 
female manufacturing employment at the municipal level, is regressed on tariffs while 
controlling for changes in the skills gap as well as brawn-intensity. Columns (1) and (2) of 
Table 3.11 separately include the skills gap and brawn-intensity channels, respectively, while 
column (3) includes both indicators for the skills gap and brawn-intensity. Columns (4) and (5) 
provide estimates for the extended (including skills and brawn-intensity gaps) gender 
employment gap for Blacks and Whites separately. 
 
The coefficients for both the skills gap and brawn-intensity are negative but insignificant. 
Broadly, the results do not find support for the dominance of the skills and brawn-intensity 
transmission channels in explaining the tariff effects. In all estimates, the coefficient on the 
tariff variable remains negative and highly significant, except in the case of Whites, where it 
remains insignificant, as shown in Table 3.9. The direct effects of tariffs on the gender gap 
remain large, negative, and significant even after controlling for the skills gap and brawn-
intensity channels.  
 
Our findings are similar to a study in Brazil by Gaddis and Pieters (2017), which finds that the 
skills gap and brawn-intensity gap are not the channels through which tariff liberalisation 
influences the employment gap. However, in the case of Indonesia, Kis-Katos et al. (2018) 
show that the tariff-induced increase in the employment of women is through the reduced 














Table 3.11: The effects of tariff liberalisation and transmission channels on 
manufacturing employment  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dependent variables: Change in log gender employment gap 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Black White 
            
ΔTariff -5.343*** -4.870*** -4.965*** -5.473*** -0.555 
 (1.761) (1.719) (1.737) (1.844) (6.067) 
ΔSkill gap -0.035  -0.038 -0.049 0.099 
 (0.036)  (0.037) (0.040) (0.140) 
ΔBrawn-intensity  -0.026 -0.029 -0.028 0.118 
  (0.035) (0.036) (0.041) (0.145) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.111 0.077 0.078 0.106 -0.259 
 (0.151) (0.154) (0.153) (0.168) (0.322) 
ΔMigration rate -0.470** -0.496** -0.490** -0.553** -0.089 
 (0.199) (0.199) (0.198) (0.257) (0.503) 
ΔUnion intensity -0.123 -0.072 -0.108 -0.033 -1.942 
 (0.534) (0.537) (0.537) (0.603) (1.378) 
L.Skill rate -0.811* -0.811* -0.829* -0.793* 0.594 
 (0.446) (0.444) (0.445) (0.478) (1.282) 
L.Unemployed rate -0.047 -0.050 -0.050 -0.075 0.033 
 (0.073) (0.075) (0.074) (0.086) (0.143) 
L.Infrastructure -0.012 -0.010 -0.011 -0.008 -0.055** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.025) 
L.Manufacturing share -0.481 -0.450 -0.438 -0.358 -1.845** 
 (0.364) (0.363) (0.362) (0.398) (0.852) 
Constant 0.131 0.127 0.143 -0.249* -0.166 
 (0.099) (0.097) (0.099) (0.130) (0.375) 
      
Observations 464 458 458 457 374 
R-squared 0.036 0.039 0.041 0.032 0.057 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the manufacturing employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, 
change in tariffs comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. The gender employment gap is derived 
as male employment/female employment in manufacturing. The change in log skill gap in column is measured as skilled workers/unskilled 
workers in manufacturing. The change in log brawn-intensity measured as production workers (those employed in craft and trade)/non-
production workers in manufacturing industries excluding food & beverage, textile, clothing & footwear and electronics. Migration rate 
represents the number of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share 
of union members. Skilled rate denotes skilled workers as a share of skilled working within the working-age population, and unemployed rate 
is the number of unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with electricity 
(including solar), weekly refuse collection, flush toilet and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. Manufacturing share 
reflects manufacturing employment as a share of total employment, excluding the primary sector. 
 
3.7.5.2 Industry Segregation 
 
An explanation for the gendered effects of tariff liberalisation is the industry segmentation of 
employment. There is variation in terms of industry composition in the manufacturing sector. 




analysis, Martin & Barnard (2013) find that even if women in South African initially select 
into male-dominated industries and occupations, they often change soon after into more 
female-dominated work environments. The challenges that women face in male-dominated 
industries emanate from societal norms and gender hierarchies which prevail both in the 
household and the society at large. Cha (2013) and Prescott & Bogg (2011) argue that these 
societal norms and hierarchies inform the stereotypes which eventually spill over to gender-
biased organisational practices and become embedded into organisational culture. The sector 
segregation exposes men and women to varying degrees of import competition. 
 
Race affects both the demand and supply side of the labour market. Empirical studies show 
that there is also racial and ethnic segregation among women in the workplace (Catanzarite, 
2003; Reskin & Cassirer, 1996) demonstrating that racial and ethnic differences influence the 
labour market participation of women (Catanzarite, 2003). This informs us that races have their 
own biases which influence the sector or industry in which women select into. In support of 
this notion, Smith & Elliott (2005) argue that there is gender prejudice within race.  
 
South African women are also affected by both educational and industrial rigidities which 
based on race. The apartheid government implemented a dualist education policy which 
provided Whites with superior education while for other races more especially for Blacks, it 
was below par. This form of education system provided different job opportunities to different 
races and Blacks were limited to jobs which required low skills. There was also deep racial 
discrimination in the workplace which intersected with a patriarchal social system. Black 
women were the most discriminated demographic. Mobility of Black women across industries 
was almost non-existent, they either remained in one industry indefinitely or became 
unemployed. Casale (2004) states that occupational segregation was racial.  
 
We use the index of dissimilarity by Duncan and Duncan (1955) to highlight the initial gender 
segregation across industries using equation (3.7): 
 





















  denote 
female and male employment shares of each manufacturing industry in total manufacturing 
employment, respectively.  
 
The dissimilarity index takes values from 0 to 1 and the increase in the value indicating 
increasing industry segregation of men and women. A value of 1 indicates that industries are 
perfectly segregated by gender meaning that only women work in that industry, and a 0 value 
shows no segregation such that there are an equal number of men and women workers in the 
industry.  
 
Table 3.12 displays the index of dissimilarity from 1996 to 2011 for manufacturing industries. 
The total ID figures are constructed as national industry employment shares within 
manufacturing, as industry employment as a share of manufacturing. There is differential 
gender segregation across industries, and this segregation is varied across race. We observe 
that the largest gender segregation is in the textile, clothing and footwear industry for the 
aggregate population, but the segregation is more prevalent among the Black population. This 
is persistent over the years, showing that more women, particularly Black women, are 
employed in this industry than their male counterparts. The ID in the textile, clothing and 
footwear industry for the aggregate (Black) population declined from 0.176 (0.204) in 1996 to 
0.152 (0.179) in 2001 and eventually 0.043 (0.051) in 2011. There is less segregation in other 
industries, such as furniture and recycling, electrical machinery, and electronic products. 
Interestingly, the textile, clothing and footwear is not the most segregated industry for the 
White population. Whites have consistently been facing strong segregation in the metal 
products and machinery industry. The ID for Whites in the metal products and machinery 
industry was 0.067 in 1996, 0.070 in 2001 and 0.023 in 2011. The total ID also demonstrates 
that sector segregation is more prevalent among Blacks than Whites, revealing that Black 
women face more rigidities in the industry than their White counterparts.  Even though total 









Table 3.12: Index of dissimilarity across industries from 1996 to 2011 
  1996   2001   2011  
Industry Aggregate Black White Aggregate Black White Aggregate Black White 
Food etc. 0.010 0.016 0.013 0.001 0.004 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.015 
Textiles etc. 0.176 0.204 0.044 0.152 0.179 0.033 0.043 0.051 0.008 
Wood prods. 0.024 0.034 0.027 0.009 0.016 0.024 0.003 0.006 0.010 
Fuel etc. 0.020 0.024 0.001 0.018 0.024 0.009 0.004 0.006 0.003 
Non-metal  0.013 0.016 0.001 0.015 0.019 0.001 0.007 0.008 0.003 
Metal prods.  0.075 0.076 0.067 0.087 0.090 0.070 0.040 0.044 0.023 
Electrical  0.004 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Electronics 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Transport  0.026 0.026 0.022 0.025 0.025 0.021 0.006 0.006 0.011 
Furniture  0.005 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.000 
          
Total 0.355 0.410 0.189 0.310 0.359 0.186 0.121 0.142 0.073 
Notes: The index of dissimilarity is constructed as fe(male) employment in industry i as a share of total manufacturing employment. The 
industries are: (1) Food, beverages and tobacco products; (2) Textiles, clothing, footwear and leather goods; (3) Wood products; (4) Fuel, 
petroleum; chemical and rubber products; (5) Other non-metallic mineral products; (6) Metal products, machinery and household appliances; 
(7) Electrical machinery and apparatus; (8) Electronics, sound/vision, medical and other appliances; (9) Transport equipment (10) Furniture 
and recycling. 
Source: 10% weighted sample census data 
 
Having established the extent of industry segmentation, we revert the focus back to the 
construction of the tariff protection measure. It is clear that the regional tariff indicator based 
on aggregate employment of both genders does not adequately control for industry 
segmentation. The aggregate tariff measure under-represents the reductions in tariffs faced by 
women relative to men. This could bias the tariff coefficient estimates for the employment of 
women upwards compared to men, leading to the large negative coefficient on the tariff 
variable in the gender gap estimates.26  
 
We address the issue of industry segregation by using the gender-specific trade protection 
measures presented in Figure 3.3. We use equation (3.4), where 𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑡 now represents the 
fe(male) municipal trade protection measure at time t. 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑚,𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 is initial fe(male) 
employment in industry i in municipality m, while 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑚,𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 is initial fe(male) employment 
in municipality m. 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑡 and denotes tariff rates in industry i at time t.  
 
 
26 Figure 3.4 shows that tariffs fell relatively strongly in female-intensive sectors. The change in regional tariff exposure, 
constructed using total employment will therefore under-represent the change in tariffs faced by female employees in the 
region. Assuming tariff changes within an industry have equivalent elasticity effects on employment of men and women, the 
effect will be a bias upwards in the estimated employment response to tariffs of women relative to men. Thus, industry 
composition effects could explain the larger estimated tariff coefficient for men relative to women, as well as the negative 




Table 3.13 shows a summary of the statistics of changes in various gender-specific trade 
protection measures between 1996 and 2011. We see that on average female-specific tariffs 
fell more than for their male counterparts, but the largest decline was for Black female 
employment weighted tariffs. Aggregate female-specific tariffs fell by an average of 10.9 
percentage point compared to aggregate male-specific tariffs which fell by an average of 6.4 
percentage points. Tariffs weighted by the employment of Black and White women declined 
by an average of 16.2  and 11.4  percentage points relative to Black men and White men tariffs 
which fell by an average of 10.3 and 9.4 percentage points.  In addition, the female-specific 
tariffs are characterised by a wider dispersion of changes across municipalities than for men.  
 
Table 3.13: Summary statistics for the change in gender-specific tariffs, 1996 to 2011 
Tariffs Mean P50 SD P75-P25 
ΔTPman_female -0.109 -0.100 0.040 0.056 
ΔTPman_male -0.064 -0.060 0.015 0.013 
ΔTPman_black female 0.162 0.145 0.065 0.076 
ΔTPman_black male 0.103 0.096 0.034 0.047 
ΔTPman_white female 0.114 0.106 0.056 0.060 
ΔTPman_white male 0.094 0.090 0.038 0.049 
Notes: ΔTPman is the change in trade protection measure (tariff rates weighted by the respective manufacturing employment shares). Gender-
specific trade protection measures are tariff rates weighted by female and male employment shares 
Source: 10% weighted sample census data 
 
We now examine the role of industry segregation and industry-bias tariff reduction in gendered 
tariff effects in two ways. The expectation is that the gender gap should fall away once 
controlling for industry segregation and industry-bias liberalisation.  
 
First, we estimate the gender employment gap relationship in equation (3.6) using the gender-
specific tariffs. Table 3.14 presents the IV estimation results. The main finding is that once we 
control for gender-specific tariffs, the tariff effects decline considerably and, in most cases, the 
effects fall away except in the case of male-specific tariffs and Black male-specific tariffs. In 
columns (2) and (4) the estimates show that male-specific tariffs and black male-specific tariffs 
are weakly associated with the aggregate gender employment gap and the gender employment 
gap for Blacks, respectively. The findings point to the industry segmentation in manufacturing 
as displayed in Table 3.12. The table highlights that the largest segmentation, and more 
pronounced among Blacks, is in the textile, clothing and footwear. This industry also 





These findings indicate three main points. First, tariff reduction is not gender-neutral as tariffs 
fall differently across male and female-intensive industries. Second, the gendered tariff effects 
found earlier are explained by the drastic tariff reductions in female-intensive industries. Once 
we control for industry segregation using our gendered tariff measure, we find no differential 
effect of tariff reductions on women compare to men. The effect of tariffs on men and women 
within industries are thus similar. Third, industry segregation also differs across race in South 
Africa, and this explains the differential tariff effects between Blacks and Whites.  
 
Our findings are comparable with the findings in Brazil and Indonesia done by Gaddis and 
Pieters (2017) and Kis-Katos et al. (2018), respectively. These international studies find that 
the channel through which tariff liberalisation affects the gender employment gap is through 
industry segregation. However, in Indonesia and Brazil, industry segregation is in favour of 
women in a sense that tariff liberalisation contributed to the growth of female-intensive 
industries, contrary to the evidence we find in South Africa.  
 
The finding that tariff liberalisation had a negative effect on female manufacturing employment 
as a result of industry segregation may seem at odds with the finding that the industry-mix is 
positively associated with the initial female share in Table 2.9 but this is not the case. The first 
point to keep in mind with the industry-mix effect is that the decomposition method does not 
include other factors that may account for the changes in regional employment growth. Hence, 
we include the regression analysis to control for those changes in Table 2.9. We are not making 
conclusive arguments about the association between the share of females in a region and the 
industry-mix effect. Secondly, the decomposition results reveal that the industry-mix effect had 
a negative contribution to regional employment growth of women. This is in line with the 
findings of the effects of tariff liberalisation on female employment. Thirdly, the initial share 
of employed female variable in Table 2.9  includes other sectors such as agriculture and mining, 











Table 3.14: Gender-specific tariff effects on gendered manufacturing employment gap  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Dependent variables: Change in log gender employment gap 
VARIABLES Aggregate Aggregate Black Black White  White  
              
ΔTariff_female -1.435      
 (1.217)      
ΔTariff_male  -6.182*     
  (3.734)     
ΔTariff_black_female   -0.653    
   (1.412)    
ΔTariff_black_male    -6.724*   
    (3.784)   
ΔTariff_white_female     -3.309  
     (3.720)  
ΔTariff_white_male      6.013 
      (10.806) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.192 0.202 0.221 0.244 -0.204 -0.178 
 (0.155) (0.155) (0.175) (0.176) (0.349) (0.350) 
ΔMigration rate 0.854*** 0.829*** 0.930*** 0.905*** 0.515 0.638 
 (0.270) (0.270) (0.317) (0.319) (0.553) (0.594) 
ΔUnion intensity -0.429 -0.390 -0.402 -0.317 -2.424* -2.494* 
 (0.552) (0.550) (0.627) (0.624) (1.342) (1.366) 
L.Skill rate -0.149 -0.196 -0.081 -0.135 0.304 0.411 
 (0.395) (0.399) (0.444) (0.446) (1.113) (1.137) 
L.Unemployed rate 0.528 0.504 0.755 0.618 -0.065 0.059 
 (0.515) (0.503) (0.615) (0.592) (1.230) (1.209) 
L.Infrastructure 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.007 -0.044* -0.041* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.025) 
L.Manufacturing share -0.479 -0.538 -0.380 -0.486 -1.756** -1.674** 
 (0.368) (0.368) (0.400) (0.402) (0.810) (0.801) 
Constant -0.684** -0.724** -0.787** -0.462** -0.500 0.558 
 (0.282) (0.280) (0.346) (0.195) (0.514) (0.547) 
       
Observations 464 464 462 462 376 376 
R-squared 0.038 0.037 0.035 0.031 0.046 0.054 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. The gender employment gap is derived as male employment/female employment 
in manufacturing. Tariff variable is the manufacturing employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, change in tariffs comprises the difference in 
tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. Migration rate represents the number of individuals who migrated since the last census 
as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of union members. Skilled rate denotes skilled workers as a share of 
skilled working within the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals as a share of the working-
age population. Infrastructure represents households with electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, flush toilet and piped water, 
as a share of the total number of households. Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing employment as a share of total employment, 
excluding the primary sector. 
 
As a second check for the role of industry segregation and industry-biased tariff reduction in 
driving gendered tariff effect, we construct the trade protection measure, excluding the textile, 
clothing, and footwear industry, since it appears to be an outlier in Figure 3.4. We also exclude 
this industry in the construction of the dependent variable. The results provided in Table 3.15 




gap disappears. These results confirm that it is the tariff reduction and the gender composition 
in the textile, clothing, and footwear industry that drives the strong effect on female 
employment and widens the gender employment gap.  
 
Table 3.15: Tariff liberalisation and gendered manufacturing employment - excluding 
textile, clothing and footwear industry 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Female Male Gender employment gap 
        
ΔTariff -83.936 23.416 102.418 
 (80.319) (63.943) (69.424) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.802** 0.422 -0.329 
 (0.394) (0.268) (0.295) 
ΔMigration rate -0.684 -0.302 0.456 
 (0.451) (0.319) (0.320) 
ΔUnion-intensity 0.475 0.788 -0.013 
 (1.024) (0.764) (0.783) 
L.Skill rate 0.901 1.713** 0.803 
 (1.023) (0.726) (0.750) 
L.Unemployed rate -0.710 -0.397 0.436 
 (1.033) (0.762) (0.855) 
L.Infrastructure 0.001 0.011 0.012 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.013) 
L.Manufacturing share -0.382 -1.715*** -1.294** 
 (0.712) (0.581) (0.535) 
Constant -0.542 0.680 1.030 
 (1.048) (0.879) (0.924) 
    
Observations 463 466 462 
R-squared 0.008 0.079  
Period FE Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the manufacturing employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, 
change in tariffs comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. The dependent variables in the first two 
estimates are the change in log manufacturing employment, and in the third estimate, it is the change in log gender employment gap.  The skill 
gap is the ratio between skilled and unskilled, and brawn-intensity is production/non-production workers. Migration rate represents the number 
of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of union members. 
Skilled rate denotes skilled workers as a share of skilled working within the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of 
unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with electricity (including solar), 
weekly refuse collection, flush toilet and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing 
employment as a share of total employment, excluding the primary sector. 
 
3.7.6 Robustness Check 
 
To test the validity of the results and whether they are sensitive to different instruments, this 
section of the chapter performs a robustness check using an alternative instrument for the 
change in the trade protection measure. As an alternative instrument, we use the average tariffs 




Mauritius, Mexico and Nigeria) that have undergone tariff liberalisation over the same period 
and that have available tariff data. These are countries that have similar characteristics to South 
Africa in terms of the size of the economy (except for China and India), manufacturing sector, 
labour market, and regional wage and employment heterogeneity. We expect that tariff 
reductions in South Africa are correlated with tariff reductions in other low and middle-income 
countries underpinned by the Uruguay Round WTO Agreements.  
 
We then follow Autor et al. (2015)27 by weighting the average tariffs of these countries by the 
1996 municipal manufacturing employment share to obtain regional tariffs using equation 
(3.4). The first-stage regression is performed to determine the correlation of the employment-
weighted tariffs, and the results are presented in Table 3.3A in the appendix. The result shows 
a strong positive correlation between the change in tariffs in South Africa and tariffs in low 
and middle-income countries. This is largely driven by the common regional employment 
shares used as weights to construct both regional tariff measures28.  
 
Table 3.16 provides estimation results of the effect of tariff reduction (instrumented by 
alternative tariffs) on gendered manufacturing employment. The findings are consistent with 
the main results even though the coefficients are much larger. The estimates show that tariff 
reductions are unfavourable to the growth of manufacturing employment. In addition, the 
negative effect on manufacturing is more pronounced on the employment of women, 
particularly Black women, compared to their male counterparts, leading to a wider gender 
employment gap. The employment of Whites in manufacturing remains unaffected by 
reductions in tariffs.  
 
Lastly, we test for the sensitivity of the main results using alternative control variables. For 
these tests, we categorise the control variables according to the sub-group. The results shown 
in Table 3.6A confirm that tariff reduction has an adverse effect on manufacturing employment, 
albeit the tariff coefficient is larger. The effect remains stronger for women, particularly Black 
women relative to men. Tariffs reduction also lower manufacturing employment of White men 
and White women, however, the effect is only significant at the 10% level.  
 
27 The difference between this method and Autor et al. (2015) is that in this thesis the method is used to instrument for regional 
tariffs in South Africa, while Autor et al. (2015) use the method as an instrument for regional imports in the US.  
28 To overcome this, we regressed South African employment-weighted tariffs on alternative employment-weighted tariffs and 
estimated the predicted values. In the second stage regressions we used the predicted tariff values to estimate the effect of 




Table 3.16: The effects of tariff liberalisation on manufacturing employment using alternative tariffs 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Dependent variables: Change in log manufacturing employment 
VARIABLES Aggregate Female  Male Black female  Black male  White female  White male  
                
ΔTariff_alternative 18.569*** 24.646*** 15.145*** 26.808*** 14.337** 1.470 14.065 
 (4.199) (5.718) (5.462) (7.660) (5.589) (9.160) (11.734) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.774*** 0.564** 0.801*** 0.534* 0.835*** 0.929** 0.666* 
 (0.174) (0.234) (0.180) (0.273) (0.182) (0.426) (0.362) 
ΔMigration rate 0.382* -0.266 0.560** -0.368 0.523** 1.639** 2.244*** 
 (0.226) (0.302) (0.223) (0.383) (0.232) (0.726) (0.809) 
ΔUnion-intensity -0.103 0.246 -0.001 0.486 0.436 3.067* -0.914 
 (0.488) (0.651) (0.463) (0.763) (0.485) (1.676) (1.332) 
L.Skill rate 0.540 0.694 0.484 0.707 0.556 1.996 2.532* 
 (0.443) (0.593) (0.383) (0.607) (0.390) (1.553) (1.465) 
L.Unemployed rate -0.124 -0.309 -0.309 -0.325 -0.344 -1.580 -1.381 
 (0.551) (0.741) (0.543) (0.866) (0.574) (1.404) (1.502) 
L.Infrastructure 0.001 -0.006 -0.004 -0.012 -0.005 0.027 -0.027 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.018) (0.011) (0.025) (0.019) 
L.Manufacturing share -1.988*** -1.385*** -2.101*** -1.337** -2.095*** -2.431* -4.166*** 
 (0.379) (0.508) (0.411) (0.592) (0.420) (1.339) (1.277) 
Constant 0.585** 1.476*** 0.467* 1.276*** 0.494** -0.418 -0.557 
 (0.232) (0.306) (0.240) (0.410) (0.244) (0.571) (0.514) 
        
Observations 467 465 466 463 466 387 416 
R-squared 0.091  0.161  0.184 0.130 0.101 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Alternative tariffs represents employment-weighted tariffs for low and middle-income countries in the initial period (1996 and 2001 respectively). Migration 
rate represents the number of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of union members. Skilled rate denotes skilled workers as a share of 
skilled working within the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with electricity (including 





3.8 Concluding Remarks 
 
The first-difference model and IV estimation strategy are employed to estimate the effect of 
reduction in tariffs on gendered employment in manufacturing. The analysis is carried out by 
first constructing a local labour market trade protection measure, which involves weighting 
tariffs by the local labour market's initial employment share. Second, we use the local labour 
market trade protection measure to estimate the effects on manufacturing wages and gendered 
employment across local labour markets. Given the different initial employment composition 
by industry across local labour markets, and different tariff levels across industries, the chapter 
investigates the extent of the gendered effect between those local labour markets that faced 
greater exposure to tariff reduction against those that faced less exposure during the post-
apartheid period. 
 
One of the critical findings of the chapter is that tariff liberalisation has no effect on 
manufacturing wages in South Africa. This implies that tariff liberalisation rather impacts the 
manufacturing sector through changes in employment. The second critical finding is that the 
reduction of tariffs over the post-apartheid period is associated with slower manufacturing 
employment growth in South Africa from this time, and this result is in line with the existing 
literature. In the chapter, we show tariff reductions are the predominant drivers of slow 
manufacturing employment growth. We also control for imports and show that tariffs not only 
increase imports but also affect prices of domestic substitutes, which in turn has an effect on 
manufacturing employment. The chapter also examines the gendered effects of tariff 
liberalisation and find a sharp decline in women’s employment compared to men’s in 
manufacturing, suggesting strongly that the effects of tariff reductions differ between genders.  
 
The disaggregated analysis by race reveals that tariff liberalisation has no effect on the gender 
employment gap of Whites, but has a particularly adverse effect on Blacks. The findings reflect 
how a history of racial and gender discrimination has led to the segmentation of labour markets 
by industry and gender. The implication is that the adverse employment effects of tariff 
liberalisation have been concentrated on specific categories of labour defined according to their 
gender, race, and industry of employment. A further implication is that the greater specificity 
in employment, the more concentrated the effects of shocks on particular groupings of workers. 
Overall, reductions in discrimination have not been sufficient to offset the gendered and racial 




We further investigate the channels through which tariff liberalisation affects the gender 
employment gap. We find that the main contributing factor to gendered employment effects of 
tariff liberalisation is industrial segregation. We do not find evidence in support of less 
discrimination and trade-induced technological change benefitting the employment of women 
through reductions in the skills-gap and brawn-intensity of production. The results remain 
robust when we estimate the tariff liberalisation effect by excluding the textile, clothing, and 
footwear industry from manufacturing employment.  
 
Our findings on gendered employment, and the channels through which tariff reductions affect 
gendered employment, diverge from and contradict evidence from other developing countries, 
particularly studies from Brazil and Indonesia, both of which show tariff liberalisation as 
benefitting women. This shows that the South African experience is different from those of 
other developing countries. Unlike other developing economies, tariff liberalisation in this 
country, is not accompanied by channels through which the gender employment gap is reduced, 
meaning that, for South Africa, tariff liberalisation has a more complex and nuanced outcome.  
 
These findings also highlight the limitation of the theoretical channels, in the sense that the 
effects of the channels are country-specific and therefore cannot be generalised. The tariff 
liberalisation context of the country, specifically the industry-bias, drives the effects of the 
channels. For example, South Africa has experienced large reductions in tariffs in female-
intensive industries. While a study in Brazil (Gaddis & Pieters, 2017) shows that tariff 
reductions are not systematically different for male and female-intensive industries, it is 
possible that the negative effects of tariff liberalisation in that country were more pronounced 
on men because they constituted the largest share of the employed in the tradable sector and 
the labour force as a whole. In Indonesia, the initial tariff structure was female-biased, and thus 
tariff cuts benefitted female-intensive sectors. This explains how our research outcomes could 
contradict the findings of studies done in Brazil and Indonesia.  
 
The broad implication, both from the findings of this chapter, and from the literature, is that 
the combination of initial tariff protection, plus race and gender specificity of employment 
across industries, shapes employment outcomes from liberalisation. These influences differ 








4. Tariff Liberalisation Effects on Gendered Employment in South Africa: A Services 




A key focus of the tariff liberalisation effects on labour market outcomes is the manufacturing 
sector. The econometric analysis in Chapter 3 reveals that tariff liberalisation has no significant 
effect on manufacturing wages. Yet, there a strong positive association between changes in 
tariff exposure and changes in manufacturing employment at the local labour market level. 
Furthermore, the chapter reveals that the adverse effect of tariff reductions falls 
disproportionately on the employment of women rather than men, thereby widening the gender 
employment gap. Chapter 3 also demonstrates the heterogeneous effect of tariff liberalisation 
by race with stronger effects on the employment of Blacks, and Black women in particular. In 
contrast, the reduction of tariffs has had no significant effects on employment of Whites in 
manufacturing.  
 
This chapter extends the previous chapter’s analysis by empirically investigating what happens 
to the jobs lost in manufacturing. The main focus is on whether the services sector absorbs, or 
is likely to absorb, the employment lost in manufacturing. This chapter has three main 
objectives. Firstly, it seeks to assess the extent to which tariff liberalisation that has occurred 
in South Africa since the early 1990s, prompted structural shifts in the employment of labour 
from manufacturing to services. Secondly, it studies three transmission channels through which 
the reduction in tariffs in manufacturing affects employment in the services sector: derived 
demand for services by manufacturing firms, income effect, and infrastructure investment. 
These indirect effects have not been widely considered in the existing literature. Thirdly, the 
chapter analyses the extent to which the employment effects differ across gender and race.  
 
Theoretically, the Heckscher-Ohlin and Stopler-Samuelson theorems already mentioned 
suggest that tariff liberalisation induces a structural shift in production from manufacturing to 
services (Edwards, 1988; Leamer, 1995) through changes in wages relative to capital or 




structural shifts in response to liberalisation is provided in Section 1.1. The expected outcome 
is a change in the composition of employment from the manufacturing sector towards services.  
However, there are several limitations to this standard framework. Firstly, inter-sectoral 
production linkages between services and manufacturing imply that adverse production shocks 
in manufacturing arising from tariff liberalisation can spill over to services in the form of 
negative demand shocks (Acemoglu et al., 2016; Dehejia & Panagariya, 2014; Wacziarg & 
Wallack, 2004). In this chapter, we focus on three spillover effects: (i) derived demand for 
services input by manufacturing; (ii) income effects from employment losses in manufacturing; 
and (iii) declines in regional investment linked to slower growth in manufacturing production.  
 
Secondly, in the short to medium term, labour may be immobile across sectors or across 
regions. For example, as per the Specific-Factors model, labour may be specific to 
manufacturing, and therefore, reallocation to services would be restricted in the short to 
medium-run (Topalova, 2010). The implication is that the effect of tariff liberalisation on 
employment and wages will fall more heavily on those workers that are specific to industries 
facing relatively large cuts in tariffs. Given differences in the composition of industries across 
regions, we would also expect to find regional variation in the effects of tariffs on services 
employment arising from tariff liberalisation, in that there will be limited absorption into 
services for workers that are specific to the manufacturing industry as well as those who are 
facing high reallocation costs.  
 
This chapter contributes towards a broader understanding of the effect of tariff liberalisation 
on the services sector in the context of SSA, using South Africa as a case study. The topic is of 
relevance to the broader literature on structural changes in the composition of employment in 
response to tariff liberalisation as few studies of this nature have been done on emerging 
economies.  
 
The investigation in this chapter is also of relevance to the empirical literature on the effect of 
tariff liberalisation on employment in South Africa. Research conducted by Bell and Quintieri 
(2000) and Tregenna (2008) highlight that the relationship between manufacturing and services 
in South Africa is complementary. The implication is that manufacturing is a significant source 
of demand for the inputs from the service sector, implying that, as manufacturing contracts in 
response to tariff liberalisation, so too may services. This contrasts the strand of literature that 




manufacturing to services (Bhorat & Hodge, 1999; Bhorat et al., 2014; Edwards, 2001; Rodrik, 
2008; Tregenna, 2008). 
 
The empirical literature on South Africa and other emerging economies does not explicitly 
investigate the channels through which tariff reductions faced by producers in the 
manufacturing sector affect employment in services. South Africa has a fairly well-developed 
manufacturing sector with strong linkages to services (Tregenna, 2008). Consequently, we 
would anticipate fairly strong spillover effects arising from the liberalisation of manufacturing.  
 
The gendered effects of tariff liberalisation on structural change towards services is also under-
explored.29 Bhorat (2000), Ngai and Petrongolo (2012) and Olivetti and Petrongolo (2014) 
argue that there is a preference for skilled workers in services, and that growth in this sector on 
aggregate benefits women more than men, given the higher skills composition of the female 
labour force compared to men. Structural shifts in employment towards services from tariff 
liberalisation may thus improve the demand for women in services, as has been found in other 
emerging economies (Aguayo-Téllez et al., 2014; Ederington et al., 2009)30. This may offset 
the comparatively large decline in employment of women in manufacturing from tariff 
liberalisation shown in chapter 3.  
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of the chapter present reviews 
of the theoretical and empirical literature, respectively. Section 4.4 presents the empirical 
model utilised, and Section 4.5 briefly previews the data. Section 4.6 provides an analysis of 
the empirical estimation results and discusses the sensitivity of the results. Section 4.7 
concludes the chapter.  
 
4.2 Review of the Theoretical Literature 
 
This section of the chapter presents the theoretical model developed by Edwards (1988) to 
understand how tariff liberalisation in manufacturing affects the services sector. This model is 
an extension of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model that incorporates exportables, importables 
and nontradable sectors.  
 
29 An exception is Thurlow (2006), who uses a CGE model to simulate the effect of tariff liberalisation on employment. The 
study illustrates that South African women in services benefit from tariff reductions. 





Consider a small open economy with three goods (importables, exportables and nontradables) 
and two factors (capital and labour). Importables is manufacturing, exportables represents the 
primary sector, and the nontradables represents the services sector. Capital is assumed to be 
sector-specific, while labour is mobile across the three sectors. The order of capital-labour ratio 
in production is assumed to be importables > nontradables > exportables. From this order, it is 
evident that exportables are the most labour-intensive sector. This is anticipated to be the case 
in emerging economies that are labour abundant. The model operates under perfect competition 
in product and factor markets. Further assumptions include incomplete specialisation within 
regions, fixed labour supply and flexible wages.  
 
At the long-run equilibrium, factor prices in exportables are determined by world prices only 
and those in importables are determined by world prices plus tariffs. These prices, under perfect 
competition, determine factor prices and therefore the price of nontradables. According to 
Edwards (1988), production and factor allocation in the production of nontradables is 
determined by the demand for nontradables. The remaining factors are allocated to the 
production of exportables and importables on a comparative advantage basis, as described by 
the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The price of exportables is the numeraire (Px = 1).  
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the model taken from Edwards (1998) and the adjustment process to tariff 
reductions using a three-good Edgeworth-Bowley box. In the diagram, the isoquant for 
nontradables is drawn from the origin 𝑂𝑁, for exportables the origin is 𝑂𝑋  and production of 
importables is the distance 𝑂𝑀𝑅. The initial equilibrium is where the slope of the nontradables 
isoquant 𝑁𝑁𝑂 is equal to the slope of the exportables and importables isoquants (not drawn) 
and are tangent at point R. The capital-labour ratio for nontradables is given by the slope of the 
line 𝑂𝑁𝑂𝑀. 
 
Tariff liberalisation causes prices of importables to drop, and according to the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, this leads to lower capital rents and higher wages for workers. There will 
also be a shift in production from importables to nontradables and exportables for two main 
reasons. Firstly, capital intensity of production rises in nontradables and exportables in 
response to the decline in the rental rate relative to wage rates. Secondly, given the capital-
labour intensity assumption, demand for nontradables will increase as a result of tariff 




nontradables will decrease compared to the price of exportables, which will decrease as the 
prices for importables decline. This dynamic is a substitution effect and is underpinned by the 
higher capital-labour ratio and subsequent lower rental rate relative to the wage rate in 
nontradables vs exportables. (ii) The lower importables prices will have a positive aggregate 
income effect. Income increases because lower prices of importables translates to lower prices 
of final imported manufactured goods and lower intermediate input prices. The higher 
aggregate income will, in turn, have a positive effect on the demand for nontradables because 
(a) consumers can spend the excess income on nontradables, and (b) local exporting firms can 
expand (because of cheaper intermediate inputs31) and this will increase the demand for 
services.  
 
In summary, the economy will adjust to tariff reduction in importables given the assumption 
of full mobility of labour and differences in capital intensities across sectors in the following 
manner: (i) the price of nontradables will fall relative to exportables; (ii) wages will increase; 
(iii) exportables and nontradables sectors will expand as production increases and (iv) the 
importables sector will contract as production decreases. The employment effect will, 
therefore, be an increase in employment in exportables and nontradables in comparison to the 
importables.  
  
In Figure 4.1, the dashed lines show production at the new equilibrium following tariff 
reduction in importables. The resultant increase in demand for nontradables will shift the 
capital-labour ratio for nontradables to the left of the 𝑁𝑁𝑂 isoquant to a point such as 𝑂′′𝑀 . 
The dashed isoquant represents the new nontradables isoquant 𝑁𝑁1. Production of exportables 
is given by the distance 𝑂𝑋𝑆 and the production of importables at a lower production line 𝑂′′𝑀𝑆 












Figure 4.1: Long-run adjustment in production and factor allocation following tariff 
liberalisation 
 
Source: Edwards (1988) 
 
The model predicts a structural change in employment from manufacturing, the import 
competing good, to services in response to tariff reductions on manufacturing goods. The 
implication of the model for a regional analysis where factors are not mobile across regions in 
the short-term, but are mobile across sectors, is that we would expect to see structural shifts in 
employment and output towards services across all regions, with stronger shifts in those regions 
where manufacturing comprises a greater proportion of initial employment.  
 
However, the theory as applied above faces several limitations that may affect the outcomes. 
The model does not fully account for inter-dependency between importables and nontradables 
(services). Consequently, tariff liberalisation may affect the services sector through additional 
channels to those discussed in the theoretical model. For example, tariff liberalisation may 
benefit the services sector through cheaper imported inputs. This is because capital intensive 
and business-related services require imported inputs (Dehejia & Panagariya, 2014; 
Eichengreen & Gupta, 2013). Examples are computer hardware and software for business and 
financial services as well as vehicles for courier companies. Reductions in tariffs also reduce 
the prices of domestically produced substitutes (Feenstra, 2015). Therefore, lower tariffs 
provide a wider variety of cheaper imported inputs allowing for the growth in services, which 
𝑂𝑁 

















will increase demand for workers in that sector. Structural shifts towards services would thus 
be more pronounced in this case.   
 
On the other hand, spillovers between importables (manufacturing) and services are an 
additional form of inter-dependency that may diminish growth in the services sector. A key 
spillover channel is the derived demand in manufacturing for services. The services sector is a 
vital input in manufacturing. For example, the input-output tables for South Africa show that 
on average services inputs account for 15% of total intermediate input costs in manufacturing 
(Edwards et al., 2014). The implication is that reductions in manufacturing output, following 
tariff reductions, will have strong negative spillover effects on demand for services inputs, 
leading to less employment in services. Dasgupta and Singh (2005), Dehejia and Panagariya 
(2014) and Eichengreen and Gupta (2013), argue that the unfavourable tariff effects on the 
manufacturing sector may spill over to the services sector through this channel.  
 
The second spillover channel is through the income effect, which has two opposing influences: 
Firstly, gains from trade in a form of increases in real income and welfare due to an increase in 
prices of exportables and a greater supply of cheaper imported manufacturing goods will raise 
demand for all products, including services, as is argued by Dehejia and Panagariya (2014) and 
Winters and Martuscelli (2014). This relationship is captured in the theoretical model of 
Edwards (1988). However, when looking at regional effects from liberalisation, lower 
aggregate incomes from employment in manufacturing also need to be considered as this could 
result in a net negative income effect on demand for products in regions where manufacturing 
is highly concentrated. Mian and Sufi (2014), for example, find that locations in the US that 
are exposed to trade have lower aggregate employment and earnings, and reduced spending on 
non-traded domestic services. Therefore, on aggregate, income effects may differ across 
regions depending on the employment share of import-competing manufacturing in each 
region. As such, regions that have a higher manufacturing employment share may see more 
adverse income effects dominate than positive gains from trade.  
 
A third spillover channel through which tariff liberalisation flows to affect services is via 
manufacturing infrastructure investment. If liberalisation reduces demand for manufacturing, 
then there will be a decline in demand for manufacturing infrastructure such as roads, buildings, 
electricity provision to industrial estates or zones as well as housing infrastructure for 




manufacturing which will adversely affect some services sectors, such as construction. For 
example, a study in Chile by Martincus and Blyde (2013) finds that manufacturing employment 
is directly related to road infrastructure. These negative effects will also be more pronounced 
in regions that specialise in the import competing manufacturing sector. 
 
The Edwards (1988) theory also assumes that labour is perfectly mobile across industries. If 
workers’ skills are specific to manufacturing, then it may not be possible for services to absorb 
all the labour that is released from manufacturing in the face of increased import competition. 
Services, for example, are on average more skill-intensive than manufacturing. Technological 
progress in services fuelled by imports of intermediate inputs in services that complement 
skilled labour would further diminish the capacity of services to absorb unskilled labour 
released by manufacturing (Autor et al., 2015). The implication is a diminished growth in the 
services sector, possibly combined with higher unemployment or more dramatic wage declines 
of labour with skills specific to manufacturing.  
 
A further caveat relates to the measurement of services. Import competition in manufacturing 
can lead to the fragmentation of production and the outsourcing of the services related parts of 
the production process, e.g. catering, cleaning, and professional services such as accounting, 
and marketing. Evidence of this has been found abroad (Dasgupta & Singh, 2005; Eichengreen 
& Gupta, 2013). Expansion of outsourcing activities is supported by the growing need for 
manufacturing firms to focus on their core objective, which is the production of goods. The 
outcome is reflected in strong growth in services. This, however, is not ‘real’ growth in 
employment, but rather changes in the industrial classification of existing employment. 
Nevertheless, through this classification change, there will be a rise in employment in services 
and a decline in manufacturing, although the net employment effect is zero. 
 
The structural shift in employment is also expected to have differential effects for men and 
women. The services sector, particularly business-related services, are skill-intensive in 
comparison to manufacturing. Structural shifts in employment towards services from 
manufacturing are consequently likely to raise the demand for skilled labour. Wood (1995), 
Acemoglu (2003) and Thoenig and Verdier (2003) argue that tariff effects on the employment 
of women depend on the relative skill endowment of women.  If women in the labour force are 
more skilled than the men, then it is likely that there may be stronger growth in employment 




A second contributing factor to differential effects across gender is industry segregation within 
manufacturing. The gendered effects in manufacturing influence the supply of labour entering 
services. The previous chapter demonstrated that tariff liberalisation has profoundly negative 
effects on female employment in manufacturing, leading to a higher labour supply of women 
compared to that of men. If services are more female-intensive, the sector will absorb more 
women than men.  
 
Four main hypotheses can be drawn from this theoretical overview.  
• Firstly, trade liberalisation will see a rise in the services/manufacturing (the import 
competing sector) employment ratio across regions. 
• Secondly, growth of the services sector in response to liberalisation will absorb jobs 
lost in manufacturing. 
• Thirdly, derived demand, income and infrastructure spillover effects will attenuate the 
absorption by services of manufacturing jobs lost.  
• Finally, gender and race specificities in employment across industries imply that the 
labour market effects of trade liberalisation will not be uniform across labour 
categories. 
 
4.3 Related Empirical Literature 
 
International empirical studies have investigated the effects of tariffs on services by drawing 
on the trade theories discussed in the previous section. One cluster in the literature finds that 
tariff liberalisation leads to a weak structural shift away from manufacturing to services (Dix-
Carneiro & Kovak, 2015; Menezes-Filho & Muendler, 2011; Wacziarg & Wallack, 2004).  
 
Among these studies, Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) analyse whether tariff liberalisation 
contributes to structural shifts in employment, using sectoral data for 25 developing countries 
from 1969 to 1997. The overall finding is that employment levels drop in all sectors in response 
to liberalisation and structural change does not occur at a 1-digit ILO industry level. However, 
the study does find modest movement across manufacturing industries (at a 3-digit level) in 
these countries. Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) suggest that the effects of liberalisation on 





Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011) utilise employer-employee data from Brazil from 1986 to 
2001 to examine the reallocation of workers across sectors over time following trade reform in 
the 1990s. Multi-logit estimations reveal that reallocation of workers across sectors, including 
from manufacturing to services, in response to tariff liberalisation was slow due to high 
adjustment costs, resulting in the unemployment of many workers for periods of time.  
 
Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015) develop a specific factors model of regional economies using 
an updated matched employer-employee dataset from 1986 to 2010 to analyse the dynamics of 
labour market adjustment to tariff liberalisation that occurred in the 1990s in Brazil. They use 
a simulation of inter-industry reallocation. The study finds evidence of rapid initial sector 
reallocation from the tradable sector to the nontradable sector in response to lower wages in 
the tradable sector, post-liberalisation. However, the reallocation into nontradable sector is not 
sufficient to cover the loss of employment in the tradable sector.   
 
The other cluster of research focuses on the spillover effects on services from manufacturing 
(Acemoglu et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2015; Dehejia & Panagariya, 2014; Wacziarg & Wallack, 
2004). Autor et al. (2015) use regional data from the US for the period 1990 to 2007 to study 
the effects of Chinese imports on the rates of employment. Their study proceeds by exploring 
the effect of trade and technology exposure on the share of the working-age population 
employed in the manufacturing and non-manufacturing (services) sectors and across three 
occupations, namely abstract, routine, and manual-task-intensive occupations. They instrument 
US imports from China with non-US country exposure to Chinese imports and construct a 
routine task exposure across occupations to identify the effects of trade and technology. 
Marginal spillover effects on the services are observed. While Autor et al. (2015) do not 
explicitly investigate the channels that explain the spillover effects, they speculate that 
weakened derived demand from manufacturing is a possible contributor to the lower 
employment levels in services across all occupations, except for abstract tasks.  
 
In a later study Acemoglu et al. (2016) explore the effects of Chinese imports on US 
employment through input-output linkages for the period 2000 to 2007 and find similar 
evidence that spillover effects result in diminished reallocation effects towards services through 
demand spillover. Employment in the contracting manufacturing sector lowered the level of 





Dehejia and Panagariya (2014) use firm-level data from India to investigate the relationship 
between manufacturing and services following tariff liberalisation. They utilise the 
instrumental variable approach and analysed two periods, 2001-2002 and 2006-2007 and the 
input-output table to generate an index of reliance demand for services by manufacturing. Their 
main finding was that there are positive spillovers from manufacturing growth to services 
growth during these periods in India. They argue that the spillover effects arise from derived 
demand for services inputs from manufacturing. The study investigates the income spillover 
channel, and finds no evidence that the spillover is through the income effect.  
 
There are a few studies that explore the differential employment effects of liberalisation across 
gender. One of the studies is by Gaddis and Pieters (2017) who use microregion data that 
disaggregates workers by gender and skills levels. These authors find weak reallocation of 
workers from tradable to nontradable sectors occurs only among low-skilled men. They find 
there to be no reallocation of women and high-skilled workers into services. The authors argue 
that these results are because low-skilled men face stronger negative effects of tariff reductions 
in the tradable sector relative to their highly skilled counterparts.  
 
The South African literature shows similar inconsistent effects of liberalisation on services. 
The inclusive findings are swayed in part by the level of analysis. Existing studies focus on the 
effect of liberalisation in manufacturing on the services sector at either the national or industry 
level and thus ignore regional heterogeneity. Tariff effects may be more pronounced at the 
regional level because of differences in industry composition and tariff exposure at that level.  
 
The first group of researchers, Bhorat and Hodge (1999), Edwards (2001) and Rodrik (2008), 
find that the liberalisation of tariffs induces a structural shift in employment away from the 
manufacturing sector towards the services sector. Their studies demonstrate that the 
employment lost in contracting manufacturing is absorbed in an expanding services sector.  
 
Another branch of the literature shows the spillover effects of tariff reductions. Tregenna 
(2008) explores the extent to which employment in South Africa moves between the 
manufacturing and services sectors, with one of the channels being international trade. The 
study finds that there are backwards and forwards linkages between the manufacturing and 
services sectors. The study also highlights that manufacturing is a key source of demand for 




between manufacturing and services, it does not directly analyse the impact of international 
trade, especially tariffs, on services. 
 
Erten et al. (2019) expand the South African literature by exploiting district heterogeneity. The 
study utilises Post-Apartheid Labour Market Series (PALMS) dataset, which harmonises 
labour market variables from household surveys of Statistics South Africa from 1993 to 2019, 
however this study covers the period 1994 to 2004. They adopt simple Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) econometric methods to study the effects of tariff liberalisation across sectors. Their 
very recent study finds no association between tariff reduction and services employment. In 
the study, there is no evidence of structural change or spillover effects on services.    
 
Empirical literature in South Africa confirms the gendered employment effects of tariff 
liberalisation. Local studies show that female employment growth exceeds that of males in the 
services sector following tariff liberalisation from the early 1990s (Bhorat, 2000; Thurlow, 
2006). Bhorat (2000) argues that trade and technological progress contributed to the growth of 
the services sector and more especially to female employment. This growth is fuelled by growth 
in the financial and business sectors as well as by widespread technological change towards 
computerisation in the sector. The expanding sectors are increasingly computerized, 
particularly for desktop occupations such as clerical occupations where most women are 
employed. The studies by Bhorat (2000) and Thurlow (2006) are based on the national labour 
market. 
 
This chapter extends the South African literature by empirically evaluating the effect of import 
tariff cuts in manufacturing on service employment using disaggregated regional data. A 
particular contribution is its focus on estimating the spillover effects of manufacturing on the 
services sector. We base this exploration on the assumption that there is more heterogeneity 
across municipalities than is identified in analyses of aggregated data. Finally, the chapter 
provides insights into gendered tariff liberalisation effects in services.   
 
4.4 Empirical Model 
 
This chapter follows an empirical strategy similar to the one used in the previous chapter, where 
we employed a first-difference specification and IV estimation strategy. Given the similarity 




detail in Section 3.5. We estimate the change in services employment at the regional level in 
South Africa from 1996 to 2001 and from 2001 to 2011, using the following specification: 
 
∆𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑚𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑋𝑚𝑡
′ + 𝛽3𝑍
′
𝑚,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑡 + ∆ 𝑚𝑡           (4.1) 
 
where the dependent variable, ∆𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑚𝑡
𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣, is the change in log services employment and 
∆𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑛𝑚𝑡 represents the change in the manufacturing tariff protection measure for 
municipality m at time t. Our model includes two sets of control variables denoted by ∆𝑋𝑚𝑡
′  
and 𝑍′𝑚,𝑡−1 where ∆𝑋𝑚𝑡
′  reflects the time-varying log working-age population and migration 
rate. Lagged control variables are denoted by 𝑍′𝑚,𝑡−1, which represents the share of the skill 
rate, percentage of unemployed of the working-age population, the employment share of 




To analyse the gendered effects of tariff liberalisation on services employment, we utilise data 
from two main sources, namely the South African Population Census (a database of full census 
records and a 10% sample census dataset) annual nominal tariff data obtained from Edwards 
(2015). We construct a panel dataset using the 10% sample datasets of the 1996, 2001, and 
2011 censuses and merged these with the tariff data. We obtain the trade protection measure 
by applying municipality-level manufacturing employment shares to tariff rates. The datasets, 
as well as the construction of the variables, are discussed in detail in the previous chapter. The 
construction of the services wage variable is identical to the method used to construct the 
manufacturing wage. However, the focus of this chapter is on income per worker in services. 
Services employment includes employment in the following sectors: construction, wholesale 
and retail trade, transport and communication, finance and business services, community, 
social and personal services, public administration, private households, and other services. Our 
unit of analysis is the municipality. The final dataset contains 234 municipalities for each 







4.5.1 A Preview of the Data 
 
Table 4.1 presents an overview of the structural change from manufacturing to services using 
the manufacturing to services employment ratio from 1996 to 2011 as an indicator. The data 
reveal a dramatic shift in the composition of employment towards services. As shown in the 
table, employment in services was five times that of manufacturing in 1996, but this ratio rose 
to about 8.4 in 2011. This data corroborates the findings of other literature that argues that the 
South African economy has experienced a structural shift from manufacturing towards services 
(Bhorat & Hodge, 1999; Edwards, 2001; Rodrik, 2008).  
 
The data also shows the variation in the intensity and reallocation of labour across gender. 
Services comprise a disproportionate share of employment of women. For example, the 
services to manufacturing employment ratio for women in 1996 was close to 7, compared to 4 
for men. This ratio has risen for both males and females, but marginally more so for females. 
By 2011 the ratio for women was about 12 compared to almost 7 for men. Overall, the data 
reveals that services are more female-intensive than manufacturing. 
 
When we decompose the services to manufacturing employment ratio by race, we see that in 
1996 more Whites were employed in services relative to manufacturing than Blacks. The 
services to manufacturing ratio was about 6 for Whites and about 5 for Blacks in 1996. 
However, by 2011 the trend changed, and services absorbed more Blacks (with a ratio of 
approximately 8.5) than Whites (the ratio was approximately 8). There is a therefore a stronger 
restructuring in the sectoral composition of employment towards services for Blacks than 
Whites.  
 
Reallocation of labour is also gendered within and across race groups. As with the aggregate 
data, the ratio is higher for women relative to men irrespective of race. South Africa has 
experienced a dramatic rise in the ratio for Black females compared to all other categories, 6.4 
to 12.06 compared to 3.89 and 6.76 for Black men in 1996 and 2011, respectively. Whereas 
for White women, the ratio is high, above 8.7 compared to less than 6.40 for White men in all 
periods. Broadly, the data shows that the services sector absorbed much of the rapid increase 






Table 4.1: Services to manufacturing employment ratios over time 
 1996 2001 2011 
Structural change    
Aggregate 4.96 5.12 8.37 
Female  6.84 7.26 11.66 
Male 4.00 4.04 6.73 
    
Black 4.75 5.28 8.48 
Female 6.40 7.22 12.06 
Male 3.89 4.20 6.76 
    
White 5.85 5.50 7.79 
Female 9.02 8.70 10.09 
Male 4.43 4.07 6.40 
Notes: Structural change is services employment divided by manufacturing employment. The gap in gender composition is calculated as 
men/female. Black includes Africans, Coloureds and Indians/Asians.  
Source: Full census data 
 
Table 4.2 illustrates services employment as a share of total employment. Services are the 
dominant and rising source of employment for South African workers. Services as a share of 
total employment grew from 69.7% in 1996 to 82% in 2011. The employment shares differ for 
men and women. In 2011, the employment share of women in services was about 87% 
compared to 78% for men. Moreover, employment shares vary by race. The share of Whites 
working in services was initially higher than that of Blacks (78% vs 67.5% in 1996), but this 
difference was eliminated over the period (82.9% for Whites and 81.8% for Blacks in 2011). 
Within race categories, the gender employment gap in services employment shares is wider 
among Blacks than Whites. However, gender employment gaps have declined over time. By 
2011, the gender gap among Blacks was 8.9 percentage points, and among Whites, 7.9 














Table 4.2: Share of total employment in the services sector, 1996 to 2011 
 1996 2001 2011 
Aggregate 69.7 70.8 82.0 
Female  80.1 80.2 86.9 
Male 62.6 64.0 78.3 
    
Black 67.5 68.5 81.8 
Female  78.3 77.4 86.9 
Male 60.4 61.6 78.0 
    
White 78.0 77.3 82.9 
Female  87.0 86.2 87.1 
Male 71.3 70.4 79.2 
Notes: Services employment shares are calculated as services employment divided by respective total employment. The values are expressed 
as percentages. Black comprises of Africans, Coloured and Indians/Asians. 
Source: Full census data 
 
The services sector is not homogenous. There are massive differences across the sub-sectors in 
terms of gender and skill composition. Table 4.3 shows the skill share across the sub-sectors 
from 1996 to 2011. The share of skilled workers has increased in all sub-sectors over the years. 
Finance and Community have consistently had the highest share of skilled workers while 
Construction and Private households had the lowest share. The implication is that unskilled 
workers from manufacturing may struggle to get absorbed in some of the sectors within 
services. In addition, spillovers from manufacturing may differ across the sub-sectors. For 
example, manufacturing firms’ demand for professional and skill-intensive services such as 
Finance services may decline following the contraction of the manufacturing sector.    
 
Table 4.3: Skill share in services sub-sectors  
Sub-sectors 1996 2001 2011 
Electricity 37.5 45.7 61.3 
Construction 14.8 25.5 40.5 
Wholesale 33.3 43.8 54.4 
Transport 29.9 45.8 56.6 
Finance 63.7 67.9 64.5 
Community 63.6 66.9 68.8 
Private households 4.5 9.3 30.7 
Note: Sub-sector services skill shares are calculated as sub-sector services employment divided by the respective total employment (skilled 
plus unskilled). The values are expressed as percentages.  
Source: Full census data 
 
The gender composition of employment within services also differs across sectors. The initial 




sector is by far the largest employer of women in services, followed by private households and 
wholesale, while men are mostly employed in the community, wholesale, and finance sub-
sectors. The community sub-sector employs about 32.9% of women and 24.7% of men. The 
largest variation in the employment of men and women is shown to be that of private 
households and construction. The employment share of women and men in private households 
is 32.6% and 6.8% respectively, while in construction the share is 1.5% and 17.4% 
respectively.  
 
Table 4.4: Services employment share by gender in 1996 
Sub-sector Female Male 
Electricity 0.6 3.2 
Construction 1.5 17.4 
Wholesale 18.5 20.9 
Transport 2.7 13.9 
Finance 11.2 13.2 
Community 32.9 24.7 
Private households 32.6 6.8 
Note: Sub-sector shares are calculated as total sub-sector services employment divided by respective total services employment. The values 
are expressed as percentages. 
Source: Full census data 
 
Table 4.5 displays gender employment intensities by race across the services sub-sectors. 
Although the Community sub-sector is the largest employer of Blacks and Whites, we see 
considerable heterogeneity in terms of employment intensities across the other sub-sectors. 
Black women dominate in Private household (42%) and are also largely employed in 
Wholesale & Trade (30%) while Black men predominately employed in Wholesale & Trade 
(20.5%) and Construction (19.8%). On the other hand, White men and White women are 
disproportionally represented in Finance, 24.1% and 28.4% respectively. Wholesale & Trade 
is the second largest employer of Whites within the services sector. This sub-sector employs 
17.7% of White women and 22.2% of White men.  
 
The implication of these gendered intensities is that if spillover effects from liberalisation affect 
certain sectors more than others, this will give rise to differential employment impacts for men 
and women. For example, reductions in infrastructure investment would disproportionately 






Table 4.5: Services sub-sector gendered employment intensities by race in 1996 
Sub-sector Black Female Black Male White Female White Male 
Electricity 0.4 2.8 1.2 4.4 
Construction 1.3 19.8 2.1 9.0 
Wholesale 18.7 20.5 17.7 22.2 
Transport 1.7 14.3 6.1 12.5 
Finance 5.9 10.0 28.4 24.1 
Community 30.0 24.1 42.1 26.3 
Private household 42.0 8.4 2.4 1.5 
Note: Sub-sector employment intensities are calculated as sub-sector services employment divided by the respective total services 
employment. The values are expressed as percentages. Black comprises of Africans, Coloured and Indians/Asians.  
Source: Full census data 
 
A summary of statistics for the change in the trade protection measure and employment 
variables between 1996 and 2011 is provided in Table 4.6. The summary statistics show a rise 
in the services to manufacturing employment ratio in the post-apartheid period of about 27.5 
log points (approx. percentage points), on average. The standard deviation is 61 log points, 
suggesting enormous differences in the regional distribution of the change in the structural 
shift. Furthermore, the change in the structural shift of employment of men is shown to be 
larger than that of women. The ratio of services to manufacturing employment for women grew 
by 25.3 log points compared to 29.4 log points for men. This is associated with higher growth 
in employment in services for men (68.5 log points) compared to women (63.4 log points).  
 
The disparities across race are large and persistent even in the post-apartheid period. The 
employment growth of Blacks in services (71.1 log points) far exceeds that of Whites (33.2 log 
points). The gender services employment disparity is higher among Blacks than Whites. 
Employment growth of Black men exceeded that of Black women by 0.6 log points, while the 
gender disparity for Whites was 0.3 log points. Further, as shown by the standard deviations, 
the mean hides substantial variation across regions in the change in services employment by 











Table 4.6: Summary statistics of the change in tariffs and services employment, 1996 to 
2011 
Variable Mean P50 SD P75-P25 
ΔTPman -0.080 -0.073 0.026 0.027 
Δln(Services/Manufacturing employment) 0.275 0.235 0.610 0.754 
Female 0.253 0.248 0.847 1.012 
Male 0.294 0.232 0.574 0.721 
Δln(Services employment) 0.662 0.687 0.331 0.419 
Female 0.634 0.660 0.371 0.471 
Male 0.685 0.686 0.352 0.391 
Gender gap 0.051 0.040 0.296 0.316 
Δln(Services employment: Black) 0.711 0.740 0.349 0.442 
Female 0.681 0.699 0.390 0.504 
Male 0.736 0.726 0.375 0.432 
Gender gap 0.006 0.003 0.041 0.044 
Δln(Services employment: White) 0.332 0.323 0.586 0.611 
Female 0.333 0.320 0.602 0.650 
Male 0.369 0.305 0.839 0.604 
Gender gap 0.003 -0.007 0.387 0.057 
Notes: ΔTPman is the change in trade protection measure (tariff rates weighted by manufacturing employment shares). Gender gap measures 
the difference between the change in ln(male employment) and the change in ln(female employment). Black comprises Africans, Coloured 
and Indians/Asians. 
Source: Full census data 
 
4.6 Empirical Results 
 
In this section, we apply the empirical model described in Section 4.4 to examine the effect of 
tariff liberalisation on services sector employment between 1996 and 2011. First, we assess 
whether tariff reductions influence wages in the services sector. This analysis is followed by 
an estimation of the effects of tariff shocks on structural change, as measured by the ratio of 
employment in services to that of manufacturing. Next, the chapter estimates the trade effect 
on aggregate employment in services and identifies the channels through which the relationship 
is defined. Fourth, the gendered effects of tariff liberalisation on employment in services are 
examined, together with the channels through which gendered effects arise.  
 
4.6.1 Tariff Liberalisation Effects on Wages in the Services Sector 
 
We begin the analysis of tariff liberalisation effects in the services sector by investigating 
whether liberalisation affected services wages32. The estimation results are presented in Table 
 
32 Income per worker is used as a proxy for wage. A detailed explanation of the construction of the wage variable is provided 




4.7. The models in columns (1) and (2) are estimated using the OLS estimation strategy. 
Column (1) is the baseline model that only controls for the working-age population. In column 
(2) the baseline model is extended to include other control variables, such as migration rate, 
skill rate, unemployed rate, infrastructure, and initial manufacturing share. One shortcoming 
of the OLS measure is that it does not control for potential endogeneity of tariffs. Consequently, 
in columns (3) to (4), we control for endogeneity by instrumenting the change in TPman with 
the lagged level of TPman. We find that the coefficients on the tariff variable are insignificantly 
different from zero in all estimates, suggesting that wages in the services sector are 
unresponsive to tariff cuts in the manufacturing sector33. Consequently, the remainder of the 
chapter focuses on employment responses to liberalisation.  
 
Table 4.7: The effects of tariff liberalisation on services wages 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Dependent variables: Change in log services wage  







            
ΔTariff 0.538 0.573 1.573 1.296 1.535 
 (1.061) (1.123) (1.604) (1.930) (1.571) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.407** 0.391** 0.383** 0.513*** 0.313* 
 (0.189) (0.179) (0.178) (0.196) (0.177) 
ΔMigration rate  -0.222 -0.224 -0.108 -0.140 
  (0.296) (0.296) (0.274) (0.320) 
L.Skill rate  -0.314 -0.314 -0.307 -0.172 
  (0.540) (0.540) (0.528) (0.563) 
L.Unemployed rate  0.073 0.133 0.300 0.043 
  (0.532) (0.529) (0.565) (0.538) 
L.Infrastructure  0.009 0.010 0.012 0.006 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) 
L.Manufacturing share  -0.001 0.031 0.193 -0.071 
  (0.349) (0.349) (0.346) (0.370) 
Constant 0.907*** 1.094*** 1.102*** 0.984*** 0.998*** 
 (0.058) (0.279) (0.279) (0.269) (0.301) 
      
Observations 468 468 468 468 468 
R-squared 0.169 0.172 0.172 0.170 0.151 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV No No Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: Tariff variable is the manufacturing employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, change in tariffs comprises the difference in tariffs in 
the initial period and tariffs in the final period. Wages reflect income/capita. Migration rate represents the number of individuals who migrated 
since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of union members. Skilled rate denotes skilled 
workers as a share of skilled working within the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals as a 
share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, flush 
 
33 The estimates are based on bracketed income variables and thus we are not able to make a conclusive argument about the 




toilet and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing employment as a share of 
total employment, excluding the primary sector. 
 
4.6.2 Tariff Liberalisation Effects on Structural Change 
 
As outlined in the theoretical section, tariff liberalisation in net manufacturing importing 
countries such as South Africa could be expected to reduce the price of manufacturing relative 
to services, thus leading to a structural shift in employment away from manufacturing. In this 
section, we look at how changes in average manufacturing tariffs affect the services to 
manufacturing employment ratio across municipalities in South Africa to isolate whether this 
effect is present. A negative association with the tariff variable is expected, as this would 
signify that tariff reductions tend to induce shifts in the composition of local employment from 
manufacturing towards services.  
 
Table 4.8 provides results for the model that estimates the effect of the change in regional tariffs 
(and other controls) on the change in log services to manufacturing employment ratio. The 
results indicate a weak negative effect of tariff protection on the services to manufacturing 
employment ratio. This is in line with the theory that tariff liberalisation leads to a rise in 
services to manufacturing employment ratio. A 1 percentage point increase in the average tariff 
faced by a municipality is estimated to raise the ratio of services to manufacturing employment 
by 3.5%. Since tariff protection declined by an average of 8 percentage points, as shown in 
Table 4.6, this translates to an approximately 28 percentage point increase in the services to 
the manufacturing employment ratio, holding all other factors constant. As shown in the same 
Table 4.6, the services to manufacturing employment ratio rose by 27.5 percentage points on 
average across municipalities. The results suggest that the predicted change in the services to 
manufacturing ratio that is due to tariff reductions is equivalent to the entire change for the 
mean municipality. The main implication is that tariff liberalisation appears to have had a 
substantive contribution towards structural shift in employment within municipalities. 
 
The results also explain some of the variation in the change in employment ratios across 
municipalities. For example, there is a 3 percentage point difference in tariff reductions 
between the 75th and 25th percentile municipalities. The results imply that this led to a 10.62 
percentage point increase in the difference in services to manufacturing employment ratios 
between these municipalities. Overall, the results support the theoretical expectation of tariff-




those of Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015), Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011), all of which 
show liberalisation to induce modest structural shifts in employment towards services.   
 
The estimates also indicate other municipal level characteristics that affect the change in the 
services to manufacturing employment ratio. Municipalities with higher unemployment rates, 
lower skill ratios, and higher initial shares of employment in manufacturing, experienced 
greater increases in the services to employment ratio. The results for skill are peculiar as we 
would expect that skilled individuals would face fewer rigidities in reallocating to the relatively 
skill-intensive services sector. A possible explanation for this result is that skilled workers are 
not losing as many jobs in manufacturing as unskilled workers because of increased demand 
for skills in manufacturing during this period, a demand driven mainly by technological 
progress. For this reason, the likelihood exists that there could be a reduced incentive for skilled 
workers to migrate from manufacturing to services. 
 
Table 4.8: Tariff liberalisation effects on structural change in employment composition 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Change in log services/manufacturing employment  
    
ΔTariff -3.539* 
 (1.868) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.177 
 (0.145) 
ΔMigration rate -0.195 
 (0.190) 
L.Skill rate -1.426*** 
 (0.357) 











Period FE Yes 
IV Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the manufacturing employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, 
change in tariffs comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. Migration rate represents the number of 
individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of union members. Skilled 
rate denotes skilled workers as a share of skilled working within the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of 




weekly refuse collection, flush toilet and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing 
employment as a share of total employment, excluding the primary sector. 
 
4.6.3 The Effects of Tariff Liberalisation on Services Sector Employment 
 
In this section we estimate the employment effect within services associated with tariff 
liberalisation. The results showing the effect of tariff reduction on change in log services 
employment are presented in Table 4.9. We find a significant (5% level) positive association 
between the change in local tariff protection and the change in services employment across 
municipalities. The estimated coefficient of 1.29 implies that a 1 percentage point reduction in 
the municipal level tariff rate reduced employment in the services sector by 1.29% holding all 
other factors constant. Tariff liberalisation is thus shown to have reduced employment in 
services relative to its trend.  
 
The negative effects on services employment from liberalisation, as shown by the results from 
the data is contrary to our theoretical expectations of a structural shift of employment from 
manufacturing to services. The results imply that the services sector did not absorb the labour 
that was released from manufacturing in response to liberalisation. Rather, tariff liberalisation 
diminished employment growth in services within municipalities, leading to a much larger 
aggregate negative effect on employment. Those municipalities facing large tariff reductions, 
therefore, experienced disproportionately large reductions in employment in both 
manufacturing and services.  
 
One potential explanation for the results for South Africa is the presence of negative spillover 
effects associated with the decline in manufacturing. Such effects have also been noted by 
Acemoglu et al. (2016), Autor et al. (2015) and Dehejia and Panagariya (2014) who find 
evidence of negative spillover effects for the US that diminished the structural shift towards 
services. The following section explores the effect of these linkages at the local level in South 










Table 4.9: The effects of tariff liberalisation on services employment 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Change in log services employment  
    
ΔTariff 1.285** 
 (0.583) 
ΔWorking-age population 1.070*** 
 (0.052) 
ΔMigration rate 0.211*** 
 (0.067) 
L.Skill rate -0.888*** 
 (0.133) 











Period FE Yes 
IV Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the manufacturing employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, 
change in tariffs comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. Migration rate represents the number of 
individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of union members. Skilled 
rate denotes skilled workers as a share of skilled working within the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of 
unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with electricity (including solar), 
weekly refuse collection, flush toilet and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing 
employment as a share of total employment, excluding the primary sector. 
 
4.6.3.1 Spillover Effects on Services Sector Employment 
In this section, we analyse the various channels through which tariff liberalisation in 
manufacturing affects services employment. As mentioned in the theoretical literature review, 
Section 4.2, liberalisation of tariffs in the manufactured goods sector can spill over to services 
through three channels, namely, (1) derived demand for services inputs, (2) income effects, and 
(3) infrastructure effects. This section tests the effects of the three channels of services 
employment.  
 
To capture the derived demand effects, we ideally require a measure of the change in services 
input demanded by manufacturing associated with liberalisation. Unfortunately, we do not have 
an indicator of manufacturing output at the local level. As an alternative, we proxy the derived 




𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖             (4.2)
        
where 𝑐𝑖 denotes the services share in total costs of manufacturing industry i obtained from 
South African Input-Output Tables and 𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑡 is the total employment in manufacturing industry 
i in municipality at time t. We essentially use employment as a proxy for manufacturing 
output.34 The change in 𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑡 is included in the estimates.  
 
To control for income effects, we include the change in mean individual income in the 
municipality, obtained from the population census. Since the population census reports 
bracketed income, we calculate income using the midpoint and derive mean income per capita 
(calculated as the sum of income divided by the population) in each municipality. This variable 
will capture any change in income associated with a loss in employment in manufacturing. 
 
For the infrastructure variable, we use electricity as a proxy for infrastructure investment, 
where the variable reflects the number of households with electricity as a share of total 
households. The decision to use electricity is based on the fact that reductions in manufacturing 
production and employment in response to tariff liberalisation will have reduced demand for 
infrastructure services, including electricity, by households and firms in those regions. These 
regions will, therefore, experience low increases in the provision of such services compared to 
other municipalities. Lower import tariffs affect demand for electricity by firms and 
consequently lower infrastructure investment by the government. Moreover, Garsous (2012) 
argues that electricity is a good measure of infrastructure because in that study, electricity 
produced robust results than any other infrastructure variables.  
 
Table 4.1A in the appendix illustrates a positive correlation of change in tariffs with the 
channels, but the correlation with income levels is at the 5% significance level, and 
infrastructure investment is at the 10% significance level. We find an insignificant relationship 
for derived demand. This shows that change in municipality tariff exposure is weakly 
correlated with the spillover channels. This, however, does not negate the fact that these are 
important spillover channels to control for when determining the effect of tariff changes on 
services employment.  
 
34 The one implication is that the indicator will be biased upwards for regions that have high shares of labour-intensive 




Our empirical approach is to include the spillover channels into the services employment 
regressions sequentially. Support for our hypothesis that the indirect effects of tariff 
liberalisation through manufacturing are driving the positive tariff coefficient illustrated in 
Table 4.9 would be revealed by a declining significance and size of the tariff coefficient, 
together with positive and significant coefficients on the variables controlling for the spillover 
effects.  
 
Table 4.10 provides estimation results for the analysis of tariff reduction effect on services 
employment, controlling for derived demand, income effect, and investment effect. These 
channels are included separately in columns (1) to (3). Model (1) controls for derived demand, 
and we find that the tariff coefficient remains positive, but falls marginally and is now 
significant only at the 10% level. We also find that the derived demand coefficient is positive 
and significant, providing support for the derived demand spillover effect in driving services 
employment.  
 
In column (2), we include the income variable and the tariff effect remains positive but is 
smaller and less significant (10% level). The income coefficient is also positive and significant, 
suggesting that higher average incomes produce more employment in services. These results 
suggest that lower income associated with employment losses in manufacturing from tariff 
liberalisation negatively spills over to the services sector.  
 
The effects on services employment when controlling for infrastructure investment (proxied 
by electricity) is displayed in column (3). In line with our expectation, we find that the effect 
of liberalisation diminishes, and infrastructure investment is associated with an increase in 
employment in services. The infrastructure coefficient is also positive, suggesting that an 
increase in infrastructure investment is associated with higher services employment. 
 
When combining all the controls in column (4) we find significant positive coefficients on 
derived demand, income and our proxy for investment, while the trade effect on services 
employment becomes insignificantly different from zero. 
 
The implication is that, once we control for spillover effects from manufacturing, tariffs have 
no additional effect on services employment. The results for spillover effects are in line with 




tariff variable upwards reflecting the positive effect that tariffs on manufacturing have on 
employment in services via these spillover channels. The results imply that, as the 
manufacturing sector contracts following tariff reductions, employment in services declines 
because of reduced derived demand for services, lower income, and less investment in 
infrastructure.  
 
However, the insignificance of the tariff coefficient once spillover effects are accounted for 
still implies that we do not observe the anticipated increase in services employment arising 
from liberalisation. A significant negative coefficient on the tariff variable would signify this 
effect. This demonstrates that the theory by Edwards (1988) is lacking by not incorporating the 
spillover effects in the explanation of tariff effects on the nontradable sector.  
 
There are various possible explanations for this result. Perfect mobility of workers across 
sectors, as proposed by the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, may be hampered by rigidities. These  
could include wage rigidities associated with the wage bargaining process (Bhorat et al., 2009). 
Under the Heckscher-Ohlin model, adjustment takes the form of relative price changes and 
through this wage changes that alter the industry composition of employment. If wages are 
unable to adjust downwards, there is little incentive for firms (in both manufacturing and 
services) to absorb the displaced labour resulting in unemployment and slower employment 
growth in the industry or sector experiencing rising relative prices. 
 
Further, employment losses in manufacturing will also be greater. The previous chapter 
demonstrated that the liberalisation of tariffs has no significant effect on wages. Thus, the 
negative effects of liberalisation are disproportionately revealed through declining 
manufacturing employment35.  
 
A second explanation is that sector-specific skills impede the relocation of manufacturing 
workers into services. If services production is more skill-intensive than manufacturing, the 
less-skilled workers with manufacturing-specific skills may not be able to find jobs in services 
because they lack the requisite skills that are required in services. In addition, as illustrated in 
Section 3.2, sector specificity can reduce and make costly the adjustment of labour to tariff 
liberalisation. The implication is a much smaller increase in services employment than would 
 
35 Note that employment levels in manufacturing would still decline even if wages are flexible, but with fixed wages, the 




otherwise be the case. Our results broadly reflect a subdued structural shift in employment from 
manufacturing to services, possibly associated with rigidities in labour market adjustment. In 
addition, employment growth in services is further undermined by negative spillover effects 
through derived demand, income, and infrastructure linkages associated with the decline in 
manufacturing.   
 
Table 4.10: Tariff liberalisation and the spillover effects on services employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dependent variables: Change in log services employment 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
          
ΔTariff 1.226* 1.136* 1.193* 1.002 
 (0.634) (0.608) (0.608) (0.631) 
ΔLog Derived demand 0.024**   0.024* 
 (0.012)   (0.012) 
ΔLog Income  0.126***  0.121*** 
  (0.040)  (0.041) 
ΔLog Electricity   0.064** 0.056** 
   (0.027) (0.026) 
ΔWorking-age population 1.055*** 1.051*** 1.001*** 0.979*** 
 (0.074) (0.075) (0.077) (0.074) 
ΔMigration rate 0.222*** 0.213** 0.205** 0.220** 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.084) (0.086) 
L.Skill rate -0.923*** -0.803*** -0.743*** -0.712*** 
 (0.134) (0.128) (0.141) (0.147) 
L.Unemployed rate -0.256 -0.352** -0.394** -0.466*** 
 (0.164) (0.167) (0.173) (0.172) 
L.Infrastructure 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
L.Manufacturing share 0.261** 0.267** 0.262** 0.330*** 
 (0.126) (0.117) (0.118) (0.121) 
Constant 0.493*** 0.378*** 0.481*** 0.355*** 
 (0.086) (0.105) (0.090) (0.111) 
     
Observations 467 468 468 467 
R-squared 0.765 0.769 0.766 0.774 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the manufacturing employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, 
change in tariffs comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. Derived demand is the share of services 
in cost weighted by employment shares. Income is calculated using the midpoint of the income bracket. Income reflects income per capita. 
Electricity reflects the number of households with electricity as a share of total households. Migration rate represents the number of individuals 
who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of union members. Skilled rate 
denotes skilled workers as a share of skilled working within the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed 
individuals as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with electricity (including solar), weekly refuse 
collection, flush toilet and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing employment 






4.6.4 Gendered Tariff Liberalisation Effects on Services Sector Employment 
 
The objective of this section is to assess whether tariff liberalisation in manufacturing has, or 
is likely to have, a gendered effect on services employment. Gender-specific rigidities and 
industry segregation in manufacturing and services may drive a gender-specific effect of tariff 
reductions on employment in services. Industry segregation produces gendered effects of tariffs 
on manufacturing employment, and these effects may influence the tariff effects on services 
employment. These contributing factors are discussed in greater detail in the theoretical review 
in Section 4.2.  
 
First, the chapter seeks to determine if the tariff-induced structural change in the employment 
composition differs for men and women. The estimation results for the effect of tariff reduction 
on gendered structural change are displayed in Table 4.11. The estimates reveal that there are 
differences by gender in the structural change of employment from manufacturing to services 
in response to tariff liberalisation. The shift in the services/manufacturing employment ratio in 
response to tariff liberalisation is substantially larger for women than for men. We find that the 
tariff effect on sector reallocation from manufacturing to services is pronounced on Black 
women. There is no evidence of a structural change in response to tariff liberalisation for men 
(Black or White) and White women. Nonetheless, the gendered effects are statistically not 
different as shown by the p-values in columns (2), (4) and (6).  
 
These findings on gendered tariff effects differ from those found for Brazil by Gaddis and 
Pieters (2017). They find modest sector reallocation of men, in particular, low-skilled men, but 
no sector movement of women. Our results may be facilitated by industry segregation in both 
manufacturing and services sectors coupled with industry-bias liberalisation that has been 
shown in the previous chapter to be sturdier for women, particularly Black women. However, 
manufacturing employment of White men and White women did not appear to be affected by 
tariff reductions. The heterogeneous results may also have benefitted women because services 
are female-intensive. In addition, the gendered effect (and of the race effect for Black women) 
of tariff reductions on structural change may be driven by gendered demand for labour in the 
services sector, as shown by the higher services to manufacturing employment ratios for Black 
women than for other population groups in Table 4.1. It is evident from that table that 





Table 4.11: The effects of tariff liberalisation on structural change across gender and 
race 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Dependent variable: Change in log services/manufacturing employment 
 Aggregate  Black  White 
VARIABLES Female  Male   Female  Male   Female  Male  
                
ΔTariff -6.626*** -1.461  -7.394*** -1.849  2.624 3.128 
 (2.457) (1.764) 
 (2.748) (1.784)  (5.074) (6.895) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.399* 0.108  0.397 0.073  0.120 0.414 
 (0.205) (0.140) 
 (0.241) (0.144)  (0.414) (0.316) 
ΔMigration rate 0.631** -0.552***  0.692** -0.565***  -0.935 -1.595** 
 (0.283) (0.198) 
 (0.336) (0.207)  (0.695) (0.672) 
L.Skill rate -1.531*** -1.399***  -1.421*** -1.369***  -1.534 -2.702* 
 (0.487) (0.338) 
 (0.542) (0.355)  (1.395) (1.429) 
L.Unemployed rate 1.332** 0.532  1.277** 0.307  0.731 1.368 
 (0.536) (0.429) 
 (0.646) (0.464)  (1.245) (1.346) 
L.Infrastructure 0.006 0.016  0.016 0.020  -0.046* 0.015 
 (0.017) (0.012) 
 (0.018) (0.012)  (0.025) (0.018) 
L.Manufacturing share 2.279*** 2.638***  2.365*** 2.673***  2.181** 3.370*** 
 (0.477) (0.389) 
 (0.506) (0.407)  (1.030) (1.026) 
Constant -0.777*** 0.372*  -0.844** 0.412*  0.293 0.858* 
 (0.291) (0.202) 
 (0.360) (0.211)  (0.593) (0.506) 





Observations 465 466  463 466  387 415 
R-squared 0.100 0.191  0.083 0.175  0.052 0.050 
Period FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Suest         
Chi(2)  2.389   2.463   0.248 
Prob > (Chi2)  0.122   0.117   0.619 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the manufacturing employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, 
change in tariffs comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. Migration rate represents the number of 
individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of union members. Skilled 
rate denotes skilled workers as a share of skilled working within the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of 
unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with electricity (including solar), 
weekly refuse collection, flush toilet and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing 
employment as a share of total employment, excluding the primary sector. 
 
We also analyse the gendered effect of tariffs on services employment, and the results are 
presented in Table 4.12. While the estimates in columns (1) and (2) reveal that municipalities 
which are more exposed to tariff reductions experienced a decrease in female and male services 
employment, the effect is only significant for male employment. In column (3), we regress the 
change in the ratio of male to female employment in services (the gender employment gap) on 
tariffs, but the coefficient is insignificant. The models in columns (4) to (6) include the spillover 
effects from manufacturing, and we find that the magnitude of the coefficients falls, although 




Our results suggest that tariff liberalisation is adversely associated with employment growth in 
the services sector for men, but not women, even after controlling for spillover effects. In 
neither case, we do not see evidence of rising employment in services following the 
liberalisation of manufacturing, as per the theory predictions.  Rather, we find that those regions 
that faced relatively strong reductions in tariff protection are those that also experienced weaker 
growth in employment in services. A key contributing factor appears to be the presence of 
spillover effects.  
 
Table 4.12: Tariff liberalisation effects on gendered services employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Female Male 
Gender 
Gap Female Male 
Gender 
Gap 
              
ΔTariff 0.771 1.689** 0.918 0.475 1.421* 0.946 
 (0.620) (0.739) (0.640) (0.605) (0.786) (0.663) 
ΔLog Derived demand    -0.004 0.051*** 0.055*** 
    (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) 
ΔLog Income    0.130*** 0.106* -0.024 
    (0.044) (0.057) (0.060) 
ΔLog Electricity    0.106*** 0.011 -0.095*** 
    (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) 
ΔWorking-age population 1.126*** 1.015*** -0.111 0.993*** 0.964*** -0.029 
 (0.090) (0.083) (0.086) (0.091) (0.079) (0.088) 
ΔMigration rate 0.413*** 0.037 -0.376*** 0.402*** 0.066 -0.336*** 
 (0.080) (0.108) (0.103) (0.079) (0.109) (0.096) 
L.Skill rate -0.859*** -0.910*** -0.050 -0.520*** -0.887*** -0.366** 
 (0.144) (0.145) (0.131) (0.158) (0.172) (0.161) 
L.Unemployed rate 0.001 -0.482** -0.482*** -0.333* -0.573*** -0.240 
 (0.176) (0.200) (0.182) (0.185) (0.205) (0.193) 
L.Infrastructure -0.001 0.010 0.011** 0.003 0.010* 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
L.Manufacturing share 0.301** 0.152 -0.149 0.394*** 0.267* -0.127 
 (0.132) (0.132) (0.115) (0.129) (0.138) (0.115) 
Constant 0.225*** 0.739*** 0.514*** 0.068 0.608*** 0.539*** 
 (0.086) (0.111) (0.107) (0.102) (0.145) (0.131) 
       
Observations 468 468 468 467 467 467 
R-squared 0.687 0.717 0.204 0.707 0.729 0.243 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the manufacturing employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, 
change in tariffs comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. The dependent variable in columns (1), 
(2), (4) and (5) denotes changes in log services employment while in columns (3) and (6) it is the change in log services employment gap 
(male employment/female employment). The services gender gap is male services employment divided by female services employment. 
Migration rate represents the number of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-
intensity is the share of union members. Skilled rate denotes skilled workers as a share of skilled working within the working-age population, 
and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households 
with electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, flush toilet and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. 





The chapter extends the analysis by assessing whether the aggregate gendered effects hide 
differences across racial groups. In Table 4.13, we show the effect of tariff reductions on 
gendered services employment and the gender employment gap. Panel A shows the 
unconditional tariff estimates, meaning that in these regressions we are not controlling for 
spillover channels. However, Panel B shows results when we do control for them (conditional 
estimates). Behind the insignificant aggregate effect of tariffs on services employment 
(controlling and not controlling for spillover) is a positive association for White women and an 
insignificant association for Black women. The positive coefficient on tariffs for men (in Table 
4.12) is driven by the association with Black men. The conditional estimates are lower than the 
unconditional estimates, which suggest that spillover effects are at play, although their effect 
is marginal. Underpinning these findings is segregation in the services sector in South Africa 
as will be discussed in Section 4.6.5.  
 
Table 4.13: Tariff liberalisation and gendered services employment by race 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Female Male Gender Gap 
    
Panel A: Unconditional estimates        
Black    
ΔTariff 0.806 1.845** 1.039 
 (0.680) (0.792) (0.716) 
    
White    
ΔTariff 7.352* 5.594 -3.297 
 (4.153) (5.085) (3.237) 
    
Panel B: Conditional estimates    
Black    
ΔTariff 0.551 1.626* 1.076 
 (0.676) (0.843) (0.726) 
    
White    
ΔTariff 6.893* 5.162 -3.513 
 (4.011) (5.053) (3.214) 
    
Period FE Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the manufacturing employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, 
change in tariffs comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period.  The dependent variable in columns (1) 
and (2) denotes change in log services employment while in columns (3) is change in log services employment gap (male employment/female 
employment). The services gender gap is male services employment divided by female services employment. Black comprises of Africans, 
Coloured and Indians/Asians. Migration rate represents the number of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-
age population. Union-intensity is the share of union members. Skilled rate denotes skilled workers as a share of skilled working within the 
working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. 




total number of households. Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing employment as a share of total employment, excluding the primary 
sector. 
 
4.6.5 Sub-sector Services Gendered Employment Effects of Tariff Liberalisation 
 
The observed differential effects across gender and race may be driven by varying spillover 
effects across the services sub-sectors36 which have different gender and race intensities, as 
shown in Table 4.5. To determine this, we explore the tariff effect on employment across the 
services sub-sectors. The results for the effect of the reduction of tariffs across services sub-
sectors are provided in Table 4.14. The conditional estimates37 show that tariff liberalisation 
led to slower employment growth in Construction and Finance. The adverse tariff effect on 
employment of Black men in services shown earlier appears to be attributed to the 
concentration of Black men in the construction industry, while the results for White women 
reflect their concentration in the finance sector. As shown in Table 4.5, about 19.8% of Black 
men are employed in construction and 28.5% of White women are in Finance. The differential 
effects we find for men and women, and Blacks vs Whites are strongly associated with 
differences in spillover effects as well as racial and gender composition of employment across 















36 For example, infrastructure investment may affect the construction sector more than other sub-sectors, while the income 
effect may be more pronounced in finance, private households, and wholesale and trade. It is also possible that derived demand 
may affect all other sub-sectors but have a lesser impact on the community sub-sector.  
37 The conditional estimates include the three spillover effects (derived demand, income effect, and infrastructure investment 




Table 4.14: Employment effects of tariff liberalisation on services sub-sectors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Electricity Construction Wholesale Transport Finance Community Private 
                
Panel A: Unconditional estimates     
Aggregate -2.663 2.497** 1.020 1.155 3.351** 0.945 1.978* 
 (2.265) (1.200) (0.861) (1.229) (1.305) (0.800) (1.131) 
        
Female 0.335 6.944 0.767 -0.077 1.860 0.630 1.499 
 (10.906) (12.117) (0.999) (2.659) (1.449) (0.714) (1.138) 
        
Male -3.541 3.013** 1.252 1.478 4.270*** 1.254 2.902 
 (2.238) (1.244) (0.913) (1.321) (1.563) (1.041) (1.859) 
        
Panel B: Conditional Estimates      
Aggregate -3.141 1.959* 0.916 0.632 2.766* 0.881 1.663 
 (2.315) (1.131) (0.879) (1.297) (1.431) (0.804) (1.123) 
        
Female 0.168 6.717 0.615 -0.906 0.897 0.632 1.197 
 (11.046) (12.291) (0.989) (2.601) (1.439) (0.687) (1.115) 
        
Male -3.979* 2.555** 1.168 1.080 3.922** 1.131 2.534 
 (2.264) (1.172) (0.978) (1.409) (1.720) (1.067) (1.839) 
        
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Dependent variables denote the change in log for the respective sub-sector. The 
services gender gap is male services employment divided by female services employment. Wholesale includes wholesale and retail trade while 
private denotes private households. Migration rate represents the number of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the 
working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of union members. Skilled rate denotes skilled workers as a share of skilled working 
within the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. 
Infrastructure represents households with electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, flush toilet and piped water, as a share of the 
total number of households. Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing employment as a share of total employment, excluding the primary 
sector. 
 
4.6.6 Robustness Check 
 
In this section, we test for the sensitivity of the main results in several ways. First, we test by 
using regression weights and the 2SLS IV estimation approach. We use the 1996 working-age 
population as a share of the national working-age population as weights. This robustness check 
will allow us to determine whether the main results are sensitive to initial municipality 
conditions as pertaining to the working-age population. The results are presented in the 
appendix in Table 4.2A, Table 4.3A and Table 4.4A and the estimates confirm that the main 





We test for the robustness of the structural change results depicted in Table 4.2A, and find 
evidence of tariff-induced structural change for aggregate services with a higher rate of 
migration of women from manufacturing to services. Tariffs do not appear to affect the sectoral 
mobility of men. These results also hold for Blacks but not for Whites. The robustness check 
shows that tariff reduction spurred larger structural change among White men compared to 
White women. However, the significance of these estimates is weaker. 
 
Table 4.3A shows that services employment declined with the reduction of tariffs in 
municipalities that are more exposed to tariffs. This would confirm our results that the services 
sector did not absorb all the labour that is released in manufacturing.  
 
We also find differential effects of tariff liberalisation on services employment of men and 
women, as shown in Table 4.4A, and the effect remains sturdier for White men. The adverse 
effects of liberalisation are shown to be marginally stronger on White women compared to 
those on White men. This is consistent with the main results. Contrary to the main results, the 
test shows a significant tariff effect, where liberalisation reduces the gender employment gap, 
except in the case of Whites. The tariff effect on the gender employment gap is insignificant in 
the main results.  
 
Second, we test the robustness of structural change results by examining the effect of tariff 
reductions on services employment rates and manufacturing employment rates. We construct 
employment rates as employment normalised by the working-age population. The results are 
presented in Table 4.5A for services employment rates and Table 4.6A for manufacturing 
employment rates. We continue to find that tariff reductions decreased employment in both 
sectors. The decline in manufacturing employment is larger relative to services employment 
for the aggregate population as well as across gender and race. The exception is for White 
women where the decline in services employment rate is stronger than for manufacturing (the 
effect was insignificant for manufacturing). The effect of reduction of tariffs remains 
statistically insignificant for White men. These results reveal that our main results on the tariff-
induced structural change are robust and that the observed structural change is driven by the 
larger decline in manufacturing employment rather than a rise in services employment.    
 
Third, we test whether the results on services employment are robust by using control variables 




displayed in Table 4.7A. We find that tariff cuts have a negative effect on services employment 
for men and women, however, the effect is studier for men. The effect on female services 
employment is at the 10% significant level. We also find that tariff cuts have a gendered effect 
among Blacks with Black men being more disadvantaged relative to Black women (the 
coefficient for Black women is statistically insignificant). Lastly, the results show that tariff 
cuts have no effect on the employment of White men and White women. These results are 
comparable with the main findings and indicate that our results are robust. 
 
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter analyses the effect of liberalisation of manufacturing tariffs on service 
employment across local labour markets in South Africa from 1996 to 2011. For this analysis, 
we utilise census data for 1996, 2001, and 2011, together with annual tariff data obtained from 
Edwards (2015). A first-difference approach is used to analyse changes in tariffs and service 
employment from 1996 to 2001 and from 2001 to 2011. The 2SLS IV estimation technique is 
also employed to control for endogeneity of tariffs.  
 
The chapter first probes the effects of tariff reduction on wages and finds that services wages 
are not responsive to tariff reductions. This exposes the fact that the response of the South 
African labour market to tariff liberalisation is limited to changes in employment because 
wages are unresponsive to liberalisation.  
 
Second, the chapter examines whether liberalisation brings about a structural shift in 
employment composition from manufacturing to services during these periods. The main 
finding is that liberalisation contributed to a modest structural shift in the sectoral composition 
of employment in manufacturing relative to services during these periods. Simulations using 
the regression coefficients indicate that the structural shift in employment composition from 
manufacturing to services can be entirely explained by tariff liberalisation. These findings on 
tariff-induced structural shifts in the composition of employment are broadly consistent with 
those of Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015) and Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011) who find 
similar evidence in Brazil.  
 
Third, the chapter explored the effects of liberalisation on services employment and the 




the relative price of manufactured goods would enhance the level of employment in services. 
Contrary to our expectations, the estimates reveal that regions that experienced higher tariff 
reductions also experienced slower growth in services employment. Within services sub-
sectors, we find that these aggregate results can be attributed to the construction and finance 
industries. Our results are similar the findings by Autor et al. (2015) and Acemoglu et al. (2016) 
in the US, and Dehejia and Panagariya (2014) in India which show a decline in non-
manufacturing or services employment.  
 
Further analysis reveals that lower derived demand, income, and infrastructure investment 
linked to the decline in manufacturing from tariff liberalisation explain this negative 
association. The presence of spillover effects from manufacturing corroborates the findings for 
the US of Autor et al. (2015), Acemoglu et al. (2016) and for India of Dehejia and Panagariya 
(2014). Even after controlling for spillover effects, we do not find evidence of rising growth in 
employment in services. The services sector thus failed to absorb all the employment lost in 
manufacturing in response to liberalisation. Our results are similar to the study in Brazil by 
Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015), who find that the structural change into the nontradable sector 
is not enough to compensate for the loss in the tradable sector.  
 
Overall, the results suggest that while tariff liberalisation induced a structural shift in the 
composition of employment towards services, this is not driven by increases in services 
employment. The structural shifts shown reflects that the reduction in employment in 
manufacturing associated with liberalisation exceeds that in services. One potential explanation 
for the failure of services to absorb employment is the presence of wage rigidities associated 
with the centralised Bargaining Council processes or the minimum wages imposed under the 
Sectoral Determinations. 
 
The results may also reflect the presence of industry-specific skills of those workers that lose 
jobs in manufacturing, industry segregation in manufacturing and services, as well as sector-
specific spillover effects on services employment. These industry or sector-specific factors may 
compound the adverse effect of tariff liberalisation on employment across regions.  
 
Moreover, we find the compositional shift in employment from manufacturing towards 
services from liberalisation is much stronger for women, in particular, Black women. This may 




demand in services. In terms of services employment, the adverse effects of tariff liberalisation 
are born by men rather than women (at the aggregate level), but also Black men and White 
women, due to the negative tariff effects on employment growth in construction and finance. 
The implication is an outcome that differs by gender and race because of distinctive industry, 
gender, race and spatial characteristics in the South African labour market. 
 
The challenge in some countries, such as South Africa, is that tariff liberalisation may 
compound the prior distributional gaps. Differences in the gender and racial composition in 
employment are an outcome of South Africa’s past policies of racial discrimination. These 
results reveal that tariff liberalisation in South Africa appears to have compounded some of the 
racial employment gaps. Broadly, it would also suggest that these rigidities hamper 
restructuring and can also give rise to resistance to liberalisation.   
 
Since we do not find evidence that workers are reallocating to services, the possibility exists 
that the adverse effects of tariff liberalisation on local employment may be mitigated by internal 











The effect of tariff liberalisation on the labour market depends critically on the degree of labour 
mobility across sectors and regions. Previous chapters showed stronger job displacement and 
losses in manufacturing employment in regions more exposed to reductions in tariff protection. 
Factor rigidities inhibiting the movement of workers across manufacturing and services, as well 
as spillover demand effects from manufacturing, amplified these effects such that services 
employment also declined in these regions. However, the net effect on local labour market 
outcomes and households is also influenced by the extent to which labour is able to migrate 
across regions to find new employment opportunities. Less mobile labour translates to more 
localised effects of tariff liberalisation on employment.  
 
Migration effects are particularly important given that liberalisation has affected regions 
differently, giving rise to differences in labour market outcomes across regions. Employment 
opportunities declined in regions exposed to high reductions in tariff as shown by the findings 
in preceding chapters. The differences in employment opportunity (probability of finding a job) 
and wages across these regions present an incentive for migration to occur from those regions 
strongly affected by tariff reductions to those regions less affected. According to migration 
theory, together with empirical evidence from international studies, migration lowers regional 
disparities in terms of labour market outcomes, such as wages, employment, and regional 
economic growth (De Haas, 2010; Gamlen, 2014). This implies that the degree to which these 
differentials in local labour market conditions persist across regions is influenced by the 
mobility of workers. The less mobile workers are, the longer the regional disparities arising 
from liberalisation will persist. 
 
This chapter completes the analysis of the effects of tariff liberalisation on local labour markets 
by examining the internal migration effects of tariff liberalisation across municipalities in post-
apartheid South Africa. The chapter aims to answer the following research questions:  




2. How does tariff liberalisation affect gendered migration and does the effect differ across 
individual characteristics? 
 
The chapter draws on the Specific-Factors model already discussed in Chapter 3 to provide a 
theoretical framework to analyse how tariff liberalisation drives internal migration. The model 
illustrates how differences in industry composition across regions, coupled with rigidities to 
the movement of workers across regions (e.g. male vs female, married vs single, and others) 
affects migration flows (Kovak, 2010). The model demonstrates how tariffs alter the relative 
price of goods, and through these, changes in wages and employment opportunities across 
regions. Differences in wage growth and employment opportunities serve as push or pull 
factors for migration. Workers are likely to migrate out of regions facing falling wages (or 
employment opportunities) to regions with stronger wage growth (or more employment 
opportunities).  
 
The migration effects from liberalisation are also expected to differ by gender. As shown in 
earlier chapters, the effect of tariff reductions on regional employment differs for men and 
women because of differences in gender intensities across industries. For example, women are 
more numerous in the textile, clothing, and footwear industry. Men and women also face 
different rigidities to migration related to factors such as marital status, fertility, and societal 
norms. For example, married women and women with children experience stronger constraints 
to internal migration than married men and even single women, as well as women without 
children (Chort et al., 2017; Hoang, 2011; Jacobsen & Levin, 2000). Therefore, we can expect 
that tariff induced changes in relative prices across regions, coupled with the gendered effects 
from tariff changes, will interact with rigidities to migration. This will lead to distinctive 
migration effects from liberalisation across genders and other groups. 
 
The effect of tariff liberalisation on internal migration has been studied for the United States 
(Autor et al., 2015) and several emerging economies, including India (Topalova, 2010), Brazil 
(Kovak, 2010) and Peru (Baldárrago & Salinas, 2017), but the evidence is mixed. Topalova 
(2010) finds no evidence that tariff liberalisation affects internal migration, while Baldárrago 
and Salinas (2017) and Kovak (2010), find strong effects for Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, 
respectively. Much of this international literature, however, focuses on aggregate migration 
and does not look at the effect by gender.  An exception is Kovak (2010), who finds that in 




chapter augments the literature by examining the gendered effects of tariff liberalisation on 
internal migration in South Africa.  
 
South Africa provides an interesting case study in terms of tariff-induced gendered migration. 
First, the country has an interesting history of migration that restricted mobility of Blacks. 
Earlier migration was also intrinsically and consequently gender-biased because it occurred 
through the labour migrant system which favoured and controlled the movements of men, in 
particular, African men who worked in the mines in urban areas (Posel, 2004; Von Fintel & 
Moses, 2017). The low wages that African men received proved inadequate to sustain their 
families in the urban areas, and during apartheid, African women were also not legally allowed 
to live in hostels in urban areas. As a result, African women remained behind in the homelands 
(or rural areas) and engaged in poorly paid work or unpaid household work. Thus, migration 
rates have historically been higher among men than among women.  
 
Second, South Africa experienced aggressive tariff liberalisation from the early 1990s. Third, 
the evidence from previous chapters shows that employment declined in both the 
manufacturing and services sectors in response to the liberalisation of tariffs between 1996 and 
2011. The employment effects of tariff liberalisation were also gendered and are therefore 
likely to present different incentives for migration for men and women in South Africa.   
 
This chapter’s contribution to the existing literature is twofold. Firstly, the chapter provides 
insights into how tariff liberalisation affects the regional composition of labour and the 
population. Secondly, the chapter expands our understanding of the determinants of internal 
migration across different groups. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 provides an overview of the 
theoretical foundation and theoretical literature review, while Section 5.3 discusses the related 
empirical literature. Section 5.4 presents the empirical strategy employed for the analysis. A 
description of the data and patterns of migration is provided in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 provides 
empirical evidence of the tariff liberalisation effects on internal migration in South Africa and 







5.2 Theoretical Foundation 
 
This section presents and discusses the theoretical framework that explains how tariff 
liberalisation may induce internal migration. We apply the Specific-Factors model discussed 
in Section 3.2 and extend it to explain the effects of tariff liberalisation on internal migration 
as developed by Kovak (2010). This chapter presents the Kovak (2010) model. Essentially, in 
this model, the assumption of spatial immobility is relaxed, and it allows for movement across 
regions in the long-run. Similar to Section 3.2, there are 2 regions (r = 1, 2); 2 industries (i = 
A, B) and the 2 factors of production are mobile labour (L) and industry-specific capital (K). 
Industry A is assumed to be clothing and industry B is other manufacturing. In the short to 
medium run labour is mobile across industries but immobile across regions. However, in the 
long-run labour is mobile across industries and regions. Other assumptions in this model 
remain the same as in Section 3.2.  
 
The mechanisms behind tariff liberalisation induced migration are demonstrated in Figure 5.1 
where the x-axis displays the total national labour supply to be allocated across the two regions, 
and the y-axis represents the wage in each region. Panel (a) shows the economy at the initial 
equilibrium, before tariff liberalisation. At the initial equilibrium, there is wage equality across 
the two regions, which is denoted by w*. Panel (b) shows a situation in the economy when 
there is tariff liberalisation and in the short-run labour is restricted from moving across regions. 
The figure shows that tariff reductions in industry A will cause the MRPL curves of industry A 
to fall in both regions to XX1 but the subsequent fall in wages in region 1 will be greater than 
in region 2 because employment in region 1 is more concentrated in industry A. This is shown 




In the medium to long run, the differential aggregate wage across regions will incentivise 
workers to migrate to the relatively high wage region in the medium to long term. This process 
is depicted in panel (c), which shows that as L migrates from region 1 to region 2, the central 
axis moves to the left, indicating a greater labour supply allocated to region 2. The increase in 
labour in region 2 will cause the MRPL curves to shift to the left in accordance with the shift 
of the central axis. The effect is that wages in region 2 will eventually fall and equilibrate across 
both regions at a new equilibrium level w**, as shown in panel (c). Internal migration thus 




internal migration. Further, we see structural shifts in production in both regions as L shifts 
from industry A to industry B in response to the fall in prices and wages in industry A fall. 
 
We extend the model to incorporate a country where wages are rigid. In this country, tariff 
reductions will not have a wage effect; instead, the effect will be felt on employment rates. We 
revert to panel (b) to explain this adjustment process. In the case of downward wage rigidities, 
wages remain the same at 𝑤∗ (similar level to panel (a)), as denoted by the lighter wage line 
above 𝑤1
∗ and 𝑤2
∗. Regions in such a country will face more unemployment. The level of 
unemployment is the distance between the 𝑋𝑋1 and YY. In this scenario, unemployment will be 
higher in region 1 than in region 2. This provides an incentive for L to migrate to region 2 
because, assuming some churn in employment, unemployed workers will have a higher 
probability of finding employment in region 2 compared to region 138. Migration will take place 
until the probability of finding a job equalises in both regions. There will be greater out-
migration of workers used intensively in industry A in region 1. In the case of South Africa, 
where tariffs fell sharply in the clothing industry, which is female-intensive, the implication is 
that there is likely to be higher levels of internal migration of women in response to tariff 
liberalisation.  
 
Unemployment will persist in both regions until wages adjust downwards. However, if wages 
are fixed or unresponsive to tariff liberalisation, migration will be less than expected because 
there will be no wage difference between regions, as wages are fixed to original levels. 
Likewise, if there are migration rigidities, there will be less migration than in a situation where 
there is full mobility of labour, and differences in wages across regions will persist for longer. 
It follows that local labour market outcomes for wages and employment are strongly influenced 
by migration rigidities. Migration attenuates differences in the local labour market outcomes 













Figure 5.1: Graphical representation of internal migration  
(a)  Initial equilibrium 
 
 
(b) Response to tariff liberalisation before migration 
 
 








5.2.1 Theoretical Literature Review on Tariff-induced Gendered Internal Migration  
 
This section discusses the theoretical literature that provides further insights to tariff-induced 
internal migration. Tariff liberalisation induces migration through changes in wages and 
employment across regions. There are, however, several other channels through which tariff 
liberalisation may have a gendered effect on internal migration via employment.  
 
The first channel is differences in industry composition across regions, coupled with 
differences in the gender composition of employment in those industries. For example, 
preceding chapters show that women are mostly employed in the textile and clothing industry 
and the services sector, while men are mainly employed in heavy industry and construction. 
The significant reduction of tariffs in South Africa in the textile, clothing, and footwear 
industry relative to other manufacturing industries, is a push factor for women to migrate from 
regions which are more exposed to trade in this industry to regions that are rather dominated 
by the services sector. On the other hand, given that trade exposure for men is distributed across 
several manufacturing industries, and may be the same across regions, men have less of an 
incentive to migrate. It is expected that regions that are dominated by manufacturing industries 
are likely to experience out-migration of both men and women. However, those regions with a 
greater share of female-intensive manufacturing industries may face stronger out-migration of 
women. 
 
The second channel for a gendered effect on employment migration is family structure, namely 
marital status and fertility. Family structure may be more restrictive to the movement of women 
than men. International studies by Autor et al. (2018), Braga (2018) and Hoang (2011) find that 
marriage reduces spatial mobility, particularly for women39. Studies in South Africa (Gubhaju 
& De Jong, 2009; Posel, 2004) also find that marital status is an important contributing factor 
to the decision to migrate. Gubhaju & De Jong (2009) show that never married, divorced, or 
separated men and women have a higher likelihood of moving, compared to married 
 
39 However, marriage is itself endogenous as it is affected by tariff liberalisation. According to Mincer (Mincer, 1978) tariff 
liberalisation promotes the advancement of women in the workplace and this may deter couples from getting married. This is 
because tariff liberalisation has a direct positive effect on the export-oriented services sectors in those countries that have a 
comparative advantage in these sectors, providing employment opportunities which may be concentrated in particular regions. 
Single women are able to migrate more easily than married women in order to take advantage of the employment opportunities 
in these regions. Empirically, Heath and Mobarak (2015) find that the expansion of the garment industry in Bangladesh 
provided new jobs, particularly for females, and this delayed marriage among girls. In Indonesia, the reduction of input tariffs 
contributed to lower marriage rates among women (Kis-Katos et al., 2018). There is a general consensus in international 
literature that single women are more spatially mobile compared to married women (Fleury, 2016; Hoang, 2011; Jacobsen & 




individuals. Married women are constrained because they have to consider not only their own 
careers but also their spouses' careers (Jacobsen & Levin, 2000). Fleury (2016), Hoang (2011) 
and Jacobsen and Levin (2000) show that married women often sacrifice their careers for the 
family. A foundational study by Mincer (1978) termed this phenomenon “tied moving” and 
“tied staying”. This suggests that movement of married women is dependent on that of her 
spouse. It follows that marital status determines migration, especially that of women, in 
response to tariff liberalisation.   
 
Fertility is coupled with marital status as a factor restricting the mobility of women. Hoang 
(2011) states that childbearing is a deterrent for female migration but not for male migration 
because women are more often the primary caregivers of children. Having children may 
increase the migration costs of workers, and thus inhibit the probability of their migration 
(Autor et al., 2018; Braga, 2018; Hoang, 2011) due to the financial burden of moving. Is it 
probable that tariff-induced migration may be more prevalent among single women and men 
as well as among women without children40.  
     
Kinship provides the third channel for explaining the gendered tariff effects on internal 
migration. A study claims that men have stronger networks through kinship and other social 
networks than women (Massey et al., 2006). Nonetheless, other literature, such as studies by 
Matthei (1996) and Smith-Lovin and McPherson (1993) suggests that female migrants tend to 
find initial employment, albeit in female-intensive industries, in the destination location 
through other female kin or female contacts. However, Hondagneu-Sotelo (2000) argues that 
men migrate more easily than women because they are accorded stronger enabling social 
network resources. Thus, from these early studies, the narrative is that kinship benefits men 
more than women in terms of migration possibilities. The implication of this argument, 
accepted in many circles, is that men, because of kinship links, are more likely to be more 
responsive to changes in relative returns or employment opportunities across regions arising 





40 Some studies find that tariffs are positively associated with lower fertility rates because of the negative tariff effect on 
employment. Autor et al. (2018) find increased competition in the manufacturing sector to have a heterogeneous effect on men 
and women, reducing fertility for men and also increasing the proportion of unmarried mothers. A study in Brazil shows that 




5.3 Related Empirical Literature 
 
Migration has been closely linked to international trade. Numerous international studies have 
investigated the two-way relationship between international trade and international migration. 
More relevant to this chapter is the link between tariff liberalisation and internal migration. The 
empirical literature on the effect of tariff liberalisation on migration is sparse. Lack of reliable 
data on internal migration and regional tariffs in developing countries is one of the core reasons 
for the narrow focus of migration to date.  
 
International empirical studies that explore the relationship between tariff liberalisation and 
internal migration include Autor et al. (2014), Baldárrago and Salinas (2017), Hering and 
Paillcar (2015), Kovak (2010), Mendez (2015) and Topalova (2010). The evidence from these 
studies is inconsistent. Most of the studies find that tariff liberalisation induces migration from 
regions that are more exposed to regions less exposed to tariffs (Baldárrago & Salinas, 2017; 
Mendez, 2015), while Topalova (2010) finds no evidence of tariff-induced migration in India.  
 
Evidence from the literature on the effects of tariff liberalisation on gendered internal migration 
is also limited. Some studies show that men are more mobile than women post tariff 
liberalisation (Aguayo-Téllez et al., 2010; Kovak, 2010). Aguayo-Téllez et al. (2010) use 
employer-employee data for Brazil from 1997 to 2001 to investigate the link between 
globalisation and internal migration of workers in the formal sector. The study uses 
multivariate analysis to study self-selection into the migration decision and migrants’ choice 
between multiple destinations. The findings show that concentration of firms encourages 
internal migration through wage differentials across regions, particularly that of male workers. 
Female workers are found to comprise a small share of labour migration (Aguayo-Téllez et al., 
2010). However, the driving forces behind the differential tariff-induced migration are not 
explored.   
 
In another study on Brazil, Kovak (2010) applies the Specific-Factors model to measure the 
effects of tariff liberalisation between 1987 and 1995 on local labour market wages and internal 
migration. The study utilises a static model of location choices post-liberalisation and applies 
a first-order Taylor series approximation of migration. The analysis finds that men, younger 
individuals, Whites (as opposed to non-Whites), and those with smaller families are more 




Facchini et al. (2019) analyse the effect of trade policy uncertainty on internal migration in 
China. A trade policy uncertainty gap is used as the exogenous shock and is captured as the 
gap between Normal Trade Relations (NTR) with WTO members and non-NTR, which are 
usually higher tariff rates assigned to nonmarket economies. Nonmarket economies in China 
were established under the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1930. A difference-in-difference approach 
is used to study the effect before and after the change in trade policy, which took place in 2001. 
The study reveals that regions that face an average decline in tariff reduction uncertainty 
(measured as the gap between NTR and non-NTR) experience increased in-migration, driven 
mostly by skilled individuals. Moreover, the study finds that the effect of tariff liberalisation is 
gender-biased; in-migration of women lagged behind that of men. The study neglected to 
examine the drivers of the gendered in-migration.  
 
5.3.1 South African evidence 
 
This section presents the empirical literature on internal migration in South Africa. Internal 
migration patterns in South Africa have been driven by a number of factors, such as the 
systematic process of land dispossession and relocation to homeland areas, combined with 
policies that dictated the type of participation of Black (defined in this thesis as Africans, 
Coloured, Indian/Asian) people in the labour market and the economy as a whole. The history 
of internal migration dates back to colonisation. A list of South African migration laws is 
available in Table 5.1A in the appendix. The law that played a pivotal role in internal migration 
in South Africa was the 1913 Land Act. Under this law, Black people were prohibited from 
owning more than 7% of South Africa’s land area, increased to 13% with the 1936 Native Trust 
and Land Act. The implementation of these law meant land was repossessed from Black people 
in order to keep to this limit. In addition, the colonial government(s) of South Africa levied 
heavy land taxes on African people, who constitute about 80% of the population, essentially 
forcing them to move from their native rural areas to cities in search of jobs to be able to pay 
the taxes. The apartheid system, which was formally in place from 1948 to 1991 (although land 
dispossession existed in practice before then), reinforced migration and settlement restriction 
of Black people through various laws. The apartheid government forced people to register their 
race under the Population Registration Act (1950–1991) as Black 41, White, Coloured, or Indian 
 
41 Black was the classification used during Apartheid for African. This classification changed post-apartheid where Black 




and allocated land along racial lines through the implementation of the Group Areas Act (1950–
1991).  
 
Complementing these laws governing land ownership and residency of Black people were 
others that controlled the movement of Black people into urban areas. The Bantu Authorities 
Act (1951), Bantu Urban Areas Act (1953), Promotion of Bantu Self-government Act (1959), 
and Pass Law Act (1952-1986) were implemented to designate parts of rural areas for African 
people. These areas were called “homelands” and were located far from urban city centres. 
Former homelands included Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana, Lebowa, QwaQwa, Venda, 
KwaNdebele, KaNgwane, KwaZulu, and Gazankulu. 
 
Labour migration mainly comprised men because they were not allowed to travel with their 
families to their workplace (Posel, 2004). Apartheid laws that restricted movement and 
settlement were gradually abolished between the late 1980s and early 1990s (Choe & Chrite, 
2014; Posel, 2004).  By the early 1990s, all South Africans were free to move and settle where 
they pleased, and families could be united in urban areas. This period saw a gradual increase 
in female migration. Von Fintel and Moses (2017) suggest that the rise in female migration 
could also have been driven, and continues to be driven, by an increase in labour market 
participation of women, changes in attitudes towards female migration, changes in male-female 
partnership arrangements, and reduction in fertility rates. 
 
Several papers have studied the determinants of internal migration in South Africa (Ardington 
et al., 2009; Bouare, 2001; Clarke & Eyal, 2014; Gubhaju & De Jong, 2009; Posel & Casale, 
2005; Von Fintel & Moses, 2017). Evidence from these empirical studies in South Africa is in 
line with the theory posited by Greenwood (1997). That is, much of the South African literature 
maintains that the decision to migrate is based on pull and push factors, such as regional 
differentials in wages, job opportunities, unemployment, kinship, crime, local public spending, 
and local amenities, as well as land and housing conditions (Bouare, 2001; Dodson, 1998; Von 
Fintel & Moses, 2017). Marital status is also thought to play an important role in the decision 
to migrate. The decline in marital rates has also been found to be a driving factor behind 
migration (Posel & Casale, 2005). Gubhaju and De Jong (2009) also reveal that never married, 
divorced, or separated men and women have a higher likelihood of moving compared to 





Interestingly, pensions and other social transfers also emerge as determining factors for internal 
migration in South Africa (Ardington et al., 2016; Ardington et al., 2009; Clarke & Eyal, 2014). 
Social transfers, such as pensions, can be both a push and pull factor for migration. Clarke & 
Eyal (2014) demonstrate that the presence of a pensioner or recipient of a social grant in a 
household discourages mobility to other regions as the funds provide financial support for the 
family. In contrast to this finding, Ardington et al. (2009) and Ardington et al. (2016) find that 
pensions and social transfers allow migrants to overcome childcare constraints and other 
migration costs. This is an important finding because, since the advent of democracy, the South 
African government has consistently allocated a significant share of the fiscal budget to social 
transfers.  
 
Migration patterns in South Africa have been found to differ by gender. The literature shows 
men to be more mobile than women, but that, migration of women has been on an upward trend 
since the late 1990s (Dodson, 1998; Posel, 2004; Von Fintel & Moses, 2017). Dodson (1998) 
reveals, at that time, that female migrants tend to be married, older, and more educated than 
their counterparts. Furthermore, the choice of destination has been found to differ for men and 
women. Camlin et al. (2014) document that South African women migrate to regions with a 
larger informal sector, while men are attracted to regions that have a larger share of mining and 
manufacturing sectors. A gap in this literature is it overlooks the role of trade liberation in 
stimulating internal migration.  
 
Erten et al. (2019) fill this gap by examining the effects of tariff liberalisation on in-migration 
across districts in South Africa, using data from the October Household Surveys between 1994 
to 1998 and a fixed-effects estimation model. The study finds no evidence of tariff-induced 
internal migration. The limitation with this study is it does not provide insight into the gendered 
effects of tariffs on internal migration.  
 
This thesis supplements the South African literature on internal migration by investigating the 
effect of tariff liberalisation on gendered internal migration (and other associates) at the 
municipality level. The aim is to provide new evidence about tariff-induced internal migration 
at a disaggregated level to account for regional heterogeneity as well as heterogeneity across 





5.4 Estimation Strategy 
 
To perform a descriptive analysis42 on the effect of tariff liberalisation on internal migration, 
we utilise a modified gravity model, which is a log-linear model. The long-standing gravity 
model has been used extensively in a voluminous body of literature in the last century, 
including Bergstrand (1985) and Greenwood (1975). One of the most important advantages of 
the gravity model is that it incorporates a theoretical foundation of gravity into economic 
estimation fairly well (Anderson, 2011). Anderson (2011) argues that the success of the gravity 
model is also because it is an empirical economic model that can handle an enormous variation 
of economic interactions across space of both trade and factor movements. The traditional 
gravity model adopted Newton’s Law of Gravitation, where factors of production supplied in 
one location are attracted to demand for goods or labour in another location, and the potential 
flow is limited by the distance between the two locations (Anderson, 2011). However, since 
the model allows for the analysis of spatial relations and bilateral flows, it can also be applied 
to migration (Ramos, 2016; Von Fintel & Moses, 2017) and trade (UN, 2012).  
We modify the standard gravity model applied to migration by including tariffs in the model. 
According to the Specific-Factors model, discussed in Section 5.2, workers move across 
regions when there are regional wage and employment differences. However, employment and 
wage differences are a function of tariffs, and the ability to migrate is a function of individual 
characteristics. We therefore employ a reduced-form estimation, where we estimate the effect 
of tariffs on migration. Tariffs provide us with region-specific exogenous shocks. These 
exogenous shocks will enable us to identify (a) how tariffs affect migration across 
municipalities (theoretically via relative wage or relative employment opportunity) and (b) how 
individual characteristics make it more or less difficult for workers to migrate. We provide a 
descriptive analysis of the effect of the change in tariff reductions, from 1996 to 2001 and from 
2001 to 2011, on internal migration by employing the following equation:   
𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛X′𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑙𝑛X′𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑍′𝑖,1996 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝑍′𝑗,1996 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗,𝑡                     (5.1) 
 
 





where 𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is log migration from origin municipality i to destination municipality j in time 
t. 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 and 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑗𝑡 represent the regional trade protection measure in logs at the 
origin municipality and destination municipality, respectively. This is constructed, as in 
Chapter 3, as the initial employment weighted industry tariff, following Bartik (1991), Gaddis 
and Pieters (2017), Kovak (2010) and Topalova (2010). 
 
Distance is a proxy for migration costs, such as relocation costs and transportation costs. The 
further the distance between origin and destination municipalities, the greater the cost of 
migration, and consequently, the lower the level of migration. To isolate the effect of tariff 
liberalisation we add several variables to control for push and pull factors. These are denoted 
by X′𝑖𝑡  and X′𝑗𝑡 representing push factors at the origin, and pull factors at destination 
municipality respectively, and are transformed into natural logarithms. The push and pull 
factors include population density, employment, household income, night-time lights (a proxy 
for economic activity), infrastructure, manufacturing share, pensions, and language (a proxy 
for social networks). If destination municipalities have on average more employment 
opportunities, higher household income, more night-time lights, and better infrastructure, these 
municipalities will attract more migrants. The effect of population density is ambiguous as it 
can act as a push or pull factor. The signs for the coefficients for these control variables are 
expected to be negative for the origin municipality and positive for the destination 
municipality.  
 
In addition, we include several variables to control for initial conditions. These are represented 
by 𝑍′𝑖,1996 and 𝑍′𝑗,1996 and include the share of the manufacturing sector in total employment 
(excluding the primary sector), the share of households that receive pension(s) and the share of 
mother tongue isiZulu speaking people (the most spoken language in South Africa) in logs. 
The share of employment in manufacturing is included to control for technological change in 
manufacturing that can independently affect employment and migration patterns. The reason 
for including pensions and home language is to control for factors that in the literature are 
determinants of migration in South Africa. Lastly, we control for year fixed effects43 𝛾𝑡 .  
 
 
43 The inclusion of year fixed effects provides a narrower perspective for the analysis of how tariff liberalisation may affect 
bilateral migration patterns. The shortcoming of this analysis, however, is the failure to cannot capture economy-wide changes 





The main variables of interests are 𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 and 𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑗𝑡. In the previous chapter, we 
find evidence that the reduction of tariffs reduces employment, particularly manufacturing 
employment, in municipalities with stronger exposure to tariffs. In this chapter, we work with 
the assumption that workers in municipalities where there are job losses will move out of those 
more exposed municipalities to less exposed municipalities. In terms of coefficients, we expect 
𝛽1 to be negative and 𝛽2 positive, implying that tariff reductions in origin municipalities induce 
out-migration while tariff reductions in destination municipalities lower in-migration. The 
central idea is that tariff cuts increase international competition, which leads to lower rates of 
employment. Workers then respond to job losses by moving from municipalities that face high 
tariff exposure to less exposed municipalities.  
 
5.4.1 Estimation Issues  
 
To carry out the descriptive analysis, the chapter utilises the 2SLS IV econometric approach, 
where we instrument the change in the trade protection measure by its initial values. Equation 
(5.2) shows the first-stage estimation of the relationship between change in the trade protection 
measure and the initial trade protection measure. The subscript r denotes the region, either 
origin municipality or destination municipality. We include control variables: population, 
employment, income, night-time lights, infrastructure, initial manufacturing share, initial share 
of households with a pension recipient, and initial share of isiZulu speakers. Period-fixed 
effects are also included in the model as below: 
 
Δln𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑟,1996 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛X′𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛X′𝑗𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑍′𝑖,1996 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑍′𝑗,1996 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗,𝑡                        (5.2) 
 
The second stage estimates the effects of tariff liberalisation, as measured by the predicted 
change in tariffs from the first stage regression, on bilateral migration. The following equation 
gives our final 2SLS IV estimation: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1Δ𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝛽2Δ𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑗𝑡̂ + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛X′𝑖𝑡 +





where 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡  and 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 are initial trade protection measures for the origin 
municipality and the destination municipality, respectively. The 2SLS IV approach is also 
applied to relative tariffs.  
 
The second potential estimation issue is dealing with many zero observations, since the gravity 
equation takes on the log-linearized form. This poses a potential problem for our estimation 
because of zero migration between several municipality-pairs, the dependent variable, in 
various years. In logging the migration data, these zero value observations fall away, 
potentially distorting the distance coefficient through selection bias effects. Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006) propose the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) econometric technique to 
resolve this problem. PPML is frequently used for count data, and it keeps all the observations, 
including zero-values. However, IV estimation using the PPML is complex when there are a 
large number of fixed effects. Consequently, this chapter applies the 2SLS IV approach. The 
effect on the coefficient of interest, namely, the tariff variable, is expected to be minor, as the 
exclusion of zero migration pairs primarily biases estimates of the distance coefficient. No 
systematic relationship between tariffs and bilateral distance is anticipated in the data, implying 
minimal sample selection bias on the tariff coefficients.  
 
5.5 Data  
 
5.5.1 Data Sources 
 
We utilise panel data for the descriptive analysis on the effect of tariff liberalisation on internal 
bilateral migration from 1996 to 2011. The analysis is carried out by combining data from 
several sources. These include the South African population census (for migration data), tariff 
data obtained from Edwards (2015), and data provided by Quantec (a data consultancy firm), 
the (US) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and Google maps, for 
the other control variables.  
 
Population Census data  
The population census data provides data on education, fertility, industry, language, marital 




10% sample44 of the census for 2001 and 2011 by restricting the sample to the working-age 
population, that is, individuals who are aged between 15 and 64. Migrants are defined as those 
who answer “yes” to the question “have you moved since the last census”. We then generate a 
bilateral migration variable using the current place of residence as the destination municipality 
and previous place of residence as the origin municipality. The total number of potential 
migration observations in our sample is 872 35245 for the entire period, 1996-2011.  
 
Migration is also disaggregated by gender (male or female), race (Black or White), current 
marital status (married or single), and fertility (children or no children). Marital status focuses 
only on married individuals, ‘married’ being defined as civil, traditional or polygamous 
marriages, and on single individuals, where the ‘single’ category refers to individuals who have 
never been married. We exclude individuals who are widowed, divorced, or separated. For the 
fertility variable, the sample focuses on the number of children ever born in the sample. This 
binary variable contains females either with children (one or more children) or without children 
(no children).   
 
The census also provides information on the year an individual moved to their current residence 
since the last census. In cases where the respondent moved more than once during the two 
censuses, only the recent move is captured. Census 2001 records migrants between 1996 and 
2001, while Census 2011 has migrants who moved between 2001 and 2011. Using this data, 
we can construct a panel of migration data over the period 1996 to 2001 using the 2001 Census, 
and for the 2002 to 2011 period using the 2011 Census. Our final sample includes annual 
bilateral migration, spanning the period 1996 to 2011, and the unit of analysis is 234 
municipalities, as defined in the 2011 Census.  
 
The 10% weighted sample of the population census was also used to obtain data on 
manufacturing share, pensions, and isiZulu speakers. Manufacturing, pension and isiZulu 
speaker variables are constructed as at 1996 to reflect initial conditions. Manufacturing is the 
share of manufacturing in total employment. Pension is the ratio of households that have a 
pension recipient present, to households without a pension recipient. isiZulu reflects the share 
of Zulu speaking individuals as a share of the 11 official languages in South Africa.  
 
44 Migration data is not available in the full census. 
45 There are 234 municipalities over the 16 years. Therefore, the maximum number of internal origin-destination municipality 
migration pairs between 1996 and 2011 is calculated as 234*233*16.  In several origin-destination municipality pairs there is 





A description of tariff data sources and the construction of the trade protection measure is 
provided in Chapter 3. 
 
Quantec Easydata 
Quantec provides data on gravity variables for South Africa, such as population density, 
employment, income, and infrastructure. Quantec is a consultancy firm that collects data for 
South Africa  (De Klerk, 2012). Their annual regional data are disaggregated at a sub-national 
and regional level. The methodologies followed by Quantec to estimate the annual data are not 
publicly available (De Klerk, 2012), and thus we are unable in this chapter to explain how the 
data are derived. Nevertheless, in this chapter, we derive employment to include individuals 
who are within the working-age population and have full-time employment. Income is the 
average income per worker, derived as average income divided by average employment. The 
infrastructure variable is derived as a principal component of households with electricity, 
regular refuse collection, a flush toilet, and piped water as a share of total households.  
 
Distance data 
Distance is calculated using the Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates for the census 
data from Statistics South Africa. We calculate distance as the straight-line distance from the 
centroid (centre point in a municipality) in kilometres between municipality i and municipality 
j. 
 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
Following Henderson et al. (2012) and Von Fintel and Moses (2017), we use night-time lights 
data to identify differences in economic activity across municipalities. There is a high 
correlation between economic activity and night lights (Henderson et al., 2012). Night-time 






46 The motivation for using night-time lights data is because of the concern of data quality and data availability. Regional GDP 
data that is provided by Quantec is inferred from more aggregated data and therefore do not necessarily reflect changes in 





5.5.1.1 Data Issues 
 
Table 5.1 displays the summary statistics for the constructed migration data. It is evident from 
the table that several quality issues arise concerning the data. The first issue is that our data 
contains large numbers of observations with zero values. This will affect the coefficient on 
distance because migration is negatively correlated with distance. Zero values may therefore 
reflect long distances between municipalities. If zero observations are excluded from the 
estimation, this can give rise to selection bias affecting the distance coefficient, but this is not 
a core variable of interest. The zero values are expected to be less of a problem for the 
coefficient on tariffs.   
 
A second challenge with the data is the massive drop in bilateral migration from 2001 to 2002. 
This is due to two main factors. First, because the data only captures the most recent migration 
it may under-count migration in prior years for individuals that migrate frequently. The data 
also does not account for migrants who have moved back to the municipality of origin. A 
second, is the issue of recollection bias. We find more pairs with migration data closer to the 
Census date than prior to this. This is because it is easier to recall when one moved if the period 
since moving is shorter. 2001 is therefore biased upwards, and 2002 is underscored.  
 
We overcome the possible selection bias due to recollection bias in the regressions by 
generating demeaned migration, where we take regional bilateral migration for each 
municipality pair and normalise it by annual average migration. In addition, we control for year 
fixed effects to eliminate the selection bias effects by year, assuming that the effects are the 
same across all municipalities. Relating this to the objective of the chapter, which is assessing 
tariff-induced migration, the hypothesis is that regions that face higher tariff reductions 
compared to average tariff reductions are likely to experience higher out-migration in origin 













Table 5.1: Summary statistics for bilateral migration  
Year Sum Mean P50 P1 P10 P90 N 
1996 77 278 1.417 0 0 0 0.004 54 522 
1997 278 440 5.107 0 0 0 0.985 54 522 
1998 330 737 6.066 0 0 0 8.205 54 522 
1999 390 107 7.155 0 0 0 10.817 54 522 
2000 476 491 8.739 0 0 0 11.521 54 522 
2001 660 653 12.117 0 0 0 15.968 54 522 
2002 105 924 1.943 0 0 0 0 54 522 
2003 148 288 2.720 0 0 0 0 54 522 
2004 172 271 3.160 0 0 0 0 54 522 
2005 202 191 3.708 0 0 0 0 54 522 
2006 225 342 4.133 0 0 0 0 54 522 
2007 264 189 4.846 0 0 0 0 54 522 
2008 302 225 5.543 0 0 0 0 54 522 
2009 352 929 6.473 0 0 0 0 54 522 
2010 472 189 8.661 0 0 0 11.571 54 522 
2011 713 233 13.082 0 0 0 13.644 54 522 
Total 5 172 487 5.929 0 0 0 0.278 872 352 
Source: 10% weighted sample census data 
 
In Table 5.2, we evaluate the extent to which the issue of extremely low migration flows is 
prevalent by excluding zero migration. The most striking feature of our bilateral migration data 
is that many municipality-pairs show extremely low migration values between 1996 and 2001. 
This poses a third challenge with our data. It is evident that there is some distortion in the data 
arising from the construction of the common spatial units where we convert the locations in 
the 2001 census to the 2011 municipalities. This is because the mapping is based on the share 
of area overlapping across regions, which explains the low values of bilateral migration, plus 
fractions of 1. A detailed explanation of the mapping process is provided in Appendix 2.1 We 
deal with the data challenge of the vast discrepancy of municipality-pairs over time by selecting 













Table 5.2: Summary statistics for bilateral migration observations with values greater 
than zero 
Year Sum Mean P50 P1 P10 P90 N 
1996 77 278 5.623 0.001 2.54E-11 3.55E-08 13.491 13 743 
1997 278 440 12.778 0.003 8.77E-11 1.13E-07 25.802 21 791 
1998 330 737 14.172 0.003 4.47E-11 1.02E-07 27.860 23 337 
1999 390 107 15.520 0.003 3.92E-11 9.24E-08 30.883 25 135 
2000 476 491 17.689 0.004 7.71E-11 2.06E-07 33.284 26 937 
2001 660 653 21.457 0.005 9.24E-11 3.32E-07 36.829 30 790 
2002 105 924 42.625 19.084 9.955 11.083 81.186 2 485 
2003 148 288 50.114 21.728 9.963 11.149 91.273 2 959 
2004 172 271 51.134 21.871 9.951 11.092 93.752 3 369 
2005 202 191 54.163 22.264 9.961 11.219 96.916 3 733 
2006 225 342 55.861 22.522 9.956 11.207 101.083 4 034 
2007 264 189 58.722 22.871 9.956 11.219 100.286 4 499 
2008 302 225 61.229 22.740 9.956 11.236 108.350 4 936 
2009 352 929 64.913 22.750 9.957 11.209 117.304 5 437 
2010 472 189 72.902 23.203 9.951 11.237 129.397 6 477 
2011 713 233 86.874 23.981 9.947 11.370 149.045 8 210 
Total 5 172 487 27.532 0.049 1.12E-10 9.38E-07 52.58141 187 872 
Source: 10% weighted sample census data 
 
Table 5.3 depicts summary statistics for demeaned bilateral migration for this restricted 
dataset47. The final sample size consists of 77 165 observations. The table also reveals that the 
huge drop in migration from 2001 and 2002 has been eliminated. We find that there is a 










47 It should be noted that the mean demeaned bilateral migration for each is not equal to one because this dataset is only for 
municipality pairs that have bilateral migration equal to or greater than 10. Summary statistics for all the municipality pairs 
are provided in the appendix Table 5.2A. The table shows that the mean demeaned bilateral migration is equal to one, as 
expected. An additional observation is that the mean decreases over time. This is explained by the fact that the number of 
municipality pairs with bilateral migration greater or equal to 10 increase from 2 130 in 1996 to 8 056 in 2011. This has an 
effect on the mean, Nonetheless, it is important for the analysis to restrict accordingly and this is done by restricting the data 




Table 5.3: Summary statistics for demeaned bilateral migration for a common set of 
municipality-pairs with at least ten migrants 
Year Sum Mean P50 P1 P10 P90 N 
1996 52 202 24.508 14.809 7.076 7.797 47.718 2 130 
1997 53 594 11.454 4.724 1.979 2.192 21.961 4 679 
1998 53 586 10.499 4.119 1.653 1.850 19.976 5 104 
1999 53 631 9.391 3.531 1.401 1.566 18.160 5 711 
2000 53 641 8.355 2.894 1.147 1.277 16.732 6 420 
2001 53 689 6.852 2.203 0.827 0.927 13.719 7 836 
2002 54 261 22.293 10.720 5.170 5.768 42.268 2 434 
2003 54 351 18.664 8.078 3.700 4.148 33.798 2 912 
2004 54 300 16.465 7.028 3.178 3.557 29.964 3 298 
2005 54 352 14.814 6.078 2.714 3.056 26.825 3 669 
2006 54 367 13.698 5.500 2.427 2.731 24.710 3 969 
2007 54 343 12.320 4.770 2.071 2.343 20.959 4 411 
2008 54 347 11.233 4.159 1.814 2.056 20.128 4 838 
2009 54 380 10.176 3.551 1.550 1.756 18.357 5 344 
2010 54 382 8.559 2.706 1.159 1.315 15.105 6 354 
2011 54 406 6.753 1.852 0.767 0.876 11.586 8 056 
Total 863 830 11.195 4.021 0.857 1.353 21.515 77 165 
Source: 10% weighted sample census data 
 
5.5.2 A Glimpse of the Data  
 
This section of the chapter discusses the migration trend and characterises of South African 
migrants between 1996 and 2001, using the final sample. Figure 5.2 illustrates actual migration 
(not demeaned migration) over time, specifically between the two periods 1996-2001 and 
2002-2011. In the first period observe that there is a sharp increase in the number of migrants 
from 1996 to 1997, this is followed by a gradual increase from 1997 to 2000 and another steep 
rise between 2000 and 2001. On the other hand, the figure shows that in the second period the 
increase in the number of migrants rose steadily in the former years (2002 to 2010) and that 
migrations rose sharply in the latter years (2010 to 2011). The exponential increase in migration 










Figure 5.2: Migration trend: 1996-2001 and 2002-2011 
 
Source: 10% weighted sample census data 
 
 5.5.2.1 Spatial Patterns of Migration  
 
To where do the migrants move? The answer to this question is provided in the map in Figure 
5.3, which shows the distribution of in-migration between the two five-year periods 1996-2001 
and 2006-2011. The darkly shaded municipalities represent municipalities with relatively high 
in-migration, while the lightly shaded municipalities experienced the least in-migration.  
 
From the map, it is evident that in-migration is dispersed widely across municipalities. We also 
find that the choice of destination municipality appears to remain fairly constant over time, 
with municipalities in Gauteng, the Western Cape, and, to some extent, the Northern Cape, 
attracting more migrants than municipalities in other provinces. It is not surprising that 
migrants are moving into Gauteng and the Western Cape because these provinces have the 
highest level of economic activity in South Africa (Krugell, 2014) and the Northern Cape, in 
particular, Kimberley, is known for its diamond mining sector. On the opposite side of the 
spectrum, the Eastern Cape, Mpumalanga, North West, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo 
Provinces show low in-migration. The variation in rates of in-migration indicates that tariff-





Figure 5.3: Spatial distribution of in-migration rates 
 
Source: 10% weighted sample census data 
 
In Figure 5.4, we depict the correlation between change in employment-weighted tariffs 
between 1996 and 2001 and in-migration in 2011, and we find a positive relationship, although 
this is strongly affected by the outliers. Nevertheless, the relationship is consistent with the idea 
that municipalities with larger tariff reductions have less in-migration, implying that 
destination tariffs influence where migrants go. 
 
Figure 5.4: Correlation between change in employment-weighted tariffs and in-migration 
rates across municipalities in 2011 
 
Notes: Tariffs are weighted by regional employment shares. The change is the difference between 1996 tariffs and 2011 tariffs.  




This section is a discussion of inter-provincial migration, as presented in Table 5.4 that 
occurred in South Africa in one year 2011. The table shows the origin of migrants (out-
migration) and the destination province (in-migration). Gauteng and Eastern Cape are the main 
sources of migrants, while the Northern Cape has the least migrants leaving the province. 
About 54% of migrants in the Western Cape originate from the Eastern Cape and about 21% 
from Gauteng. KwaZulu-Natal attracts migrants from the Eastern Cape (47%) and Gauteng 
(27%). Migrants in the North West are predominantly from Gauteng. People from Limpopo 
(29%), KwaZulu-Natal (19%), Eastern Cape (14%) and Mpumalanga (12%) constitute the 
largest share of migrants in Gauteng. The inter-provincial migration pattern shows that 
migrants move to provinces, which are closest to their province of origin. The pattern of 
migration suggests that distance is a possible contributing factor to migration in South Africa. 
 
In terms of the provincial in-migration as a share of total in-migration, we observe that Gauteng 
is overwhelmingly the most popular destination province, with 43.5% of migrants. The 
Western Cape has the second largest share of in-migrants, about 15%, followed by North West 
(8.4%), and KwaZulu-Natal (8.3%). This spatial distribution of in-migrants is consistent with 
economic activity in South Africa, which is clustered around Gauteng, Western Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal. This spatial pattern of migration suggests that migration is driven by the 
likelihood of greater employment opportunities.   
 














West Gauteng Mpumalanga Limpopo 
Western Cape 0% 29% 18% 6% 6% 3% 5% 3% 3% 
Eastern Cape 54% 0% 11% 21% 47% 16% 14% 9% 9% 
Northern Cape 6% 3% 0% 8% 2% 7% 2% 2% 2% 
Free State 4% 8% 14% 0% 5% 13% 8% 6% 4% 
KwaZulu-Natal 8% 19% 4% 12% 0% 5% 19% 17% 7% 
North West 2% 4% 30% 11% 3% 0% 11% 5% 12% 
Gauteng 21% 30% 16% 32% 27% 38% 0% 35% 44% 
Mpumalanga 2% 4% 3% 5% 7% 6% 12% 0% 19% 
Limpopo 2% 4% 4% 5% 3% 13% 29% 23% 0% 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
In-migration 
share 15.4% 5.0% 2.6% 4.4% 8.3% 8.4% 43.5% 7.1% 5.4% 







5.5.2.2 Characterisation of Migration  
 
Table 5.5 shows in-migration rates decomposed by gender, race, marital status, and fertility. 
In-migration rates are calculated as the sum of migrants over the period, divided by the 
population at the end period in the destination municipality. The data shows that there has been 
a marginal decline in in-migration for all demographics in the two periods, with aggregate in-
migration falling from 8.1% (1996-2001) to 6.9% (2006-2011).  
 
In addition, the table reinforces the finding that men are more spatially mobile than women. 
We see that a higher share of men migrates than women in both periods. Between 1996 and 
2001, the migration rate of men was 8.7% while that of women was 7.7% compared to the 
period 2006-2011, where the rate of migration of men was 7.4% compared to 6.4% for women. 
The migration rate has fallen for both men and women, but the rate has fallen faster for women 
than for men. Migrants have thus become more male-intensive over the period. 
 
The gendered migration rates are also evident across race and marital status, with men having 
higher rates of in-migration than women. The differences in migration rates suggest that 
rigidities to migration differ for men and women. Comparing other characteristics of men and 
women, the data shows that White women migrate more than Black women, with in-migration 
rates of 15.9% and 6.8% for the period 1996-2001 and 13.5% and 6.4% between 2006 and 
2011, respectively. This is in line with empirical literature which shows that South African men 
migrate more than women. 
 
In terms of family structure, married women are marginally more mobile than single women. 
Over the period 1996-2001 (2006-2011), the share of migrant women who are married is 7.7% 
(6.7%) compared to 7.2% (5.7%) for their single counterparts. This perhaps supports the 
explanation –previously mentioned - that married women move in association with their 
husbands, while single women face some discrimination and stigma when migrating. The 
migration pattern for men does not reveal the same pattern with married men migrating more 
than single men. In the former period, single men had a migration rate of 8.3% while married 
men had a migration rate of 8.9%. In the latter period, about 7% of single men migrated, a 





Lastly, the fertility of women seems to play a significant role in migration ability and decisions. 
About 8.6% of women without children moved locations between 1996 and 2001, and about 
6.5% of women with children. Between 2006 and 2011, the migration rates of mothers were 
4.7% and 8.3% for women without children. This shows that women with children face tougher 
rigidities to migration.  
 
Table 5.5: In-migration rates for the periods 1996-2001 and 2006-2011 
In-migration rates 2001 2011 Change 2001 - 2011 
Aggregate 8.1% 6.9% -1.3% 
Female 7.7% 6.4% -1.3% 
Male 8.7% 7.4% -1.3% 
Black female 6.8% 5.6% -1.1% 
Black male 7.8% 6.7% -1.1% 
White female 15.9% 13.5% -2.4% 
White male 16.4% 13.8% -2.6% 
Married female 7.7% 6.7% -1.0% 
Married male 8.9% 7.6% -1.2% 
Single female 7.2% 5.7% -1.5% 
Single male 8.3% 7.0% -1.4% 
Females with children 6.5% 4.7% -1.9% 
Females without children 8.6% 8.3% -0.3% 
Notes: The five-year period migration rates are computed as the sum of migrants during the period divided by the end of the period population.  
Source: 10% weighted sample census data 
 
5.6 Estimation Results 
 
The objective of this chapter is to perform a descriptive analysis on the gendered effects of 
tariffs on internal migration in South Africa. The analysis is carried out by using restricted 
annual data on internal bilateral migration and the tariff protection measure spanning 1996 to 
2011. We employ the restricted demeaned migration data for the core municipality-pairs that 
have bilateral migration of at least 10 migrants. We further restrict the analysis to municipality 
pairs that contain migration values for both men and women to obtain comparative estimates 








5.6.1 Tariff Liberalisation Effects on Internal Migration  
 
The estimation results for the analysis of the effects of tariffs on aggregate internal migration 
are displayed in Table 5.6. A positive coefficient for tariffs suggests that tariff reductions 
discourages in-migration at the destination municipality. Likewise, a positive coefficient for 
tariffs at the origin municipality suggests that the reduction of tariffs lowers out-migration. 
Estimations in columns (1) and (2) are based on the OLS estimation approach. Column (1) is 
a baseline model where we control for distance, population density, economic activity, and 
infrastructure. The results show that the effect of tariff liberalisation on internal migration is 
not significantly different from zero. The estimates also show that internal migration decreases 
with distance. Moreover, internal migration is positively correlated with population density and 
infrastructure but negatively associated with economic activity at both the origin and 
destination municipalities.  
 
We expand the model in column (2) by including other control variables, such as the 
manufacturing share, pensions, and kinship in the initial period (1996). We find that tariff 
reductions induces in-migration in the destination municipalities but has no effect on out-
migration in the origin municipality. The effect at the destination municipality is unexpected. 
These peculiar estimates may be driven by the endogeneity of tariffs.  
 
We follow the same techniques as in Chapter 3 by implementing the IV estimation strategy 
using the two-stage least squares estimation (2SLS), where we instrument the change in the 
trade protection measure with the initial trade protection measure in 1996. The IV estimation 
results are presented in column (3). The IV estimates reveal that the reduction of tariffs is 
associated with a rise in out-migration at the origin municipalities but the positive tariff 
coefficient for the destination municipalities is insignificant. Our findings also show, that in 
the IV model, the effect of tariffs on internal migration intensifies, suggesting that the baseline 
underestimates the tariff effect on migration. The results show that a 1% decrease in tariffs at 
the origin municipality is associated with an 11.3% increase in out-migration. Existing studies 
in other developing countries, such as those by Kovak (2010) in Brazil, Mendez (2015) in 
Mexico and Baldárrago and Salinas (2017) in Peru, find similar evidence. We find that the 
tariff effect on in-migration disappears. Conversely, the migration effects of economic activity 




municipality, which is insignificant in the OLS model, becomes weakly associated with 
internal migration.  
 
Looking at some of the other variables, population density is positively related to both in-
migration and out-migration. This is to be expected since population density captures the size 
of the population, and therefore increases the likelihood of migration from a region. In contrast, 
it is also that in-migration increase in regions with higher population density, possibly because 
those regions are likely to be in urban area, more developed and have better employment 
opportunities. We find that the shorter the distance between origin and destination 
municipalities, the more movement there is across the two locations. Economic activity, 
manufacturing share, and kinship discourage and limit migration out of the origin municipality. 
These results imply that migrants are less likely to leave regions with high levels of economic 
activity. Kinship at the origin municipality provides networks and support, and thus 
discourages out-migration. This is in line with expectations.  
 
The effects of infrastructure on out-migration are peculiar. We expect that municipalities with 
adequate infrastructure face less out-migration, but we find more movement of migrants out of 
origin municipalities with relatively well-developed infrastructure. When comparing the 
infrastructure coefficient for the origin and destination municipalities, we see that the effect is 
stronger at destination municipalities. This suggests that even though infrastructure leads to 
both in and out-migration, in-migration exceeds out-migration. An additional unexpected result 
is the effect of manufacturing share on internal migration, which shows that municipalities with 
higher manufacturing share face low out-migration. A possible reason may be that workers in 
the manufacturing sector face rigidities to spatial migration. Perhaps in this instance, the lack 
of spatial migration by workers initially employed in manufacturing is mitigated by sectoral 
migration from manufacturing to services within these municipalities.  
 
As expected, in-migration appears to be spurred by pull factors, such as population density and 
infrastructure, but destination municipalities with higher manufacturing share experience less 
in-migration. Yet, destination municipalities with stronger kinship ties seem to face reduced 
in-migration. This is contrary to our expectations. Nevertheless, the coefficient of kinship is 






Table 5.6: Tariff liberalisation effects on internal migration 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent variables: Log demeaned bilateral migration 
VARIABLES Baseline OLS Extended OLS Extended IV  
        
ΔlnTariff_orig 0.148 -0.281 -11.314*** 
 (0.203) (0.200) (3.783) 
ΔlnTariff_des -0.028 -0.405** 9.997 
 (0.174) (0.173) (6.491) 
lnDistance -0.340*** -0.395*** -0.403*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
lnPop_density_orig 0.248*** 0.265*** 0.283*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
lnPop_density_des 0.279*** 0.271*** 0.252*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) 
lnEcoact_orig -0.105*** -0.056*** -0.100*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.023) 
lnEcoact_des -0.088*** -0.030* 0.017 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.033) 
lnInfrast_orig 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.072*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
lnInfrast_des 0.165*** 0.167*** 0.158*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) 
lnManuf_orig  -0.183*** -0.198*** 
  (0.021) (0.022) 
lnManuf_des  -0.075*** -0.071*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) 
lnPension_orig  0.005 0.012* 
  (0.006) (0.007) 
lnPension_des  0.018*** 0.008 
  (0.005) (0.008) 
lnKinship_orig  -0.030*** -0.033*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
lnKinship_des  -0.025*** -0.020*** 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
Constant 1.544*** 0.892***  
 (0.112) (0.129)  
    
Observations 43,333 43,333 43,333 
R-squared 0.427 0.452 0.169 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
IV No No Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: Variables with orig and des suffixes are variable at the origin municipality and destination municipality respectively. All control 
variables are in natural logarithm. Tariff variables are employment weighted tariff rates. ΔlnTariff, change in log tariffs comprises the 
difference in log tariffs in the initial period and log tariffs in the final period. lnPop_density denotes population density. lnEcoact represents 
economic activity, which is proxied by night-time lights. lnInfrast denotes infrastructure which is the principal component of the log 
infrastructure variable and includes the share of households with electricity, regular refuse collection, flush toilets, and piped water. 
Manufacturing share, pension, and kinship are at the initial period in 1996. lnManuf represents manufacturing share, which is the share of 
manufacturing in total employment (excluding employment in the primary sector). lnPension is the number of households with a pension 







5.6.2 Gendered Tariff Liberalisation Effects on Internal Migration 
 
The effects of tariff reduction are unlikely to be equal for men and women, given differences 
in rigidities between genders. Rigidities may include industry composition and segregation, 
family structure (in particular, marital status and fertility), and kinship or social networks. 
These factors are discussed in detail in Section 5.2.1. This part of the chapter evaluates the 
extent to which tariff-induced migration differs by gender and other demographic 
characteristics. The subsequent models are based on the IV strategy with year fixed effects48. 
 
The estimation results is displayed in Table 5.7. The full results are available in Table 5.3A in 
the appendix. The results in Table 5.7 suggest that tariff cuts have differential migration effects 
across gender. The estimates in columns (1) and (2) show that women tend to be more 
responsive to tariff reduction in the origin municipalities while the response of men is stronger 
at the destination municipalities. A 1% cut in tariffs increases out-migration of women by an 
average of 29% in the origin municipality and shows an average of 27% in-migration of men 
at the destination municipalities. These results suggest that men move to municipalities that 
experience relatively low tariff reductions, while women move out of municipalities that 
experience relatively large tariff cuts. 
 
This evidence contradicts findings on Brazil by both Aguayo-Téllez et al. (2010) and Kovak 
(2010), and in China by Facchini et al. (2019), who show that male migration is more 
responsive to tariff reductions. We show that women in South Africa appear to be more 
responsive to the reduction of tariffs because employment of women is more adversely affected 
by liberalisation, which affects female intensive manufacturing industries more than male 
dominated industries. We also show stronger in-migration effects of tariffs on men than 
women, although note that the gender gap coefficient is not significant. This may be because 
women are more able to shift into services, which is a female-intensive sector. This points to 
country specificity of tariff liberalisation effects.  
 
 
48 We explored various estimations for the analyses. First, we aggregate the data by in-migration and out-migration separately. 
However, the results show that tariff coefficients are insignificant for both in-migration and out-migration. Erten et al. (2019) 
also employed the census data for 1996 and 2001 to test their main findings and found the relationship between tariff reductions 
and in-migration to be insignificant. Second, we use the control function approach using the IV Poisson method and including 
the residuals from the first-stage into the second-stage in the IV estimation and the results remain inconclusive. The IV PPML 
method is not valid for models with fixed effects hence we explored the IV Poisson method. Given the inconclusive results, 




Columns (3) to (6) show gendered results by race, and the estimates show that Black and White 
women tend to be more responsive to tariff cuts at the origin municipalities than their male 
counterparts. It is also worth noting that the origin municipalities’ tariff coefficients are larger 
than in columns (2) and (3), suggesting that the aggregate gendered effects are understated. 
Conversely, in-migration is not affected by tariff reductions in the destination municipalities. 
Broadly, these results are also robust across gender and race. However, in general, the effects 
appear to be sturdier on women, in particular Black women. This suggests that the 
disproportionate adverse effect of tariff liberalisation on manufacturing employment of women 
(especially Black women), as shown in Chapter 3, may be a driver of the stronger migration 
effect on women. 
 
Table 5.7: The effects of tariff liberalisation on gendered internal migration 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Dependent variables: Log demeaned bilateral migration 
 Aggregate  Black  White 
VARIABLES Female Male  Female Male  Female Male 
                
ΔlnTariff_orig -28.640*** -4.600  -80.871*** -44.384***  -41.102** -33.528* 
 (7.629) (8.203) 
 (14.703) (13.726)  (17.219) (17.512) 
ΔlnTariff_des -3.644 26.978**  -1.273 9.796  -22.825 -29.951 
 (12.588) (13.673) 
 (15.342) (14.577)  (18.622) (18.360) 
lnDistance -0.794*** -0.678***  -1.671*** -1.521***  -0.618*** -0.601*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) 
 (0.058) (0.057)  (0.068) (0.067) 





Observations 43,333 43,333  13,641 13,641  13,641 13,641 
R-squared 0.051 0.030  0.004 0.079  0.140 0.142 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: Variables with orig and des suffixes are variable at the origin municipality and destination municipality respectively. All control 
variables are in natural logarithm. Tariff variables are employment weighted tariff rates. ΔlnTariff, change in log tariffs comprises the 
difference in log tariffs in the initial period and log tariffs in the final period. lnPop_density denotes population density. lnEcoact represents 
economic activity which is proxied by night-time lights. lnInfrast denotes infrastructure which is the principal component of the log 
infrastructure variable and includes the share of households with electricity, regular refuse collection, flush toilets, and piped water. 
Manufacturing share, pension, and kinship are at the initial period in 1996. lnManuf represents manufacturing share, which is the share of 
manufacturing in total employment (excluding employment in the primary sector). lnPension is the number of households with a pension 
recipient compared to household without a recipient. lnKinship is the share of mother tongue isiZulu speaking people. 
 
5.6.2.1 Gendered Tariff Liberalisation Effects and the Family Structure 
 
This section explores the heterogeneity of tariff-induced internal migration according to the 
family structure. First, we probe the effects of tariffs on gendered migration by marital status, 




The results suggest that tariff reductions increase out-migration of singles (men and women) 
and the effect is likely to be stronger on single women. Yet, tariff reductions seem to not 
encourage out-migration of married men. The likely effect of tariff reduction on out-migration 
of married women may be due to the tariff effect on the employment of women both in 
manufacturing an services sectors. Women, irrespective other marital status are likely to 
respond to the adverse effect of tariff reductions by seeking employment in other less exposed 
municipalities. Our results are dissimilar to those of Kovak (2010), who finds that spatial 
movement is more evident among unmarried individuals following tariff reductions. 
Nonetheless, we do find an indication that single women migrate more than married women. 
This suggests that married people face higher migration costs associated with a spouses desire 
to migrate, and their employment decisions. 
 
We also find that the reduction of tariffs is likely to increase in-migration of single women in 
destination municipalities but have no effect on single men or married individuals. A possible 
explanation is that the financial responsibility within the household borne by single women 
may be a strong pull factor for these individuals to other municipalities, irrespective of tariff 
exposure in those municipalities. In addition, these coefficients point out that there are 
potentially other channels that allow for in-migration when tariffs at the destination 
municipalities are reduced.   
 
In general, the results suggest that tariff liberalisation seems to have significantly stronger 
effect on out-migration than on in-migration. These results are also robust across marital status. 















Table 5.8: Tariff liberalisation effects on gendered internal migration by marital status  
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Dependent variables: Log demeaned bilateral migration 
VARIABLES Married Female Married Male  Single Female Single Male 
           
ΔlnTariff_orig -26.126*** -13.143  -70.641*** -49.997*** 
 (9.708) (9.929) 
 (10.084) (9.314) 
ΔlnTariff_des -14.278 -23.974  -38.878*** -17.954 
 (14.067) (14.795) 
 (14.335) (13.461) 
lnDistance -1.156*** -0.935***  -1.411*** -1.200*** 
 (0.047) (0.046) 
 (0.048) (0.045) 
   
 
  
Observations 22,187 22,187  22,187 22,187 
R-squared 0.079 0.082  -0.009 0.051 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: Variables with orig and des suffixes are variable at the origin municipality and destination municipality respectively. All control 
variables are in natural logarithm. Tariff variables are employment weighted tariff rates. ΔlnTariff, change in log tariffs comprises the 
difference in log tariffs in the initial period and log tariffs in the final period. lnPop_density denotes population density. lnEcoact represents 
economic activity which is proxied by night-time lights. lnInfrast denotes infrastructure which is the principal component of the log 
infrastructure variable and includes the share of households with electricity, regular refuse collection, flush toilets, and piped water. 
Manufacturing share, pension, and kinship are at the initial period in 1996. lnManuf represents manufacturing share, which is the share of 
manufacturing in total employment (excluding employment in the primary sector). lnPension is the number of households with a pension 
recipient compared to household without a recipient. lnKinship is the share of mother tongue isiZulu speaking people. 
 
Lastly, we examine the tariff effect on internal migration of women with and without children, 
with the estimates for this effect shown in Table 5.9 (the full results are provided in Table 5.5A 
in the appendix). Even though tariff reduction appears to escalates internal migration of women 
generally, there seems to be higher levels of out-migration among women without children. 
There also appears to be an increase in in-migration of women without children following tariff 
reduction in the destination municipality. This is consistent with the idea that children impose 
rigidities on migration for women, thus making them less responsive to shocks. This evidence 
is in line with the evidence from Brazil that shows more movement across regions of 










Table 5.9: Tariff liberalisation effects on internal migration of women with and without 
children 
  (1) (2) 
 Dependent variables: Log demeaned bilateral migration 
VARIABLES With children Without children 
      
ΔlnTariff_orig -39.597*** -70.004*** 
 (7.689) (10.203) 
ΔlnTariff_des -6.172 -52.300*** 
 (12.000) (15.074) 
lnDistance -1.059*** -1.165*** 
 (0.034) (0.045) 
   
Observations 27,458 27,458 
R-squared 0.054 -0.048 
Year FE Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: Variables with orig and des suffixes are variable at the origin municipality and destination municipality respectively. All control 
variables are in natural logarithm. Tariff variables are employment weighted tariff rates. ΔlnTariff, change in log tariffs comprises the 
difference in log tariffs in the initial period and log tariffs in the final period. lnPop_density denotes population density. lnEcoact represents 
economic activity which is proxied by night-time lights. lnInfrast denotes infrastructure which is the principal component of the log 
infrastructure variable and includes the share of households with electricity, regular refuse collection, flush toilets, and piped water. 
Manufacturing share, pension, and kinship are at the initial period in 1996. lnManuf represents manufacturing share, which is the share of 
manufacturing in total employment (excluding employment in the primary sector). lnPension is the number of households with a pension 
recipient compared to household without a recipient. lnKinship is the share of mother tongue isiZulu speaking people. 
 
5.6.3 Sensitivity Tests 
 
Since we restricted the migration data to core municipalities that have at least ten migrants, in 
this section, we test the sensitivity of the effect of tariff reductions on the aggregate migration 
and gendered migration IV results using alternative bilateral migration thresholds. The 
estimates confirm that the main results are robust and are not sensitive to changes in the 
thresholds.  
 
As depicted in Table 5.6A in the appendix, we make use of bilateral data for the core 
municipalities with a value of 5 or more migrants. We find that tariff reductions are likely to 
induce out-migration. Tariffs appear to have less effect on in-migration. The estimates of 
gendered tariff reduction effects are similar to the main results, in that tariff cuts are associated 






In the appendix, Table 5.7A displays the estimation results where the data is restricted to core 
municipalities with a bilateral migration value of 50 or more. The estimates show that our 
results are robust and not sensitive to changes in the migration threshold.  
 
5.7 Concluding Comments 
 
The chapter examines the gendered internal migration effects of tariff liberalisation in South 
Africa between 1996 and 2011. The gravity model and the 2SLS IV estimation strategy are 
employed in the descriptive analysis. The focus is on annual internal bilateral migration and 
the main variable of interest is the change in tariffs. 
 
The main findings suggest that trade openness has varying migration effects in the origin and 
destination municipalities. Tariff reductions in the origin municipality is likely induce out-
migration, while tariff reductions at the destination municipality may have no effect on 
migration. Our finding on tariff-induced internal migration is comparable with findings of 
studies in Brazil (Kovak, 2010), Mexico (Mendez, 2015) and Peru (Baldárrago & Salinas, 
2017). These studies show that tariff liberalisation encourages spatial movement. The tariff-
induced migration out of the origin municipality is underpinned by the destructive effect on 
employment. 
 
We also find that the tariff effect on migration is likely to differ by gender in different locations. 
Tariff shocks may raise the out-migration of women and in-migration of men. The out-
migration effects on women relative to men are robust, even across race. We show that tariffs 
are likely to have a larger effect on women, particularly Black women, driven by the adverse 
tariff effects on manufacturing employment. This suggests that tariff liberalisation influence 
women more through the direct effect of tariffs on employment. This finding on gendered 
migration is unique to South Africa. Findings from other developing countries point to men 
being more mobile and thus more responsive to tariff shocks, for example, studies in countries 
such as Brazil (Aguayo-Téllez et al., 2010; Kovak, 2010) and China (Facchini et al., 2019).  
 
The effect of tariff reductions on gendered migration may differ from other emerging countries 
for several reasons. First, the labour force participation of women has been growing 
consistently over the year. However, unlike other emerging countries, labour force 




African women may be more motivated to migrate for better job prospects. Second, South 
Africa is characterised by high levels of female-headed household (Casale & Posel, 2002). This 
may serve as a contributing factor to the spatial movement of women to counteract the negative 
tariff effects on employment by seeking job opportunities in less exposed regions because they 
are the breadwinners in the household. Third, the apartheid history of South Africa that limited 
the movement of women may also be at play with women now enjoying the liberty to move. 
South African woman may not necessarily require a strong motivation to move. 
 
A contributing factor to the increase in migration of Black women is the adverse employment 
effect of tariffs that is heavier on them. Women in South Africa appear to be reallocating 
towards less tariff exposed regions and it is likely that they are reallocating to services where 
more absorption is taking place. We find that tariff reductions may have no effect on in-
migration across race.  
 
The chapter also teases out the complexities of gendered migration by identifying the migration 
effect on married and single individuals. We discover from our descriptive analysis that there 
seem to be more movement in terms of out-migration of singles and married women in response 
to tariff reductions while there is no effect of tariffs on migration of married men. The effect 
appears to however be larger for single women than for single women. Singles are potentially 
more able to relocate to find alternative job opportunities. This finding that marriage reduces 
labour mobility, especially for women, is in line with findings in other studies. In addition, the 
chapter confirms that having children restricts the movement of women. We find that women 
without children are more likely to be responsive to tariff reductions than women with children. 
This finding is consistent with that of Kovak (2010) in Brazil, which shows that smaller 
families are more mobile than bigger families.  
 
Although the chapter presents descriptive analysis and thus not making causality inferences, 
the chapter does however provide the insight that the effect of tariff liberalisation on the 
migration of women is country specific. In addition, the chapter highlights that rigidities affect 
the responsiveness of men and women to tariff shocks. Finally, the chapter shows that it is 
possible that the ability of women to migrate has diminished the adverse tariff effects on 





The results from research conducted in South Africa demonstrates that industry-bias tariff 
liberalisation is associated with internal migration patterns that vary by gender, with women 
more likely to migrate in response to liberalisation. The results for South Africa differ from the 
experience of Brazil and China, where tariff liberalisation has had a stronger effect on 
migration of men. In South Africa, the results appear to be linked closely to the effect of tariff 
liberalisation on employment. Relatively large reductions in employment of women compared 
to men in response to liberalisation may have given rise to greater responsiveness of women to 
liberalisation than men in relation to migration. In addition, the results also point to the 
characteristics of South Africa wherein tariff liberalisation is not a significant contributor to 
internal migration. Other social and cultural factors may play a more dominant role in inducing 




























6.1 Summary of Key Findings 
 
Improving the rate at which new job opportunities are created is a central economic challenge 
facing South African policymakers. Over the past two decades, the economy has not generated 
enough jobs to employ all work-eligible individuals in the country. Extensive empirical 
research on the causes of poor employment creation in South Africa has pointed to the supply-
side and demand-side factors. 
 
The main focus of this thesis is on the demand side of the labour market, the relationship 
between international trade and labour. The effect of trade on production and employment is 
through two channels. The first is trade liberalisation from the early 1990s (multilateral trade 
liberalisation from 1994 and preferential trade liberalisation from 2000). The second is 
increased competition from China, subsequent to its membership of the World Trade 
Organization in 2001, which saw China quickly become one of South Africa’s main trading 
partners.   
 
The effects of tariff liberalisation on the labour market is a contested issue globally. This is 
because liberalisation creates winners and losers in an economy. The standard endowment-
based trade theory suggests that openness is beneficial to all countries in terms of production, 
employment, and wages. Yet, a Specific-Factors model provides a nuanced explanation by 
taking into consideration rigidities that play a vital role in the distributional effects of tariff 
liberalisation. International empirical evidence shows that factor rigidities influence the 
benefits of liberalisation. One of the most profound and under-researched differential 
distributional tariff effects is gendered effects. There is insufficient knowledge about the 
gendered effects of tariff liberalisation in a SSA context, which has resulted in imperfect 
conclusions about the gendered effects of tariff liberalisation in the research field of 
international trade. 
 
The unique apartheid history of South Africa makes the country an interesting case study. One 
of the legacies of apartheid is high and persistent unemployment, particularly for women. 




South Africa still lags behind other developed and emerging countries in reaching gender 
convergence.  
 
The primary objective of the thesis is to examine the gendered effects of liberalisation in the 
South African labour market, a middle-income country that has a unique labour market and 
history. The research identifies the relationship using region-specific variations in labour 
market outcomes and exposure to tariffs, focusing specifically on the gendered effects, as is 
now more common in the literature  (Autor et al., 2015; Gaddis & Pieters, 2017; Kis-Katos et 
al., 2018). Using population census and tariff data, the analysis covers the post-apartheid period 
(1996 – 2011) when the economy opened up to international trade through liberalisation of its 
import tariffs. The two datasets enable us to document the gendered effects of tariff 
liberalisation at a local labour market level. The thesis contributes to the existing body of 
literature by applying a local and gendered lens to examine the distributional effects of tariff 
liberalisation on labour market outcomes in South Africa.  
 
The thesis is comprised of four related chapters. Chapter 2 provides a descriptive analysis of 
the dynamics of regional employment growth. The chapter uses a decomposition approach to 
isolate the importance of region-specific factors driving employment growth. The chapter 
demonstrates substantial variation in regional employment growth across local labour markets 
between 1996 and 2011. The chapter also finds that industry-specific factor namely the industry 
composition of employment and the regional competitiveness is key determinants of variations 
in employment growth across regions. Lastly, regions with a high initial share of employment 
in nontradable sectors, experience relatively fast employment growth (or positive industry-mix 
effects). These outcomes are compatible with the anticipated effects arising from tariff 
liberalisation.  By altering the relative price of goods across industries (also manufacturing 
relative to services), tariff liberalisation alters the structure of production and employment. The 
remainder of the thesis tests for this association more rigorously.  
 
Chapter 3 estimates econometrically the association between changes in regional exposure to 
tariffs and labour market outcomes across regions in South Africa. To identify the causal 
relationship, it makes use of IV estimation techniques. The main findings of the chapter are 
that reduced tariffs over the period in review had no effect on manufacturing wages. Secondly, 
the reduction of tariffs lowered employment in the manufacturing sector, similar to findings in 




effects of tariff liberalisation are disproportionately on the employment of women and widen 
the gender employment gap. The analysis by gender and race indicates that tariff liberalisation 
had no effect on the gender employment gap of Whites (men and women), but had a particularly 
negative effect on Blacks, especially Black women. This is as a result of the apartheid history 
of South Africa because Blacks were discriminated against, in terms of participation in the 
labour market. In the chapter, we discover that the key driver of gendered effects of tariff 
liberalisation is industrial segregation. Societal norms provide different opportunities and 
adjustment costs for men and women. Men are able to find employment in a range of numerous 
industries, while women are confined to only a few. The norms, stereotypes, discrimination 
and patriarchy (Braunstein & Folbre, 2001; Elson & Pearson, 1981; Fontana & Wood, 2000) 
make it harder for women, particularly Black women, to enter male-dominated industries when 
female-dominated industries collapse due to tariff liberalisation. This new evidence presenting 
in chapter 3 contributes to existing knowledge by highlighting that tariff effects are country-
specific, relying predominately on the gender intensity across industries. Countries where tariff 
liberalisation is industry-biased against female-intensive industries will experience a dramatic 
decline in female employment after trade liberalisation, as is the case in South Africa. 
 
Chapter 4 extends the analysis of the effects of tariff liberalisation on employment by looking 
at how liberalisation affected employment in the services sector. Its primary aim is to establish 
whether tariff liberalisation induced structural shifts in employment towards services. The 
chapter shows that tariff reductions had no effect on services sector wages. This provides 
further evidence that services sector wages in South Africa are not responsive to tariff 
liberalisation because of the strong presence of wage bargaining councils that prohibit the 
lowering of wages. Consistent with expectations and existing literature, the data reveals 
stronger shifts in employment from manufacturing towards services, particularly for women, 
in regions exposed to relatively large reductions in tariffs, but these shifts are almost entirely 
due to reductions in employment of workers in manufacturing. In fact, regions exposed to tariff 
reductions experienced relatively large declines in employment in both manufacturing and 
services. The study did not find evidence of structural shifts for men. The adverse effect on 
services employment was through spillover effects, including lower demand for services 
inputs, lower incomes and subdued manufacturing infrastructure investments associated with 
the contracting manufacturing sector. The chapter also illustrates that tariff liberalisation had 
heterogeneous effects for men and women driven mainly by differential gender intensities and 




Trade theory states that benefits from trade are reliant on the extent of sectoral and or regional 
reallocation. Since the analyses discussed in Chapter 4 finds limited sectoral reallocation, in 
Chapter 5 we aim to determine if workers are instead reallocating spatially in response to 
increased international competition. The main objective for Chapter 5 was to provide a 
descriptive analysis on the effects of tariff liberalisation on internal migration using the gravity 
model and the 2SLS IV estimation approach. By altering relative employment opportunities 
across regions, liberalisation is expected to induce migration of workers in search of alternative 
employment options. The chapter finds that there is a positive relationship between the 
reduction of tariffs and out-migration in the origin municipality. The results also indicate that 
tariff reduction has a weak effect on in-migration. Secondly, the chapter teases out the gendered 
effects to assess whether internal migration in response to tariff liberalisation is the same for 
men and women workers. In contrast to the literature, the evidence in the chapter shows 
differential tariff effects on internal migration across gender, with women being more 
responsive to tariff reductions than men. Thirdly, the chapter shows more movement of women 
than their male counterparts. This is underpinned by the disproportionately negative effect of 
tariffs on manufacturing employment of women compared to men. The evidence from the 
chapter also shows stronger movement of singles in response to tariff reductions than married 
individuals, especially single women compared to married women. We also observe that tariff 
reductions have a stronger impact on the mobility of women without children compared to 
those with children. These findings corroborate the literature that highlights that internal 
migration diminishes the negative effects of tariffs on employment.  
 
In sum, the findings of this thesis reveal heterogeneous and gendered effects associated with 
tariff liberalisation in South Africa. The results presented in the thesis differ in several ways 
from other international empirical studies on emerging economies. This is because tariff 
liberalisation in these emerging economies favoured female-intensive industries, unlike in 
South Africa. The thesis points to the relevance of country-specific characteristics and 
institutions in mediating the impact of tariff liberalisation on labour market outcomes. Industry 
segregation and spatial rigidities emergence as key underlying factors to the gendered effects. 
 
In South Africa, the adverse effects of liberalisation are particularly pronounced on female 
workers. The thesis contributes to empirical research on the gendered effects of tariff 
liberalisation. The findings in the thesis reflect the industry bias of liberalisation, namely the 




gender-specific outcomes to attenuate the adjustment costs associated with liberalisation. 
Consistent with the results, these will necessarily need to be country-specific. 
 
The thesis also supports the view that industry-bias tariff liberalisation leads to gendered 
distributional effects and that these effects are country-specific. The thesis in this manner 
advances existing knowledge on the distributional effects of tariffs in middle-income countries 
and SSA countries with similar characteristics to South Africa. Where there are wage 
bargaining councils or rigid wages, tariff liberalisation will have an impact on employment. A 
lesson for policymakers in other countries is that where tariff reductions are disproportionately 
in female-intensive industries, those countries are likely to experience unfavourable 
employment effects on women. In addition, specificity to industries and regions plays a vital 
role in workers’ ability to migrate across industries and regions. This is because rigidities to 
industries intensify the adverse employment effects of trade liberalisation while lower spatial 
rigidities may reduce these negative effects. 
 
6.2 Policy Implications of the Findings 
 
The thesis set out to examine the gendered effects of tariff liberalisation on the labour market, 
focusing specifically on wages, employment, and internal migration in post-apartheid South 
Africa. Although the thesis has theoretical contributions, the results have policy relevance. 
 
Firstly, the results from the shift-share decomposition in Chapter 2 suggest that both national 
and regional factors contribute to regional employment growth. However, given the dynamics 
in South Africa, with most regions lagging behind national growth, the regional industrial 
structure and regional competitiveness are dominant. The results suggest that since national 
growth is an accumulation of regional growth, it is important for policymakers to be intentional 
about achieving balance growth because failure to do so will have a detrimental effect on the 
national labour market. The evidence also implies that policy decisions by both the national 
and local government affect regional industrial and economic development. Accordingly, it is 
recommended that policymakers take into consideration regional dynamics when formulating 
policies that are targeting at improving social infrastructure, physical infrastructure and 
institutions, particularly in marginalised regions. Improvements in infrastructure and 
institutions will attract industries to the peripheral regions, which is likely to bring about 




areas and will benefit urban areas by reducing the over-population and strained public services 
in these areas. 
 
Secondly, the key observation in Chapter 3 and 4 is that policies can have unintended gender-
differentiated impacts. Trade policies, macroeconomic policies, labour market policies, and 
education policies may all generate differentiated impacts on men and women. The thesis 
establishes that disproportionate tariff reduction in female-intensive industries intensifies the 
unfavourable employment effects of tariff liberalisation despite moderate absorption into 
services and regional internal migration, which have mitigated the adverse effects in 
manufacturing. The policy implication of these findings is that there are different employment 
opportunities and adjustment costs for men and women. Men may be able to find employment 
in a range of industries, while women may be confined to a few. These findings show that 
limited labour demand is not the only factor contributing to unemployment, but that labour 
supply of women due to sector segregation is another factor. This would indicate that there is 
a need for policymakers, in the face of sectoral shocks such as tariff liberalisation, to pay close 
attention to the employment intensities and industry segregation. A trade policy that does not 
take into consideration industry-bias which is often associated with gender-bias tariff 
liberalisation is likely to widen the gender wage and employment gap. The solution is not to 
increase tariffs but rather to develop industry-specific policies that seek to find a balance 
between trade openness and achieving gender equality.  
 
Industry segregation and limited movement across industries and regions of women are 
perpetuated and enforced by social norms, stereotypes, patriarchy and discrimination 
(Braunstein & Folbre, 2001; Elson & Pearson, 1981). These social norms play out in both the 
demand and supply side of the labour market. Gender-focused initiatives are necessary to help 
women overcome the constrains to industry and regional mobility. The main objective of such 
initiatives would be to improve the employability of women across various sectors. The 
absorption and retention of women into the labour market is imperative for the development of 
economies. This is especially relevant for South Africa because women constitute the largest 
share of the population. The initiatives can include improving on the implementation and 
enforceability of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Act 53 of 2003 
and the Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998 which already have a particular focus on women. 
For example, a public works programme can consider gender disparity when sourcing workers. 




can be a policy that all employers would be expected to abide by. Such laws will boost women’s 
confidence in knowing that there is a government body that they can approach if they 
experience discrimination in the workplace.  
 
The thesis also supports policy initiatives aimed at addressing the social norms that act as 
constraints for women. One of the initiatives could be aimed at empowering women. Women 
can be empowered first and foremost through the provision and better access to education and 
training to improve their skills levels. Other initiatives can include wage compensation for the 
unemployed, relocation assistance, child-care services and better job search resources to 
facilitate the movement of working and employable women across sectors and regions for 
better job opportunities. 
 
Finally, the findings in chapter 5 of tariff-induced internal migration over the period 1996 – 
2001 period offer an encouraging message about the adjustment to tariff liberalisation. The 
evidence shows that workers, particularly female workers, respond to the adverse effects of 
tariff liberalisation by migrating to regions with better job prospects. This has implications for 
the free movement of labour, particularly important for a country such as South Africa where 
there was a restricted movement of Blacks. The thesis has illustrated that the inability to move 
spatially has the potential to exacerbate the unfavourable and unintended consequences of tariff 
liberalisation.   
 
6.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research  
 
There are several limitations in the empirical methods and analysis of the results and that we 
would like to highlight. These open up areas for further research in various ways. While the 
industry shift-share decomposition analysis in Chapter 2, provides useful and new insights 
about regional employment growth dynamics, our knowledge of regional dynamics can be 
improved by exploring the spatial distribution of the industry shift-share components, namely 
the industry-mix and regional competitiveness components, using disaggregated industry data 
(data that is currently not available to inform this thesis). The objective should be to identify 
whether there is spatial dependence in industry composition and regional competitiveness. In 
addition, since the study is descriptive, future research can focus on investigating potential 
identification properties of the shift-share approach. Such an empirical analysis will provide a 




In Chapter 3 the thesis has highlighted the gendered employment effects of the liberalisation 
on tariffs, which are more adverse for women than men as a result of industry-biased tariff 
reductions and unequal gender intensities in industries. However, the thesis did not investigate 
the causes of gender industry segregation. The concentration of women in, and their immobility 
out of, female-intensive industries is a major concern because of huge job losses in these 
industries following tariff liberalisation. The findings in the thesis can be extended by exploring 
potential contributing factors to the segregation of men and women in the manufacturing 
industry. These factors include societal norms, such as stigmatisation, stereotypes, and 
patriarchal systems. We were not able to study these effects directly for this thesis due to the 
unavailability of data. 
 
Chapter 3 and 4 revealed substantial employment changes in the local labour market, 
particularly manufacturing employment. It also highlights shifts between manufacturing and 
services, albeit the structural shift is limited. The modest sectoral reallocation provides an 
opportunity for further research that explores the responses of those workers that are unable to 
find alternative employment. The research can investigate tariff effects on unemployment and 
labour force participation. This analysis requires more detailed data, preferably panel data, to 
properly identify the dynamics of adjustment. Thus, it is not feasible for the thesis given the 
data limitations. 
 
In these two chapters, we also examine the effects of tariff liberalisation on sectoral wages 
using income data. The thesis demonstrated that tariff liberalisation has no effect on sectoral 
wages. The use of income data influences the interpretation of the thesis results and assessment 
of the overall impact, including the channels through which tariffs affect employment. For 
example, the results in the thesis may be interpreted as suggesting that there were 
inconsistencies in the adoption of policies. It may be interpreted that tariff liberalisation and 
the imposing labour laws prevented firms and employees from adjusting to international 
competitive forces. Future research using actual wage data can build on the evidence in the 
thesis. 
 
A further limitation in Chapter 3 and 4 is that we use the Bartik (1991) approach to generate 
tariffs at the local labour market level. The constructed tariff measure is not a true reflection of 
the local labour market’s tariff exposure because we use employment shares as weights for 




relationship between tariff reductions and changes in employment at the local labour market 
level. A new strand of literature that investigates the identification properties of the approach 
is emerging. The literature includes Borusyak et al. (2018), Adāo et al. (2019) and Goldsmith-
Pinkham et al. (2020). These studies propose several tests that identify causality. This research 
provides an avenue for further research that explores the causal relationship between tariff 
reductions and local labour market employment changes. 
 
While Chapter 5 provides some insight to tariff-induced internal migration, there are a number 
of challenges with the data and these are discussed in the chapter. Extensions of the analysis 
include utilising individual-level data which will control for individual characteristics. 
Furthermore, the findings on tariff-induced internal migration presented in this thesis also 
suggest that further research is required to explicitly identify the combined effect of tariff 
reductions and internal migration on labour market outcomes. 
 
Finally, since the thesis shows striking results on gendered effects of tariff liberalisation at a 
local labour market level using the municipality as the unit of analysis, new research can delve 
deeper into local labour markets by using the main place. From this level of analysis, we can 



























Acemoglu, D. (2003). Patterns of skill premia. Review of Economic Studies, 70(2), 199–230.  
Acemoglu, D., Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., Hanson, G. H., & Price, B. (2016). Import competition 
and the great US employment sag of the 2000s. Journal of Labor Economics, 34(1), 141–
198.  
Adão, R., Kolesár, M., & Morales, E. (2019). Shift-share designs: Theory and inference. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 134(4), 1949–2010.  
Aguayo-Téllez, E., Airola, J., & Juhn, C. (2014). Did trade liberalization help women? The 
case of Mexico in the 1990s. In New analyses of worker well-being (pp. 1–35). Emerald 
Group Publishing Ltd. 
Aguayo-Téllez, E., Muendler, M. A., & Poole, J. P. (2010). Globalization and formal sector 
migration in Brazil. World Development, 38(6), 840–856.  
Ahsan, R. N. (2013). Input tariffs, speed of contract enforcement, and the productivity of firms 
in India. Journal of International Economics, 90(1), 181–192.  
Aliber, M. (2003). Chronic poverty in South Africa: Incidence, causes and policies. World 
Development, 31(3), 473–490.  
Alleyne, T., & Subramanian, A. (2001). What Does South Africa’s Pattern of Trade Say About 
Its Labour Market?. IMF (No. 148; 01). 
Amiti, M., &  Konings, J. (2007). Trade liberalization, intermediate inputs, and productivity: 
Evidence from Indonesia. The American Economic Review, 97(5), 1611–1638.  
Anderson, J. E. (2011). The Gravity Model. Annual Review of Economics, 3(1), 133–160.  
Anker, R., Melkas, H., & Korten, A. (2003). Gender-based Occupational Segregation in the 
1990s. International Labour Office. 
Arbache, J. S., Dickerson, A., & Green, F. (2004). Trade liberalisation and wages in developing 
countries. Economic Journal, 114(493). 
Ardington, C., Bärnighausen, T., Case, A., & Menendez, A. (2016). Social protection and labor 
market outcomes of youth in South Africa. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 69(2), 
455–470.  
Ardington, C., Case, A., & Hosegood, V. (2009). Labor supply responses to large social 
transfers: Longitudinal evidence from South Africa. American Economic Journal: 
Applied Economics, 1(1), 22–48. 
Ardington, C., Lam, D., Leibbrandt, M., & Welch, M. (2006). The sensitivity to key data 
imputations of recent estimates of income poverty and inequality in South Africa. 
Economic Modelling, 23(5), 822–835.  
Artuç, E., Chaudhuri, S., & McLaren, J. (2010). Trade shocks and labor adjustment: A 
structural empirical approach. American Economic Review, 100(3), 1008-1045.  
Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. H. (2018). When work disappears: Manufacturing 
decline and the falling marriage market value of young men. American Economic Review: 
Insights. 
Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. H. (2013). The geography of trade and technology shocks 
in the United States. American Economic Review, 103(3), 220–225.  
Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., & Hanson, G. H. (2015). Untangling trade and technology: Evidence 
from local labour markets. Economic Journal, 125(584), 621–646.  
Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., Hanson, G. H., & Song, J. (2014). Trade adjustment: Worker level 
evidence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(4), 1799-1860. 
Baldárrago, E., & Salinas, G. (2017). Trade liberalization in Peru: Adjustment costs amidst 
high labor mobility. International Monetary Fund. 
Baliamoune-Lutz, M. (2007). Globalisation and gender inequality: Is Africa different? Journal 




Bartik, T. (1991). Who benefits from state and local economic development policies?. Upjohn 
Institute, 1–16. 
Becker, G. S. (2010). Economics of discrimination. University of Chicago Press. 
Bell, T., & Cattaneo, N. (1997). Foreign trade and employment in South African manufacturing 
industry. International Labour Office. 
Bella, M., & Quintieri, B. (2000). The effect of trade on employment and wages in Italian 
industry. Labour, 14(2), 291–310. 
Benería, L. (2003). Gender, Development, and Globalization: Economics as if People 
Mattered. Routledge. 
Benguria, F., & Ederington, J. (2018). Decomposing the effect of trade on the gender wage 
gap. SSRN 2907094. 
Bergstrand, J. H. (1985). The gravity equation in international trade: Some microeconomic 
foundations and empirical evidence. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67(3), 474.  
Berik, G., van der Meulen Rodgers, Y., & Seguino, S. (2009). Feminist economics of 
inequality, development, and growth. Feminist Economics, 15(3), 1–33.  
Bhorat, H., & Leibbrandt, M. (1999). Modelling vulnerability and low earnings in the South 
African labour market. University of Cape Town. 
Bhorat, H., & McCord, A. (2003). Employment and labour market trends. Human Resources 
Development Review. 
Bhorat, H. (2005). Labour market challenges in the Post-Apartheid South Africa. South African 
Journal of Economics, 72(5), 940–977.  
Bhorat, H., & Hodge, J. (1999). Decomposing shifts in labour demand in South Africa. The 
South African Journal of Economics, 67(3), 155–168.  
Bhorat, H., Van der Westhuizen, C., & Goga, S. (2009). Analysing wage formation in the South 
African labour markets: The role of bargaining councils. Development Policy Research 
Unit Working Paper (No. 09/135).  
Bhorat, H. (2000). The impact of trade and structural changes on sectoral employment in South 
Africa. Development Southern Africa, 17(3), 437–466.  
Bhorat, H., & Cassim, R. (2004). The challenge of growth, employment and poverty in the 
South African economy since democracy: An exploratory review of selected issues. 
Development Southern Africa, 21(1), 7–31.  
Bhorat, H., Goga, S., & Stanwix, B. (2014). Skills-biased labour demand and the pursuit of 
inclusive growth in South Africa. WIDER Working Paper (No. 2014/130). 
Black, S. E., & Brainerd, E. (2004). Importing equality? The impact of globalization on gender 
discrimination. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 57(4), 540–559.  
Borusyak, K., Hull, P., & Jaravel, X. (2018). Quasi-experimental shift-share research designs. 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper (No. 24997). 
Bosker, E. M., & Krugell, W. F. (2006). Convergence or divergence of South African cities 
and towns? 
Bosker, M., & Krugell, W. F. (2008). Regional income evolution in south africa after apartheid. 
Journal of Regional Science, 48(3), 493–523.  
Bouare, O. (2001). Determinants of internal migration in South Africa. Southern Africa Journal 
of Demography, 8(1), 23–28. 
Braga, B. (2018). The effects of unilateral trade liberalization on marriage and fertility choices: 
Evidence from Brazil. SSRN 3161625. 
Brakman, S., Garretsen, H., & Van Marrewijk, C. (2001). An introduction to geographical 
economics: Trade, location and growth. Cambridge University Press. 
Braunstein, E., & Folbre, N. (2001). To honor and obey: Efficiency, inequality, and patriarchal 
property rights. Feminist Economics, 7(1), 25–44.  




gender employment inequality in Latin America, 1990–2010. Review of Keynesian 
Economics, 6(3), 307–332.  
Breau, S., & Saillant, R. (2016). Regional income disparities in Canada: Exploring the 
geographical dimensions of an old debate. Regional Studies, Regional Science, 3(1), 463–
481.  
Brox, J. A., & Carvalho, E. (2008). A demographically augmented shift-share employment 
analysis: An application to Canadian employment patterns. Journal of Regional Analysis 
and Policy, 38(1), 56–66. 
Burger, R., & Jafta, R. (2006). Returns to race: Labour market discrimination in post-apartheid 
South Africa. Department of Economics, University of Stellenbosch. 
Bussmann, M. (2009). The effect of trade openness on women’s welfare and work life. World 
Development, 37(6), 1027–1038. 
Camlin, C. S., Snow, R. C., & Hosegood, V. (2014). Gendered patterns of migration in rural 
South Africa. Population, Space and Place, 20(6), 528–551.  
Casale, D. (2004). What has the feminisation of the labour market ‘bought’women in South 
Africa? Trends in labour force participation, employment and earnings, 1995–
2001. Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 15(3-4), 251-275. 
Casale, D., & Posel, D. (2002). The Continued Feminisation of the Labour Force in South 
Africa. South African Journal of Economics, 70(1), 156–184.  
Cassim, R., Onyango, D., & Van Seventer, D. E. (2004). The state of trade policy in South 
Africa. In Exchange Organizational Behavior Teaching Journal. 
Catanzarite, L. (2003). Immigrant Latino Representation and Earnings Penalties in 
Occupations. Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, 16, 147–79. 
Cha, Y. (2013). Overwork and the persistence of gender segregation in occupations. Gender & 
Society, 27(2), 158–184.  
Chitiga, M., Cockburn, J., Decaluwe, B., Fofana, I., & Mabugu, R. (2010). Case study: a 
gender-focused macro-micro analysis of the poverty impacts of trade liberalization in 
South Africa. International Journal of Microsimulation, 3(1), 104–108. 
Choe, C., & Chrite, E. L. (2014). Internal migration of blacks in South Africa: An application 
of the roy model. South African Journal of Economics, 82(1), 81–98.  
Chort, I., De Vreyer, P., & Zuber, T. (2017). Gendered internal migration patterns in Senegal, 
Hal, (01497824). 
Clarke, R., & Eyal, K. (2014). Microeconomic determinants of spatial mobility in post-
apartheid South Africa: Longitudinal evidence from the National Income Dynamics 
Study. Development Southern Africa, 31(1), 168-194.  
Cochrane, W., & Poot, J. (2008). Forces of change: A dynamic shift-share and spatial analysis 
of employment change in New Zealand labour markets areas. Studies in Regional 
Science, 38(1), 51-78.  
Cochrane, W. (2011). A Spatial econometric analysis of selected local labour market outcomes 
in New Zealand (Doctoral dissertation, University of Waikato). 
Cockburn, J., Fofana, I., Decaluwe, B., Mabugu, R., & Chitiga, M. (2007). A gender-focused 
macro-micro analysis of the poverty impacts of trade liberalization in South Africa. 
In Equity (pp. 269-305). Emerald Group Publishing Limited.  
Crozet, M. (2004). Do migrants follow market potentials? An estimation of a new economic 
geography model. Journal of Economic Geography, 4(4), 439–458.  
Dasgupta, S., & Singh, A. (2005). Will services be the new engine of Indian economic growth? 
Development and Change, 36(6), 1035–1057.  
De Haas, H. (2010). Migration transitions: a theoretical and empirical inquiry into the 
developmental drivers of international migration. 





Dehejia, R.H., & Panagariya, A. (2014). Trade liberalization in manufacturing and accelerated 
growth in services in India. National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Dinkelman, T., & Ranchhod, V. (2012). Evidence on the impact of minimum wage laws in an 
informal sector: Domestic workers in South Africa. Journal of Development 
Economics, 99(1), 27-45. 
Dix-Carneiro, R., & Kovak, B. K. (2015). Trade liberalization and the skill premium: A local 
labor markets approach. American Economic Review, 105(5), 551–557.  
Dix-Carneiro, R., & Kovak, B. K. (2017). Trade liberalization and regional dynamics. 
American Economic Review, 107(10), 2908–2946.  
Dix-Carneiro, R., & Kovak, B.K. (2015). Trade reform and regional dynamics: Evidence from 
25 years of Brazilian matched employer-employee data. The World Bank.  
Do, Q. T., Levchenko, A. A., & Raddatz, C. (2016). Comparative advantage, international 
trade, and fertility. Journal of Development Economics, 119, 48–66.  
Dodson, B. (1998). Women on the move: Gender and cross-border migration to South Africa. 
In Southern Africa Migration Project. 
Duncan, O.D. & Duncan, B., (1955). A methodological analysis of segregation 
indexes. American sociological review, 20(2), 210-217.  
Dunn, E. S. (1960). A statistical and analytical technique for regional analysis. Papers in 
Regional Science, 6(1), 97–112. 
Dunne, P., & Edwards, L. (2006). Trade, technology and employment: A case study of South 
Africa. In Centre for the Study of African Economics, University of Oxford, Conference 
on “Reducing Poverty and Inequality: How can Africa be included.  
Ederington, J., Minier, J., & Troske, K. (2009). Where the girls are: Trade and labor market 
segregation in Colombia. IZA Discussion Papers (No. 4131). Institute for the Study of 
Labor (IZA).  
Edwards, L., Floweday, W., Rankin, N., Roberts, G., & Schӧer, V. (2014). Restructuring of 
the South African economy: 1994-2014. 
Edwards, L. (2001). Globalisation and the skills bias of occupational employment in South 
Africa. South African Journal of Economics, 69(1), 40–71.  
Edwards, L. (2005). Has South Africa liberalised its trade? South African Journal of 
Economics, 73(4), 754–775.  
Edwards, L., & Abdi, T. (2002). Trade, technology and wage inequality in South 
Africa. Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper (No. 02/60). 
Edwards, L., & Behar, A. (2005). Trade liberalisation and labour demand within South African 
manufacturing firms. Studies in Economics and Econometrics, 30(2), 127-146.  
Edwards, S. (1988). Terms of trade, tariffs, and labor market adjustment in developing 
countries. World Bank Economic Review, 2(2), 165–186.  
Eichengreen, B. B., & Gupta, P. (2013). The two waves of service-sector growth. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 65(1), 96–123.  
Elson, D., & Pearson, R. (1981). “Nimble Fingers Make Cheap Workers”: An Analysis of 
Women’s Employment in Third World Export Manufacturing. Feminist Review, 7(7), 87.  
Erten, B., Leight, J., & Tregenna, F. (2019). Trade liberalization and local labor market 
adjustment in South Africa. Journal of International Economics, 118, 448–467.  
Esteban-Marquillas, J. M. (1972). A reinterpretation of shift-share analysis. Regional and 
Urban economics, 2(3), 249-255.  
Facchini, G., Liu, M. Y., Mayda, A. M., & Zhou, M. (2019). China’s “Great Migration”: The 
impact of the reduction in trade policy uncertainty. Journal of International Economics, 
120, 126–144.  




of South Africa. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 74(6), 808-830. 
Feenstra, R. C. (2015). Advanced international trade: Theory and evidence. Princeton 
Univeristy Press. 
Feinstein, C. H. (2005). An economic history of South Africa: Conquest, discrimination, and 
development. Cambridge University Press. 
Fleury, A. (2016). Understanding women and migration: A literature review. Global 
Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development Working Paper (No. 8).  
Fontana, M. (2004). Modelling the effects of trade on women, at work and at home: 
Comparative perspectives. Economie Internationale, 99(3), 49–80. 
Fontana, M. (2009). The gender effects of trade liberalization in developing countries: a review 
of the literature. In M. Bussolo & RE De Hoyos (Ed.), Gender Aspects of the Trade and 
Poverty Nexus. A Macro-Micro Approach, 25–50. 
Fontana, M., & Wood, A. (2000). Modeling the effects of trade on women, at work and at 
home. World Development, 28(7), 1173–1190. 
Freeman, R.B., & Katz, L.F. (1991). Industrial wage and employment determination in an open 
economy. In Immigration, Trade, and the Labor market (pp. 235-259). University of 
Chicago Press.  
Fujita, M. K; Krugman, P. R., & Venables, A. J. (2001). The spatial economy: Cities, regions 
and international trade. MIT Press. 
Gaddis, I., & Pieters, J. (2017). The gendered labor market impacts of trade liberalization 
evidence from Brazil. Journal of Human Resources, 52(2), 457-490.  
Galor, O., & Weil, D. N. (1996). The gender gap, fertility, and growth. American Economic 
Review, 86(3), 374–387. 
Gamlen, A. (2014). The new migration-and-development pessimism. Progress in human 
geography, 38(4), 581-597. 
Garsous, G., 2012. How productive is infrastructure? A quantitative survey. ECARES 
Working Paper. Belgium: Universite libre de Bruxelles.  
Goldberg, P. K., & Pavcnik, N. (2007). Distributional effects of globalization in developing 
countries. Journal of economic Literature, 45(1), 39-82.  
Greenwood, M. J. (1975). Research on internal migration in the United States: A survey. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 13(2), 397–433. 
Greenwood, M.J. (1997). Internal migration in developed countries. Handbook of population 
and family economics, 1, 647-720.  
Gregory, I. N., Marti-Henneberg, J., & Tapiador, F. J. (2010). Modelling long-term pan-
European population change from 1870 to 2000 by using geographical information 
systems. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A: Statistics in Society, 173(1), 
31–50. 
Gubhaju, B., & De Jong, G. F. (2009). Individual versus household migration decision rules: 
Gender and marital status differences in intentions to migrate in South Africa. 
International Migration, 47(1), 31–61.  
Head, K., & Mayer, T. (2006). Regional wage and employment responses to market potential 
in the EU. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 36(5), 573–594.  
Heath, R., & Mushfiq Mobarak, A. (2015). Manufacturing growth and the lives of Bangladeshi 
women. Journal of Development Economics, 115, 1–15.  
Henderson, J. V., Storeyard, A. & Weil, D. N. (2012). Measuring economic growth from outer 
space. American Economic Review, 102(2), 994–1028. 
Hering, L., & Paillacar, R. (2015). Does access to foreign markets shape internal migration? 
Evidence from Brazil. The World Bank Economic Review, 30(1), 78-103.  
Heugh, K. (1999). Languages, development and reconstructing education in South Africa. 




Hoang, L. A. (2011). Gender identity and agency in migration decision-making: Evidence from 
Vietnam. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 37(9), 1441–1457.  
Holden, M., & Casale, D. (2002). Endogenous protection in a trade liberalizing economy: The 
case of South Africa. Contemporary Economic Policy, 20(4), 479-489.  
Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (2000). Feminism and migration. The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, 571(1), 107–120. 
Huang, J., Li, N., & Rozelle, S. (2003). Trade reform, household effects, and poverty in rural 
China. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 85(5), 1292-1298. 
International Labour Organization. (2018). World employment and social outlook – Trends for 
women 2018 – Global snapshot. International Labor Organization, 14.  
Jacobsen, J. P., & Levin, L. M. (2000). The effects of internal migration on the relative 
economic status of women and men. Journal of Socio-Economics, 29(3), 291–304.  
Jenkins, R, & Edwards, L. (2015). Is China ‘crowding out’ South African exports of 
manufactures? European Journal of Development Research, 27(5), 903–920.  
Jenkins, Rhys. (2008). Trade, technology and employment in South Africa. Journal of 
Development Studies, 44(1), 60–79.  
Jones, R. W. (1975). Income distribution and effective protection in a multicommodity trade 
model. Journal of Economic Theory, 11(1), 1–15.  
Jonsson, G. (2001). Inflation, Money Demand, and Purchasing Power Parity in South Africa. 
IMF Staff Papers, 48(2), 243–265.  
Juhn, C., Ujhelyi, G., & Villegas-Sanchez, C. (2014). Men, women, and machines: How trade 
impacts gender inequality. Journal of Development Economics, 106, 179–193.  
Kambourov, G. (2009). Labour market regulations and the sectoral reallocation of workers: 
The case of trade reforms. Review of Economic Studies, 76(4), 1321–1358.  
Kingdon, G., & Knight, J. (2007). Unemployment in South Africa, 1995–2003: Causes, 
problems and policies. Journal of African Economies, 16(5), 813-848. 
Kis-Katos, K., Pieters, J., & Sparrow, R. (2018). Globalization and social change: Gender-
specific effects of trade liberalization in Indonesia. IMF Economic Review, 66(4), 763–
793.  
Kleynhans, E., & Claassen, C. (2012). A shift-share analysis of job creation in the Platinum 
SDI during its first decade (1996-2006). Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences, 
5(2), 591–605.  
Kleynhans, E., & Sekhobela, M. J. (2011). Shift-share analysis of production in the 
manufacturing industry of South Africa’s Southern District Municipality. Journal of 
Economic and Financial Sciences, 4(1), 9–30. 
Kovak, B. K. (2010). Regional labor market effects of trade policy: Evidence from Brazilian 
liberalization. In Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan 
Working Paper (No. 605).  
Kovak, B. K. (2011). Local Labor Market Effects of Trade Policy: Evidence from Brazilian 
Liberalization. Population Studies, 1–63. 
Kovak, B. K. (2013). Regional effects of trade reform: What is the correct measure of 
liberalization? American Economic Review, 103(5), 1960–1976.  
Krugell, W. F. (2014). The spatial persistence of population and wealth during Apartheid: 
Comparing the 1911 and 2011 Censuses. Economic History of Developing Regions, 29(2), 
336–352.  
Krugman, P. R. (1991). Geography and trade. MIT Press. 
Leamer, E. E. (1995). The Heckscher-Ohlin Model in theory and practice. In Princeton Studies 




Leibbrandt, M., Woolard, I., McEwen, H., & Koep, C. (2010). Employment and inequality 
outcomes in South Africa. University of Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour and 
Development Research Unit. 
Leibbrandt, M., Woolard, I., Finn, A., & Argent, J. (2010). Trends in South African income 
distribution and poverty since the fall of Apartheid. OECD Social, Employment and 
Migration Working Papers (No. 101). 
Mabugu, R., & Chitiga, M. (2009). Liberalising trade in south africa: A survey of computable 
general equilibrium studies. South African Journal of Economics, 77(3), 445–464.  
Magruder, J. R. (2012). High unemployment yet few small firms: The role of centralized 
bargaining in South Africa. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(3), 138–
166.  
Martin, D., Dorling, D., & Mitchell, R. (2002). Linking censuses through time: Problems and 
solutions. Area, 34(1), 82–91.  
Martincus, C. V., & Blyde, J. (2013). Shaky roads and trembling exports: Assessing the trade 
effects of domestic infrastructure using a natural experiment. Journal of International 
Economics, 90(1), 148-161. 
Massey, D. S., Fischer, M. J., & Capoferro, C. (2006). International migration and gender in 
Latin America: A comparative analysis. International Migration, 44(5), 63–91.  
Matlaba, V. J., Holmes, M., McCann, P., & Poot, J. (2014). Classic and spatial shift-share 
analysis of state-level employment change in Brazil. In Advances in Spatial Science, 78, 
139–172, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
Matthei, L. M. (1996). Gender and international labor migration: A networks approach. Social 
Justice, 23(3), 38. 
Melitz, M. J. (2003). The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry 
productivity. Econometrica, 71(6), 1695–1725.  
Mendez, O. (2015). The effect of Chinese import competition on Mexican local labor markets. 
North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 34, 364–380.  
Menezes-Filho, N. A., & Muendler, M. A. (2011). Labor reallocation in response to trade 
reform. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series (No. 17372). 
Mian, A., & Sufi, A. (2014). What explains the 2007-2009 drop in employment? Econometrica, 
82(6), 2197–2223.  
Mincer, J. (1978). Family Migration Decisions. Journal of Political Economy, 86(5), 749–773.  
Mitchell, W., & Carlson, E. (2003). Why do disparties in employment growht across 
metropolitcan and regional space occur? Centre of Full Employment and Equity. Working 
Paper (No. 03-09), 121-151. 
Mitchell, W., & Carlson, E. (2005). Exploring employment growth disparities across 
metropolitan and regional Australia. The Australasian Journal of Regional Studies, 11(1), 
25-40.  
Mudiriza, Gibson, & Edwards, L. (2020). The persistence of apartheid regional wage 
disparities in South Africa. (ERSA Working Paper No. 816).  
Murray, J., & Van Walbeek, C. (2007). Impact of the sectoral determination for farm workers 
on the South African sugar industry: Case study of the KwaZulu-Natal North and South 
Coasts. Agrekon, 46(1), 94–112.  
Nattrass, N., & Seekings, J. (2012). Differentiation within the South African clothing industry: 
Implications for wage setting and employment. Centre for Social Science Research: 
University of Cape Town. 
Naudé, W. (2010). Suburbanization and residential desegregation in South Africa's cities. 
World Institute for Development Economics Research. Working paper (No. 2010, 24).  
Naudé, W. A., & Krugell, W. F. (2004). An inquiry into cities and their role in subnational 




Ngai, L. R., & Petrongolo, B. (2012). Structural transformation, marketization and female 
employment. Mimeo London School of Economics.  
Nguyen, D. X. (2016). Trade liberalization and export sophistication in Vietnam. Journal of 
International Trade and Economic Development, 25(8), 1071–1089.  
Olivetti, C., & Petrongolo, B. (2014). Gender gaps across countries and skills: Demand, supply 
and the industry structure. Review of Economic Dynamics, 17(4), 842–859.  
Patterson, M. (1991). A note on the formulation of a full-analogue regression model of the 
shift-share method. Journal of Regional Science, 31(2), 211–216. 
Pavcnik, N. (2017). The impact of trade on inequality in developing countries. National Bureau 
of Economic Research (No. 23878). 
Pierce, J. R., & Schott, P. K. (2016). The surprisingly swift decline of US manufacturing 
employment. American Economic Review, 106(7), 1632–1662.  
Posel, D. (2004). Have migration patterns in Post-Apartheid South Africa changed? Journal of 
Interdisciplinary Economics, 15(3–4), 277–292.  
Posel, D., & Casale, D. (2005). What has been happening to internal labour migration in South 
Africa, 1993-1999? South African Journal of Economics, 71(3), 455–479.  
Prescott, J., & Bogg, J. (2011). Career attitudes of men and women working in the computer 
games industry. Eludamos: Journal for Computer Game Culture, 5(1), 7–28. 
Ramos, R. (2016). Gravity models: A tool for migration analysis. IZA World of Labor, 239, 1–
10. 
Rangasamy, L., & Harmse, C. (2005). The Extent of Trade Liberalisation in the 1990s: 
Revisited. South African Journal of Economics, 71(4), 705–728.  
Ray, M. A., & Harvey, J. T. (1995). Employment changes in the European Economic 
Community: a shift-share analysis. Review of Regional Studies, 25(1), 97–110. 
Redding, S., & Venables, A. J. (2004). Economic geography and international inequality. 
Journal of International Economics, 62(1), 53–82.  
Reibel, M., & Agrawal, A. (2007). Areal interpolation of population counts using pre-classified 
land cover data. Population Research and Policy Review, 26(5–6), 619–633.  
Republic of South Africa. (1996). Growth, employment and redistribution. Pretoria. 
Reskin, B., & Cassirer, N. (1996). Occupational segregation by gender, race and ethnicity. 
Sociological Focus, 29(3), 231–243.  
Robertson, R. (2000). Trade liberalisation and wage inequality: Lessons from the Mexican 
experience. World Economy, 23(6), 827–849.  
Rodrik, D. (2008). Understanding South Africa’s economic puzzles. Economics of Transition, 
16(4), 769–797.  
Sauré, P., & Zoabi, H. (2014). International trade, the gender wage gap and female labor force 
participation. Journal of Development Economics, 111, 17–33.  
Shendy, R. (2009). Do unions matter? Trade reform and manufacturing wages in South Africa. 
Journal of African Economies, 19(2), 163–204.  
Silva, J. S. & Tenreyro, S. (2006). The log of gravity. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
88(4), 641–658. 
Smith-Lovin, L. & McPherson, J. M. (1993). You are who you know: A network approach to 
gender. In Theory on gender/feminism on theory, 223–251. 
Smith, R. A., & Elliott, J. R. (2005). Family structure and organizational power: A 
Multiracial/Ethnic Analysis of Women and Men. Du Bois Review, 2(1), 69–90.  
Statistics South Africa. (2012). Census 2011 - Census in brief. In World Wide Web.  
Tejani, S., & Milberg, W. (2016). Global Defeminization? Industrial Upgrading and 
Manufacturing Employment in Developing Countries. Feminist Economics, 22(2), 24–54.  
Thoenig, M., & Verdier, T. (2003). A theory of defensive skill-biased innovation and 




Thomas, D. (1996). Education across generations in South Africa. American Economic Review, 
86(2), 330–334. 
Thurlow, J. (2006). Has trade liberalization in South Africa affected men and women 
differently? (No. 580-2016-39331).  
Topalova, P. (2010). Factor immobility and regional effects of trade liberalization: Evidence 
from India. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2, 1–41.  
Tregenna, F. (2008). The contributions of manufacturing and services to employment creation 
and growth in South Africa. South African Journal of Economics, 76, 175–204.  
UN. (2012). The Gravity Model of international trade: A User Guide. 
Van der Berg, S., Burger, R. & Louw, M. (2007). Post-Apartheid South Africa: Poverty and 
distribution trends in an era of globalization. WIDER Research Paper (No. 2007/57). 
Venables, A. J. (1999). The international division of industries: Clustering and comparative 
advantage in a multi-industry model. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 101(4), 495–
513.  
Von Fintel, D. (2007). Dealing with earnings bracket responses in household surveys - How 
sharp are midpoint imputations? South African Journal of Economics, 75(2), 293–312.  
Von Fintel, D. (2014). Spatial heterogeneity, generational change and childhood 
socioeconomic status: Microeconometric solutions to South African labour market 
questions. Doctoral Dissertation: Stellenbosch University.  
Von Fintel, D., & Moses, E. (2017). Migration and gender in South Africa: Following bright 
lights and the fortunes of others? Regional Science Policy and Practice, 9(4), 251–268.  
Von Fintel, D. (2018). Long-run spatial inequality in South Africa: Early settlement patterns 
and separate development. Journal for Studies in Economics and Econometrics, 42(2), 
81–102. 
Wacziarg, R., & Wallack, J. S. (2004). Trade liberalization and intersectoral labor 
movements. Journal of international Economics, 64(2), 411-439. 
Wamboye, E. F., & Seguino, S. (2015). Gender Effects of Trade Openness in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Feminist Economics, 21(3), 82–113.  
Weinberg, B. A. (2000). Computer use and the demand for female workers. Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review, 53(2), 290–308.  
Weir-Smith, G. (2017). Spatiotemporal variation of South African jobless trends: Policy 
directions. The Professional Geographer, 70(1), 94-102. 
Weir-smith, G., & Ahmed, F. (2013). Unemployment in South Africa : Building a spatio-
temporal Understanding. South African Journal of Geomatics, 2(3), 218–230. 
Winters, L. A., & Martuscelli, A. (2014). Trade liberalization and poverty: What have we 
learned in a decade? Annual Review of Resource Economics, 6(1), 493–512.  
Wittenberg, M. (2017). Wages and Wage Inequality in South Africa 1994–2011: Part 2 – 
Inequality Measurement and Trends. South African Journal of Economics, 85(2), 298–
318.  
















Table 1.1A: Chronology of tariff liberalisation in South Africa from the early 1990s 
 
1990 General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS) introduced. Provided a tax-free 
financial export subsidy to exporters based on the value of exports, degree of 
processing, and local content of the exported product. 
1990-1991 Reduction of import surcharges to 40%, 5%, 15% and 5% for Luxury, 
Capital, Motor vehicles and Intermediate goods, respectively. 
1994  Import surcharges abolished for Capital and Intermediate goods. 
1995 Remaining import surcharges abolished. 
1994 South African government’s GATT offer during the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations within the framework of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The offer:  
(1) Bound about 98% of all tariff lines at the Harmonised System (HS) eight-
digit level as against 18% before the round.  
(2) Reduced the number of tariff rates to six: 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% and 
30%.  
(3) Rationalised over 12000 tariff lines.  
(4) Tariffied quantitative restrictions (QRs) on agricultural products.  
(5) Provided for special provisions (extensions of the adjustment period and 
raised maximum tariff rates) for textile, clothing and motor vehicle 
industries.  
(6) Agreed to phase out GEIS. Adoption of anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties legislation. 
1995 Payments under GEIS became taxable, and the range of eligible products 
reduced. 
1994-1997 Deregulation of agricultural marketing and control boards established under 
the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1968. Import control on agricultural 
products removed. 
1996 New Tariff Rationalisation Process (TRP) formulated. These were:  
(1) Tariff lines and peaks to be reduced,  
(2) Formula and specific duties to be converted into ad valorem rates,  
(3) Imports that have no “suitable substitutes” to be duty-free, ad valorem 
rates of 30% on final products, 20% on intermediate goods and 10% on 
primary goods are generally not to be exceeded.  
(4) GEIS limited to manufacturing goods. 
1996 Signing of the SADC Free Trade Protocol (implemented in September 2000) 
1997 Termination of export subsidies provided under GEIS. 
2000 Implementation of SA-EU Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement 
(TDCA) 
2000 Preferential access to the US for some products under the African Growth 




2002 2002 Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) Agreement introduces a new 
institutional structure, which included: 
(1) A dispute settlement mechanism;  
The requirement to have common policies on industrial development, 
agriculture, competition, and unfair trade practices;  
A new system regarding the common revenue pool and sharing formula 
(WTO, 2003: viii) 
2004 Preferential Trade Agreement signed between SACU and MERCOSUR 








Appendix for Chapter 2 
 
Appendix 2.1: Constructing a census dataset for a comparable level of analysis 
 
Municipal demarcations in South Africa changed from 253 municipalities in 2001 to 234 in 
2011. There are nine provinces, 52 district municipalities (or district councils), eight 
metropolitan municipalities, 234 local municipalities in South Africa. The country is also 
divided into 354 magisterial districts, which are areas of jurisdiction of district courts, some of 
which are now aligned to municipalities. From the 2011 Census, the latter are no longer a 
geographical unit of the census. Figure 2.1A highlights the changes in geographical units across 
the three censuses.  
 




















As mentioned before, we construct a consistent level of analysis by using ArcGIS geographic 
software. Based on the assumption that data is evenly distributed across the source areas (Weir-
Smith, 2017), areal-weighted interpolation techniques superimpose and intersect two 
incomparable geographical boundaries (polygons) to create a set of intersection polygons 
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From the resulting mapping, the area of each target polygon is weighted by the area of the 
source polygon of interest to create an areal-weighted ratio, which is then applied to all 
variables of interest in the source polygon to get the variable values in the target polygon. The 
literature on the applicability of the areal-weighted interpolation technique includes works by 
Gregory et al. (2010) and Martin et al. (2002). For South Africa, the technique has been applied 
by Weir-Smith (2017), who used it to aggregate 1991 and 1996 magisterial district data to 2005 
municipal boundaries. 
 
The thesis utilises the ArcGIS software overlay tools that combine two source polygons to 
produce a new target polygon, using either the union or the intersect overlay tools. While the 
union tool completely retains all parts of the source polygon in the target polygon, mapped and 
not mapped, the intersect tool allows for only the overlapping and common portions of the two 
source polygons to be retained in the target polygon. The thesis employs the union overlay tool. 
The next challenge is deciding on the target geographic unit.  
 
This decision relies on the thesis definition of local labour market. However, there is no official 
definition of local labour market in the literature. According to Von Fintel (2014), the definition 
is often dictated by demarcations in the data employed. We have to consider the most 
appropriate sub-provincial geographic unit for this thesis to be able to provide adequate 
variation across local labour markets.  
 
A study of the spatial distribution of unemployment in South Africa by Weir-Smith and Ahmed 
(2013) uses census data and defines local labour markets according to municipal demarcations. 
The thesis follows the study and defines local labour markets as local municipalities. These 
municipalities thus become the target unit in the union overlay and thus the unit of analysis. 
The advantage of using municipalities include (a) the census data contains with 253 and 234 
municipalities in the 2001 and 2011 census respectively, (b) municipalities are large enough to 
reduce the chance of having few industries but also small enough to provide us with the spatial 
variation of employment, (c) aggregating lower geographical levels using the full census to a 
municipal level will result in fewer measurement errors than disaggregating municipalities in 
the 2011 census to lower levels. The disadvantages of defining local labour markets according 
to municipal boundaries is that some variation of labour market outcomes may be lost, as some 




demarcations between 2001 and 2011. Nonetheless, this level of analysis appears to provide 
adequate examples of regional heterogeneity. 
 
The lowest unit of analysis in the 10% sample of the 1996 and 2001 censuses is magisterial 
district. Accordingly, using the ArcGIS union overlay tool and the 10% weighted sample, the 
2011 municipality polygon is intersected with the 1996/2001 magisterial district polygon to 
derive a simple areal-weighted ratio, since magisterial districts defined in the 1996 and 2001 
censuses have the exact demarcations. The ratio gives the proportion of a given 1996/2001 
magisterial district area content in the new target polygon, which consists of the union area 
between the magisterial district and municipality polygons. The ratio is given as follows:   
 
Union_ratio = unionarea_mnmd/md_area     (2.1A) 
 
where unionarea_mnmd is the union area is for 1996/2001 magisterial district polygon and 
2011 municipality polygon, while md_area is the area of a given 1996/2001 magisterial area. 
Thus, union_ratio gives the proportion of a given 1996/200 magisterial area contained in the 
union area.  Given this ratio, we can proportionally assign the 1996/2001 magisterial district-
based variables to their corresponding union area values. Finally, we sum up and aggregate the 
union area values by the municipality to get the 1996/2001 variables at the municipality level. 
The same process is applied to the Full census dataset using place-names in 1996 and sub-
places in 2001.  
 
A glimpse of the results of the areal-weighting interpolation process of the full census is 
presented in Table 2.1A. Here we map (or interpolate) the 1996 place-names to the 2011 
municipalities using the employment variable. The first challenge with this is the discrepancy 
between the number of place-names in the shapefiles and those in the full census. The full 
census has 12 851 places while the shapefile has 12 404. In addition, we cannot map 6 of the 
12 404 place-names in the shapefile to the municipalities. These six unmapped places do not 
have employment data and are therefore dropped. Our final sample has 12 398 place-names, 
giving us 96% precision (12 398/12 851). The 453 missing place-names in the shapefile have 





5 038 place-names fall entirely into municipalities, the union ratio of 1. These comprise 30% 
of total place-names. The second union ratio category is that of place-names with a union ratio 
of between 0.9 and 0.9999. There are 6 816 place-names in this category, constituting 40% of 
place-names, with a cumulative percentage of 70%. This shows that two-thirds of the place-
names are mapped completely to municipalities. However, imputed employment in these 
places is quite error-prone (error is the difference between actual employment and imputed 
employment) for 5 120. We lose data on 7 953 places due to the mapping process. Although 
the employment error is highest for the first two union ratio categories, the last union ratio 
category (union ratio between 0 and 10%) has the highest share of imputed employment (47% 
compared to 43% for the first two categories).  
 
Table 2.1A: Interpolation of 1996 place-names to 2011 municipalities 










Employment (%) Error 
1 5 038 30 30 31 874 3 422 552 3 422 552 18 0 
0.9 to 0.9999 6 816 40 70 522 048 4 626 694 4 621 574 25 -5 120 
0.8 to 0.9 159 1 71 183 584 234 230 234 194 1 -36 
0.7 to 0.8 126 1 72 57 980 163 536 163 514 1 -22 
0.6 to 0.7 106 1 72 50 438 166 101 165 827 1 -274 
0.5 to 0.6 120 1 73 51 058 176 935 176 515 1 -420 
0.4 to 0.5 118 1 74 42 485 169 377 169 358 1 -19 
0.3 to 0.4 126 1 74 94 225 224 977 224 942 1 -35 
0.2 to 0.3 155 1 75 66 142 316 950 316 901 2 -49 
0.1 to 0.2 234 1 77 79 613 483 444 483 367 3 -77 
0 to 0.1 3 980 23 100 39 194 8 768 855 8 766 954 47 -1 901 
Total 16 978 100 
 
1 218 641 18 753 651    18 745 698 100       -7 953 
Notes: Obs is observations. Perc. reflects percentage. Cum (%) is cumulative percentage. Imputed Emp. and Imputed Emp. (%) represent 
imputed employment and share of imputed employment, respectively. There are 12 398 place-names in 1996, and 234 municipalities in 2011 
generating 16 978 union zones.  
Source: Full census data 
 
Table 2.2A shows the error statistics for employment and land area. The actual area is the total 
land area in South Africa, as provided by Statistics South Africa in 2011. Place-names are not 
mapped completely to municipalities, and as a result, we lose 2 172 square kilometres in land 
area. This difference in land area explains the difference between actual employment and 
imputed employment. The table also shows that the mean absolute error (absolute error divided 
by the number of union zones) is 46.8% and 12.8% respectively. The employment data lost for 






Table 2.2A: Error analysis of the interpolation process of the 1996 place-names 
 
Actual Imputed Absolute Error Mean absolute error Mean absolute % error 
Employment 18 753 651 18 745 698 7 953 0.468 0.04% 
Total area (sq km) 1 220 813 1 218 641 2 172 0.128 0.18% 
Notes: There are 12 398 place-names in 1996, 234 municipalities in 2011, which form 16 978 union zones.  
Source: Full census data 
 
For 2001, the smallest unit of analysis is sub-place and sub-places are mapped to the 2011 
municipalities. The results are presented in Table 2.3A and Table 2.4A. Sub-places with a 
union ratio of 1 are 8 779 (34% of total sub-places), and those that have a union ratio of between 
0.9 and 0.9999 are 12 309 (48%). Sub-places in these two union ratio categories have a 
cumulative percentage of 81.4% and an error of 587. The total difference between actual and 
imputed employment is 1 670. Mean absolute percentage error (total error divided by actual 
employment) is 0.01%. The total land area lost is 1 318 square kilometres.   
 
Table 2.3A: Interpolation of the 2001 sub-places to 2011 municipalities 










Employment (%) Error 
1 8 779 33.89 33.89 44 442 3 868 387 3 868 387 26.87 0 
0.9 to 0.99999 12 309 47.52 81.41 1 042 019 5 648 923 5 648 336 39.24 -587 
0.8 to 0.9 76 0.29 81.7 12 926 20 590 20 154 0.14 -436 
0.7 to 0.8 25 0.1 81.8 24 541 9 811 9 810 0.07 -1 
0.6 to 0.7 26 0.1 81.9 34 007 11 973 11 945 0.08 -28 
0.5 to 0.6 25 0.1 81.99 6 273 3 937 3 705 0.03 -232 
0.4 to 0.5 26 0.1 82.09 9 524 3 614 3 614 0.03 0 
0.3 to 0.4 26 0.1 82.19 14 446 10 848 10 843 0.08 -5 
0.2 to 0.3 26 0.1 82.29 12 406 10 063 10 061 0.07 -2 
0.1 to 0.2 74 0.29 82.58 15 607 22 297 22 293 0.15 -4 
0 to 0.1 4 513 17.42 100 3 303 4 787 317 4 786 942 33.25 -375 
Total 25 905 100 
 
1 219 495 14 397 760 14 396 090 100 -1670 
Notes: Obs is observations. Perc. reflects percentage. Cum (%) is cumulative percentage. Imputed Emp. and Imputed Emp. (%) represent 
imputed employment and share of imputed employment, respectively. There are 21 243 sub-places in 2001 mapped to 234 municipalities in 
2011, generating 25 905 union zones.  
Source: Full census data 
 
Table 2.4A: Error analysis of the interpolation process of the 2001 sub-places 
 
Actual Imputed Absolute Error Mean absolute error Mean absolute % error 
Employment 14 397 760 14 396 090 1 670 0.06 0.01% 
Total area (sq kms) 1 220 813 1 219 495 1 318 0.05 0.11% 
Notes: There are 21 243 sub-places in 2001 mapped to 234 municipalities in 2011, generating 25 905 union zones.  
Source: Full census data 
 
Second, we map the 1996 magisterial districts to municipalities. The results are presented in 




districts is that only 2 magisterial districts have a union ratio of 1 and 191 have a union of 
between 0.9 and 0.9999 with a cumulative percentage of about 12%. The error incurred when 
we use magisterial districts is higher compared to when we use sub-place. This suggests that 
the smaller the source area, the more precise the imputation. Nevertheless, the advantage of 
using magisterial districts is that there are no discrepancies between the shapefile and the places 
listed in the Full census database. Furthermore, a smaller land area is lost with magisterial 
districts compared to place-names. The difference is actual and imputed is 1 732 square 
kilometres. The error as a percentage of actual employment is 0.08% (32 126/38 354 585).  
 
Table 2.5A: Interpolation of 1996 magisterial districts to 2011 municipalities 










employment (%) Error 
1 2 0.12 0.12 308 170 532 170 532 0.44 0 
0.9 to 0.99999 191 11.43 11.55 462 350 5 276 953 5 261 850 13.73 -15 103 
0.8 to 0.9 44 2.63 14.18 182 043 1 003 559 1 003 389 2.62 -170 
0.7 to 0.8 40 2.39 16.58 100 546 917 686 917 338 2.39 -348 
0.6 to 0.7 33 1.97 18.55 55 494 678 943 678 702 1.77 -241 
0.5 to 0.6 25 1.50 20.05 51 754 515 164 514 774 1.34 -390 
0.4 to 0.5 27 1.62 21.66 77 955 658 087 657 628 1.72 -459 
0.3 to 0.4 34 2.03 23.70 75 939 677 405 677 057 1.77 -348 
0.2 to 0.3 53 3.17 26.87 65 945 1 091 515 1 090 463 2.85 -1 052 
0.1 to 0.2 101 6.04 32.91 100 415 2 771 864 2 771 259 7.23 -605 
0 to 0.1 1 121 67.09 100.00 46 333 24 592 877 24 579 467 64.14 -13 410 
Total 1 671 100 
 
1 219 081 38 354 585 38 322 459 100 -32 126 
Notes: Obs is observations. Perc. reflects percentage. Cum (%) is cumulative percentage. Imputed Emp. and Imputed Emp. (%) represent 
imputed employment and share of imputed employment, respectively. There are 354 magisterial districts in 1996, 234 municipalities in 2011, 
generating 1 671 union zones.  
Source: Full census data 
 
Table 2.6A: Error analysis of the interpolation process of the 1996 magisterial districts 
 
Actual Imputed Absolute Error Mean absolute error Mean absolute % error 
Employment 38 354 585 38 322 459 32 126 19.23 0.08% 
Total area (sq km) 1 220 813 1 219 081 1 732 1.04 0.14% 
Notes: There are 354 magisterial districts in 1996, 234 municipalities in 2011, generating 1 671 union zones.  
Source: Full census data 
 
While the interpolation process is not without error, it is the best solution available to the 
problem of inconsistent geographic units over time. Furthermore, the most appropriate 
interpolation to use is the data from the Full census dataset (where possible) because we have 
smaller error - 96% precision – with this data despite the discrepancy between the number of 




Table 2.7A: Provincial location quotients in 2011 
 
Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Utilities Construction Wholesale & Trade Logistics Finance Other services 
Western Cape 48% 0% 56% 32% 40% 72% 48% 44% 16% 
Eastern Cape 59% 0% 15% 33% 59% 26% 10% 0% 90% 
Northern Cape 93% 48% 11% 48% 59% 22% 22% 4% 44% 
Free State 70% 25% 10% 35% 50% 40% 5% 0% 90% 
KwaZulu-Natal 73% 4% 49% 22% 65% 24% 27% 6% 61% 
North West 74% 58% 21% 16% 0% 11% 0% 5% 79% 
Gauteng 0% 10% 80% 50% 10% 90% 90% 80% 10% 
Mpumalanga 61% 61% 44% 50% 94% 22% 28% 0% 39% 
Limpopo 68% 44% 4% 44% 48% 12% 0% 0% 76% 























Table 2.8A: Dynamic industry shift-share decomposition of employment growth in South African municipalities 
  1996 - 2001 2001 - 2011 1996 - 2011 
Code Municipality name ΔE NE IM CE ΔE NE IM CE ΔE NE IM CE 
362 Gamagara 
-4.9 7.0 -9.0 -2.9 928.1 51.5 -13.0 889.6 877.4 62.0 -32.3 847.7 
361 Ga-Segonyane -10.6 7.0 -7.0 -10.6 678.8 51.5 -8.6 636.0 596.5 62.0 -27.5 562.1 
538 uMhlathuze 29.3 7.0 -0.2 22.5 399.5 51.5 -6.6 354.6 545.7 62.0 -4.8 488.5 
974 Polokwane 32.7 7.0 0.1 25.7 325.1 51.5 3.3 270.4 464.0 62.0 3.9 398.1 
662 Rustenburg 30.4 7.0 -12.1 35.6 229.1 51.5 -18.5 196.1 329.2 62.0 -35.9 303.2 
561 Umdoni 5.1 7.0 2.9 -4.8 302.1 51.5 -11.7 262.3 322.5 62.0 -7.9 268.4 
667 Mafikeng 12.7 7.0 -0.1 5.8 208.0 51.5 4.8 151.7 247.0 62.0 9.8 175.2 
378 Kai !Garib 32.4 7.0 7.1 18.3 159.9 51.5 -46.2 154.7 244.2 62.0 -28.7 210.9 
987 Greater Tubatse 16.8 7.0 -6.0 15.8 188.4 51.5 -8.5 145.4 236.8 62.0 -10.8 185.6 
873 Thaba Chweu 50.0 7.0 5.3 37.8 116.0 51.5 -20.2 84.8 224.1 62.0 -19.1 181.2 
868 Emalahleni-MP 11.4 7.0 -10.1 14.5 161.1 51.5 -8.4 118.0 190.8 62.0 -19.9 148.7 
869 Steve Tshwete -2.7 7.0 -4.0 -5.7 196.0 51.5 -8.6 153.2 188.0 62.0 -15.3 141.4 
382 Kgatelopele -0.8 7.0 -10.9 3.1 172.6 51.5 -13.7 134.8 170.4 62.0 -30.0 138.4 
506 Hibiscus Coast 1.8 7.0 2.2 -7.4 163.3 51.5 -2.7 114.6 168.1 62.0 -1.4 107.5 
580 Nongoma -14.2 7.0 -5.9 -15.3 207.2 51.5 12.3 143.4 163.5 62.0 4.4 97.1 
583 Jozini 2.1 7.0 -1.6 -3.3 150.0 51.5 7.0 91.6 155.3 62.0 1.8 91.5 
591 Mandeni 19.7 7.0 1.9 10.9 111.3 51.5 -13.9 73.8 153.0 62.0 -15.7 106.8 
574 Endumeni 9.1 7.0 0.3 1.8 131.9 51.5 -6.7 87.1 153.0 62.0 -4.1 95.1 
542 Nkandla 29.6 7.0 -5.0 27.7 92.9 51.5 6.8 34.6 150.0 62.0 -2.6 90.6 
586 Mtubatuba 11.9 7.0 2.6 2.4 122.7 51.5 -1.3 72.6 149.3 62.0 -12.1 99.4 
764 Randfontein -2.8 7.0 -4.1 -5.6 154.3 51.5 -1.3 104.1 147.2 62.0 -6.7 91.9 
590 Mthonjaneni 73.7 7.0 3.9 62.8 38.0 51.5 -26.3 12.8 139.7 62.0 -22.2 99.9 
268 Kouga 5.9 7.0 4.7 -5.8 124.7 51.5 -20.9 94.2 138.0 62.0 -18.3 94.3 
504 Umuziwabantu 45.5 7.0 1.2 37.4 63.2 51.5 -10.2 21.9 137.5 62.0 -12.8 88.3 
566 The Msunduzi 0.3 7.0 1.1 -7.8 132.8 51.5 6.7 74.6 133.4 62.0 11.2 60.2 




  1996 - 2001 2001 - 2011 1996 - 2011 
Code Municipality name ΔE NE IM CE ΔE NE IM CE ΔE NE IM CE 
297 Mbizana 0.8 7.0 -0.7 -5.5 125.8 51.5 10.0 64.4 127.6 62.0 6.6 59.0 
265 Ndlambe 30.1 7.0 5.0 18.2 74.0 51.5 -0.2 22.7 126.4 62.0 -15.8 80.2 
296 Umzimvubu 21.8 7.0 -4.0 18.8 81.3 51.5 7.6 22.2 120.8 62.0 1.7 57.1 
866 Govan Mbeki 17.6 7.0 -6.3 17.0 85.5 51.5 -11.3 45.4 118.2 62.0 -20.3 76.5 
270 Mbhashe -7.9 7.0 -3.2 -11.6 136.5 51.5 13.0 72.0 117.9 62.0 1.9 54.0 
290 Ngquza Hill 19.3 7.0 -2.9 15.3 82.4 51.5 4.5 26.5 117.7 62.0 -9.1 64.8 
596 Greater Kokstad 59.1 7.0 6.3 45.8 36.8 51.5 -12.4 -2.3 117.5 62.0 -6.7 62.3 
592 KwaDukuza 5.8 7.0 5.4 -6.6 105.7 51.5 -18.6 72.8 117.5 62.0 -26.0 81.5 
292 Nyandeni -3.2 7.0 -3.9 -6.2 121.6 51.5 11.8 58.3 114.6 62.0 1.9 50.7 
570 Umtshezi 19.1 7.0 1.7 10.4 79.6 51.5 -9.2 37.3 113.9 62.0 -4.2 56.1 
798 City of Johannesburg 14.5 7.0 3.0 4.5 85.7 51.5 18.2 16.0 112.6 62.0 25.9 24.6 
982 Mogalakwena 36.1 7.0 -2.4 31.5 55.9 51.5 -2.4 6.9 112.2 62.0 3.0 47.2 
981 Bela-Bela 16.7 7.0 1.7 8.0 79.4 51.5 -6.1 34.0 109.4 62.0 -7.6 55.0 
979 Mookgopong 82.2 7.0 5.3 70.0 14.4 51.5 -32.8 -4.2 108.6 62.0 -27.1 73.6 
285 Sakhisizwe 17.6 7.0 -1.8 12.4 77.0 51.5 -0.8 26.2 108.0 62.0 -7.3 53.3 
180 Knysna 25.3 7.0 4.0 14.4 64.5 51.5 9.3 3.7 106.2 62.0 8.9 35.4 
295 Matatiele 8.8 7.0 0.9 0.9 89.3 51.5 -2.2 40.1 105.9 62.0 0.2 43.7 
968 Makhado 10.1 7.0 0.6 2.5 86.2 51.5 -2.5 37.3 105.0 62.0 -1.7 44.7 
177 George 25.3 7.0 5.0 13.4 61.8 51.5 -3.0 13.4 102.8 62.0 0.4 40.4 
594 Ingwe 9.8 7.0 2.5 0.3 84.4 51.5 -13.5 46.5 102.4 62.0 -14.9 55.4 
797 Ekurhuleni 18.5 7.0 1.3 10.3 70.4 51.5 9.4 9.5 101.9 62.0 15.3 24.6 
298 Ntabankulu 12.0 7.0 -8.1 13.1 78.8 51.5 10.0 17.3 100.4 62.0 -6.2 44.6 
284 Engcobo 1.7 7.0 -3.0 -2.2 96.5 51.5 14.7 30.4 100.0 62.0 1.6 36.4 
597 Ubuhlebezwe 18.6 7.0 5.0 6.7 68.1 51.5 -16.0 32.6 99.4 62.0 -19.5 57.0 
281 Lukanji 24.6 7.0 0.3 17.4 59.2 51.5 9.2 -1.5 98.4 62.0 6.2 30.2 
529 Abaqulusi -17.5 7.0 -0.5 -24.0 138.9 51.5 -3.8 91.3 97.2 62.0 -20.2 55.4 
760 Emfuleni -22.1 7.0 -0.1 -28.9 152.0 51.5 2.5 98.0 96.3 62.0 4.1 30.2 




  1996 - 2001 2001 - 2011 1996 - 2011 
Code Municipality name ΔE NE IM CE ΔE NE IM CE ΔE NE IM CE 
980 Modimolle 42.1 7.0 5.3 29.8 35.2 51.5 -21.5 5.2 92.0 62.0 -28.6 58.7 
514 Emnambithi/Ladysmith 23.5 7.0 -0.5 17.1 55.4 51.5 -5.6 9.6 91.9 62.0 -4.8 34.6 
582 Umhlabuyalingana 1.1 7.0 -2.3 -3.5 88.8 51.5 8.0 29.4 91.0 62.0 1.7 27.3 
961 Greater Letaba 49.1 7.0 3.3 38.8 28.1 51.5 -24.3 0.9 90.9 62.0 -13.9 42.8 
876 Nkomazi 42.0 7.0 3.0 32.1 32.3 51.5 -27.4 8.2 87.8 62.0 -22.0 47.8 
966 Thulamela 6.9 7.0 -0.8 0.8 75.4 51.5 7.2 16.7 87.5 62.0 3.5 22.1 
874 Mbombela 12.6 7.0 2.4 3.2 66.4 51.5 -1.3 16.3 87.4 62.0 2.5 22.9 
669 Ramotshere Moiloa 13.6 7.0 0.4 6.2 63.7 51.5 -15.9 28.1 86.0 62.0 -16.7 40.7 
172 Overstrand 23.2 7.0 4.5 11.8 49.9 51.5 -5.7 4.2 84.7 62.0 -2.0 24.7 
179 Bitou 25.4 7.0 4.0 14.5 44.6 51.5 10.0 -16.8 81.4 62.0 9.2 10.2 
525 Emadlangeni 29.7 7.0 -0.4 23.2 38.1 51.5 -28.1 14.8 79.2 62.0 -41.6 58.7 
985 Makhuduthamaga 7.9 7.0 -4.3 5.3 65.8 51.5 8.5 5.9 78.9 62.0 1.4 15.5 
986 Fetakgomo 0.3 7.0 -9.4 2.8 78.2 51.5 0.6 26.1 78.7 62.0 -8.7 25.4 
763 Mogale City 34.3 7.0 1.9 25.4 32.2 51.5 4.5 -23.8 77.5 62.0 11.1 4.5 
163 Saldanha Bay 11.8 7.0 2.7 2.2 58.6 51.5 -19.4 26.5 77.4 62.0 -11.8 27.2 
963 Ba-Phalaborwa 42.4 7.0 -4.8 40.3 24.5 51.5 -17.1 -9.8 77.3 62.0 -20.4 35.7 
598 Umzimkhulu -6.0 7.0 -2.0 -11.0 88.2 51.5 0.8 35.9 76.8 62.0 -11.3 26.1 
260 Buffalo City -8.9 7.0 0.5 -16.4 93.2 51.5 5.9 35.8 76.1 62.0 4.1 10.0 
166 Drakenstein -6.1 7.0 5.1 -18.2 86.5 51.5 -20.7 55.7 75.2 62.0 -17.3 30.5 
169 Langeberg 22.1 7.0 8.1 7.1 43.1 51.5 -41.4 33.0 74.7 62.0 -38.6 51.4 
383 Sol Plaatjie -9.2 7.0 -2.1 -14.0 91.2 51.5 7.4 32.3 73.6 62.0 8.4 3.3 
983 Ephraim Mogale 15.1 7.0 1.4 6.8 50.5 51.5 -9.1 8.2 73.2 62.0 -6.0 17.2 
293 Mhlontlo -1.8 7.0 -4.8 -4.0 76.1 51.5 7.8 16.8 72.9 62.0 -4.1 14.9 
299 Nelson Mandela Bay -0.8 7.0 1.3 -9.1 73.2 51.5 6.0 15.8 71.8 62.0 8.1 1.6 
861 Msukaligwa 5.3 7.0 1.7 -3.3 62.8 51.5 -19.8 31.1 71.4 62.0 -16.7 26.1 
875 Umjindi 73.1 7.0 6.9 59.2 -1.1 51.5 -46.0 -6.5 71.2 62.0 -46.7 56.0 
162 Bergrivier 38.1 7.0 7.8 23.3 23.6 51.5 -44.1 16.3 70.7 62.0 -35.7 44.3 




  1996 - 2001 2001 - 2011 1996 - 2011 
Code Municipality name ΔE NE IM CE ΔE NE IM CE ΔE NE IM CE 
173 Cape Agulhas 8.6 7.0 6.8 -5.2 55.2 51.5 -14.7 18.4 68.5 62.0 -16.0 22.5 
171 Theewaterskloof 13.8 7.0 8.5 -1.7 47.9 51.5 -36.8 33.3 68.3 62.0 -36.8 43.1 
294 King Sabata Dalindyebo -14.3 7.0 -1.5 -19.8 96.3 51.5 16.6 28.3 68.3 62.0 11.4 -5.1 
573 Imbabazane 23.6 7.0 1.9 14.7 35.5 51.5 -9.9 -6.0 67.5 62.0 -4.0 9.5 
282 Intsika Yethu -25.3 7.0 -2.5 -29.8 122.3 51.5 4.7 66.1 65.9 62.0 0.0 3.9 
564 Mpofana 55.7 7.0 6.6 42.1 6.4 51.5 -31.3 -13.7 65.7 62.0 -30.9 34.6 
576 Msinga 26.0 7.0 0.5 18.6 30.7 51.5 -1.4 -19.4 64.7 62.0 4.3 -1.7 
984 Elias Motsoaledi 15.0 7.0 1.3 6.7 42.8 51.5 -16.5 7.8 64.2 62.0 -14.1 16.3 
379 //Khara Hais 9.4 7.0 4.0 -1.6 49.4 51.5 -29.9 27.9 63.5 62.0 -17.6 19.1 
199 City of Cape Town 4.1 7.0 3.9 -6.7 56.4 51.5 12.2 -7.3 62.8 62.0 17.4 -16.7 
286 Elundini 21.8 7.0 -1.1 16.0 33.5 51.5 -6.4 -11.5 62.6 62.0 -11.0 11.6 
960 Greater Giyani 24.7 7.0 -0.8 18.5 30.3 51.5 2.4 -23.5 62.5 62.0 5.4 -4.9 
181 Laingsburg 2.3 7.0 7.7 -12.4 58.6 51.5 -37.3 44.4 62.2 62.0 -28.5 28.7 
499 Mangaung -3.7 7.0 -0.2 -10.5 68.5 51.5 8.9 8.1 62.1 62.0 9.8 -9.6 
978 Lephalale 39.7 7.0 -3.3 36.0 14.7 51.5 -17.7 -19.0 60.3 62.0 -22.3 20.6 
175 Hessequa 29.8 7.0 4.1 18.7 22.7 51.5 -16.0 -12.8 59.3 62.0 -19.0 16.3 
289 Gariep 20.8 7.0 3.8 10.1 31.2 51.5 -25.8 5.5 58.5 62.0 -25.0 21.5 
160 Matzikama 21.4 7.0 6.3 8.1 30.5 51.5 -33.0 12.0 58.4 62.0 -32.3 28.7 
862 Mkhondo 11.3 7.0 4.6 -0.3 41.6 51.5 -27.8 18.0 57.7 62.0 -26.4 22.1 
478 Metsimaholo 2.6 7.0 -2.8 -1.6 53.5 51.5 -5.0 7.0 57.4 62.0 -6.6 2.0 
380 !Kheis 46.5 7.0 8.2 31.3 7.1 51.5 -54.1 9.7 56.8 62.0 -38.9 33.7 
599 eThekwini 5.9 7.0 1.6 -2.7 47.9 51.5 8.2 -11.7 56.6 62.0 10.7 -16.1 
165 Witzenberg 7.3 7.0 9.5 -9.1 45.5 51.5 -50.6 44.7 56.2 62.0 -44.0 38.1 
671 Mamusa 2.8 7.0 3.2 -7.4 51.2 51.5 -25.7 25.4 55.4 62.0 -34.4 27.8 
967 Musina 26.0 7.0 2.8 16.2 23.0 51.5 -28.2 -0.3 55.0 62.0 -19.1 12.1 
291 Port St Johns 15.9 7.0 -2.9 11.8 33.1 51.5 2.3 -20.6 54.4 62.0 -8.0 0.4 
364 Nama Khoi -12.0 7.0 -12.1 -6.9 71.2 51.5 -18.4 38.1 50.6 62.0 -35.6 24.2 




  1996 - 2001 2001 - 2011 1996 - 2011 
Code Municipality name ΔE NE IM CE ΔE NE IM CE ΔE NE IM CE 
176 Mossel Bay 24.6 7.0 1.6 16.1 19.7 51.5 3.7 -35.5 49.2 62.0 0.6 -13.3 
167 Stellenbosch 17.7 7.0 5.1 5.6 26.6 51.5 -12.0 -12.8 49.0 62.0 -6.1 -6.9 
280 Inkwanca 17.8 7.0 3.6 7.3 26.4 51.5 -18.1 -7.0 48.9 62.0 -24.5 11.4 
288 Maletswai 28.1 7.0 1.3 19.8 16.3 51.5 -8.0 -27.2 48.9 62.0 -13.4 0.3 
670 Naledi-NW -14.5 7.0 5.9 -27.3 72.2 51.5 -19.5 40.2 47.3 62.0 -23.2 8.5 
168 Breede Valley 4.9 7.0 6.7 -8.8 39.0 51.5 -36.8 24.4 45.8 62.0 -27.0 10.8 
524 Newcastle -0.6 7.0 -0.9 -6.7 46.4 51.5 -4.8 -0.2 45.5 62.0 -4.1 -12.3 
579 Uphongolo 16.6 7.0 2.3 7.3 23.8 51.5 -30.6 3.0 44.4 62.0 -26.2 8.6 
575 Nqutu 10.8 7.0 -3.0 6.9 29.6 51.5 14.1 -36.0 43.6 62.0 5.7 -24.1 
661 Madibeng 6.8 7.0 0.1 -0.3 31.2 51.5 -5.9 -14.3 40.1 62.0 -2.8 -19.1 
182 Prince Albert -2.4 7.0 6.2 -15.6 42.6 51.5 -36.6 27.8 39.2 62.0 -28.7 5.9 
161 Cederberg 26.2 7.0 9.4 9.9 9.6 51.5 -44.1 2.3 38.3 62.0 -34.8 11.1 
277 Nxuba 14.3 7.0 4.5 2.9 20.0 51.5 -17.8 -13.6 37.3 62.0 -21.7 -3.1 
595 Kwa Sani -19.1 7.0 7.4 -33.5 69.7 51.5 -12.5 30.8 37.3 62.0 -26.9 2.2 
864 Lekwa 1.3 7.0 0.7 -6.4 35.5 51.5 -22.2 6.3 37.2 62.0 -22.0 -2.7 
563 uMngeni 28.8 7.0 1.9 19.9 6.6 51.5 -10.0 -34.9 37.2 62.0 0.3 -25.1 
581 Ulundi 19.5 7.0 -3.5 16.0 14.6 51.5 10.9 -47.8 36.9 62.0 -2.8 -22.3 
366 Hantam 15.8 7.0 6.4 2.5 16.2 51.5 -35.4 0.1 34.6 62.0 -19.7 -7.7 
860 Albert Luthuli -0.6 7.0 0.6 -8.1 35.0 51.5 -19.5 3.0 34.2 62.0 -21.9 -5.9 
370 Umsobomvu -16.4 7.0 3.6 -27.0 60.2 51.5 -14.1 22.8 33.9 62.0 -13.0 -15.2 
676 Tlokwe City Council 18.2 7.0 -5.0 16.2 13.2 51.5 -10.7 -27.5 33.8 62.0 -13.9 -14.3 
278 Inxuba Yethemba 4.1 7.0 1.9 -4.8 28.0 51.5 -15.3 -8.2 33.2 62.0 -11.5 -17.2 
872 Dr JS Moroka -29.6 7.0 -3.0 -33.6 88.9 51.5 14.6 22.8 32.9 62.0 10.3 -39.4 
577 Umvoti -3.3 7.0 5.0 -15.2 36.4 51.5 -27.9 12.8 31.9 62.0 -25.8 -4.3 
470 Dihlabeng 4.5 7.0 4.1 -6.5 25.2 51.5 -19.4 -6.9 30.8 62.0 -16.3 -14.8 
472 Maluti a Phofung 3.4 7.0 -0.4 -3.2 26.4 51.5 -4.5 -20.6 30.6 62.0 2.1 -33.4 
674 Kagisano/Molopo 14.2 7.0 3.2 4.1 13.3 51.5 -22.6 -15.5 29.5 62.0 -31.4 -1.1 




  1996 - 2001 2001 - 2011 1996 - 2011 
Code Municipality name ΔE NE IM CE ΔE NE IM CE ΔE NE IM CE 
668 Ditsobotla 15.0 7.0 -2.1 10.1 10.5 51.5 -15.9 -25.0 27.1 62.0 -18.0 -16.9 
276 Nkonkobe -20.4 7.0 -3.4 -24.0 59.4 51.5 0.5 7.4 26.8 62.0 -2.8 -32.4 
678 Maquassi Hills 16.0 7.0 3.2 5.8 9.1 51.5 -27.9 -14.5 26.6 62.0 -33.9 -1.5 
871 Thembisile -1.3 7.0 -3.6 -4.7 25.7 51.5 6.4 -32.1 24.1 62.0 2.3 -40.2 
877 Bushbuckridge -5.2 7.0 -0.3 -11.8 29.7 51.5 -2.6 -19.2 23.0 62.0 -1.5 -37.4 
373 Renosterberg -7.7 7.0 3.3 -17.9 32.2 51.5 -23.2 3.9 22.0 62.0 -34.8 -5.2 
673 Lekwa-Teemane 12.7 7.0 3.4 2.4 7.6 51.5 -20.9 -22.9 21.3 62.0 -16.3 -24.4 
479 Mafube -18.9 7.0 3.3 -29.2 47.9 51.5 -15.7 12.2 19.9 62.0 -20.0 -22.1 
264 Makana -18.0 7.0 2.0 -27.0 44.7 51.5 -1.6 -5.1 18.6 62.0 -9.2 -34.2 
170 Swellendam -10.7 7.0 6.4 -24.0 29.3 51.5 -34.3 12.1 15.4 62.0 -30.2 -16.3 
368 Khâi-Ma 5.3 7.0 -5.6 3.9 8.8 51.5 -32.5 -10.2 14.6 62.0 -35.3 -12.1 
977 Thabazimbi 3.2 7.0 -14.0 10.2 10.5 51.5 -25.6 -15.4 14.0 62.0 -45.5 -2.5 
174 Kannaland 12.2 7.0 9.1 -3.9 1.0 51.5 -44.1 -6.4 13.4 62.0 -43.5 -5.2 
363 Richtersveld -12.0 7.0 -12.1 -6.9 28.3 51.5 -18.4 -4.7 12.9 62.0 -35.6 -13.5 
973 Molemole 80.8 7.0 3.3 70.6 -37.7 51.5 -5.4 -83.7 12.7 62.0 -5.4 -43.9 
374 Thembelihle 101.7 7.0 5.8 89.0 -44.6 51.5 -29.0 -67.1 11.8 62.0 -26.6 -23.6 
571 Okhahlamba 31.1 7.0 1.3 22.8 -15.2 51.5 -2.5 -64.2 11.2 62.0 -4.3 -46.5 
867 Victor Khanye 15.0 7.0 -2.2 10.3 -3.5 51.5 -10.8 -44.2 10.9 62.0 -15.7 -35.3 
664 Moses Kotane -7.3 7.0 -7.5 -6.8 19.0 51.5 -12.3 -20.1 10.3 62.0 -17.6 -34.1 
386 Phokwane 1.3 7.0 6.1 -11.8 8.6 51.5 -33.5 -9.4 9.9 62.0 -23.6 -28.4 
371 Emthanjeni -16.8 7.0 0.3 -24.1 31.0 51.5 -0.7 -19.7 9.0 62.0 -0.4 -52.5 
178 Oudtshoorn -7.6 7.0 4.3 -18.9 16.4 51.5 -5.8 -29.2 7.5 62.0 -3.3 -51.1 
460 Letsemeng 31.2 7.0 -0.9 25.1 -19.0 51.5 -32.6 -37.9 6.3 62.0 -32.9 -22.7 
164 Swartland 7.1 7.0 4.4 -4.2 -0.8 51.5 -20.4 -31.8 6.3 62.0 -18.1 -37.6 
666 Tswaing -6.7 7.0 1.9 -15.6 13.6 51.5 -22.4 -15.5 6.0 62.0 -21.0 -35.0 
375 Siyathemba -20.9 7.0 5.9 -33.8 33.0 51.5 -26.5 8.1 5.2 62.0 -28.8 -27.9 
865 Dipaleseng -6.9 7.0 2.7 -16.6 12.0 51.5 -14.8 -24.6 4.3 62.0 -21.8 -35.9 
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468 Nala 5.5 7.0 1.8 -3.3 -1.7 51.5 -33.5 -19.6 3.7 62.0 -30.0 -28.3 
863 Pixley Ka Seme 1.1 7.0 0.6 -6.4 2.2 51.5 -15.1 -34.1 3.4 62.0 -19.9 -38.7 
677 City of Matlosana -15.0 7.0 -15.5 -6.4 20.2 51.5 -10.9 -20.3 2.2 62.0 -35.4 -24.3 
279 Tsolwana 16.2 7.0 2.0 7.3 -12.6 51.5 -9.2 -54.8 1.6 62.0 -15.5 -44.9 
474 Mantsopa 4.4 7.0 4.5 -7.1 -4.9 51.5 -25.0 -31.3 -0.7 62.0 -26.2 -36.5 
587 Mfolozi 28.3 7.0 -0.4 21.8 -25.3 51.5 -4.2 -72.6 -4.2 62.0 -1.7 -64.5 
463 Naledi-FS -4.3 7.0 1.6 -12.9 -2.1 51.5 -22.4 -31.2 -6.3 62.0 -23.5 -44.8 
369 Ubuntu -25.5 7.0 5.2 -37.7 24.8 51.5 -21.9 -4.8 -7.1 62.0 -22.0 -47.0 
546 Maphumulo -25.2 7.0 -0.4 -31.7 23.9 51.5 -7.6 -20.0 -7.3 62.0 -3.7 -65.6 
283 Emalahleni-EC -47.6 7.0 -2.5 -52.1 75.3 51.5 2.1 21.7 -8.2 62.0 2.3 -72.4 
465 Tokologo 17.9 7.0 4.1 6.8 -23.0 51.5 -37.2 -37.2 -9.3 62.0 -39.3 -31.9 
262 Blue Crane Route 4.8 7.0 4.7 -6.8 -13.5 51.5 -22.9 -42.1 -9.3 62.0 -23.2 -48.2 
477 Ngwathe -11.5 7.0 1.8 -20.2 2.2 51.5 -11.9 -37.3 -9.5 62.0 -11.8 -59.7 
584 The Big 5 False Bay 7.5 7.0 2.8 -2.3 -17.1 51.5 0.6 -69.2 -10.9 62.0 -8.8 -64.1 
976 Lepele-Nkumpi 16.7 7.0 -1.7 11.5 -23.8 51.5 2.8 -78.0 -11.1 62.0 4.6 -77.7 
273 Amahlathi -9.1 7.0 0.9 -17.0 -2.2 51.5 -5.2 -48.5 -11.1 62.0 -5.2 -68.0 
964 Maruleng 36.5 7.0 -1.0 30.6 -35.6 51.5 -16.6 -70.5 -12.1 62.0 -13.3 -60.8 
870 Emakhazeni 4.2 7.0 -1.7 -1.0 -17.3 51.5 -11.2 -57.6 -13.9 62.0 -17.9 -58.0 
672 Greater Taung -11.7 7.0 -2.1 -16.6 -2.9 51.5 -1.6 -52.8 -14.3 62.0 -7.0 -69.3 
372 Kareeberg -28.2 7.0 4.7 -39.9 17.5 51.5 -25.9 -8.1 -15.7 62.0 -22.2 -55.4 
466 Tswelopele -1.6 7.0 4.2 -12.7 -15.4 51.5 -33.6 -33.3 -16.8 62.0 -35.3 -43.5 
462 Mohokare -1.7 7.0 1.8 -10.5 -16.0 51.5 -29.2 -38.2 -17.4 62.0 -21.5 -57.9 
675 Ventersdorp 25.3 7.0 -0.9 19.2 -34.1 51.5 -24.0 -61.6 -17.5 62.0 -28.1 -51.3 
267 Baviaans 4.0 7.0 6.7 -9.7 -20.8 51.5 -40.8 -31.4 -17.7 62.0 -32.2 -47.4 
473 Phumelela 21.4 7.0 1.3 13.1 -32.6 51.5 -26.9 -57.1 -18.1 62.0 -15.8 -64.4 
568 Richmond 5.1 7.0 5.0 -6.8 -22.4 51.5 -20.8 -53.1 -18.4 62.0 -19.5 -60.9 
969 Blouberg 43.7 7.0 1.5 35.2 -44.2 51.5 -10.4 -85.2 -19.8 62.0 -5.1 -76.7 
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381 Tsantsabane 0.2 7.0 -8.6 1.9 -20.4 51.5 -16.4 -55.4 -20.2 62.0 -28.7 -53.6 
471 Nketoana -12.1 7.0 2.6 -21.7 -10.0 51.5 -24.2 -37.3 -20.9 62.0 -19.7 -63.3 
475 Moqhaka -25.2 7.0 -8.0 -24.1 1.6 51.5 -17.6 -32.2 -24.0 62.0 -36.1 -49.8 
569 Indaka 20.4 7.0 0.2 13.2 -37.9 51.5 -5.9 -83.5 -25.3 62.0 -2.4 -84.9 
263 Ikwezi 6.9 7.0 1.8 -1.9 -31.4 51.5 -18.0 -64.8 -26.7 62.0 -16.6 -72.1 
562 uMshwathi 12.3 7.0 3.0 2.3 -35.8 51.5 -14.2 -73.1 -27.9 62.0 -10.4 -79.4 
589 uMlalazi 19.6 7.0 0.7 12.0 -39.8 51.5 -16.6 -74.6 -27.9 62.0 -14.9 -75.0 
384 Dikgatlong -5.9 7.0 -4.2 -8.6 -25.0 51.5 -15.9 -60.5 -29.4 62.0 -15.5 -75.9 
588 Ntambanana 35.7 7.0 0.3 28.4 -48.5 51.5 -8.7 -91.3 -30.1 62.0 -4.9 -87.2 
762 Lesedi -7.9 7.0 0.4 -15.3 -25.8 51.5 -0.6 -76.6 -31.7 62.0 3.2 -96.8 
385 Magareng -9.1 7.0 0.0 -16.0 -26.3 51.5 -16.4 -61.4 -32.9 62.0 -14.8 -80.1 
565 Impendle -47.7 7.0 3.9 -58.5 27.2 51.5 -18.0 -6.3 -33.4 62.0 -26.1 -69.4 
965 Mutale 12.9 7.0 -1.5 7.4 -42.2 51.5 2.6 -96.2 -34.7 62.0 -0.4 -96.3 
526 Dannhauser -16.9 7.0 -7.5 -16.4 -29.9 51.5 -4.8 -76.5 -41.7 62.0 -19.5 -84.3 
503 Umzumbe 4.3 7.0 2.7 -5.4 -44.6 51.5 -7.6 -88.4 -42.2 62.0 -5.4 -98.8 
467 Matjhabeng -47.5 7.0 -20.7 -33.8 9.5 51.5 -11.7 -30.3 -42.5 62.0 -47.7 -56.8 
505 Ezingoleni 8.1 7.0 2.1 -0.9 -47.4 51.5 -4.0 -94.8 -43.1 62.0 -2.9 -102.2 
766 Merafong City -28.3 7.0 -23.0 -12.3 -23.1 51.5 -20.6 -54.0 -44.9 62.0 -55.0 -51.9 
660 Moretele -1.1 7.0 0.1 -8.2 -46.2 51.5 5.5 -103.1 -46.8 62.0 6.5 -115.3 
970 Aganang 7.7 7.0 -1.1 1.8 -51.1 51.5 11.3 -113.9 -47.4 62.0 11.7 -121.1 
593 Ndwedwe -5.6 7.0 2.7 -15.2 -45.5 51.5 -9.6 -87.4 -48.5 62.0 -12.6 -97.9 
585 Hlabisa 19.4 7.0 1.1 11.3 -57.3 51.5 -1.2 -107.5 -49.0 62.0 -7.4 -103.6 
376 Siyancuma -16.9 7.0 1.5 -25.4 -39.8 51.5 -17.5 -73.7 -49.9 62.0 -13.6 -98.4 
360 Joe Morolong -7.6 7.0 -6.8 -7.9 -46.0 51.5 -7.6 -89.8 -50.1 62.0 -21.8 -90.3 
765 Westonaria -20.4 7.0 -16.7 -10.7 -39.1 51.5 -7.8 -82.8 -51.5 62.0 -36.8 -76.8 
274 Ngqushwa -15.0 7.0 -0.4 -21.5 -43.0 51.5 6.6 -101.1 -51.6 62.0 -1.6 -111.9 
761 Midvaal 41.6 7.0 0.6 34.0 -66.6 51.5 7.7 -125.8 -52.7 62.0 12.2 -127.0 




  1996 - 2001 2001 - 2011 1996 - 2011 
Code Municipality name ΔE NE IM CE ΔE NE IM CE ΔE NE IM CE 
461 Kopanong 3.9 7.0 1.0 -4.1 -57.3 51.5 -2.5 -106.2 -55.6 62.0 0.7 -118.3 
266 Sundays River Valley 7.9 7.0 2.7 -1.7 -59.9 51.5 -10.7 -100.7 -56.7 62.0 -10.0 -108.7 
567 Mkhambathini 14.2 7.0 1.3 6.0 -64.4 51.5 -9.8 -106.0 -59.3 62.0 -6.6 -114.7 
665 Ratlou 13.5 7.0 -0.2 6.8 -65.1 51.5 7.5 -124.1 -60.4 62.0 13.3 -135.8 
272 Great Kei 3.6 7.0 2.1 -5.5 -65.5 51.5 4.3 -121.2 -64.3 62.0 4.4 -130.6 
365 Kamiesberg -12.0 7.0 -12.0 -6.9 -63.8 51.5 -18.4 -96.9 -68.2 62.0 -35.6 -94.6 
560 Vulamehlo 8.5 7.0 1.5 0.1 -72.0 51.5 -6.7 -116.7 -69.6 62.0 -5.0 -126.5 
663 Kgetlengrivier 33.4 7.0 -14.4 40.8 -78.3 51.5 -17.9 -111.9 -71.1 62.0 -37.9 -95.2 
377 Mier 11.7 7.0 5.7 -1.0 -93.0 51.5 -31.9 -112.5 -92.2 62.0 -15.4 -138.7 
183 Beaufort West  7.0 3.1  26.5 51.5 -7.8 -17.1  62.0 -2.05  
261 Camdeboo  7.0 1.6  50.9 51.5 -15.7 15.2  62.0 -4.5  
367 Karoo Hoogland  7.0 6.7  30.5 51.5 -35.8 14.8  62.0 -30.5  




















Table 2.9A: Structural change effects across regions 
Code Municipality name 1996 - 2001 2001 - 2011 1996 - 2011 
160 Matzikama -1.46% 8.68% 11.66% 
161 Cederberg 0.07% 39.86% 37.74% 
162 Bergrivier 1.63% 10.54% 7.33% 
163 Saldanha Bay 3.94% 18.20% 19.77% 
164 Swartland 1.81% 7.78% 12.39% 
165 Witzenberg 1.52% 54.64% 55.02% 
166 Drakenstein 1.93% 37.43% 44.94% 
167 Stellenbosch 1.97% 31.11% 39.30% 
168 Breede Valley 2.54% 56.16% 59.76% 
169 Langeberg 1.48% 58.91% 70.42% 
170 Swellendam 1.87% 55.40% 67.76% 
171 Theewaterskloof 0.24% 55.39% 66.61% 
172 Overstrand 1.34% 22.07% 31.42% 
173 Cape Agulhas -0.17% 30.03% 43.03% 
174 Kannaland -0.60% 66.94% 79.78% 
175 Hessequa 0.81% 32.33% 49.32% 
176 Mossel Bay 2.88% 17.56% 37.66% 
177 George 1.83% 23.16% 35.08% 
178 Oudtshoorn 2.01% 16.05% 22.84% 
179 Bitou 0.55% 8.64% 18.22% 
180 Knysna 0.67% 8.30% 17.00% 
181 Laingsburg 1.76% 31.44% 24.25% 
182 Prince Albert 1.57% 31.04% 23.68% 
183 Beaufort West 3.04% 10.40% 11.78% 
199 City of Cape Town 2.09% 6.59% 13.68% 
260 Buffalo City 2.80% 5.63% 14.26% 
261 Camdeboo 3.35% 25.44% 22.51% 
262 Blue Crane Route 0.28% 37.32% 47.11% 
263 Ikwezi 3.52% 31.73% 36.01% 
264 Makana -0.04% 14.64% 28.72% 
265 Ndlambe -2.83% 8.10% 27.41% 
266 Sundays River Valley 1.92% -24.45% -21.30% 
267 Baviaans 0.97% 35.19% 29.41% 
268 Kouga 2.33% 18.45% 22.10% 
269 Kou-Kamma 1.81% -0.21% 3.33% 
270 Mbhashe 0.44% 3.84% 17.50% 
271 Mnquma 1.40% 9.13% 19.57% 
272 Great Kei 2.18% -13.26% -11.29% 
273 Amahlathi 2.04% 0.30% 3.12% 
274 Ngqushwa 1.67% 6.62% 15.40% 
276 Nkonkobe 4.05% 12.27% 18.38% 
277 Nxuba 0.61% 11.79% 18.84% 




Code Municipality name 1996 - 2001 2001 - 2011 1996 - 2011 
279 Tsolwana 2.27% 9.48% 16.80% 
280 Inkwanca -0.04% 3.75% 11.43% 
281 Lukanji 1.73% 6.56% 15.01% 
282 Intsika Yethu 1.95% 11.43% 14.12% 
283 Emalahleni 0.67% 7.90% 7.33% 
284 Engcobo 1.16% 3.63% 16.13% 
285 Sakhisizwe 1.89% 7.02% 13.89% 
286 Elundini 2.76% 15.17% 20.33% 
287 Senqu 1.71% 12.45% 18.98% 
288 Maletswai 3.18% 10.37% 19.06% 
289 Gariep 0.11% 25.44% 31.53% 
290 Ngquza Hill 1.56% 10.16% 23.66% 
291 Port St Johns 2.74% 12.04% 22.13% 
292 Nyandeni 1.49% 7.32% 18.78% 
293 Mhlontlo 2.94% 4.10% 15.78% 
294 King Sabata Dalindyebo 0.74% 3.25% 14.30% 
295 Matatiele 2.92% 16.54% 13.06% 
296 Umzimvubu 2.52% 12.15% 18.20% 
297 Mbizana -0.16% 9.59% 13.96% 
298 Ntabankulu 3.48% 10.97% 25.78% 
299 Nelson Mandela Bay 2.87% 7.77% 14.73% 
360 Joe Morolong 4.98% 14.30% 26.48% 
361 Ga-Segonyana 6.46% -2.06% 19.74% 
362 Gamagara 5.53% 19.71% 43.60% 
363 Richtersveld 4.35% 20.39% 36.16% 
364 Nama Khoi 4.35% 28.24% 48.12% 
365 Kamiesberg 4.35% 21.46% 39.40% 
366 Hantam 0.62% 31.65% 17.73% 
367 Karoo Hoogland 0.00% 18.37% 19.03% 
368 Khâi-Ma 5.15% 5.84% 7.12% 
369 Ubuntu -0.03% 12.31% 15.94% 
370 Umsobomvu 1.58% 23.57% 26.14% 
371 Emthanjeni 4.50% 14.54% 17.87% 
372 Kareeberg 0.15% 10.08% 11.33% 
373 Renosterberg -0.90% 21.16% 37.57% 
374 Thembelihle -0.60% 26.32% 26.18% 
375 Siyathemba -1.80% 25.56% 32.58% 
376 Siyancuma 0.37% 9.39% 7.23% 
377 Mier 2.65% 34.77% 22.20% 
378 Kai !Garib 2.31% 6.27% -7.58% 
379 //Khara Hais 3.29% 38.36% 33.68% 
380 !Kheis 1.79% 31.99% 20.01% 
381 Tsantsabane 4.14% 16.57% 25.05% 
382 Kgatelopele 4.13% 9.34% 17.72% 




Code Municipality name 1996 - 2001 2001 - 2011 1996 - 2011 
384 Dikgatlong 0.94% 9.42% 8.36% 
385 Magareng 1.37% 24.07% 22.82% 
386 Phokwane 2.04% 37.34% 34.37% 
460 Letsemeng 2.85% 30.96% 33.99% 
461 Kopanong 2.38% -1.77% -8.77% 
462 Mohokare 3.67% 36.41% 29.18% 
463 Naledi 1.74% 22.25% 20.51% 
464 Masilonyana 9.49% 24.10% 58.56% 
465 Tokologo -0.33% 46.52% 54.78% 
466 Tswelopele 1.51% 37.46% 44.85% 
467 Matjhabeng 10.67% 21.57% 61.17% 
468 Nala 4.32% 21.53% 21.79% 
469 Setsoto 0.01% 22.28% 32.00% 
470 Dihlabeng 2.13% 25.30% 29.68% 
471 Nketoana 2.81% 19.16% 15.87% 
472 Maluti a Phofung 3.58% 16.94% 16.76% 
473 Phumelela 4.89% 16.64% 7.85% 
474 Mantsopa 0.93% 30.69% 35.83% 
475 Moqhaka 10.75% 22.30% 43.66% 
477 Ngwathe 2.34% 13.59% 17.31% 
478 Metsimaholo 2.28% 14.75% 17.70% 
479 Mafube 2.26% 15.61% 21.37% 
499 Mangaung 2.98% 10.68% 17.40% 
503 Umzumbe 1.99% 17.59% 23.79% 
504 UMuziwabantu 2.39% 19.22% 23.65% 
505 Ezingoleni 1.84% 14.64% 17.85% 
506 Hibiscus Coast 1.78% 8.63% 14.06% 
514 Emnambithi/Ladysmith 3.80% 10.62% 15.52% 
524 Newcastle 3.76% 17.01% 25.03% 
525 Emadlangeni 4.51% 43.71% 69.93% 
526 Dannhauser 10.26% 21.84% 47.15% 
529 Abaqulusi 4.70% 23.99% 51.41% 
538 uMhlathuze 3.06% 20.45% 24.72% 
542 Nkandla 3.94% 16.08% 23.41% 
546 Maphumulo 2.18% 30.56% 25.60% 
560 Vulamehlo 2.65% 7.61% 5.65% 
561 Umdoni 2.32% 16.44% 20.26% 
562 uMshwathi 2.30% -14.24% -14.94% 
563 uMngeni 2.69% 11.17% 6.59% 
564 Mpofana 1.88% 14.05% 15.27% 
565 Impendle 2.11% 22.74% 35.71% 
566 The Msunduzi 2.33% 8.95% 11.79% 
567 Mkhambathini 3.12% -16.49% -15.75% 
568 Richmond 1.33% 11.94% 15.21% 




Code Municipality name 1996 - 2001 2001 - 2011 1996 - 2011 
570 Umtshezi 1.92% 15.42% 15.23% 
571 Okhahlamba 1.58% 4.82% 10.93% 
573 Imbabazane 2.60% 19.69% 17.82% 
574 Endumeni 3.01% 19.91% 20.88% 
575 Nqutu 2.05% 4.31% 11.68% 
576 Msinga 2.73% 17.52% 15.65% 
577 Umvoti 1.58% 19.64% 22.64% 
578 eDumbe 2.07% 1.31% 17.31% 
579 UPhongolo 2.90% 26.11% 24.57% 
580 Nongoma 3.30% 7.12% 17.59% 
581 Ulundi 3.26% 10.60% 29.88% 
582 Umhlabuyalingana 2.45% 11.21% 20.14% 
583 Jozini 2.08% 8.53% 15.55% 
584 The Big 5 False Bay 0.04% 5.26% 19.20% 
585 Hlabisa 1.43% 18.62% 21.77% 
586 Mtubatuba 0.54% 9.65% 24.76% 
587 Mfolozi 2.89% 13.55% 14.54% 
588 Ntambanana 2.93% 17.87% 18.33% 
589 uMlalazi 3.10% 13.10% 15.60% 
590 Mthonjaneni 2.16% 9.38% 9.96% 
591 Mandeni 2.38% 2.52% 12.02% 
592 KwaDukuza 0.92% 27.15% 40.16% 
593 Ndwedwe 2.16% 1.30% 8.00% 
594 Ingwe 2.44% 12.68% 15.70% 
595 Kwa Sani -2.98% 0.18% 17.75% 
596 Greater Kokstad 1.85% 16.61% 20.99% 
597 Ubuhlebezwe 1.10% 13.95% 19.99% 
598 Umzimkhulu 0.05% 11.42% 22.28% 
599 eThekwini 3.00% 9.09% 16.76% 
660 Moretele 2.47% -7.03% -9.75% 
661 Madibeng 0.65% 3.11% -4.45% 
662 Rustenburg 1.14% 8.14% 14.52% 
663 Kgetlengrivier 1.96% 9.70% 31.17% 
664 Moses Kotane -2.59% 4.70% 2.99% 
665 Ratlou 2.42% -14.83% -18.84% 
666 Tswaing 2.26% 11.18% 12.27% 
667 Mafikeng 2.43% 15.00% 18.39% 
668 Ditsobotla 1.86% 13.15% 19.94% 
669 Ramotshere Moiloa 2.46% 21.42% 24.99% 
670 Naledi -0.30% 25.23% 37.41% 
671 Mamusa -3.31% 13.68% 23.59% 
672 Greater Taung 1.55% 10.69% 17.95% 
673 Lekwa-Teemane -2.01% 19.54% 17.78% 
674 Kagisano/Molopo 0.40% 4.60% 14.03% 




Code Municipality name 1996 - 2001 2001 - 2011 1996 - 2011 
676 Tlokwe City Council -1.06% 22.24% 32.46% 
677 City of Matlosana 5.92% 14.22% 37.49% 
678 Maquassi Hills -2.07% 21.66% 29.56% 
760 Emfuleni 3.06% 5.76% 8.85% 
761 Midvaal 2.77% 0.88% 4.99% 
762 Lesedi 2.31% 13.38% 18.99% 
763 Mogale City 2.61% 10.73% 13.93% 
764 Randfontein 4.75% 20.10% 35.12% 
765 Westonaria 8.51% 24.31% 64.56% 
766 Merafong City 7.35% 40.54% 87.69% 
797 Ekurhuleni 2.92% 12.10% 18.68% 
798 City of Johannesburg 3.18% 5.58% 12.61% 
799 City of Tshwane 1.81% 6.66% 8.36% 
860 Albert Luthuli 2.41% 22.03% 24.90% 
861 Msukaligwa 2.44% 20.29% 11.84% 
862 Mkhondo 0.70% 35.80% 33.68% 
863 Pixley Ka Seme 1.03% 28.74% 34.97% 
864 Lekwa 1.06% 36.38% 44.11% 
865 Dipaleseng 0.89% 25.48% 41.34% 
866 Govan Mbeki 2.03% 13.56% 24.63% 
867 Victor Khanye 0.68% 8.14% 14.46% 
868 Emalahleni 0.40% 9.76% 13.32% 
869 Steve Tshwete 0.61% 10.97% 13.65% 
870 Emakhazeni 2.17% 6.70% 12.89% 
871 Thembisile 1.30% 12.62% 16.16% 
872 Dr JS Moroka 3.95% 4.04% 10.01% 
873 Thaba Chweu -0.57% 13.19% 13.45% 
874 Mbombela 2.04% 13.46% 17.32% 
875 Umjindi 1.01% 40.27% 40.95% 
876 Nkomazi 2.54% 17.10% 14.20% 
877 Bushbuckridge 2.71% 16.72% 18.02% 
960 Greater Giyani 1.99% 4.98% 5.18% 
961 Greater Letaba 3.15% 37.47% 31.16% 
962 Greater Tzaneen 2.98% 22.40% 12.10% 
963 Ba-Phalaborwa 4.45% 18.72% 19.88% 
964 Maruleng 3.92% 9.76% 12.48% 
965 Mutale 2.07% 11.16% 10.54% 
966 Thulamela 1.43% 11.51% 16.51% 
967 Musina 2.89% 7.14% 3.81% 
968 Makhado 2.41% 7.35% 9.58% 
969 Blouberg 2.69% 5.21% 1.14% 
970 Aganang 4.89% 4.86% 3.53% 
973 Molemole 1.67% -3.31% -1.21% 
974 Polokwane 3.23% 14.02% 19.85% 




Code Municipality name 1996 - 2001 2001 - 2011 1996 - 2011 
977 Thabazimbi 6.69% 10.24% 16.00% 
978 Lephalale 3.48% 25.08% 22.15% 
979 Mookgopong 0.91% 18.89% 17.96% 
980 Modimolle -0.51% 29.93% 40.42% 
981 Bela-Bela 2.74% 11.56% 20.82% 
982 Mogalakwena 3.50% 12.90% 9.36% 
983 Ephraim Mogale 1.84% -3.57% -2.56% 
984 Elias Motsoaledi 1.28% 16.80% 17.59% 
985 Makhuduthamaga 2.87% 7.29% 15.74% 
986 Fetakgomo 2.59% -3.22% -6.94% 









































Appendix for Chapter 3 
 
Table 3.1A: Significance test of differences between employment of men and women 
Variables t-statistic p-value 
Total employment 222.52 0.0000 
Black -219.70 0.0000 
White -205.14 0.0000 
Manufacturing employment -314.42 0.0000 
Black -236.87 0.0000 
White -100.42 0.0000 
Skill share 2.44 0.0151 
Brawn share  -87.01 0.0000 
Notes: Employment rates are normalised by the respective working-age population (ages 15-64). Manufacturing share is manufacturing 
employment as a share of total employment. Skill share is calculated as the number of skilled workers divided by the sum of skilled and 
unskilled workers in all the manufacturing industries. Production share represents workers who are employed as craft and trade workers as a 
share of the sum of workers employed in all occupations (production/non-production occupations) in manufacturing industries excluding food 
& beverage, textile, clothing & footwear and electronics. 
Source: Full census and the 10% weighted sample census data 
 
Table 3.2A: First-stage IV results 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Change in Tariff 
    
L.Tariff -0.406*** 
 (0.018) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.000 
 (0.002) 




L.Skill rate -0.019*** 
 (0.005) 











Period FE Yes 
Durbin Test 
Chi(2) 27.089*** 
Wu-Hausman Test  
F-statistics 35.565*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: Lagged alternative tariff protection measure represents employment-weighted tariffs in the initial period (1996 and 2001 respectively). 
Migration rate represents the number of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-




rate is the number of unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with access to 
electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, a flush toilet, and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. 
Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing employment as a share of total employment, excluding employment in the primary sector.  
  
Table 3.3A: First-stage alternative IV results  
  (1) 
VARIABLES Change in tariffs 
    
ΔTariff_alternative 0.764*** 
 (0.126) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.006 
 (0.005) 




L.Skill rate -0.014 
 (0.011) 











Period FE Yes 
Durbin Test 
Chi(2) 21.151*** 
Wu-Hausman Test  
F-statistics 25.225*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: Alternative tariffs represents employment-weighted tariffs for low and middle-income countries in the initial period (1996 and 2001 
respectively). Migration rate represents the number of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. 
Union-intensity is the share of trade union members. Skill rate denotes skilled workers as a share of the working-age population, and 
unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with 
access to electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, a flush toilet, and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. 














Table 3.4A: Tariff liberalisation effects on wages using alternative IV measure 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent variables: Change in log wages 
VARIABLES Aggregate Female Male 
        
ΔTariff_alternative 4.392 6.759 0.709 
 (7.077) (8.836) (9.461) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.090 0.042 0.379 
 (0.282) (0.350) (0.310) 
ΔMigration rate 0.454 0.455 0.162 
 (0.345) (0.457) (0.348) 
ΔUnion-intensity 1.403* 1.906** 1.529** 
 (0.751) (0.925) (0.730) 
L.Skill rate 0.237 0.779 -0.159 
 (0.588) (0.743) (0.640) 
L.Unemployed rate -0.971 -0.960 -1.004 
 (0.876) (0.985) (1.039) 
L.Infrastructure -0.002 -0.006 0.018 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.021) 
L.Manufacturing share 0.389 0.266 0.404 
 (0.452) (0.605) (0.585) 
Constant 0.557* 0.802* 0.636** 
 (0.332) (0.476) (0.314) 
    
Observations 467 464 466 
R-squared 0.028 0.067 0.030 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: Alternative tariffs represents employment-weighted tariffs for low and middle-income countries in the initial period (1996 and 2001). 
Migration rate represents the number of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-
intensity is the share of trade union members. Skill rate denotes skilled workers as a share of the working-age population, and unemployed 
rate is the number of unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with access to 
electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, a flush toilet, and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. 





















Table 3.5A: Gendered effects of tariff liberalisation controlling for an initial share in the 
textile, clothing and footwear industry  
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Female employment Male employment Gender employment gap 
        
ΔTariff 8.365*** 3.878* -4.571** 
 (2.808) (1.986) (2.003) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.744*** 0.923*** 0.199 
 (0.190) (0.141) (0.157) 
ΔMigration rate -0.266 0.561*** 0.847*** 
 (0.306) (0.212) (0.270) 
ΔUnion-intensity 0.628 0.272 -0.357 
 (0.614) (0.405) (0.555) 
L.Skill rate 0.752 0.545 -0.183 
 (0.514) (0.349) (0.408) 
L.Unemployed rate -1.398** -1.070*** 0.413 
 (0.544) (0.407) (0.500) 
L.Infrastructure -0.009 -0.006 0.002 
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.015) 
L.Manufacturing share -2.081*** -2.591*** -0.501 
 (0.529) (0.437) (0.383) 
L.Textiles_share 0.823 0.625 -0.216 
 (0.652) (0.503) (0.553) 
Constant 1.060*** 0.405* -0.699** 
 (0.311) (0.217) (0.282) 
    
Observations 465 466 464 
R-squared 0.180 0.310 0.038 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, change in tariffs 
comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. Dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) denotes the 
change in log manufacturing employment. The dependent variable for column (3) is the change in log male manufacturing employment 
denoted by female manufacturing employment. Migration rate represents the number of individuals who migrated since the last census as a 
share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of trade union members. Skill rate denotes skilled workers as a share of the 
working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. 
Infrastructure represents households with access to electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, a flush toilet, and piped water, as a 
share of the total number of households. Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing employment as a share of total employment, excluding 



















Table 3.6A: Tariff Liberalisation and Gendered Effects in manufacturing with alternative controls 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Dependent variables: Change in log manufacturing employment 
VARIABLES Female  Male   Black Female  Black Male   White Female White Male 
                
ΔTariff 48.796*** 6.651***  44.654*** 7.706***  31.691* 13.164* 
 (13.924) (2.245) 
 (15.276) (1.816)  (16.935) (6.717) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.022 -0.105***  0.031 -0.116***  -0.156 -0.255** 
 (0.089) (0.039) 
 (0.102) (0.029)  (0.202) (0.106) 
ΔMigration rate 0.252 -0.385**  0.550 -0.190  0.068 -0.125 
 (0.328) (0.158) 
 (0.362) (0.162)  (0.660) (0.391) 
ΔUnion-intensity 1.127 0.263  0.651 0.622**  1.106 -1.205* 
 (1.049) (0.293) 
 (1.456) (0.269)  (0.736) (0.629) 
L.Skill rate 1.398 1.080**  0.689 0.628  1.568 -0.699 
 (0.967) (0.419) 
 (1.291) (0.490)  (2.144) (0.883) 
L.Unemployed rate -2.182 0.058  -1.875 0.833***  7.069 0.697** 
 (1.450) (0.433) 
 (1.592) (0.267)  (15.938) (0.287) 
L.Infrastructure -0.009 0.003  -0.005 0.006  0.010 -0.045** 
 (0.017) (0.010) 
 (0.018) (0.010)  (0.021) (0.023) 
L.Manufacturing share -2.963*** -1.939***  -2.903*** -1.971***  -10.207*** -4.928*** 
 (0.859) (0.336) 
 (0.825) (0.308)  (3.680) (1.239) 
Constant 1.510*** 0.561***  1.514*** 0.601***  0.744 1.848** 
 (0.333) (0.111) 
 (0.350) (0.102)  (1.659) (0.751) 





Observations 231 466  229 466  162 416 
R-squared 0.208 0.245  0.179 0.259  0.160 0.231 
Period FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy and the control variables are differentiated by sub-group. Migration rate represents the number of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of 
the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of trade union members. Skill rate denotes skilled workers as a share of the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals 
as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with access to electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, a flush toilet, and piped water, as a share of the total number of 




Appendix for Chapter 4 
 
Table 4.1A: Effects of tariff liberalisation on derived demand, income and investment 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Derived demand Income Electricity 
        
ΔTariff 0.151 1.565** 2.068* 
 (2.285) (0.711) (1.175) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.595*** 0.125* 1.034*** 
 (0.229) (0.068) (0.087) 
ΔMigration rate -0.591* -0.021 0.213 
 (0.312) (0.079) (0.140) 
L.Skill rate 1.177*** -0.893*** -2.556*** 
 (0.392) (0.149) (0.267) 
L.Unemployed rate -0.036 0.863*** 2.291*** 
 (0.578) (0.169) (0.301) 
ΔInfrastructure -0.017** 0.009*** -0.008** 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) 
ΔManufacturing share 5.150*** -0.109 0.004 
 (0.669) (0.221) (0.316) 
Constant 0.343 0.978*** 0.185 
 (0.307) (0.083) (0.113) 
    
Observations 467 468 468 
R-squared 0.189 0.560 0.374 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, change in tariffs 
comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. The dependent variables are the change in log derived 
demand, income and investment, respectively. Derived demand is the share of services in cost weighted by employment shares. Income is 
calculated using the midpoint of the income bracket. Income reflects income per capita. Electricity reflects the number of households with 
electricity as a share of total households. Migration rate represents the number of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of 
the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of trade union members. Skill rate denotes skilled workers as a share of the working-
age population, and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure 
represents households with access to electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, a flush toilet, and piped water, as a share of the 
total number of households. Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing employment as a share of total employment, excluding employment 








Table 4.2A: Tariff liberalisation and structural change (weighted) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 Dependent variables: Change in log services/manufacturing employment 
 Aggregate  Black  White 
VARIABLES Aggregate Female Male  Aggregate Female Male  Aggregate Female Male 
                      
ΔTariff -2.541** -9.247*** 1.155  -4.406** -12.390*** 0.086  3.541 10.108* 15.491** 
 (1.266) (1.844) (1.211)  (2.166) (3.297) (2.019)  (4.811) (5.395) (7.259) 
ΔWorking-age population -0.013 0.226 -0.141  0.117 0.410 -0.052  0.184 -0.430 0.454 
 (0.165) (0.240) (0.158)  (0.209) (0.322) (0.184)  (0.529) (0.838) (0.856) 
ΔMigration rate -0.527*** -0.166 -0.734***  -0.548*** -0.271 -0.736***  -2.048*** -4.730*** -4.611*** 
 (0.133) (0.194) (0.128)  (0.190) (0.274) (0.198)  (0.766) (1.197) (1.288) 
L.Skill rate -0.664*** -0.506 -0.801***  -0.651** -0.480 -0.761**  -0.993 -1.839 -3.341* 
 (0.234) (0.341) (0.224)  (0.317) (0.381) (0.329)  (0.953) (1.620) (1.771) 
L.Unemployed rate 0.875** 0.422 1.154***  0.470 -0.033 0.826  1.952* -1.745 -1.522 
 (0.385) (0.561) (0.369)  (0.525) (0.814) (0.534)  (1.181) (2.472) (2.322) 
L.Infrastructure -0.004 -0.019 0.013  0.004 -0.010 0.018  0.019 0.187** 0.256*** 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.011)  (0.015) (0.019) (0.017)  (0.022) (0.092) (0.091) 
L.Manufacturing share 2.169*** 1.226*** 2.528***  2.134*** 1.081** 2.484***  3.670*** 1.914 4.100** 
 (0.254) (0.369) (0.243)  (0.367) (0.476) (0.386)  (0.960) (1.422) (1.730) 
Constant 0.296* 0.080 -0.188*  0.335 0.184 -0.164  -0.207 5.153*** 2.044** 
 (0.155) (0.226) (0.114)  (0.215) (0.322) (0.156)  (0.493) (0.907) (0.850) 
            
Observations 467 465 466  467 463 466  429 289 325 
R-squared 0.330 0.113 0.402  0.286 0.116 0.351  0.084 0.371 0.352 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, change in tariffs comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final 
period. Migration rate represents the number of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of trade union members. Skill rate denotes skilled 
workers as a share of the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with access to electricity 
(including solar), weekly refuse collection, a flush toilet, and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing employment as a share of total employment, excluding 




Table 4.3A: Tariff liberalisation and services employment (weighted) 
  (1) (2) 
 Dependent variables: Change in log services employment 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 
      
ΔTariff 0.896** 0.854* 
 (0.449) (0.442) 
ΔLog Derived demand  0.017 
  (0.012) 
ΔLog Income  0.123*** 
  (0.039) 
ΔLog Electricity  0.043** 
  (0.022) 
ΔWorking-age population 1.043*** 0.945*** 
 (0.058) (0.063) 
ΔMigration rate 0.152*** 0.156*** 
 (0.047) (0.047) 
L.Skill rate -0.626*** -0.483*** 
 (0.083) (0.096) 
L.Unemployed rate -0.208 -0.343** 
 (0.136) (0.140) 
L.Infrastructure 0.005 0.007 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
L.Manufacturing share 0.150* 0.284*** 
 (0.090) (0.095) 
Constant 0.495*** 0.346*** 
 (0.055) (0.065) 
   
Observations 468 467 
R-squared 0.813 0.821 
Period FE Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, change in tariffs 
comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. Migration rate represents the number of individuals who 
migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of trade union members. Skill rate denotes 
skilled workers as a share of the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals as a share of the 
working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with access to electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, a flush 
toilet, and piped water, as a share of the total number of households. Manufacturing share reflects manufacturing employment as a share of 












Table 4.4A: Tariff liberalisation and gendered employment in services (weighted) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 Aggregate  Black  White 
VARIABLES Female Male Gender gap  Female Male Gender gap  Female Male Gender gap 
                      
ΔTariff -0.262 1.842*** 2.103***  -0.441 2.221*** 2.662***  5.866*** 5.664* -0.944 
 (0.465) (0.548) (0.510)  (0.512) (0.583) (0.555)  (2.267) (3.367) (2.372) 
ΔWorking-age population 1.183*** 0.921*** -0.262***  1.132*** 0.858*** -0.274***  0.900*** 0.863* 0.035 
 (0.060) (0.071) (0.066)  (0.067) (0.076) (0.072)  (0.299) (0.441) (0.314) 
ΔMigration rate 0.245*** 0.084 -0.161***  0.148*** 0.054 -0.093  0.605** 0.900** 0.180 
 (0.049) (0.058) (0.054)  (0.054) (0.061) (0.058)  (0.244) (0.359) (0.257) 
L.Skill rate -0.602*** -0.631*** -0.030  -0.389*** -0.392*** -0.003  -0.118 -0.227 -0.092 
 (0.086) (0.101) (0.095)  (0.095) (0.108) (0.103)  (0.423) (0.627) (0.444) 
L.Unemployed rate -0.138 -0.264 -0.127  -0.272* -0.305* -0.034  -0.624 -0.745 0.030 
 (0.141) (0.167) (0.155)  (0.156) (0.177) (0.169)  (0.693) (1.029) (0.727) 
L.Infrastructure -0.001 0.011** 0.012**  0.001 0.012** 0.011**  -0.008 -0.009 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.021) (0.031) (0.022) 
L.Manufacturing share 0.050 0.224** 0.174*  0.083 0.240** 0.157  -0.075 -0.080 0.040 
 (0.093) (0.110) (0.102)  (0.103) (0.117) (0.111)  (0.458) (0.678) (0.480) 
Constant 0.363*** 0.594*** 0.232***  0.447*** 0.618*** 0.171**  0.293 0.074 -0.080 
 (0.057) (0.067) (0.063)  (0.063) (0.071) (0.068)  (0.213) (0.414) (0.292) 
            
Observations 468 468 468  468 468 468  457 459 453 
R-squared 0.784 0.763 0.121  0.769 0.753 0.099  0.115 0.088 0.009 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Tariff variable is the employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, change in tariffs comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final 
period. Dependent variable in columns (1), (2), (4), (5), (7) and (8) denote the change in log services employment while in columns (3), (6) and (9)  is change in log services employment gap (male employment/female 
employment). The services gender gap is male services employment divided by female services employment. Migration rate represents the number of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the 
working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of trade union members. Skill rate denotes skilled workers as a share of the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals 
as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with access to electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, a flush toilet, and piped water, as a share of the total number of 






Table 4.5A: Tariff Liberalisation Effects on Services Employment Rates 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
 Dependent variables: Change in log services employment rates 
VARIABLES Aggregate Female  Male   Black Female  Black Male  White Female White Male 
                  
ΔTariff 1.260** 0.520 1.831**  0.408 0.835  6.674* 4.908 
 (0.623) (0.629) (0.740) 
 (0.680) (0.719)  (3.632) (4.587) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.056 0.171** -0.057  0.176** 0.004  0.070 0.063 
 (0.061) (0.069) (0.077) 
 (0.079) (0.079)  (0.131) (0.173) 
ΔMigration rate 0.150*** 0.199*** 0.101*  0.239*** 0.203***  -0.241 -0.047 
 (0.046) (0.064) (0.057) 
 (0.079) (0.076)  (0.155) (0.147) 
L.Skill rate -1.008*** -1.206*** -0.787***  -1.251*** -0.927***  0.316 0.045 
 (0.130) (0.144) (0.141) 
 (0.153) (0.149)  (0.640) (0.896) 
L.Unemployed rate -0.326** -0.014 -0.618***  -0.008 -0.234  -0.125 -0.704 
 (0.164) (0.175) (0.195) 
 (0.192) (0.196)  (0.430) (0.621) 
L.Infrastructure 0.001 -0.007 0.010*  -0.005 -0.002  0.001 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.013) 
L.Manufacturing share 0.230* 0.276** 0.187  0.335** 0.394***  -0.112 -0.372 
 (0.123) (0.138) (0.130) 
 (0.147) (0.147)  (0.658) (0.821) 
Constant 0.685*** 0.589*** 0.758***  0.603*** 0.579***  0.383*** 0.653** 
 (0.046) (0.051) (0.056) 
 (0.057) (0.058)  (0.134) (0.296) 





Observations 468 468 468  468 468  457 459 
R-squared 0.693 0.593 0.649  0.584 0.516  0.065 0.057 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Services employment rates are constructed as services employment denoted by the respective working-age population (individuals aged between 15 and 65 
years). Tariff variable is the employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, change in tariffs comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. Migration rate represents the number of 
individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of trade union members. Skill rate denotes skilled workers as a share of the working-age population, 
and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with access to electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, a flush 





Table 4.6A: Tariff Liberalisation Effects on Manufacturing Employment Rates 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) 
 Dependent variables: Change in log manufacturing employment rates 
VARIABLES Aggregate Female  Male   Black Female Black Male  White Female White Male 
                  
ΔTariff 4.667** 7.122*** 3.018*  7.711*** 8.157***  3.524 2.961 
 (1.959) (2.506) (1.821) 
 (2.728) (2.759)  (5.739) (7.381) 
ΔWorking-age population -0.181 -0.189 -0.329**  -0.183 -0.360*  -0.290 -0.604** 
 (0.142) (0.185) (0.137) 
 (0.207) (0.207)  (0.423) (0.299) 
ΔMigration rate -0.156 -0.199 -0.625***  -0.236 -0.269  -0.517 -0.835* 
 (0.283) (0.153) (0.186) 
 (0.210) (0.227)  (0.345) (0.495) 
ΔUnion-intensity 0.348 0.488 0.518  0.618 0.698  3.689** 0.973 
 (0.416) (0.595) (0.409) 
 (0.669) (0.674)  (1.544) (1.146) 
L.Skill rate 0.433 0.671 0.618*  0.561 0.887*  1.802 2.388* 
 (0.371) (0.485) (0.350) 
 (0.528) (0.529)  (1.413) (1.372) 
L.Unemployed rate -1.010*** -1.185** -1.188***  -1.112* -1.360**  -1.299 -2.392* 
 (0.384) (0.532) (0.403) 
 (0.637) (0.638)  (1.288) (1.338) 
L.Infrastructure -0.008 -0.006 -0.012  -0.012 -0.009  0.039 -0.030 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) 
 (0.019) (0.018)  (0.025) (0.023) 
L.Manufacturing share -2.390*** -1.960*** -2.438***  -1.970*** -1.895***  -1.615 -3.692*** 
 (0.411) (0.486) (0.396) 
 (0.510) (0.512)  (1.176) (1.164) 
Constant 0.811*** 0.833*** 0.810***  0.858*** 0.840***  -0.006 1.066*** 
 (0.114) (0.161) (0.115) 
 (0.189) (0.189)  (0.422) (0.389) 





Observations 467 465 466  463 463  387 416 
R-squared 0.268 0.165 0.291  0.142 0.135  0.107 0.083 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Manufacturing employment rates are constructed as services employment denoted by the respective working-age population (individuals aged between 15 
and 65 years).Tariff variable is the employment weighted tariff rates. ΔTariff, change in tariffs comprises the difference in tariffs in the initial period and tariffs in the final period. Migration rate represents the number 
of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of trade union members. Skill rate denotes skilled workers as a share of the working-age population, 




Table 4.7A: Tariff Liberalisation and Gendered Effects in services with alternative controls 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Dependent variables: Change in log services employment 
VARIABLES Female Male   Black Female  Black Male  White Female White Male 
                
ΔTariff 8.451* 2.332**  5.876 5.132***  13.454 8.024 
 (4.805) (1.009) 
 (4.498) (0.987)  (8.386) (5.612) 
ΔWorking-age population 0.050** 0.030  0.023 -0.070***  0.032 -0.016 
 (0.024) (0.022) 
 (0.025) (0.011)  (0.040) (0.097) 
ΔMigration rate 0.073 -0.023  0.104* 0.013  -0.033*** -0.023 
 (0.065) (0.089) 
 (0.055) (0.077)  (0.009) (0.020) 
ΔUnion-intensity -0.496 -0.226  -0.232 -0.202  -0.463* -0.457 
 (0.305) (0.152) 
 (0.384) (0.148)  (0.265) (0.376) 
L.Skill rate -0.524** -0.564***  0.712* -0.419  -0.490 -0.943 
 (0.218) (0.215) 
 (0.422) (0.270)  (0.394) (1.495) 
L.Unemployed rate -0.607** -0.703***  -0.985*** -0.233  2.227 3.466 
 (0.273) (0.260) 
 (0.287) (0.190)  (1.570) (2.155) 
L.Infrastructure -0.002 0.014**  0.002 0.024***  -0.014 -0.007 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.009) (0.014) 
L.Manufacturing share 0.796*** 0.592***  0.606** 0.743***  1.398 1.339** 
 (0.267) (0.154) 
 (0.248) (0.192)  (0.900) (0.628) 
Constant 0.957*** 0.862***  0.788*** 0.581***  0.761** 0.778 
 (0.132) (0.083) 
 (0.126) (0.057)  (0.348) (1.144) 





Observations 234 468  234 468  223 459 
R-squared 0.079 0.566  0.110 0.484  0.132 0.183 
Period FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy and the control variables are differentiated by sub-group. Migration rate represents the number of individuals who migrated since the last census as a share of 
the working-age population. Union-intensity is the share of trade union members. Skill rate denotes skilled workers as a share of the working-age population, and unemployed rate is the number of unemployed individuals 
as a share of the working-age population. Infrastructure represents households with access to electricity (including solar), weekly refuse collection, a flush toilet, and piped water, as a share of the total number of 




Appendix for Chapter 5 
 
Table 5.1A: Apartheid laws that restricted the migration of Black people 
Name of laws Description 
1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act  Empowered urban local authorities to set aside land 
for Blacks in separate areas. 
1937 Native Law Amendment Act  Allowed Blacks a maximum of only 14 days to find 
work in an urban area (reduced to three days in 
1945). 
1945 Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act Made it very difficult for Blacks to claim permanent 
residence in an urban area. 
1952 Native Laws Amendment Act Laid the basis for the entire state intervention to 
control the distribution of black labour. 
1950 Population Registration Act (repealed 1991) Required all citizens to be registered as Black, 
White, Coloured or Indian. 
1950 Group Areas Act (repealed 1991) Partitioned the country into different areas, allocated 
to different racial groups. This law represented the 
very heart of Apartheid because it was the basis upon 
which political and social separation was to be 
constructed. 
1951 Bantu Authorities Act  Created separate government structures for the Black 
population. 
1952 Native Services Levy Act  Imposes monthly taxes on employers of urban 
Blacks. 
1952 Pass Laws Act (1952–1986) Made it compulsory for all Black South Africans 
over the age 16 to carry a passbook. 
1952, 1955, 1957 Amendments to the Native 
Consolidation Act  
Restrictions on Blacks in urban areas who could only 
remain without a pass under special 
Conditions. 
1953 Bantu Urban Areas Act  Curtailed Black migration to the cities. 
1956 Native Administration Amendment Act  Permitted government to send Africans into exile in 
remote parts of the country. 
1959 Promotion of Black Self-Government Act 
(repealed 1993) 
Set up separate territorial governments in the 
“homelands”, designated lands for African people 
where they could have a vote. The aim was that these 
Bantustans would eventually become independent of 
South Africa. 
1959 Bantu Investment Corporation Act  Set up a mechanism to transfer capital to the 
homelands to create jobs in the African 
Homelands. 
1959 Physical Planning and Utilisation of 
Resources Act 
Allowed the government to stop industrial 
development in “white” cities and redirect such 
development to homeland border areas. The aim was 
to speed up the relocation of Africans to the 
homelands by relocating jobs to homeland areas. 
1970 Bantu Laws Amendment Act Introduced job reservation, which made possible the 
prohibition of the employment of Blacks in any job, 




Name of laws Description 
1970 Black Homeland Citizenship Act Changed the status of the inhabitants of the 
“homeland” so that they were no longer citizens of 
South Africa. The aim was to ensure whites became 
the demographic majority in South Africa. 
 
Table 5.2A: Summary statistics for demeaned bilateral migration for a common set of 
municipality-pairs  
Year Sum Mean P50 P1 P10 P90 N 
1996 54 522 1 0 0 0 0.003 54522 
1997 54 522 1 0 0 0 0.193 54522 
1998 54 522 1 0 0 0 1.353 54522 
1999 54 522 1 0 0 0 1.512 54522 
2000 54 522 1 0 0 0 1.318 54522 
2001 54 522 1 0 0 0 1.318 54522 
2002 54 522 1 0 0 0 0.000 54522 
2003 54 522 1 0 0 0 0.000 54522 
2004 54 522 1 0 0 0 0.000 54522 
2005 54 522 1 0 0 0 0.000 54522 
2006 54 522 1 0 0 0 0.000 54522 
2007 54 522 1 0 0 0 0.000 54522 
2008 54 522 1 0 0 0 0.000 54522 
2009 54 522 1 0 0 0 0.000 54522 
2010 54 522 1 0 0 0 1.336 54522 
2011 54 522 1 0 0 0 1.043 54522 
Total 872 352 1 0 0 0 0.042 872 352 
























Table 5.3A: Tariff liberalisation effects on gendered internal migration 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Dependent variables: Log demeaned bilateral migration 
 Aggregate  Black  White 
VARIABLES Female Male  Female Male  Female Male 
                
ΔlnTariff_orig -28.640*** -4.600  -80.871*** -44.384***  -41.102** -33.528* 
 (7.629) (8.203) 
 (14.703) (13.726)  (17.219) (17.512) 
ΔlnTariff_des -3.644 26.978**  -1.273 9.796  -22.825 -29.951 
 (12.588) (13.673) 
 (15.342) (14.577)  (18.622) (18.360) 
lnDistance -0.794*** -0.678***  -1.671*** -1.521***  -0.618*** -0.601*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) 
 (0.058) (0.057)  (0.068) (0.067) 
lnPop_density_orig 0.601*** 0.438***  1.481*** 1.254***  0.571*** 0.534*** 
 (0.037) (0.038) 
 (0.090) (0.085)  (0.113) (0.114) 
lnPop_density_des 0.519*** 0.298***  1.129*** 0.699***  0.426*** 0.523*** 
 (0.041) (0.042) 
 (0.088) (0.083)  (0.110) (0.107) 
lnEcoact_orig -0.360*** -0.073  -1.157*** -0.781***  -0.164 -0.063 
 (0.049) (0.051) 
 (0.113) (0.105)  (0.140) (0.141) 
lnEcoact_des -0.099 0.127*  -0.121 0.109  0.005 -0.141 
 (0.067) (0.070) 
 (0.115) (0.108)  (0.146) (0.142) 
lnInfrast_orig 0.148*** 0.162***  0.080* 0.058  1.120*** 1.099*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) 
 (0.049) (0.046)  (0.070) (0.071) 
lnInfrast_des 0.277*** 0.270***  0.055 0.091**  1.177*** 1.127*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
 (0.048) (0.044)  (0.063) (0.063) 
lnManuf_orig -0.246*** -0.403***  -0.952*** -0.966***  -0.449*** -0.382** 
 (0.045) (0.046) 
 (0.148) (0.136)  (0.171) (0.174) 
lnManuf_des -0.075* -0.042  -0.435*** -0.189*  0.682*** 0.776*** 
 (0.042) (0.044) 
 (0.118) (0.110)  (0.151) (0.151) 
lnPension_orig 0.019 0.022  0.140*** 0.087**  0.118*** 0.066 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
 (0.039) (0.035)  (0.043) (0.042) 
lnPension_des 0.044** 0.021  0.050 0.080**  0.213*** 0.231*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
 (0.038) (0.035)  (0.041) (0.042) 
lnKinship_orig -0.077*** -0.043***  -0.218*** -0.142***  -0.049* -0.054* 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
 (0.024) (0.024)  (0.029) (0.029) 
lnKinship_des -0.072*** -0.049***  -0.117*** -0.074***  -0.154*** -0.162*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
 (0.028) (0.027)  (0.033) (0.033) 





Observations 43,333 43,333  13,641 13,641  13,641 13,641 
R-squared 0.051 0.030  0.004 0.079  0.140 0.142 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy Variables with orig and des suffixes are variable at the origin municipality and 




Table 5.4A: Effects of tariff liberalisation on gendered internal migration by marital 
status 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Dependent variables: Log demeaned bilateral migration 
VARIABLES Married Female Married Male  Single Female Single Male 
           
ΔlnTariff_orig -26.126*** -13.143  -70.641*** -49.997*** 
 (9.708) (9.929) 
 (10.084) (9.314) 
ΔlnTariff_des -14.278 -23.974  -38.878*** -17.954 
 (14.067) (14.795) 
 (14.335) (13.461) 
lnDistance -1.156*** -0.935***  -1.411*** -1.200*** 
 (0.047) (0.046) 
 (0.048) (0.045) 
lnPop_density_orig 0.782*** 0.560***  1.160*** 1.059*** 
 (0.075) (0.075) 
 (0.076) (0.069) 
lnPop_density_des 0.776*** 0.632***  1.277*** 0.797*** 
 (0.071) (0.074) 
 (0.071) (0.066) 
lnEcoact_orig -0.190** 0.150  -0.952*** -0.695*** 
 (0.092) (0.093) 
 (0.093) (0.085) 
lnEcoact_des -0.075 -0.031  -0.463*** -0.077 
 (0.100) (0.105) 
 (0.100) (0.093) 
lnInfrast_orig 0.317*** 0.319***  0.228*** 0.224*** 
 (0.040) (0.042) 
 (0.039) (0.037) 
lnInfrast_des 0.428*** 0.443***  0.341*** 0.388*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) 
 (0.041) (0.038) 
lnManuf_orig -0.578*** -0.573***  -0.549*** -0.596*** 
 (0.097) (0.103) 
 (0.097) (0.092) 
lnManuf_des -0.126 -0.119  -0.052 0.044 
 (0.096) (0.101) 
 (0.095) (0.092) 
lnPension_orig 0.027 0.053*  0.113*** 0.114*** 
 (0.030) (0.031) 
 (0.031) (0.029) 
lnPension_des 0.172*** 0.170***  0.160*** 0.162*** 
 (0.031) (0.030) 
 (0.031) (0.030) 
lnKinship_orig -0.121*** -0.078***  -0.131*** -0.118*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) 
 (0.019) (0.018) 
lnKinship_des -0.205*** -0.229***  -0.166*** -0.113*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) 
 (0.023) (0.021) 
   
 
  
Observations 22,187 22,187  22,187 22,187 
R-squared 0.079 0.082  -0.009 0.051 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy Variables with orig and des suffixes are variable at the origin municipality and 




Table 5.5A: Tariff liberalisation effects on internal migration of women with and without 
children 
  (1) (2) 
 Dependent variables: Log demeaned bilateral migration 
VARIABLES With children Without children 
      
ΔlnTariff_orig -39.597*** -70.004*** 
 (7.689) (10.203) 
ΔlnTariff_des -6.172 -52.300*** 
 (12.000) (15.074) 
lnDistance -1.059*** -1.165*** 
 (0.034) (0.045) 
lnPop_density_orig 0.841*** 0.930*** 
 (0.055) (0.072) 
lnPop_density_des 0.671*** 1.142*** 
 (0.053) (0.069) 
lnEcoact_orig -0.536*** -0.727*** 
 (0.068) (0.088) 
lnEcoact_des -0.029 -0.421*** 
 (0.078) (0.099) 
lnInfrast_orig 0.185*** 0.273*** 
 (0.028) (0.035) 
lnInfrast_des 0.275*** 0.427*** 
 (0.030) (0.039) 
lnManuf_orig -0.429*** -0.405*** 
 (0.071) (0.090) 
lnManuf_des -0.201*** 0.110 
 (0.069) (0.088) 
lnPension_orig 0.055** 0.095*** 
 (0.022) (0.028) 
lnPension_des 0.093*** 0.166*** 
 (0.025) (0.031) 
lnKinship_orig -0.077*** -0.147*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) 
lnKinship_des -0.097*** -0.203*** 
 (0.016) (0.020) 
   
Observations 27,458 27,458 
R-squared 0.054 -0.048 
Year FE Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy Variables with orig and des suffixes are variable at the origin municipality and 




Table 5.6A: Tariff liberalisation effects on internal migration using alternative migration 
data (bilateral migration greater or equal to 5) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent variables: Log demeaned bilateral migration 
VARIABLES Aggregate Female Male 
        
ΔlnTariff_orig -10.076*** -28.352*** -1.806 
 (3.435) (7.449) (7.685) 
ΔlnTariff_des 7.640 -5.345 25.505** 
 (5.878) (12.195) (12.677) 
lnDistance -0.413*** -0.901*** -0.697*** 
 (0.013) (0.023) (0.023) 
lnPop_density_orig 0.286*** 0.663*** 0.465*** 
 (0.017) (0.038) (0.038) 
lnPop_density_des 0.249*** 0.540*** 0.286*** 
 (0.020) (0.042) (0.041) 
lnEcoact_orig -0.099*** -0.396*** -0.082* 
 (0.022) (0.050) (0.049) 
lnEcoact_des 0.024 -0.074 0.140** 
 (0.031) (0.067) (0.066) 
lnInfrast_orig 0.074*** 0.167*** 0.167*** 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.019) 
lnInfrast_des 0.159*** 0.285*** 0.269*** 
 (0.009) (0.022) (0.021) 
lnManuf_orig -0.197*** -0.259*** -0.401*** 
 (0.021) (0.047) (0.046) 
lnManuf_des -0.072*** -0.046 -0.020 
 (0.019) (0.044) (0.044) 
lnPension_orig 0.010 0.017 0.016 
 (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) 
lnPension_des 0.011 0.050*** 0.027 
 (0.007) (0.018) (0.017) 
lnKinship_orig -0.033*** -0.085*** -0.045*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) 
lnKinship_des -0.021*** -0.081*** -0.045*** 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) 
    
Observations 45,018 45,018 45,018 
R-squared 0.209 0.060 0.037 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy Variables with orig and des suffixes are variable at the origin municipality and 
destination municipality respectively. All control variables are in natural logarithm. Tariff variables are employment weighted tariff rates. 
ΔlnTariff, change in log tariffs comprises the difference in log tariffs in the initial period and log tariffs in the final period. lnPop_density 
denotes population density. lnEcoact represents economic activity, which is proxied by night-time lights. lnInfrast denotes infrastructure, 
which is the principal component of the log infrastructure variable and includes the share of households with electricity, regular refuse 
collection, flush toilets, and piped water. Manufacturing share, pension, and kinship are at the initial period in 1996.  lnManuf represents 
manufacturing share, which is the share of manufacturing in total employment (excluding employment in the primary sector). lnPension is the 










Table 5.7A: Tariff liberalisation effects on internal migration using alternative migration 
data (bilateral migration greater or equal to 50) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Dependent variables: Log demeaned bilateral migration 
VARIABLES Aggregate Female Male 
        
ΔlnTariff_orig -34.328** -36.247** -30.431 
 (15.926) (14.561) (20.352) 
ΔlnTariff_des 57.182 16.856 91.253* 
 (36.097) (32.592) (47.558) 
lnDistance -0.263*** -0.338*** -0.228*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.029) 
lnPop_density_orig 0.230*** 0.248*** 0.230*** 
 (0.043) (0.041) (0.053) 
lnPop_density_des 0.163** 0.313*** 0.048 
 (0.064) (0.057) (0.083) 
lnEcoact_orig -0.109 -0.123* -0.083 
 (0.069) (0.064) (0.087) 
lnEcoact_des 0.153 -0.036 0.341** 
 (0.130) (0.116) (0.170) 
lnInfrast_orig 0.068** 0.059** 0.085** 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.035) 
lnInfrast_des 0.073** 0.109*** 0.071 
 (0.034) (0.030) (0.045) 
lnManuf_orig -0.219*** -0.211*** -0.236*** 
 (0.048) (0.046) (0.059) 
lnManuf_des 0.020 -0.098 0.070 
 (0.077) (0.067) (0.106) 
lnPension_orig 0.027 0.030* 0.028 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) 
lnPension_des -0.069 -0.023 -0.112* 
 (0.048) (0.042) (0.065) 
lnKinship_orig -0.041*** -0.047*** -0.039*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) 
lnKinship_des 0.009 -0.021 0.022 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.023) 
    
Observations 17,947 17,947 17,947 
R-squared -2.379 -0.268 -3.231 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
IV Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 
Notes: All the estimations are based on the 2SLS IV strategy. Variables with orig and des suffixes are variable at the origin municipality and 
destination municipality respectively. All control variables are in natural logarithm. Tariff variables are employment weighted tariff rates. 
ΔlnTariff, change in log tariffs comprises the difference in log tariffs in the initial period and log tariffs in the final period. lnPop_density 
denotes population density. lnEcoact represents economic activity, which is proxied by night-time lights. lnInfrast denotes infrastructure, 
which is the principal component of the log infrastructure variable and includes the share of households with electricity, regular refuse 
collection, flush toilets, and piped water. Manufacturing share, pension, and kinship are at the initial period in 1996. lnManuf represents 
manufacturing share, which is the share of manufacturing in total employment (excluding employment in the primary sector). lnPension is the 
number of households with a pension recipient compared to household without a recipient. lnKinship is the share of mother tongue isiZulu 
speaking people. 
  
